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White guilt is a culturally and historically contingent emotion rooted in White 
people’s recognition of unearned privileges and collective and/or individual roles in the 
perpetuation of racism. Situated within the context of neoliberal multiculturalism, this 
interdisciplinary dissertation investigates contemporary manifestations of White guilt in 
popular discourse and the lived experiences of young White adults in the United States. 
As a form of identity-based affect, White guilt may aid in the development of antiracist 
White people; however, because White guilt retains a focus on the White subject, it may 
offer limited potential to transform social relationships and systems of inequity. Three 
interrelated studies compose the methodological work of this project and undertake the 
task of empirically grounding White guilt so that we may better understand its forms, 
limits and consequences. 
The first study interrogates journalists’ coverage of three moments of controversy 
in the early 21st century: Anderson Cooper’s “emotional” reporting during the aftermath 
  
of Hurricane Katrina, the Don Imus-Rutgers University basketball scandal and Isaiah 
Washington’s firing from Grey’s Anatomy after allegedly calling a co-star a “faggot.” 
Reporting on these episodes illustrates how multiculturalism manages and defers racial 
guilt and shame while simultaneously eliding the intersections of identity that structure 
experience. The second study is the creation and initial validation of a survey-based 
measure of White guilt (the Test of White Guilt and Shame or “TOWGAS”), which 
attempts to reconcile several limitations of extant research on racial affect – namely, the 
persistent conflation of guilt and shame. The third study centralizes the intersectionality 
of White people’s experiences through in-depth interviews with 10 White college 
students. A modified grounded theory approach is used to explore how gender, sexuality 
and race together influence how these White people a) perceive Imus, Washington and 
Cooper and b) conceptualize their own Whiteness and the feelings associated with racism 
and inequality. Finally, the concept of “emergent racisms” is posited as a critical, 
working framework with which to investigate White racial affect. This theoretical 
approach emphasizes the complex interactions between identity, affect, attitudes and 
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"There's only one thing more powerful that White fear – and that's White guilt. 
Now they say 'good morning,' but what they really saying is ‘I'm not racist!'" 
-Heylia James, Weeds (Episode 13, Season 3; Original air date: November 
5, 2007) 
 
 I remember the first time I felt guilt. 
I was approximately five years old, and I was watching television in the basement 
of my house. I called upstairs to my mother to ask if I could have a miniature Reese’s 
peanut butter cup, which was sitting in a bowl on the coffee table. She called back down 
the stairs to say no, but that I could have one after dinner. A few minutes later, when she 
called me upstairs for dinner, she caught me. I reeked of peanut butter and chocolate (and 
probably had chocolate all over my mouth, though I like to think I was smarter than that). 
 “Paddy, did you eat a peanut butter cup?” 
 “No…” 
She immediately knew what I had done, and I knew that I was wrong on two counts: 
eating the chocolate, and lying to her. Though I do not claim to understand my own five-
year-old logic, I suspect that the lying was what made me feel guilty. My mother did not 
punish me, but that was irrelevant: I had lied, I felt guilty, and that was punishment 
enough. 
 Guilt – that emotional cocktail of remorse, frustration, anxiety and depression that 
infects and inflects when we do (or perceive that we have done) something wrong – is my 
object of study in this dissertation. Akin to other commonly referenced psychological 
constructs such as “identity” or “trauma,” the ontology of guilt is highly contingent upon 




concept embedded in the U.S. Constitution, a psychological emotion, an identity label or 
characteristic, a central component of certain religious traditions, a phenomenological 
experience, a behavioral motivator, a cultural milieu and a potential disorder, to name just 
a few different constructions of the term. Despite the varying uses and definitions of the 
term, there are some recurrent themes that link any discussion of guilt. Guilt is made 
possible by the concepts of responsibility and blame, which imply that someone or some 
group of people has done something wrong. As observed in legal discourse, one does not 
have to accept any responsibility or blame to be labeled guilty – to become guilty. 
Furthermore, one does not have to acknowledge personal responsibility or blame in order 
to behave in ways that might be identified as guilty. Moreover, one does not have to 
actually do anything wrong to feel guilty; mere association with a group of wrongdoers is 
enough to produce guilt (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears & Manstead, 1998). Alternatively, 
people have been found to express feelings of guilt when they survive disasters, war or 
trauma in which others have suffered more or lost their lives (Leys, 2007). A moderate 
amount of guilt can be a strong motivator of positive social behavior, but abundant guilt 
can be emotionally paralyzing and devolve into shame, with its associated forms of 
depression, anger and self-loathing (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  
 A quintessential example of “material-semiotics” (Haraway, 1997), guilt is real 
but exceedingly difficult to establish, prove or touch; it is an intrapsychic, affective 
experience with psychological consequences, and it simultaneously operates on a 
symbolic and cultural level beyond individual psychologies.1 Guilt is as surprising and 
                                                
1 I do not intend here to create a binary between “culture” and “individual.” I use the 
phrase cultural level in this instance to question how White guilt operates in popular 




unsettling to researchers as it is to all human beings who have felt the pangs of guilt at 
some (usually many) points in their lives. Guilt is “subjective” in both the popular and 
philosophical sense of the word: it is loaded with individual “bias” and “opinion,” and it 
exists only insomuch as the self is conceptualized as a reflexive agent and social actor 
that has meaningful relationships with other people and things (Mead, 1934/2004). It is 
unpredictable but simultaneously associated with certain well-established behaviors and 
feelings. Psychologists typically posit guilt as a self-conscious and moral emotion, and 
many scholars have devoted their careers to developing more effective and accurate 
means of measuring or assessing guilt (see the battery of tests included in Tracy, Robins 
& Tangney, 2007). It is often conflated with moral attitudes (e.g., “I believe that cheating 
on your spouse is wrong.”), and getting people to admit to guilty feelings can be 
extremely challenging due to social and cultural pressures, as well as individual 
differences. As psychologists Tangney and Dearing (2002) describe, guilt is difficult to 
assess because it is an exclusively “internal” phenomenon that is not amenable to direct 
observation, and because “people do not typically have a clear sense of the distinction 
between shame and guilt, which poses problems for introspective accounts” (p. 3). 
Finally, other emotional responses, such as shame, detachment, anger, depression and 
externalization of blame, may indicate one’s guilty feelings or propensity for guilt even if 
there is no tangible evidence of guilt itself. In other words, guilt is powerful even in its 
apparent absence, and it may make us do things we fail to understand.  
                                                                                                                                            
that many groups of actors are involved in the social practices of White guilt, and that 





 This dissertation is an examination of a particular kind of guilt that is rooted 
culturally and historically in the United States, and is made possible by White people’s 
responsibility for historical and contemporary forms of racial genocide, oppression and 
social inequality. “White guilt” constitutes a complex terrain of psychological experience 
at the intersection of identity, attitudes, affect and culture. Pervasively deployed, rarely 
defined and always elusive, White guilt refers generally to White people’s negative 
feelings about unfair racial privilege and inequality. White guilt matters because guilt 
influences relationships with others (Tangney & Dearing, 2002); accordingly, White 
people’s feelings about their own race and Others’ affect relationships between racialized 
social actors and groups that are always negotiated within and by unequal relations of 
power. White guilt is not equivalent to a racial attitude, such as a prejudice or racism, but 
it is closely connected to attitudinal beliefs about race and may indeed partially shape or 
motivate anti-racist, as well as racist, attitudes (Swim & Miller, 1999; Iyer, Leach & 
Crosby, 2003). In dealing with White guilt as an object of study, scholarship from across 
the humanities and social sciences has arbitrarily compartmentalized the relevant issues 
such that: cultural context is treated as either everything or nothing; guilt and shame are 
conflated emotions; and race exists outside of other dimensions of difference, such as 
gender and sexuality. This project serves as a corrective to such reductionism and as a 
critical intervention into contemporary American racial discourse by embracing the 
complexity of White guilt as a historically specific phenomenon that moves through and 
between identity-based groups, individuals and cultural production.  
 White guilt is found at the intersection of two discourses that are characterized by 




private experiences; and second, the discourse of Whiteness, the unmarked side of a 
racial binary that draws its strength from its ability to camouflage itself in discourse. Of 
course, the pain of guilt is palpable; guilt would be meaningless if it did not actually feel 
uncomfortable. Likewise, Whiteness would cease to exist as a meaningful social category 
if it did not possess visible, detectable characteristics that influence the movement of 
various forms of capital and bodies. But asserting that White guilt is discursively silent is 
not the same as saying that White guilt is inconsequential. To the contrary, silence is 
power. Notably, Foucault (1978) asserted: 
Silence itself – the things one declines to say, or is forbidden to name, the 
discretion that is required between different speakers – is less the absolute limit of 
discourse, the other side from which it is separated by a strict boundary, than an 
element that functions alongside the things said, with them and in relation to them 
within over-all strategies….There is not one but many silences, and they are an 
integral part of the strategies that underlie and permeate discourses. (p. 27) 
White guilt may be an important motivator of anti-racist or compensatory behavior, as 
some psychologists have proposed (e.g. Swim & Miller, 1999; Spanierman & Heppner, 
2004), and it may also be a powerful inhibitor of honest and explicit conversations about 
racial inequality (Tatum, 1994). It may – and likely does – go by many names and take 
many forms, some spoken and some hidden.  
 White guilt is even more amorphous and complex than other generic forms of 
guilt because it is constituted by Whiteness, an extremely powerful but necessarily 
“invisible” racial formation (Omi & Winant, 1994; Bonilla-Silva & Embrick, 2007). 




the African American Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, Whiteness commands 
immense, disproportionate material and symbolic power in the United States and 
globally. Today, as at other times in history, the source of this power is made possible 
and maintained because Whiteness continues to go largely unmarked and unarticulated in 
contemporary U.S. discourse (Lipsitz, 2006). In the social and historical context of what 
many scholars from across the disciplines now call “neoliberalism” (see Duggan, 2003; 
Melamed, 2006), Whiteness is particularly adept at invisibility. White people in the 
United States enjoy disproportionate and unfair access to material wealth, privilege, 
safety and comfort even as hegemonic movements, such as neoliberalism, and political 
ideologies, such as neoconservatism, have asserted that so-called assaults on American 
meritocracy – particularly “political correctness,” civil rights legislation and affirmative 
action – have made White people the targets of systemic discrimination (Lipsitz, 2006; 
Duggan, 2003; also, Roediger, 1998). These conservative movements have been 
successful at least in part because though White people have been forced to recognize 
their individual racial identities in the post-Civil Rights era (i.e., “I am White.”), the 
dominant culture of the U.S. has not reconciled what Whiteness means as a historical, 
structural, racial phenomenon that constitutes racial inequality (i.e., “We are White, and 
that matters….”). And though anti-racist academic discourse and many cultural arenas 
within the United States – especially those occupied primarily by racial and ethnic 
minorities – have extensive, well-established discourses that denaturalize and deconstruct 
Whiteness and racism, such a sophisticated and critical understanding of “White” remains 
largely absent from mainstream, popular American discourse. Evidence presented in this 




everyday lives of many young adult White people, as well. In this historical moment 
during the first decade of the 21st century, the extent to which White people experience 
self-directed racial guilt is unclear. Before questions about White guilt’s effects can be 
explored, an empirically grounded understanding of the construct is needed.  
 Invisibility, unmarkedness and deferred articulation are endemic to the situation 
at-hand. Accordingly, any project that aims to offer an adequate account of White guilt 
must possess an appropriately “tricky” theoretical, linguistic and rhetorical strategy. 
Consequently, my account of White guilt is articulated in rhetorics of specters, haunting 
and discursive silence – linguistic strategies that are inherited from neo-Marxist, feminist, 
anti-racist, postmodern and poststructural theorists. By figuring White guilt as a haunting, 
seething presence in the culturally grounded, social psychologies of diverse White 
peoples in the United States (Gordon, 1997), I have attempted to allow the complexity of 
White guilt to emerge – to become visible, legible – in extraordinary and unexpected 
spaces and places. This analytic work happens across the following five chapters and is 
based in three years of empirical research, including qualitative and quantitative human 
‘subjects’ investigations conducted at the University of Maryland with three samples of 
young college students and digital, archive-based analysis of contemporary print media 
coverage of recent controversies that invoked talk about race and responsibility. These 
data are situated within critical surveys of the academic study of guilt and shame in the 
social sciences (especially the areas of counseling and social psychology) and the 
humanities (especially history, literature and cultural studies). The knowledges that 
emerge from these interrelated studies are positioned throughout the dissertation as what 




social investigations that embrace the differences in human experience, as opposed to 
falsely inscribing similarity and cohesion upon an arena of inquiry (p. 273). Even more 
importantly, diffractions can, as sociologist Kelly Joyce (2008) asserted, “spark 
meaningful dialogues and interventions” (p. 19); in this sense, diffractions and diffracting 
are as much about the production of critical social knowledge and theory as the effects 
and consequences of such knowledges (Hall, 1997b).   
 Chapter 1, “Guilt, Reconsidered” is a critical survey of the major academic 
contributions to the study of White guilt from across the disciplines. This chapter lays the 
groundwork for the empirical studies herein by reviewing and critiquing the relevant 
literatures that have constituted White guilt as an object of academic inquiry. Through a 
protracted critique of conservative social critic Shelby Steele’s (2006) important White 
Guilt: How Whites and Blacks Together Destroyed the Promises of the Civil Rights Era, I 
argue that, while Steele’s argument is almost completely reductive, essentialist and 
regressive, his thinking is reflective of broader discourse about White guilt. In this 
chapter, I argue that we must unhinge the concept of “White guilt” from the rhetorics and 
logics of the African American Civil Rights movement of the 1960s – where our thinking 
about contemporary White guilt finds its origins – are resituate it within the context of 
neoliberal multiculturalism and colorblind and otherwise aversive forms of racism 
(Duggan, 2003; Omi & Winant, 1994; Bonilla-Silva, 2006; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). 
My proposal is to take an interactionist and intersectional approach to White guilt that: a) 
refigures White guilt as a culturally constituted process and practice (Denzin, 1992), as 
opposed to an amorphous cultural milieu (Steele, 1990, 2006; Ellison, 1996) or 




identity, particularly race, gender and sexuality, that frame all affective experiences and 
produce structures of inequity (Collins, 1990/2000; McCall, 2005; Cole, 2009). 
 Chapter 2, “Finding White Guilt: Popular Culture and Three Moments of Crisis” 
posits three recent social controversies as archives of cultural information about 
contemporary epistemologies of race and responsibility. Over 100 print journalism 
articles are analyzed for evidence of talk about ‘race’ and ‘responsibility’ – not 
necessarily White guilt – so that we can better understand the cultural context in which 
individual affective experiences of White guilt are manifested. By employing strategies 
of Foucauldian discourse analysis and what Adele Clarke (2005) terms “situational 
analysis,” I argue that White guilt – more specifically, the threat of White guilt – operates 
subtly and strategically in moments of hegemonic instability, and that this process is 
evidenced by journalistic explanations of fault, blame and responsibility vis a vis social 
group membership. Primarily descriptive, as opposed to theory-building (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008), the qualitative analysis in this chapter critically contextualizes the lived 
experiences that become the focus of the analytic work in chapters 3 and 4. By tracing the 
discursive talk about who is to blame when public figures behave badly – or when, in the 
case of Hurricane Katrina, hundreds of people die and are displaced – I argue that we can 
see some ways in which the hegemony of neoliberalism exerts its influence on the logic 
of race relations in the United States and their intersections with structures of sexism and 
heteronormativity. 
 Chapter 3, “The Differences Between and Within Guilt and Shame: Quantitative 
Perspectives,” centralizes three preoccupying questions of this research. First, what are 




experiences varied among White people and do sexual and gender identity correspond 
with these variations? Finally, how do we observe or best evaluate affective experiences 
of White guilt in ways that are repeatable, verifiable and systemic? Drawing upon moral 
emotions research on ‘generic’ guilt and shame that is exemplified by the work of 
psychologist June Price Tangney, I propose and offer initial data on the psychometric 
properties of a new Test of White Guilt and Shame (“TOWGAS”). Data collected from 
two samples of White undergraduate students at the University of Maryland are presented 
which suggest that White shame may be a distinct emotion from White guilt, with distinct 
behavioral and emotional antecedents and consequences (Iyer, Leach & Crosby, 2003). 
Whereas previous psychological measures of White guilt have failed to culturally ground 
the concept or adequately consider the challenges of assessing negative, self-conscious 
affect (Tangney & Dearing, 2002), my measure is designed to centralize culture (Gergen, 
1973; Marcus, Kitayama & Heiman, 1996), subvert the artificial boundaries between 
identity, attitudes and affect, and allow respondents to assert ownership over 
simultaneous and even contradictory experiences of guilt, shame and related emotions. 
Statistical data from exploratory factor analyses, as well as correlations between my 
measure and hypothesized measures of convergent validity, constitute the majority of the 
analytic material within this chapter. However, theory-construction begins in this 
analysis, because the observed relationships between my hypothesized “factors” points to 
a constellation of psychological strategies that I call affect “negation.” I conclude by 
proposing questions about the relationship(s) between negation, White guilt and White 




studies are so relatively low, which sometimes contradicts data found in qualitative 
studies (see Spanierman et al., 2008). 
 Ten students who completed the online surveys that constituted the data in 
Chapter 3 were recruited to participate in one-on-one in-depth interviews with me 
throughout fall 2008 and spring 2009. Their experiences are presented in Chapter 4, 
“Upsetting Whiteness: Guilt and Shame at the Intersections of Difference,” which is an 
ethnographic exploration of how a group of young White people think differently about 
race, gender, sexuality and their own roles in systems of inequality. Each participant met 
with me twice and interviews lasted between one half hour and two hours; the semi-
structured format of our conversations was organized around video clips of the three 
recent crises that were analyzed in Chapter 2. The qualitative data from these interviews 
were analyzed using the principles of grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Strauss 
& Corbin, 1990; Fassinger, 2005) and Clarke’s (2005) recent ‘postmodern’ version of the 
methodology, situational analysis. Purposeful  (or “purposive”) sampling was used to 
recruit a gender- and sexuality-diverse sample of participants, and I was particularly 
concerned with allowing the multiplicity of their experiences and reactions to the 
interviews themselves to emerge within my analysis and the construction of the theory. 
Though not generalizable, this group of young college students’ reactions challenged my 
thinking about White guilt and racism, while simultaneously reinforcing assumptions 
about the ideological contradictions inherent to 21st century neoliberal perspectives of 
race and identity in the U.S. Their struggles, outlooks, reactions and personal theories of 
race coalesce into a grounded account of White guilt in the early 21st century that 




much more than a person’s racial identity or attitudes, and b) White guilt may be as much 
about denying the personal experience of guilty or shameful feelings as it is about 
actually facing the implications of one’s own situatedness within systems of oppression. 
 Chapter 5, “Emergent Racisms,” takes up Leslie McCall’s (2005) concern over 
the “complexity of intersectionality” and the challenges inherent to balancing complexity 
and coherence when conducting mixed-methods, intersectional analysis. This chapter 
serves as the conclusion of the dissertation and is composed of comparative analyses in 
which the qualitative and quantitative data from chapters 3 and 4 are placed in dialectic 
(as opposed to dialogical) conversation with one another (Collins, 2000). Special 
attention is paid to the issue of interdisciplinary methodology, including the knowledge 
making practices and specific procedures involves in the creation of this project. The goal 
here is to express the findings of the dissertation as a whole by highlighting moments of 
contradiction, similarity and discrepancy in the data from each chapter. In doing so, I 
discuss the strengths and limitations of the dissertation, as well as implications and plans 
for future research. A discussion of potential political interventions concludes the 
document, as I consider Seidman’s (1997) call to a renewed pragmatism in critical social 
theory by contemplating applications of this research in real social environments. The 
chapter title “emergent racisms” refers less to actual attitudes than to the hegemonic 
instability of neoliberalism that constantly produces new challenges to substantive 
antiracist work.  
 The formal preparation of this dissertation was contained to my doctoral studies, 
which included three years of empirical pilot research with my students in the Honors 




level research. However, one could argue that I have 25 years of formal training in the 
study of American White guilt, because I am a White adult who has lived his entire life in 
the United States and has been working toward and for antiracism since adolescence. 
That is not to say, however, that my relationships with my object of study are linear, 
transparent, or static. To the contrary, the auto-ethnographic, explicitly feminist, self-
reflexive introspection involved in this project was the most complex and challenging 
aspect of the research (Hesse-Biber & Piatelli, 2007). I suspect that many readers will 
inevitably wonder: What do you think? Do you have White guilt? Do you feel guilty? 
Though I will challenge the specific formulation of these kinds of questions about 
emotion, which reinforce an ontology of guilt based in modernism and functionalist 
social psychology (Gergen, 2000; Orr, 2006), I also think that these questions are fair. 
My ability to answer them is indicative of the depth of my antiracist, feminist politics and 
the preparation of this document; my answers implicate my ability to engage in the 
construction of the kinds of critical webs of positioning that serve as the foundation of 
feminist objectivity, or what Haraway (1988) refers to as “situated knowledges.” 
Accordingly, each formal study (i.e., chapters 2, 3 and 4) of this dissertation begins with 
narrative recounting of my own experiences with White guilt. These interludes are 
organized by the three “factors” of the psychometric survey instrument developed in 
Chapter 3: guilt, shame and negation. The purpose of these ‘factor’ narratives is twofold: 
to make explicit my personal relationships with these emotions, and to offer an 
interdisciplinary audience the chance to engage with these emotions in a form (i.e., 




binary that frames so much research in the social sciences – and arguably asserts 
influence on this dissertation.  
 This project was guided by the following research questions: How do 
contemporary U.S. race relations, largely negotiated through popular culture and mass-
mediated communication, influence contemporary White guilt at the cultural level? What 
are the distinctions between White guilt and White shame and how do these constructs 
relate to attitudes toward race and identity in contemporary U.S. race relations? How is 
the phenomenology of White guilt (i.e., lived experiences, specifically affect and affect-
based behavior) co-constituted by gender, sexual and racial identity and their situatedness 
in hierarchical power/knowledge relations? There are many other questions that 
undoubtedly influenced my data gathering, analysis and writing, but which cannot be 
answered within the confines of this project. Because racism is ultimately the target of 
this research, I am preoccupied by questions about the social and political efficacy of 
White guilt, specifically what role(s) it may play in the production of antiracist people 
and antiracist cultures. The concept itself is quite ambivalent: though some psychologists 
suspect that some elements of White guilt may even be a necessary step in the 
development of antiracist consciousness and colloquial knowledge suggests that people 
who feel White guilt are less racist than those who have none of it, guilt has a negative 
valence. Guilt is also self-focused, as opposed to being directed at the “victim” of one’s 
wrongful actions. People tend to try to “fix” their guilt by making amends or correcting 
their behavior so that they can stop feeling guilty (Tangney & Fisher, 1995). Iyer et al. 
(2003) found that White guilt could only reliably predict endorsement of compensatory 




transformation of workplace environments and institutions. I similarly suspect that there 
may be some profound limits to White guilt’s ability to motivate antiracism within a 
cultural moment in which discourse about race minimizes the structural import of 
unequal race relations and reduces differences in life experiences to personal choices 
rather than complex interactions between agency and structure (Lipsitz, 2006; Seidman, 
1997). 
 In interviews with faculty who teach intersectionality that were conducted prior to 
and in preparation for this dissertation, I asked a Black feminist professor and mentor 
what she thought about White guilt. “I think guilt is very unpredictable,” she said. When I 
followed up by asking if White guilt was a requisite part of antiracism, she told me that 
this was an empirical question – and one that I should try to answer. I do not have one 
single answer, but rather a series of propositions about White guilt that I hope complicate 
reductive thinking about the politicized emotionality of White guilt and which simplify 
confusion about the construct that has produced little practical knowledge about the 
relationships between guilt and antiracism. I am not prepared to say that White guilt is 
worthless or necessary, and I do explicitly question logics that insist upon its inevitability 
or insignificance. In the cacophony of talk about who is to blame for a United States that 
continues to suffer from profound racial inequity and that promotes this and similar forms 
of stratification worldwide, I am concerned about a White antiracist project that rests its 
hopes upon the guiltiness of liberal- or progressive-identified White people. What I am 








“White guilt can be defined as the fantastic phenomenon whereby Caucasian 
Americans, as a result of their being indoctrinated to view slavery and wars of 
conquest as being unique to western man, are [sic] psychologically debilitated 
from taking up their own defense. Of course, feeling guilty about things you 
haven't personally done is ludicrous, particularly in this case. Foul acts like 
murder, slavery, and wanton destruction are ubiquitous to humanity, and were 
committed by peoples all over the world since the beginning of time.” 




“As a reader of this history, I have been overwhelmed by how much ‘emotions’ 
have been a ‘sticking point’ for philosophers, cultural theorists, psychologists, 
sociologists, as well as scholars from a range of other disciplines. This is not 
surprising: what is relegated to the margins is often, as we know from 
deconstruction, right at the centre of thought itself.” 
 -Sara Ahmed (2004a), in The Cultural Politics of Emotion (p. 4). 
 
 
Pinning down a stable definition of “White guilt” is so challenging for many of 
the same reasons that it is fascinating. First, as a compound subject, White guilt is 
dependent upon at least two other ontological questions: What is “Whiteness,” and what 
is “guilt”? Of course, one must also then take into account how the definitions of both 
Whiteness, which signifies the cultural construction of White racial identity, and guilt, a 
form of emotion, may shift in interaction when joined together as racialized affect. 
Secondly, White guilt is discursively constructed both within and outside of the academy. 
Though serious academic scholarship has been devoted to codifying, measuring and 
concretizing White guilt as an object of study, the construct is constantly evolving in 




and emotionality intersect. The movement of White guilt in contemporary popular 
discourse will be explored more fully in Chapter 2; in this chapter, I will survey a 
diversity of academic literature that has shaped my thinking about White guilt, and then 
offer a critical analysis of these perspectives. This review involves a protracted critique of 
the work of Shelby Steele (1990, 2002, 2006), a conservative Black writer who is 
considered by some to be the most vocal scholar of White guilt in the humanities. Though 
Steele’s work is highly problematic, its influence can be seen across the disciplines and is 
reflected in the ways in which scholars continue to conflate guilt and shame, divorce race 
from other dimensions of difference, treat White guilt as an emotion or an attitude and/or 
view contemporary race relations through the logics of the Civil Rights movement of the 
1960s. I conclude this chapter with a proposal for re-thinking and re-figuring White guilt 
using the theory-methods of symbolic interactionism and intersectionality (see Denzin, 
1992; Collins, 1990/2000). Accordingly, I propose a working framework for the study of 
White guilt that treats White guilt as a process and practice (Bourdieu, 1992, 1993; 
Goffman, 1959, 1963), and which takes into account the co-constitution of racial affect 
within intersecting discourses of race, gender and sexuality, among other historicized 
dimensions of identity and inequity (Collins, 1998; McCall, 2005).   
Review of Literature 
 The questions that guide this research necessarily implicate diverse fields of 
academic research from the humanities and social sciences, as well as interdisciplinary 
fields, such as Women’s, African American, gender, sexuality and American studies. 
What follows is an introduction to these bodies of literature – a survey of the discourse on 




This review is neither exhaustive nor comprehensive; however, these extant areas of 
research will be explored in greater depth and specificity when relevant at the start of 
each of the three following chapters, which each engage a specific dimension of White 
guilt and an accompanying methodological paradigm, including discourse analysis, 
psychometrics and grounded theory. I begin here with a summary and critique of Steele’s 
work; then, I proceed into a discussion of theoretical perspectives, including 
poststructuralism, cultural studies and “critical Whiteness studies,” that inform my 
critique. Notable contributions to the study of race and Whiteness from historians, 
counseling psychologists and social psychologists are also discussed to survey the 
contours of the academic terrain on which this project is constructed. Finally, I explicate 
the paradigms of symbolic interactionism and intersectionality that co-constitute the lens 
through which I interrogate White guilt and which shape my argument for a 
reconsideration of how we (i.e., researchers) think about White guilt.   
Steele’s White Guilt 
Readers familiar with scholarship on U.S. race relations will likely notice that the 
title of this dissertation is similar to a best-selling book by prominent African American 
public intellectual and self-identified “Black conservative” Shelby Steele, “probably the 
most well- known person currently arguing for the existence of White guilt” across the 
disciplines and in popular culture (Swim & Miller, 1999; p. 500). For example, all 
psychologists in this dissertation who have studied White guilt (Swim & Miller; Iyer, 
Leach & Crosby, 2003; Spanierman & Heppner, 2004; see also Doosje, Branscombe, 
Spears & Manstead, 1998) cite his work, even though they have no disciplinary 




concerns. His work is published by one of the largest global publishing houses (Harper 
Collins) and his many books on race in America have positioned him as one of the U.S.’s 
most prominent conservative Black critics, alongside Bill Cosby, Alvin Poussaint, 
William Raspberry, etc. Though I do not consider my project to be a direct response to 
Steele, this dissertation does offer a radically different approach to thinking about White 
guilt and is purposefully titled in a similar way to his White Guilt monograph. We come 
to our respective projects from divergent scholarly locations: he is trained as a literary 
critic and writes as a historian to a public audience, whereas I am neither engaged in 
literary criticism nor claim to be a historian, and I write to an academic audience. 
Furthermore, his White Guilt (2006) is based on no empirical evidence and is more of a 
personal manifesto about race relations. Whereas the subtitle of Steele’s work is “How 
Black and Whites Together Destroyed the Promise of the Civil Rights Era,” my subtitle 
points to my concern with White guilt’s relationship to other dimensions of difference 
and contemporary forms of racism. Accordingly, this dissertation presents somewhat of a 
counter-argument, in that I attempt to move the conversation about White guilt out of the 
simplistic and vague terms of his configuration. Steele’s work warrants careful attention 
and critique for multiple reasons, not the least of which is that his ideas have largely 
shaped popular and academic discourse on White guilt.  
White guilt, conservativism and the concept of “dissociation.” Steele’s (1990; 
2006) work is based on a perspective I would argue is characteristic of most popular 
historical and literary work on race relations that relies on “major” historical events, 
“influential” literature and anecdotal evidence to develop wide-reaching and 




Steele’s White Guilt (2006) includes no references and the first page of the book features 
a misquoted remark from former President Bill Clinton during what became known as the 
Lewinsky scandal. Steele’s work takes a psychological concept – identity group-based 
guilt – and uses it as a historiographic device to explain historical phenomena, just as 
traditional, Western historians are ought to do (Scott).  
 Steele’s White Guilt (2006) is at least partially a memoir, and he even describes 
the book’s development as inspired by the Native American story-telling method of 
Chautauqua. This book is preceded by more than a decade of Steele’s writing on White 
guilt that includes a prominent 1990 piece in The American Scholar and a 2002 essay in 
Harper’s; 2006’s White Guilt serves as a culminating treatise on the topic. To build his 
argument, Steele narrates the development of his racial identity as a process of a) 
recognizing the differences between how White people treated him and other Black 
people in the U.S. before and after the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, and b) 
imagining Black politics and racial uplift across historical contexts. In the process, he 
considers events of historical significance, including high-profile court cases such as the 
O.J. Simpson murder trial, in which he views the verdicts as racially motivated and 
evidence of culture-wide shifts in racial attitudes. But most of his argument is drawn 
from personal experiences, such as conflicts with fellow academics, childhood memories 
of racism and encounters with Black political figures.  
 Steele (2006) defines White guilt as: 
...Something very specific: the vacuum of moral authority that comes from simply 
knowing that one’s race is associated with racism. Whites (and American 




it, but once they acknowledge it, they lose moral authority over everything having 
to do with race, equality, social justice, poverty, and so on. They step into a void 
of vulnerability. The authority they lose transfers to the ‘victims’ of historical 
racism and becomes their great power in society. This is why white guilt is quite 
literally the same thing as black power. (p. 24) 
According to Steele, White guilt is defined by a lack of something – moral authority – 
that is caused by a cognitive process: the knowledge of White racism. White guilt is 
figured as an emptiness endemic not only to White people but organizations and 
institutions. White people and American institutions were formally defined by explicit 
and overt (“actual”) racism that characterized the “Age of Racism” (roughly all of U.S. 
history before the mid-1960s). Now, in the “Age of White Guilt” (the mid-1960s 
forward), White people and American institutions, specifically large private corporations, 
all levels of government and educational institutions, are shaped by the lack of moral 
authority that is White guilt. “Because white guilt is a vacuum of moral authority,” he 
explains, “it makes the moral authority of whites and the legitimacy of American 
institutions contingent on proving a negative: that they are not racist” (p. 27). White guilt 
is a powerful social imperative that, Steele argues, functions through stigma, like racism. 
White people are stigmatized by their skin color, because Black people may suspect them 
of being racist on account of their White skin. This stigma (and threat of being further 
stigmatized as racist) causes all White people and organizations, from political parties to 
museums, to prove that they are not racist by promoting diversity and using racial 
preferences to increase the visibility of minorities. Black people are largely free from 




shameful and immoral – that exists because of White guilt; indeed, this new social reality 
was paradoxically both created by and solves the problem of White guilt. Though Steele 
spends most of his time criticizing White guilt for its effects on race relations and 
especially African American politics and culture, he does attribute “possibly the greatest 
transformation in American history” to White guilt (p. 28). 
 Steele’s ontology of White guilt expands to an epistemology of contemporary 
race relations. Whereas “actual racism” was the hallmark of the historical period called 
the “Age of Racism,” during which White people maintained their moral authority, 
today’s “Age of White Guilt” racism is a myth Steele calls “globalized racism.”  
Globalized or “global” racism is defined as follows, but has nothing to do with 
transnational or hemispheric politics: 
…Racism inflated into a deterministic, structural, and systemic power. Global 
racism seeks to make every racist event the tip of iceberg….It is a 
reconceptualization of racism designed to capture the fruit of the new and vast 
need in white American for moral authority in racism matters. True or not, global 
racism can have no political viability without white guilt. What makes it viable is 
not its truth but the profound moral need that emerged in mid-sixties white 
America. (pp. 35-36) 
Global racism was made possible as an idea by a social determinism that defined Black 
politics during the latter years of the Civil Rights movement and was loosely derived 
from Marxism, though Steele claims most Black leaders had no formal or tangible 
relationships with Marxism (Angela Davis, Malcolm X and Martin Luther King Jr.’s 




determinism is a story about relationships of power that has no basis in reality; it is a 
perspective that is used to prey upon White guilt and is invoked by two main groups: 
Blacks looking for power (remember that White guilt is the same as Black power) and 
White people, driven by White guilt, who are deferring the stigma of racism. Steele posits 
that this perspective is a political-rhetorical logic of race relations that sees inequalities of 
power everywhere and attributes one racist incident, such as the beating of Rodney King, 
to structural racism; it enables Black university students across the country to effectively 
make up stories about racist educators and institutions without evidence or experience of 
discrimination; and excuses Black urban rioters from consequence because Black rage is 
figured as the direct result of so-called invisible and undetectable social forces. The 
Marxist notion of structure was deployed by Black political figures and White apologists 
and became ingrained in the fabric of American cultural hegemony, ultimately and 
unfairly enabling generations of African Americans to exploit White guilt, according to 
Steele. “When racism is defined as a determinism, then whites and American institutions 
are part of a cultural pattern (“white privilege”) that automatically oppresses blacks; and 
blacks are automatically victims of this same pattern,” he argues (p. 38).  His evidence 
for this supposed exploitation of White guilt is found in the ways in which the 
underperformance of African Americans in education, Black urban poverty, 
disproportionate levels of unemployment and unequal wages are attributed to structural 
racism, while the success of Black men and women in sports, music, literature and 
entertainment is attributed to hard work, exceptionally high standards and dedication. 
 In the “Age of White Guilt,” agency, choice and responsibility are displaced by 




everything from education, employment, housing, and racial uplift generally from Black 
individuals and relocates this responsibility on the back of “White America.” This 
structural milieu necessitates the maintenance of a mythic Black collective (“the black 
community”), which was a reality created by slavery that now only exists as a political 
strategy to allow Black people to exploit and benefit from a perceived weakness in White 
people – that is, White guilt. White guilt – really Black peoples’ willingness to rely on it 
for redistributive affirmative action programs and other social welfare initiatives – has 
eliminated the fierce sense of personal responsibility that defined earlier generations of 
Black Americans and the early leaders of the Civil Rights movement. Most Black people 
today cling to the notion of global racism and have rejected their freedom brought forth 
by legal emancipation and civil rights legislation, according to Steele, and this reliance 
has severely limited African American cultural politics and economic prosperity. He 
asserts that, “Without oppression – and it must be acknowledged that blacks are no longer 
oppressed in America – the group itself becomes automatically responsible for its 
inferiority and non-competitiveness” (p. 68). Rather than work towards integration and 
equality, the “overwhelming burden of responsibility” that accompanies freedom from 
oppression has caused Black Americans to retreat from freedom: “Our understandable 
fear of freedom has led us to bank our fate on an absurdity: that we can develop by taking 
less responsibility for ourselves” (pp. 68-69).   
 Black elites, though, seem to be quietly – even shamefully – aware of this social 
reality, as Steele outlines. He chastises his fellow Black elites and White sympathizers for 
not speaking the truth about White guilt and Black responsibility. Steele offers 




how he initially embraced the logic of White guilt in his militant youth. This political 
orientation was almost immediately dissatisfying and disempowering for Steele, and he 
began to distance himself from the political Left, typified by Maureen Dowd and Sandra 
Day O’Conner, with whom he felt had erroneously and fatally aligned itself with White 
guilt.  He realized his identification with the Black conservative archetype when 
confronted by a fellow literature professor who assumed his support for an ethnic 
literature course on the basis of his race. To Steele, “ethnic literature” is a curricular form 
of affirmative action, which always and in all forms serves to diminish expectations for 
African Americans and other minorities and uses inclusion and diversity as indicators of 
the absence of racism (i.e., to solve the problem of White guilt). Steele details his 
alienation from the Black mainstream and from the Left for what they call his 
conservative ideals and rejection of White guilt politics. He attributes his alienation – and 
stigmatization as a Black conservative – to his rejection of the politics of dissociation, 
which he describes as White liberals’ self-focused obsession with distancing themselves 
from Whiteness in order to reclaim humanity and moral authority from White guilt (p. 
140). Though in his explication of the two forms of racism (i.e., actual and global) Steele 
seems to dismiss racism as a non-issue, his discussion of dissociation – with which he 
closes the book – attributes White people’s efforts at dissociation as patently racist. He 
eviscerates liberal columnist Maureen Dowd, Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day 
O’Conner and other White liberals by explaining how their alleged support for 
affirmative action (e.g., he views the University of Michigan Supreme Court case as a 
definitive victory for affirmative action) is evidence of their refusal to recognize the 




politicking designed at reclaiming moral authority by framing Whites as agents and Black 
as powerless victims. Before rendering any kind of genuine antiracism all but impossible, 
he praises contemporary conservatism and compares George W. Bush to Lyndon Johnson 
and Martin Luther King, Jr. In Bush II’s version of conservatism, Steele finds an 
emphasis on individuality and responsibility that serves as a welcome corrective to the 
misguided and failed attempts of the baby-boomer generation’s Left. In a surprising turn, 
Steele explains that Bush’s detractors – his harsh liberal critics – are reacting to this 
“historical correction” because they (i.e., the “dissociational left”) have been shamed by 
conservatism’s (lack of) racial politics. Steele demonstrates his only command of 
emotion psychology at the conclusion by stating simply, “whenever people feel shamed, 
there is a blowback” (p. 179). 
 I have devoted substantial space to Steele’s work for two primary reasons: first, 
his work is often cited and has cross-disciplinary import; second, his work is hugely 
problematic and yet is reflective of much contemporary thinking about White guilt. For 
example, even though Swim and Miller (1999) may or may not agree with Steele’s 
political position, they use his work to define the construct White guilt in the 
development of their psychometric White guilt scale. They even go so far as to compare 
his theory of White guilt to the anti-racist scholarship of psychologists Beverly Daniel 
Tatum and Janet Helms, and they read his observations as confirming those made by the 
groundbreaking social psychologist Gordon Allport 50 years prior (p. 502). Steele’s 
writing would be easier to deal with and dismiss, however, if he was wholly wrong or 
completely insane. Though his writing supports and is used by explicit racists’ and the 




forms of racism, Steele also problematizes his version of White guilt and White 
paternalism – which is real and does characterize certain segments of the American 
political Left (see Lott, 2006, for a detailed and astute analysis). Nonetheless, there are 
significant ontological, epistemological and methodological issues with his argument 
about White guilt that merit explication, because these problems have influenced the 
shape of my project. 
 Steele’s is not a psychological project; he does not rely on disciplinary 
psychology’s methods or epistemological configuration to describe the causes and 
consequences of White guilt. This is not necessarily a problem. Psychology does not nor 
should it have a monopoly on the intellectual or academic study of emotions. For 
example, several prominent humanities-based scholars, notably Eng and Kazanjian 
(2003), Berlant (2004), Ahmed (2004a, 2004b), Leys (2007) and Sedgwick (2003), have 
recently turned critical attention to affect as a useful framework and object of study for 
addressing cultural experience across time and space. Ahmed (2004b), for example, has 
developed a cultural model of emotions – an analytic theory of affect – that borrows from 
the social sciences but ultimately transforms psychological and sociological assumptions 
about emotionality into something quite novel. Rather than wholly accept psychological 
frameworks, which position emotions as interiority (i.e., I feel something), or 
anthropological and sociological accounts, which figure emotions exteriorly (i.e., We, the 
social group, feel something), Ahmed insists that emotions are social and cultural 
practices that allow us to conceptualize the self or the social group in the first place (p. 
10). Her theory emerges via an ethnography of texts that explores how emotions – or 




bodies and identities, a move which further subverts mind-body and symbolic-material 
dualisms that have their origins in Platonic thought but which concretized in the 19th 
century with the advent of the modern social sciences and the psychologizing of 
emotionality (p. 8-10; also, Orr, 2006). Ahmed’s “data” are texts that cumulatively and 
differentially contribute to contemporary epistemology of emotions, including the work 
of academic theorists and cultural figures, government and legislative policies, journalism 
and Web sites. By deeply historicizing emotionality, Ahmed is able to demonstrate how 
feelings and identities, such as womanhood, Whiteness, Austalian-ness, queerness, are 
co-constituted in practice, rather than proceeding or preceding one another. 
The critical study of affect occurring in certain spaces of humanities scholarship 
does not disregard the psychological reality that shapes the phenomenology of affect and 
its intersections with political attitudes, cultural formations and social identities. Steele, 
on the other hand, investigates an emotion but cannot adequately account for the affective 
experience of White guilt. Instead, in recognizing that White guilt is at least partially 
based in a cognitive process – the knowledge of racism – he completely displaces affect 
with attitude. White guilt, to Steele, loses its affective dimension and becomes primarily 
cognitive and, thereby, attitudinal: it is both a knowledge and a politics, but not a feeling. 
This is not a moment of conflation of cognition and emotion, which is observed in some 
psychological literature; it is a literal displacement of affect. White guilt, for Steele, only 
becomes affective when it moves into the level of shame, which manifests as anger. 
Furthermore, the only apparent route to White shame, for Steele, is opened by the Right 
through a proverbial “calling out” of liberal Whites’ attempts to “dissociate” from their 




problematic, and Steele offers no research-based evidence to support this claim, which is 
fundamentally about the effects/consequences of White guilt (i.e., what emotion 
psychologists would call the “behavioral” outcomes of guilt). 
 Steele does base his argument about White guilt in the social identity category of 
race: White people have White guilt, and Black people deal with it. He pays almost no 
attention to other racial or ethnic groups, which is typical of White guilt scholarship 
emanating from disciplinary psychology and may not be a substantial problem at least at 
the level of defining White guilt. Steele bases his argument in historical phenomena that 
have been shaped and driven by the history of White colonialism and racism against 
Black people, and the Black-White racial binary. Along with other scholars working in 
race studies, such as Patricia Hill Collins (2005) and Darnell Hunt (2005), I concur with 
his choice to focus on the persistence of the White-Black binary and White racism toward 
Black people as we attempt to establish what White guilt actually is. Nevertheless, 
Steele’s conceptualization of race at a category is limited at best and essentialist at worst. 
He presents a homogenized and universalizing perspective on White and Black people 
that allows for only four distinct groups of people, all constituted by political convictions: 
conservative Blacks, such as Steele and Bill Cosby; liberal Blacks, such as Michael Eric 
Dyson and all Black feminists; liberal Whites, such as Sandra Day O’Connor and 
Maureen Dowd, who problematically dissociate from their Whiteness in response to 
White guilt; and conservative Whites, such as George W. Bush and the neoconservatives, 
who rightly reject affirmative action and “dehumanizing” social programs and 
progressive politics in exchange for an agenda and rhetoric of individual responsibility 




course, selectively minimal, as the contemporary conservative movements have made 
heretofore unseen interventions into the social life of ordinary Americans). Somewhere 
overlapping this configuration is the category of “Black elites,” who are usually liberal 
and from whom Steele self-identifies as alienated. Ultimately, Steele neglects any 
meaningful or even superficial consideration of multiple dimensions of difference, 
especially class, gender, sexuality and nationality, not to mention ability or age. Rather 
than simply not intersectional2, his argument is anti-intersectional. Even as he argues 
against the essentializing of Blackness (his example: the rhetorical deployment of “the 
Black community”), he renders Black and White experience static and homogenous by 
failing to acknowledge the diversity of Black (and White) experience that is constituted 
not only by race but by other structural dimensions (examples include his usage of the 
terms “America,” “a Black,” “a White,” etc.). Ironically, the book begins with an analogy 
to shifting sexual attitudes when he considers possible reactions to the Clinton-Lewinsky 
scandal and President Eisenhower’s private use of the N-word if these events were 
temporally switched and Clinton had used the N-word and Eisenhower had a public 
sexual affair. He recognizes the ways in which race and sexuality (as major social issues) 
influence history and politics, but he fails to carry this relationship through the text to 
consider how race and sexuality are not merely analogous but actually intersect in co-
                                                
2 A more complete explanation of intersectional theory and politics occurs later in this 
chapter. For readers unfamiliar with intersectionality, one can use the following 
definition of the term as it appears herein: those perspectives that centralize the 
interconnectedness of identity categories, such as race, gender, sexuality and nationality, 
in shaping individual and group experiences, as well as social systems and structures of 





constitution. White guilt, accordingly, becomes an issue of race and not gender and 
sexuality, no to mention class, age, citizenship status, looks or ability.  
 This anti-intersectionalism is reflective of Steele’s overall anti-empirical 
perspective on racism that views racism ontologically as individual actions and attitudes 
that are made and possessed by independent social actors. This approach is explicitly 
anti-structural, anti-discursive and implicitly anti-sociological; Steele embraces a 
typically conservative viewpoint that any kind of systemic or structural racism ended in 
the 1960s with the Civil Rights movement and its consequential legislation and otherwise 
‘legal’ reforms. Any claims to the contrary are paranoid allegations of power-hungry 
Blacks and blindly guilty, dissociative Whites. He presumes that White guilt is omni-
present and that White people are preoccupied by guilt and a lack of moral authority on 
race. However, empirical evidence collected for this dissertation and prior studies of 
White guilt (see Swim & Miller, 1999; Spanierman & Heppner, 2004; Iyer et al., 2003) 
refute this – both when considering contemporary discourse about race and responsibility 
in the news media and when asking real White people to talk about their own feelings 
about race. White guilt may be hegemonic in the Gramscian sense (Gramsci, 1971), in 
that in plays some role(s) in the sustenance of racial hierarchy and inequity and that these 
inequities are perpetuated by the intellectual elite, but there is no evidence that White 
people are generally preoccupied by palpable guilt in everyday life.  
 Despite the profound limitations of his work to provide any empirically grounded 
or theoretically complex insight on White guilt, Steele does bring up many of the issues 
that have preoccupied psychologists and other scholars studying White guilt, including: 




antiracism (Ahmed, 2006), and the precarious relationship between racist attitudes (or 
“racism”) and White guilt (or “Whiteness”). Before exploring these individual research 
areas, the roots of the academic study of Whiteness merits explication. Critical studies of 
Whiteness from across the academy are not connected by a singular genealogy of 
intellectual inquiry or social activist movement; nonetheless, there are some assumptions 
and theoretical innovations that loosely link this work in psychology, history and 
literature: namely, poststructuralism, critical theories of race and cultural studies. 
Whiteness as an Object of Study: When “Race” Does Not Equal “Black” 
A central theoretical assumption of this work is that – in the 21st century United 
States – Whiteness functions as a site of discursive silence in everyday life and social 
relations, which is to say that Whiteness typically goes unmarked or unnamed and yet is 
productive of meaning and consequences for the unequal distribution of diverse forms of 
capital (social, economic, cultural, etc.) (Bourdieu, 1992, 1993). Though this knowledge 
is made possible by the everyday lived experiences of people of color and social 
minorities and those who reject the social, economic and cultural dominance of 
Whiteness, the assertion that Whiteness is a site of discursive silence is – in the context 
and genealogy of academic thought on race and racism – made possible by the 
interrelated domains of poststructuralism, cultural studies, postmodernism and what has 
ultimately come to be known as “Critical Whiteness Studies.” I will now proceed into a 
selective review of each of these domains, paying special attention to how these fields 
have influenced by research and argument.  
Poststructural origins. Michel Foucault is hardly best characterized as a “race 




theorists of social constructivism and subsequently one of the most influential thinkers of 
the 20th century, however, Foucault’s scholarship is pivotal to my work as it informs my 
theoretical position on race and racism in the United States. Challenging and expanding 
upon many of the dominant theoretical traditions that came before him and their most 
famous figures, namely Marx, Hegel, Saussure, Kant, Nietzsche, Sarte and Hyppolite, 
French philosopher Foucault’s career traces a move from structuralism to 
poststructuralism that in its wake left an intellectual landscape transformed by the 
concepts of discourse and power/knowledge. Symbolic interactionist and dramaturgical 
sociologist Erving Goffman (1959) used the concept “discourse” 10 years prior to 
Foucault in the development of a theory of identity performance in everyday social 
interaction. However, it was Foucault’s explication of discourse as the process through 
which meaning is made and power is negotiated that ushered in the discursive turn that is 
so characteristic of poststructural thought (Hall, 1997b).  For Foucault, “discourse” for 
Foucault is much more than words or even verbal interaction. Indeed, discourse is most 
simply defined as the social practices that produce knowledge and, thereby, power 
(Foucault, 1972). Whereas structuralists, such as Saussure (1986) and Levi-Strauss, had 
attempted to systematize the study of language and linguistics to such an extent that a 
“science of signs” (i.e., “semiology”) would reveal the truth behind all human 
interactions, Foucault’s poststructuralist tendencies are exemplified by his focus on the 
effects and consequences of language and its role in the productions of social structures 
and institutions (Hall, 1997b, 1997c; Bloland, 1995).  
In his earlier work, particularly Madness and Civilization (1965) and The Order 




man as an object of study. He argued that the human sciences – what we would today 
typically identify as the social or behavioral sciences – occupied a precarious position in 
the modern episteme, which was operationalized as the dominant way of knowing 
(epistemology) since the (European and Euro-American) Enlightenment and Scientific 
Revolution of the 17th and 18th centuries, respectively. The human sciences, namely 
psychology, sociology and anthropology, “appeared when man constituted himself in 
Western culture as both that which must be conceived of and which is to be known” 
(1970, p. 345). This “event in the order of knowledge” sparked a redistribution of the 
episteme; parts of man had been studied before, but until the human sciences emerged, 
man had not studied himself as representation. Foucault’s critique of the human sciences 
was complex and insightful because his criticism was based not on the object of study 
(i.e., man) per se, nor even the mostly quantitative methods on which the human sciences 
relied. Instead, Foucault identified the location of the human sciences in the modern 
episteme – in between the three dimensions of physical and mathematical sciences; 
biology, economics and linguistics; and philosophy – as simultaneously perilous and in 
peril. This meant that the human sciences were (and are) always in danger of collapsing 
into themselves or of suffering an epistemological breakdown from their reliance on 
modernist, scientific logic to understand representation of humanity that resist such logic. 
At the same time, though, the human sciences benefit from the social and cultural power 
of scientific knowledge such that their decisions and findings about what constituted 
“normal” are instantly taken to be truth. “Truth” about social worlds, and the 
normativities that shape any claims to truth, are the discursive basis for unequal, identity-




In his deeply historical work on the human sciences, which was later elaborated in 
the first volume of the History of Sexuality (1978) and Discipline and Punish (1977), 
Foucault (1970) first argued that these disciplines rely on models from biology, 
economics and linguistics to approach the study of man3 (as man appears to himself). 
Unlike biology, economics and linguistics, however, the human sciences do not study the 
structure of “laws” and “rules” of human behavior. Instead, they depend on (self-
constructed) representations of man to produce knowledge about man. Note that the use 
of the term “man” (as opposed to “human” or “people”) is meaningful to Foucault. This 
terms and its rhetorical citationality in Foucault’s writing both exposes the ways in which 
the modernist logic descendent from the Englightenment was fundamentally masculinist 
and androcentric. “The human sciences are not, then, an analysis of what man is by 
nature; but rather an analysis that extends from man in his positivity (living, speaking, 
labouring being) to what enables this same being to know (or seek to know) what life is, 
in what the essence of labour and laws consist, and in what way he is able to speak,” 
according to Foucault (p. 353). The knowledge produced by the human sciences plays a 
central role in the production of knowledge about the self (self-knowledge) in modernity; 
and because their internal logic is framed by dichotomies, taxonomies and binaries 
inherited from the natural sciences, they are the primary producers of normativity and 
deviance in culture. Such knowledge is exceedingly powerful, and structures how we 
know ourselves and Others (Hall, 1997c; Said, 1978). 
                                                
3 I follow Foucault’s use of the term “man” here not because I agree with the default 
masculine gendering in his rhetoric, but because the use of “man” (as opposed to 
“human” or “people”) was significant and meaningful. It both exposes the ways in which 
modernist logic was masculinist and androcentric, and distinguishes Foucault from his 




Foucault’s theoretical intervention is especially useful for conceptualizing race, as 
well as other dimensions of difference, as both an object of study and a consolidated, 
constitutive element of disciplining and disciplined social relations and structures. 
Because knowledge is produced within, through and by discourse, it is with a 
Foucauldian lens that I argue that race, along with gender and sexuality, is made 
meaningful through unequal discursive relations of power and then made visible by a 
poststructural and intersectional lens that destabilizes the taken-for-granted ways in 
which race functions unnoticed and impenetrably in contemporary neoliberal cultural 
contexts. Foucault’s contributions are immeasurable, and he is typically credited as the 
laying the groundwork and articulating the primary tenets of the social constructionist 
approach (Hall, 1997b), along with other major figures such as Berger and Luckman 
(1966) and Thomas Kuhn (1962) and sometimes-rival Jacques Derrida. Diverging from 
various neo- and post-Marxist approaches that privileged class conflict as the organizing 
component of social worlds and structures, Foucault moved ‘beyond’ class to formulate a 
theory of power that can incorporate literally any meaningful category of difference 
because his perspective is framed by discourse, which is only limited by the boundaries 
of human knowledge. Foucault also largely displaced the subject, choosing instead to 
focus on discursive power structures and relationships; this choice has been sharply 
criticized along with his assertion that nothing/no one exists outside of discourse. Some 
feminists – and particularly Black feminists, such as Patricia Hill Collins (1998) – 
challenge what many read as a nihilistic perspective because it may limit any individual 
or group’s ability to cause meaningful change to dominant discourses. Others have also 




implicit White, European male privilege of Foucault’s social location (Hall, 1997b; see 
Collins, 1998, for a more lengthy critique). Nonetheless, Foucault offered a theoretical 
frame that exposes the ways in which discourse works to obscure or make invisible 
oppressive practices that shape everyday life. In the context of White guilt, Foucault’s 
displacement of the universal, all-knowing subject – the “man” of the modern human 
sciences – facilitates a complication of affective experience such that emotions can be 
within and outside phenomenology. In other words, the flexibility and richness of 
discourse, power and knowledge – the discursive lens – enables us to imagine how White 
guilt and shame are both felt within people’s affective lives and how these emotions 
travel discursively through diverse social practices and institutions.  
Cultural studies. Though a full explication of the robust arena of theory and 
research that came to be known as “Cultural Studies” is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
a brief explication of some key aims and terms of the field warrant explication here. 
Challenging the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, which became the status quo of the 
academic study of culture in the early post-World War II era, British cultural studies 
began to coalesce into a field or approach in the United Kingdom during the late 1960s 
and 1970s. During the 1980s and 1990s, leading figures such as Raymond Williams, Paul 
Gilroy, Angela McRobbie, Paul DuGay and Stuart Hall helped to transport cultural 
studies from a primarily British context at the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies (CCCS) to continental Europe and the United States, where it eventually 
intersected with and transformed American Studies.4 The Frankfurt approach to the study 
                                                
4 Various American Studies Association presidential addresses have chronicled the 
development of cultural studies and its relationship to American Studies in great detail. 




of culture, exemplified by Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse and Benjamin, had used neo-
Marxism to initiate a critique of postmodernity, or what the Critical Theorists saw as the 
cooptation of consumer culture to manipulate the masses in the interest of the ruling 
class, who controlled the field of production. Hall (1973/2006) and his contemporaries 
benefited from the Frankfurt School’s theorization of culture as involving more than just 
“high” art (i.e., the stuff of art history and classical music theory), but critiqued the early 
Critical Theorists for using a modernist framework to approach postmodernity. 
Launching an attack on what came to be known as the hypodermic model of cultural 
analysis – where consumers are conceptualized as drones who experience culture by 
figuratively having its meaning injected into their consciousness – Hall, DuGay and 
others theorized a complex “circuit of culture” that is best characterized by 
multidirectional and nonlinear interactions between consumers, producers and the 
processes of regulation, identification and representation (Hall, 1997a, 2006). Cultural 
studies retained an investment in politics, economics and culture, but tended to embrace 
more postmodern formulations of social relationships. For Hall (1997a), culture is simply 
“shared meanings,” which are established and communicated within language systems (p. 
1). The definition of language, to Hall and other practitioners of cultural studies, is not 
limited to the spoken or written word, however. Music, visual arts, and diverse forms of 
communication constitute language through which shared ideas about people, society and 
relationships are communicated, sustained and transformed. Hall’s definition of culture – 
a framework of shared meanings – is the one that is used throughout this dissertation.  
                                                                                                                                            
controversial genealogy and critique of contemporary tensions between the fields, see 




As a neo-Marxist model – and one that was both reflective and productive of the 
postmodern turn in social theory (Clarke, 2005) – cultural studies was and is heavily 
reliant on the work of Italian Antonio Gramsci to conceptualize how domination and 
subordination operate in macro-level social relationships. Whereas the Frankfurt School 
proposed a unidirectional model of interaction in which consumers were manipulated by 
mass media, Gramsci had earlier theorized that “hegemony” was a better way to 
characterize the process of domination and how inequity is sustained – even when it 
seems implausible and illogical. Gramsci (1971; initially written in the 1920s and 1930s) 
argued that all social groups are culpable for hegemonic systems and institutions – albeit 
differentially. To Gramsci, social domination of one group over another is only 
sustainable when both the oppressed and oppressors – and those who fall somewhere in 
between – literally ‘buy into’ the system of inequity. Gramsci observed this as the poor 
and peasantry in Italy endorsed fascism even as it promised severe penalties on their 
quality of life. Similar arguments have been made today about White people who are 
complacent in U.S. racial inequity, which has tangible consequences for all members of 
society, including Whites (Spanierman & Heppner, 2004; Frankenberg, 1993). 
Hegemonic systems tend to obscure these consequences, or present them as necessary 
evils to maintain the status quo. This process is facilitated by the social elites, including 
intellectuals, who produce knowledge to support the logic of the ruling class.  
Rejecting Marx’s two-class system in which one dominates the other, Gramsci 
opened up his social theory to incorporate the diversity of ways in which multiple 
ideologies operate simultaneously in any given historical moment, in any given context. 




Hegemony is also dynamic – never static – and has to consistently work to establish itself 
as the dominant and most desirable system of thought and practice in a given society. 
U.S. racial dynamics are a quintessential hegemonic system; for example, post-Civil 
Rights movement race relations are distinguished by an urgent insistence that race is no 
longer the motivating factor in unequal access to resources and power because racism is 
“illegal.” Hall and the British cultural studies camp studied the global politics of race and 
racism in their work, which helped form what is now referred to as postcolonial studies 
and theory; moreover, this framework became a useful lens for scholars working in a 
U.S. context to investigate the diverse ways in which race works, disciplines and 
transforms in the United States, past and present. Accordingly, cultural studies has 
exerted a substantial influence in the humanities and social sciences, including sociology, 
which throughout most of the 20th century had largely failed to sufficiently theorize race 
and develop methods with which to evaluate and critique its role in social relations 
(Collins, 1998; Bonilla-Silva & Zuberi, 2008). 
Racial Formation Theory. Omi and Winant’s (1986/1994) sociological work 
does just that, and the exigency of their project is at least partially rooted in the historical 
reluctance of mainstream and radical academic scholarship to adequately deal with race. 
Their work emerges in the late 1980s in the context of two interrelated intellectual 
discourses, which shaped by an implicit White subjectivity: a) continued neglect of race 
and racial theory in the social sciences, and b) inadequate theorization of race by those 
few scholars who attempted to directly address race and racism.  
 Omi and Winant (1994) explain that existing scholarship has not met the 




on three organizing categories: ethnicity, class and nation (p. 11). These three dimensions 
of difference, none of which of course is equivalent to race, are seen as guiding 
theoretical and empirical scholarship on race up until the mid-1980s. Omi and Winant 
critique the ethnicity approach along two major lines: 1.) “the bootstraps model,” in 
which group norms are treated as the dependent variable in analysis whereby 
differentiation in success/failure of assimilation and “racial uplift” of a given racial group 
are attributed to essential characteristics of said group, and 2.) the “they all look the 
same,” model, in which Whites are viewed as a diverse and multi-variable racial group 
and Blacks, in particular, are all the same. This theoretical approach reflects and supports 
social psychology’s assertion of the outgroup homogeneity effect, especially when 
considering that such racial theories were generated from a White-centric standpoint 
(even if their authors were not White). Displacing Whiteness from the center is critical to 
the reduction of the outgroup homogeneity effect, which stipulates that in-groups always 
view themselves as more internally diverse than outgroups, which appear to be 
homogenous (see Stangor & Schaller, 1996; also Sherman & Johnson, 2003 for a 
thorough discussion). Finally, ethnicity model approaches quintessentially conflate 
ethnicity and race, according to Omi and Winant, refusing to distinguish between the two 
concepts; this is especially problematic in a U.S. context, in which race and ethnicity 
have functioned in fundamentally different ways throughout American history.  
Racial theories based on a class paradigm typically work to deny the uniqueness 
and significance of race as an organizing component of everyday life and institutional 
processes in exchange for over-emphasizing the role of class and market relations in 




intra-group racial dynamics, e.g., between middle-class and poor African Americans. 
Nationality paradigms, on the other hand, are viewed more favorably than either 
ethnicity- or class-based approaches, but these are ultimately nonetheless insufficient. 
Nation-based theory generally “emphasizes the relationships among the different 
elements of racial oppression – inequality, political disenfranchisement, territorial and 
institutional segregation, cultural domination,” according to Omi and Winant (p. 37).  
These approaches share a reliance on components derived from colonialism to 
demonstrate, “the continuity of racial oppression from its origins in the national 
oppression prevailing in colonialism’s heydey” (p. 37).  Still, even though the 
colonialism critique is largely based in racial terms (albeit through the distorted lens of 
nation), the conditions and structures of colonial systems created and practiced by 
colonizers who retain dominant social positions today do not automatically capture the 
racial experiences of minorities in the postcolonial era. Nation-based paradigms, though 
largely advanced by Black scholars, may importantly fail to reflect the lived experiences 
of African Americans (as opposed to Black Caribbean Americans and other Black 
immigrant groups), obscuring the legacy of American slavery and the forced immigration 
of many Blacks into the United States. Colonialism and slavery are distinct but related 
phenomena, and though national approaches to racial dynamics may serve as a “partial 
prototype” for their argument (more so than ethnicity or class theories), Omi and Winant 
position racial formation theory (centering race) as necessary in order to capture the 
complexity and specificity of U.S. race relations (p. 47). 
Omi and Winant’s (1994) project pivots on several “definitions,” which can also 




“definitions” are hardly static. On the contrary, they are practices. Omi and Winant 
define race as: “a concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by 
referring to different types of human bodies” (p. 55). They explicate that, “Although the 
concept of race invokes biologically based human characteristics (so-called 
‘phenotypes’), selection of these particular human features for purposes of racial 
signification is always and necessarily a social and historical process” (p. 55). Racial 
formation is defined as, “the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are 
created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed” (p. 55). A racial project is,  
“simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics, and 
an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines. Racial 
projects connect what race means in a particular discursive practice and the ways in 
which both social structures and everyday experiences are racially organized, based upon 
that meaning” (p. 56). Note the linguistic choice of the term “formation,” as opposed to 
“form”: Omi and Winant insist upon a conceptualization of race that captures the 
complexity and historical contingency of race and signals a constant enactment of race 
(as a category), as opposed to a static definition that implies transhistoricism, stablity or 
universality.  
Omi and Winant’s theoretical perspective aids understanding of race and racial 
dynamics grounded in anti-essentialism, deep historicism and critical attention to the role 
of culture in any identity-based power relation. As such, I read them as integrating the 
contributions of Foucault and Gramsci, particularly, as they (re)focus discourse, 
discipline and hegemony on the U.S. racial state.  For Omi and Winant, social and 




in everyday life as well as institutional apparatuses that are less visible in everyday 
experiences but nonetheless effective and influential (Hall, 1997a; Foucault, 1977). 
Racial signification – such as those constructed and disseminated in televisual and other 
mass mediated discourses – are central to any racial formation or racial project (racist or 
otherwise). Racial formations are dependent upon culturally and historically situated 
racial projects, which organize and represent social structures and (racially marked) 
bodies. Their “racial formation” is also dependent upon specific hegemonies, which 
localizes and specifies the ways in which race works in contemporary society, 
simultaneously offering insight into race’s relationships with other identities, identity-
based movements and socio-political dilemmas (p. 56).   
In historical terms, “Racial rule can be understood as a slow and uneven historical 
process which has moved from dictatorship to democracy, from domination to 
hegemony….In the U.S., the origins of racial division, and of racial signification and 
identity formation, lie in a system of rule which was extremely dictatorial” (p. 67). Now, 
however, “racial rule” works hegemonically to obscure the ways in which the state 
dictates particular race relations (structurally) and the manner by which the mass media 
and popular culture support such unequal racial dynamics (representationally). Together, 
these structural and representational components constitute the contemporary U.S. racial 
project. Social justice-based changes to the contemporary U.S. racial order manifest 
themselves in processes of “rearticulation,” which are composed of the disorganization 
(deconstruction) of dominant, pre-existing racial ideology and (re)construction of 
alternative, oppositional frameworks for knowing and doing race and race relations (p. 




minorities, as exemplified by the new right of the mid-1970s, the emergence of Reagan-
era neoconservatism and the development of Clinton-era neoliberalism, which persists 
today (Duggan, 2003; Melamed, 2006). I will return to neoliberalism later, but now 
proceed to a discussion of those studies of race that are primarily concerned with the 
construction of “White” and “Whiteness.”  
Critical Studies of Whiteness 
 With ‘race’ sufficiently troubled by poststructuralist approaches to the category 
that effectively unhinge race from the concept “Black,” the door was opened for critical 
investigations into the ways in which race emerged as a category in the United States and 
how it is deployed in a diversity of ways in contemporary U.S. cultures. Some scholars 
began to point their critical attention toward “White” and “Whiteness” during the 1980s 
and 1990s; the label used to describe this scholarship is hotly contested even today 
(Weigman, 1999), but can generally be grouped under the umbrella category of “critical 
studies of whiteness” or “critical whiteness studies.”  
 In addition to inheriting theoretical tools from Foucauldian poststructuralism and 
more general postmodern approaches to cultural and social analysis, critical Whiteness 
studies are directly descendent from critical social theories of race and racism largely 
emanating from scholars and communities of color (Roediger, 1998), as well as allied 
feminist theories, politics and activisms (Frankenberg, 1993). Critical Whiteness studies 
have worked since the 1980s and early 1990s to highlight how “White” raciality is 
defined not by neutrality or its supposed emptiness as a cultural signifier. To the contrary, 
Whiteness and White people are racialized in distinct ways but within the same macro-




promotes inequity. Whiteness means specific things in distinct historical moments and 
shifts in its meanings across time and space; Whiteness also changes in its relationships 
to class, gender and other dimensions of difference. 
 Critical Whiteness studies are not, however, about re-centering Whiteness in 
critical discourse or about re-inscribing the centrality of White racial identity in 
sociocultural analysis, though this has been the subject of intense academic debate over 
the past several decades (see Hill, 2004; Weigman, 1999). Understandably, there is a 
tangible amount of anxiety regarding an antiracist academic project that posits White 
people as its primary object of study/inquiry. To the contrary, the types of scholarship 
that I would identify as fitting within this broad category are those kinds of projects that 
are typically about the socio-historical configurations of racisms, and they approach 
Whiteness at an oblique angle. The effect is the destabilization of Whiteness as the racial 
equivalent of “normal,” troubling hegemonic norms about how race and racism function. 
These interventions across the humanities and social sciences have varied in their 
substance and influence, but critical studies of Whiteness have universally emphasized 
that “race” does not equal “Black,” and “White” does not equal “neutral.” As prominent 
figures such as Roediger, Lott, Hill, Ignatiev, Lipsitz, Weigman, Helms and Frankenberg 
have established, accounts of historical and contemporary racism are therefore 
profoundly limited if Whiteness is taken for granted and not explored in all its 
particularity.  
 Roediger (1991), for example, has traced the shifting group memberships of 
“White” people throughout colonial U.S. history and up to the immigration waves of the 




Whiteness have been simultaneously policed and permeable, moving and shifting as class 
statutes and perception of immigrant groups have transformed through primarily 
economic relations. Similarly, Noel Ignatiev’s (1995) landmark worked focused on how 
one particular group of immigrants – the working class Irish – transformed their social 
standing in the U.S. through access to White identity group membership enabled by a 
complex combination of language (i.e., English), labor, religious and race. In literary 
studies, Eric Lott (1995) has shown how racism was literally performed in working class 
minstel shows, and how race, gender, class and sexuality intersected in these 
performative moments. Ultimately, Lott argues that minstrelsy represents latent-but-
powerful homoerotic desire of the Black man’s body.  
Not all influential studies of Whiteness emanate from a strictly academic context. 
Professional writers Tim Wise (2008) and Maurice Berger (1999) have both published 
memoirs in which their identities as White men have served as launching points for the 
interrogation of how White privilege intersects with gender, sexuality, class, nationality 
and religion together shape the life experiences of diverse White people. Both 
demonstrate familiarity with the academic study of racism and Whiteness, but use 
personal life history, autoethnography, creative writing, informal interviews, oral history 
and storytelling as their data sources. For example, Berger (1999) recounts the story of a 
White, Jewish, South African immigrant to the United States who was frequently 
confronted with questions about racial apartheid in her country of origin. She told Berger, 
“When Americans ask me if I’m ashamed to admit that I’m South African, I wonder if 
they should be ashamed to admit that they are American” (p. 60). Berger uses this 




racism, whereby “outsiders” to the United States may be more perceptive of American 
White raciality and intergroup race relations than White people born and raised in a U.S. 
context. He asserts that, “Whiteness is rarely discussed in American life and culture. 
White people, while vigilantly aware of the presence of blackness, are most often 
oblivious to the psychological and political weight of their own color” (p. 184).   
George Lipsitz, a leading figure in American Studies, offered one of the most 
empirical accounts of systemic racism in the U.S. ever published with his thesis on the 
“possessive investment in Whiteness.” Lipsitz (1996/2006) painstakingly accounts for the 
movement of White people from cities to suburbs throughout the Cold War era and the 
diverse and contradictory ways in which government action and inaction contributed to a 
massive disinvestment in urban spaces occupied primarily by people of color throughout 
the 1960s and 70s. In the domains of housing, banking, transportation, education, public 
health and various aspects of infrastructure, U.S. governmental agencies on the federal, 
state and local levels – together with Congress – have overvalued Whiteness and 
devalued Blackness and other forms of raciality, according to Lipsitz. He argues 
ultimately that White people – the most vocal critics of so-called “identity politics” – 
have been the greatest beneficiaries of identity-based practices in the most fundamental 
practices of civic life in the United States. Of course, these discriminatory and systemic 
processes are largely “invisible” to the extent that they fit within the racist logics of 
advanced capitalism and draw upon deep-seeded U.S. racial projects that associate White 
people with entitled affluence and Black people with deserving poverty. Lipsitz asserts 
that these practices, such as “the organized abandonment of poor and working class 




that precipitated the federal government’s failed response to Hurricane Katrina in the 
Gulf Coast region (p. 243).  
 The genealogy and impact of critical studies of Whiteness is especially relevant to 
the present inquiry, because so much of this field of research is about the social and 
cultural politics of antiracism, which I argue are inextricable from feelings engendered by 
antiracism. As Whiteness studies scholars in history, sociology and cultural studies have 
traced the shifts and demarcations of White identity in the U.S. throughout the nation’s 
history and prior, they have paid principal attention to the relationships between 
Whiteness and Blackness and how Whiteness has influenced macro-level social 
relationships and U.S. institutions. In psychology, scholars have also examined 
Whiteness and White identity for its influence on personal and social identity (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979) and the consequences of White identification on social relationships and 
attitudes, such as racism (Saucier & Miller, 1999), and intrapsychic problems, such as 
guilt, depression, anger and shame.  
The Psychology of White Guilt 
 Janet Helms’s work is one of the most commonly cited sources in psychological 
research on Whiteness, because she developed an influential model of racial identity 
development that attempts to formalize and codify diverse experiences of White people 
into a workable identity model. For Helms (1993), a counseling psychologist, White 
racial identity is observable set of characteristics that reflect the intrapsychic and 
interpersonal qualities of people who are White. Her model includes the following stages, 
which are organized linearly and normatively to the extent that certain stages are 




“immersion/emersion,” and “autonomy” (Helms & Carter, 1993). The model, which is 
arguably the most influential and commonly used of its kind, presumes that White racial 
identity is dynamic and that, like other forms of social identity, will inevitably shift and 
change over time. The narrative that underlies this model presumes that White people 
will likely interact with people of color and non-Whites throughout the lifespan, and that 
these interactions will have implications for a White individual’s sense of self. This 
process is sometimes painful and regressive, but ultimately should lead toward a 
reconciliation of one’s racial identity and, ideally, a sense of autonomy. In other words, 
the “developed” White person will reach a psychosocial space in which he can both be 
White and distinguish himself from racist attitudes and behavior, embracing racial 
empathy and an understanding of White racial and social inequality. Implicit in the 
measure, however, is a kind of Ericksonian identity development framework, with its 
normative value on “autonomy” reminiscent of Erickson’s “integrity” stage – an 
essentially unattainable ‘perfect’ identity (Côté & Levine, 2002). These six distinct stages 
are also posited as measurable and quantifiable using the Helms and Carter’s WRIS, a 
survey-based instrument designed to assess where an individual is in her White racial 
identity development (Helms & Carter, 1993). Though this conceptualization of identity 
is radically different from the way in which symbolic interactionists, poststructuralists or 
postmodernists might think about racial identity, Helms’ work is reflective of the ways in 
which counseling and social psychologists tend to approach social and personal identity – 
as an observable reducible construct that lends itself to quantification using self-report or 
other forms of measurement. The development of the model, in isolation from other 




psychology, which emphasizes and values parsimony. Indeed, this is how psychologists 
have theorized and researched White guilt despite how, as I will argue, what we call 
“White guilt” is multidimensional. Because of this multidimensionality, which means that 
White guilt is dependent upon identity, culture, affect, attitudes and situation/context – 
the construct is largely resistant to traditional methods of self-report measurement and 
observation. These methodological limitations and concerns will be centralized in 
Chapter 3 and 4, which rely on different forms of self-reporting and observation to gather 
data, and will be further discussed in Chapter 5, when the data are explored collectively.  
In developing one of the first and widely used psychological measures of White 
guilt, Swim and Miller (1999) astutely observed that while the literature on White racial 
identity and attitudinal racism has reached a consensus about the existence of White guilt, 
“these claims lack empirical tests and have been based primarily on commentaries and 
nonsystematic observations” (p. 501). Moreover, “the White racial identity models 
assumed the existence of White guilt. They embed guilt feelings in a certain stage or 
subcomponent of their models without empirically testing for White guilt,” according to 
Swim and Miller (p. 501). Accordingly, they identify an underlying assumption of White 
guilt as a requisite component of White racial identity; however, little scholarship exists 
to confirm the presence of White guilt during White racial identity development in any 
kind any systemic or empirical way. For example, unsystematic observations in education 
settings have employed White guilt as an umbrella concept to group together such a 
variety of identity-based emotions, attitudes and behaviors as guilt, shame, depression, 
paralysis, anger, resistance and anxiety (Tatum, 1992, 1994; Davis, 1992; Romney, 




the racial formation and culture of the contemporary United States, it seems to have 
imbedded itself into psychological theories or racial identity as a kind of taken-for-
granted aspect of being White.  
But what exactly is White guilt, according to psychologists? Surprisingly – at 
least for a discipline relatively concerned with clear, parsimonious and transparently 
defined constructs – an answer to this question is somewhat elusive. A more effective 
version of the question is: what are the things that psychologists have identified as 
“White guilt,” and why do they assume its universality?  
According to Swim and Miller (1999), “In general, Whites need not spend as 
much psychological effort or economic resources recovering from others’ prejudice and 
protecting themselves from possible encounters with prejudice. Awareness of this 
unearned White privilege along with the awareness of racism could create feelings of 
White guilt” (p. 500). In this framework, White guilt is cognitively triggered by an 
awareness of unfair inequity and unearned privilege and is dependent upon an individual 
possessing certain racial attitudes, such as the belief that racism is not a good thing. Iyer, 
Leach and Crosby (2003) go further to define the construct: “The term White guilt 
describes the dysphoria felt by European Americans who see their group as responsible 
for illegitimate advantage held over other racial groups, such as African Americans” (p. 
118). Their definition retains the cognitive, perspectival aspect (e.g., “…who see their 
group as responsible…”) but emphasizes, to a greater extent than Swim and Miller, the 
emotional consequences of these attitudes. By identifying White guilt as a form of 
dysphoria, the authors have centralized concerns about the negative dimensions of guilt 




amorphous socio-cultural group, experience White guilt to some degree, large or small. 
Regardless of the differences between their definition of the construct, Iyer et al. assess 
the presence and magnitude of feelings of White guilt using Swim and Miller’s White 
guilt scale, which includes the following five items: 
1. Although I feel my behavior is typically nondiscriminatory toward Blacks, I 
still feel guilt due to my association with the White race. 
2. I feel guilty about the past and present social inequality of Black Americans 
(i.e., slavery, poverty). 
3. I do not feel guilty about social inequality between White and Black 
Americans. (reverse-coded) 
4. When I learn about racism, I feel guilt due to my association with the White 
race. 
5. I feel guilty about the benefits and privileges that I receive as a White 
American. (Swim & Miller; p. 513).  
Note that these fairly simple items restrict the attitudinal component of White guilt to the 
structural relationships between Black and White people in the United States, as opposed 
to relationships between Whites and all non-White people. Questions one and five refer 
to personal behaviors or privileges, while two, three and four point to sociological and 
historical concerns. The format of the scale essentially bounds racial affect to a spectrum: 
one side represents the complete absence of guilt, and the other represents its total 
presence. In other words, the opposite of feeling guilty is not feeling guilty, as opposed to 
feeling entitled, deserving and fair, etc. There is no possibility, in this universe of 




enjoy unequal privilege. Finally, all five questions conspicuously employ the word 
“guilt” or “guilty,” a point of psychometric controversy that will be discussed later (in 
Chapter 3) in detail. 
Even though guilt has a negative valance and ranges from uncomfortable to 
painful (Tangney & Dearing, 2002), one might assume that White guilt actually has 
positive consequences for racial attitudes, or that it is at least positively correlated with 
antiracist perspectives and behaviors. Psychologists have found some evidence of this 
association, but feeling or claiming to experience White guilt does not appear to be a 
reliable predictor of antiracist attitudes or behaviors. A fundamental aspect of guilt is that 
it focuses attention on the self (Tangney & Fischer, 1995). Those who feel guilty direct 
their attention toward themselves, their guilt-provoking behavior and the extent to which 
they are responsible for this behavior (Iyer, Leach & Crosby, 2003). “Thus,” as Iyer et al. 
explain, “the experience of White guilt should focus European Americans’ attention on 
the (ingroup) self rather than on the (outgroup) other” (p. 118). Self-focus, accordingly, 
should generally make guilt a weaker basis for actually helping the harmed or wrong 
group (in this case, African Americans) than internalized feelings or political convictions 
that are focused on the welfare of the harmed themselves, according to Iyer et al. 
Congruent with research on generic guilt, Iyer et al. assert that White guilt should 
motivate compensatory behavior, because psychological literature suggests that people 
who feel guilty attempt to make restitution to their victims. Swim and Miller’s (1999) 
development of the five-item White guilt scale (above) supports this notion, as White 
guilt was a predictor of “European Americans’” support for compensatory affirmative 




As measured using existing psychometric instruments (e.g., Swim & Miller’s five-item 
test), Iyer et al. found that White guilt is not, however, a reliable predictor of support for 
comprehensive, equal opportunity affirmative action programs that seek to address 
inequality in systemic ways and at the structural level, addressing White privilege and 
explicit racial discrimination on the part of White people. They argue that this is the 
result of White guilt’s self-focus, and that White guilt may only motivate people to 
alleviate the dysphoria of guilt and is not necessarily or consistently predictive of 
internalized antiracism or concern (i.e., “group-based sympathy”) for African Americans 
(p. 125). Similarly, in the development of a multidimensional scale to assess the 
psychosocial consequences of racism to White people, Spanierman and Heppner (2004) 
concluded the following: 
Contrary to expectation, no relationship was found between White Guilt and 
ethnocultural empathy. One possible explanation may be that White individuals 
who experience high levels of guilt and shame may be too overwhelmed to 
empathize with people of other races. Similarly, sometimes Whites become 
“stuck” in guilt and shame (e.g., self-pity, self-absorption, and so forth), which 
consequently may inhibit them from increasing their racial awareness beyond 
their current levels and further prevent them from taking action to challenge 
racism. (p. 260) 
If their assertion if followed to its logical conclusion, then White guilt is only a 
productive insomuch as it may motivate White people to do things to compensate for 
White privilege; accordingly, in the absence of internalized antiracism, these behaviors 




White guilt is present. Moreover, there is a presupposition – rooted in their use of the 
term “stuck” – that non-movement is not the ‘normal’ state of White people, at least 
when it comes to race relations. There is no extant psychological evidence to suggest that 
White guilt motivates an internalization of group-based sympathy or antiracist attitudes 
such that an individual’s concern for African Americans as a social group and 
commitment to resisting racism will extend beyond or greater than the duration and 
severity of her White guilt. Tatum (1994) has also qualitatively observed that White guilt 
is not a dependably useful pedagogical tool, as guilty White students may be too anxious 
or depressed to learn about racism and integrate knowledge about their own relationships 
to systems of power and inequality. 
Guilt and (In)Action 
 Groups of guilty White people may behave in similarly compensatory ways that 
elide actual political attitudes and commitments. In “The Nonperformativity of 
Antiracism,” Ahmed (2006) explores the complexities of institutional statements about 
diversity and the ways in which they may actually obscure the material actions and 
commitments of an institution. Ahmed elucidates a distinction between the actual 
performance of antiracism and empty, antiracist nonperformance. Diversity statements 
(e.g. “We are committed to diversity,”) and statements that admit to certain failures in the 
past, she argues, “do not do what they say: they do not, as it were, commit a person, 
organization, or state to an action. Instead, they are nonperformatives” (p. 105). 
Referencing John Langshaw Austin and Judith Butler, Ahmed explains that a speech act 
is performative when it does what is says – when it secures the effect that it names. In 




accidental, but is indeed quite deliberate; a nonperformative speech act: “‘works’ because 
it fails to bring about what it names” (p. 105). The speech act is read as nonperformative 
because it indicts failures to do things (to act) as opposed to naming and criticizing the 
actions of perpetuating racism. Likewise, the central paradox then emerges: admitting to 
being racist becomes a claim to have transcended one’s own racism (ironically, the 
reason for issuing such a speech act). The implications of nonperformativity for a theory 
of White guilt are intriguing, and will be explored in greater detail in the empirical 
portions of this dissertation. What is potentially most compelling about Ahmed’s 
argument is that nonperformativity may be central to White guilt. If White guilt 
simultaneously a) manifests rhetorically as antiracism, then b) alleviates White guilt 
while c) not resulting in an internalization of antiracist or a structural critique of racism 
and White privilege, then can the experience of White guilt be likened to the superficial 
diversity statements that constitute the evidence of Ahmed’s thesis? 
 A question that lurks beneath and beyond the scope of this present investigation is 
the causal and longitudinal relationship between White guilt and racist 
attitudes/antiracism. Because the task at hand is to establish a more cultural, critical, 
psychologically grounded account of White guilt, I am not yet prepared to answer this 
question, which ultimately – as I intend to demonstrate -- will require a mixed-
methodological, experimental and ethnographic examination of individuals over time. 
However, as Ahmed and others’ work insists, the rhetorical expression of lament over 
racism and its consequences does not equate to antiracism as a material-semiotic 




White guilt will require a more nuanced account of the diverse relationships between 
racial identity, racial attitudes and White guilt. 
Distinguishing Between Guilt and Shame     
 Before I turn toward my proposal for an intersectional and interactionist approach 
to White guilt, I will discuss another area of ontological ambiguity in the study of White 
guilt that merits attention. Anecdotal evidence collected in preparation for this 
dissertation suggests a strong diversity of opinions regarding what “guilt” is, much less 
its racialized forms. A survey of relevant literature confirms the controversy over 
defining guilt as an affective construct and experience. Psychologists studying emotion 
maintain robust debates over the ontology of guilt (see Tangney & Fisher, 1995), and 
these constructions of guilt can and do differ largely from those in other academic 
discourses and popular culture (see Fisher, 1984). For example, Leys (2007) argues that 
the decades since the Holocaust and World War II have seen a shift in popular discourse 
from guilt to shame that is based on her readings of cultural texts and selected works of 
psychotherapists and affect theorists. The differences in guilt and shame, to Leys, appear 
to me more rooted in rhetorical than psychological experience. Comedian Tina Fey 
(Carlock & Scardino, 2006) invoked the concept of White guilt in a recent episode of her 
sitcom 30 Rock when referring to her character’s ability to be manipulated by a Black co-
worker; in this instance, guilt is constructed as a weakness of personality – a political 
vulnerability. As noted earlier, anecdotal observations of White guilt in classroom 
settings have associated guilt with a wide range of emotions that do little to advance a 
tangible conceptualization of the feeling or how it is distinct from other forms of affect 




ignore White guilt’s relationships with other forms of affect, I assert that we must 
distinguish the construct on a theoretical level and through empirical praxis before 
making claims about its relationships to and interactions with other forms of affect, 
behavior and attitudes. 
 Within the psychological literature on White guilt, I have observed two 
problematic trends regarding the conceptual/definition discreetness of “guilt” as a 
construct. First, the term “guilt” and the emotional construct to which it refers are under-
defined and used synonymously with “shame.” For example, Spanierman and Heppner 
(2004) used the terms “shame” and “guilt” synonymously in the development of their 
Psychosocial Costs of Racism to Whites (PCRW) scale, neglecting to distinguish the 
respective constructs theoretically or psychometrically. On the other hand, Swim and 
Miller (1999) hesitantly asked whether some of their data might be confounded by the 
existence of White shame: “It would be informative for future research to explore what 
people mean when they say that they feel White guilt. For instance, it might be useful to 
differentiate between White guilt and White shame” [emphasis added] (p. 512). Swim 
and Miller acknowledge that there are meaningful differences between the antecedents 
and behavioral consequences of guilt and shame, and they point to preeminent research 
on these distinctions developed by J. P. Tangney and others in their moral emotions 
research (Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tangney et al., 1996). Tangney’s work (Tangney & 
Dearing, 2002; Tangney & Fischer, 1994; Tangney et al., 1996) has established crucial 
distinctions between guilt and shame, as well as their respective behavioral and emotional 
implications. Guilt and shame are both conceptualized as self-­‐referential, “moral” 




attribute, as opposed to shame’s indictment of the entire self, and guilt is generally less 
painful than shame. Literally, this translates to the following: a guilty person might 
express that “I feel bad for doing that,” whereas a person feeling shameful might express 
that “I hate myself.” Despite extensive empirical research that distinguishes guilt from 
shame, including behavioral, cognitive, social and cultural approaches, prior attempts to 
formalize and measure White guilt have often conflated the two emotions. 
 A second problematic trend that emerges in the psychological study of White guilt 
is the tendency to assume that a lay psychological understanding of guilt exists and that 
most people share or understand psychologists’ definition of the construct, and its 
distinction. Because Swim and Miller’s (1999) five-­‐item White guilt scale actually uses 
the words “guilt” and “guilty” in individual items, it is thereby dependent upon a 
common definitional understanding of what “guilt” means (feels, looks like, etc.) and its 
distinction from other forms of self-­‐conscious, negative affect; the same critique can be 
lodged against the more psychometrically and conceptually sophisticated PCRW scale 
(Spanierman and Heppner, 2004). Conversely, Tangney and Dearing (2002) have 
advocated for the use of scenario-­‐based measures, such as the Test of Self-­‐Conscious 
Affect-­‐3 (TOSCA-­‐3), that assess “proneness” to guilt and shame (as opposed to state or 
in-the-moment guilt and shame) without requiring respondents to possess psychological 
knowledge of the terms “guilt” and “shame” or the psychological distinctions between 
them.5 The TOSCA-­‐3 is composed of hypothetical scenarios and asks respondents to rank 
several possible responses to each scenario on a 1 to 5 scale, with higher numbers 
                                                
5 Proneness, as opposed to state guilt or shame, leans toward measurement of trait guilt 
and shame. Trait characteristics offer global information about a person that tends to be 




indicating greater likelihood of that particular response. None of the scenarios or 
responses contains the words guilt or shame; instead, the instrument ‘taps’ or captures 
these emotions by presenting anxiety-provoking hypothetical situations that are likely to 
elicit these feelings and then offering potential reactions. Because one situation may elicit 
different responses among different people and simultaneous or contradictory responses 
in the same individual, the TOSCA-3 allows respondents to indicate that they would be 
likely to react in multiple ways. In other words, they are not forced to react in only the 
ways predicted by psychologists nor possess an academic knowledge of guilt and shame. 
Though this kind of scenario-based, multidimensional scale produces more 
psychometrically complex and sometimes ambiguous data (Fowler, 1995), it is preferred 
to overly simplistic forms of survey measurement. 
The resulting data from the TOSCA-3 are divided into four inter-related 
subscales: shame-proneness, guilt-proneness, and two related emotions, detachment and 
externalization (of blame). Detachment and externalization are included as subscales 
because of their significant correlations with shame; Tangney and Dearing (2002) assert 
that both are ways of avoiding feelings of shame and can be indicators of latent shame 
and/or guilt. Swim and Miller (1999) note that White shame might motivate defensive 
reactions to confronting inequality and racism, as opposed to the compensatory behaviors 
triggered by White guilt. Furthermore, detachment and externalization appear to have 
potentially profound consequences for a theory of White guilt, because they may signal 
its presence when other forms of measurement might not be able to detect White guilt 
using self-report surveys and other forms of quantitative and qualitative assessment. 




argue that Swim and Miller’s proposition that “it might be useful to differentiate between 
White guilt and White shame” is a profound understatement. These problems, as well as 
the question of individual versus collective or ‘corporate’ guilt (Doosje et al., 1998), will 
be addressed empirically in Chapter 3, but now I turn to the relationship between context 
and method that motivate my intersectional, interactionist approach to White guilt.  
Neoliberalism and Implications for Cultural Psychology 
Realizing a truly cultural psychology necessitates careful consideration of the 
cultural and historical contexts in which psychosocial processes are constituted and 
manifest (Gergen, 1973; Markus, Kitayama & Heiman, 1996). The White guilt that is the 
subject of this dissertation, accordingly, is a psychosocial process that is situated within a 
particular time and space: the United States, at the beginning of the 21st century, in the 
lives actual White people and popular, mass-mediated discourse. Recently, through a lens 
that identifies and critiques the politics of “neoliberalism,” scholars in the humanities and 
social sciences have worked to explain the contradictions and inequities endemic to race 
relations, specifically, and identity politics, generally, in the contemporary U.S. 
Originally a concept developed in the arena of political science and studies of 
international relations, neoliberalism is the term used to describe the ideology behind 
“globalization” and the policies and strategies employed by powerful Western 
governments (e.g., the United Kingdom, the United States), military coalitions (e.g., the 
U.N., NATO) and policy organizations, such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, to spread liberal political-economic interests and unequal trade policies 
across the globe, typically in the name of promoting freedom and democracy. In 




and activists as promoting postmodern forms of imperialism. Neoliberalism is a category 
that exists conceptually above ideological labels such as “Republican,” “Democrat,” 
“liberal,” “conservative” or “neoconservative”; indeed, neoliberalism is such a pervasive 
hegemony that contemporary manifestations of each of these political positions are 
constituted within and by the logics of neoliberalism.6 Though much academic work that 
studies and critiques neoliberalism has focused on issues of empire and globalization, 
including macro-economic concerns over the flow of capital, the War on Terror and 
macro-sociological relationships between political entities (see Pietrse, 2007), scholars 
have also examined the cultural impact of neoliberalism both internationally and in the 
United States.   
Political scientist, queer theorist and leading Americanist Lisa Duggan’s (2003) 
work elucidates neoliberalism’s influence on domestic social policies and the discourse 
on identity and inequity at the turn of the 21st century. Broadly defined, in the terms of 
‘domestic’ affairs, neoliberalism is the dominant structuring of intersecting economic, 
cultural and political processes that result in a privileging of privatization, upward 
economic distribution, and a dismantling of the social welfare state (Duggan, 2003). 
Duggan (2003), Sara Ahmed (2006), Nikhil Pal Singh (2007), Jodi Melamed (2004), Eric 
Lott (2006) and other leading figures of American Studies have posited interventions that 
collectively suggest that neoliberalism is the dominant era, cultural aesthetics, politics 
and epistemology of our time. As articulated by Lisa Duggan, neoliberalism “organizes 
material and political life in terms of race, gender, and sexuality as well as economic 
                                                
6 It might be better to say that neoliberalism has developed into a term that can be used to 
describe or denote a variety of hegemonies that interlock to create globalized systems of 




class and nationality, or ethnicity and religion. But the categories through which 
Liberalism (and also neoliberalism) classifies human activity and relationships actively 
obscure the connections among these organizing terms.” These processes subsequently 
silence critiques of structural inequality along lines of race, ethnicity, class, gender, and 
sexuality within a multicultural framework that allows for superficial inclusion of 
difference (Grzanka & Maher, in review). Under neoliberalism, race, ethnicity and other 
markers of difference are embraced by a superficial multiculturalism that celebrates 
diversity while shutting down any discussion of power and inequitable access to 
resources. As Melamed (2006) explains, “Race continues to permeate capitalism’s 
economic and social processes, organizing the hyperextraction of surplus value from 
racialized bodies and naturalizing a system of capital accumulation that grossly favors the 
global North over the global South. Yet multiculturalism portrays neoliberal policy as the 
key to a postracist world of freedom and opportunity” (p. 1). Neoliberal hegemonic 
conditions precipitate, according to Melamed, discourses of multiculturalism that suggest 
America is post-racial; such discourses have only been amplified with the 2008 election 
of Barack Obama to the U.S. Presidency. Gallagher (2008) asserts that neoliberal 
ideology produces a standpoint held by the majority of White Americans whereby “the 
imperatives of the market have rid society of the irrationality of racism” and other forms 
of inequity (p.165). According to Gallagher, concordant colorblind racisms facilitate 
dominant groups’ perspectives that racial inequality is the result of cultural pathologies or 
individual choices made and internalized by racial and ethnic minorities, as opposed to 




Like any hegemony, neoliberalism is inherently in flux and always re-inventing 
itself to accommodate the discontinuities between material reality and neoliberal 
ideology. Literature on neoliberalism tends to emphasize the many contradictions that 
permeate its ideological framework and policy implications. In his analysis of the Bush 
Doctrine and the military strategies of the United States in the wake of the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks, Pieterse highlights the inconsistencies that arise when unilateral 
force is deployed within rhetorics of freedom and liberty so central to neoliberalism’s 
legitimacy as a foreign policy agenda: 
Applying the entire arsenal of instruments of power open up multiple fronts and 
as many points of contradiction. How, for instance, do freedom and democracy 
rhyme with the use of military force? How does the liberal use of depleted 
uranium ammunition square with bringing liberty? (p. 80) 
In order for neoliberalism to function in international and domestic spheres, discourse 
about its structural inequalities and undemocratic logic cannot sufficiently breach the 
mainstream so as to reveal the hypocrisies and il-logics of neoliberal movements such 
economic globalization and multiculturalism. Accordingly, neoliberalism is always in 
danger of legitimation crisis (Gramsci, 1971; Habermas, 1975). This has meaningful 
implications for the cultural and psychological study of race in the United States, because 
neoliberalism facilitates forms of discourse that actively obscure the materiality of 
persistent and pervasive racialized economic, political and ideological inequity and the 
varied ways in which racial inequity interfaces with other systems of identity-based 
subordination and oppression (Collins, 1990/2000). Specifically, Whiteness is a “site of 




taken-for-granted space for the upward redistribution of (multiple forms of) capital 
(Clarke, 2005). Whiteness remains unfairly, disproportionately and violently privileged in 
contemporary U.S. racial formations, at it has been throughout the history of the nation 
and its colonies; however, the discursive articulation and material reality of today’s 
Whiteness is historically unique to the conditions of postmodernity and neoliberal 
multiculturalism. Accordingly, the effects of neoliberalism not only manifest in the realm 
of discourse and social policies, but in the ways in which people think and talk about race 
and other forms of socio-political identity in the United States.7  
Yet, much of the academic discourse about White guilt, specifically, retains a 
one-dimensional and linear conceptualization of personal and collective racial guilt that 
presupposes a guilty White populace and a victimized Black minority, which is arguably 
a form of cultural residue from the colonial roots of the nation, the Civil Rights 
movement (Ellison, 1996) and deeply embedded Western ontologies of self-psychology, 
guilt and shame (Carroll, 1985). Perhaps even more importantly, there is an assumption 
in such research that ordinary Americans recognize said inequities and agree with this 
dualistic and binary representation of U.S. race relations. However, multiculturalism both 
demographically, economically and rhetorically challenges such a simple rendering of 
                                                
7 I do not mean to imply here that neoliberal discourse, including multiculturalism or 
postraciality, comes squarely before attitudes or emotions about race in the contemporary 
United States, which will signify a unidirectional relationship between neoliberalism and 
political identity. Such a model would also seem to suggest that neoliberalism comes 
from “above” or even nowhere. Indeed, the relationship between social attitudes and 
neoliberal hegemony is more accurately described as co-constitutive. However, it is 
important to recognize that neoliberalism does not just refer to cultural practices nor do 
all people equally shape its conditions and ideologies. Major political figures and 
governmental bodies have disproportionate effects on neoliberal policy agendas and 
thereby exert disproportionately strong influence on the cultural contexts in which 




race relations by presenting diverse images of White and Black people, as well as many 
people of other races, including ambiguous and mixed raciality that challenges, subverts 
and transforms the black/white binary. Highly influential symbols of affluent African 
Americans in popular media culture provide ammunition for the defense of the racial 
status quo and obscure the complex heterogeneity of Black experiences, including 
differences in sexuality, gender and class (Collins, 2005), as well as similarities in 
experience that include systemic discrimination, unequal access to unequal resources, 
symbolic violence, hate crimes, unfair persecution and criminalization. The cacophony of 
information and representations characterized by postmodern media cultures facilitates 
the discursive schizophrenia of neoliberalism (Gergen, 2000), in which making any kind 
of sense structural relations of power is exceedingly difficult and variations in experience 
are easily reduced to individual choices and actions. Extreme forms of racialized, 
economic stratification exists alongside disproportionate over-representation of Blacks – 
especially Black men – in television, film and music; meanwhile, Whites maintain 
control over a shrinking number of corporations that control access to an increasingly 
huge proportion of media outlets and mediums for information dissemination (Hunt, 
2005; Gray, 2005; Means Coleman, 1998; see also Screen Actors Guild, 2006).  
I do not suggest that neoliberal hegemony is so inescapable or universally 
affecting that all people in the United States think about race, identities and inequality in 
the same way or that intervening in such discourses that obfuscate systemic 
discrimination is impossible. However, I do believe that disrupting the inequalities 
engendered by neoliberalism – and the multiculturalism and so-called “colorblind” 




methodological approach that addresses the impact of neoliberalism on the ontologies of 
race and responsibility in the contemporary United States. In other words, I presume that, 
like all cultural systems, race and White guilt are being made and re-made in 21st century 
discourse, and that – even though contemporary rhetoric would suggest otherwise – these 
concepts interface with other systems of inequity, such as sexism, heteronormativity and 
classism. Approaching these concepts with an epistemology and logic that fails to see 
these points of intersection and which neglects to conceptualize race, social identity and 
guilt as interpersonally dynamic and historically contingent is only likely to reinforce 
what we already assume and to reflect academic discourse more than material reality. The 
situation at-hand necessitates a sufficiently reflexive and multidimensional approach to 
the study of White guilt in order to first capture the complexity of the social relationships 
that create differences, identities and inequalities, and then to intervene in these 
discourses so as to promote social justice. 
Conclusion: Toward an Intersectional Interactionism 
 Based in the critical review of literature that has composed the majority of this 
chapter, I conclude by making the case for an intersectional approach to the study of 
White guilt that is grounded in the principles of symbolic interactionism. Though this 
dissertation employs a variety of methodologies, the research design and theoretical 
positioning has been thoroughly influenced by the domains of Black feminist thought, 
which is synonymous with intersectionality (Collins, 2000), and symbolic interactionism, 
which is descendent from the philosophical tradition of American pragmatism. Though 




capacity for reflexivity and political subjectivity that lends itself to the production of 
critical social theory – that is, social theory for justice. 
The origins of interactionism. Generally, symbolic interactionism (SI) is both a 
theoretical and methodological approach to social interaction that a) characterizes social 
interaction as the foundation of the self and b) relies on empirical, qualitative observation 
and analysis to uncover meaning-making in social interaction. George Hebert Mead was 
an American philosopher and pragmatist and is credited as one of the earliest and most 
influential developers of the SI perspective (Denzin, 1992). SI is a diverse field with a 
variety of theoretical approaches (e.g., pragmatic, dramaturgical, feminist, 
phenomenological and interpretive approaches) as well as a range of qualitative 
methodologies, such as ethnography (feminist, postmodern, semiotic, structural, practical, 
etc.); biographical, life history; traditional interviewing and participant observation; 
creative interviewing; and historical analysis, to name some of the major strands of 
practice. According to Denzin (1992), SI is descendant from the pragmatist tradition led 
by James, Mead, Pierce and Dewey, who developed theories of “knowing, truth, science 
and meaning” (p. 5). The pragmatists fostered a sense of cultural romanticism in the 
interactionist heritage, which is congruent with the left and liberal romanticism of such 
major American and European figures as Emerson, Marx, Gramsci (1971) and Martin 
Luther King, Jr. SI’s birth is often associated with the 1890 publication of James’ 
Principles of Psychology, Dewey’s 1896 “The Reflexive Arc Concept in Psychology,” 
Cooley’s 1902 Human Nature and the Social Order and Mead’s 1910 “What Social 




sociology and sociological social psychology – not disciplinary psychology (Denzin, 
1992).  
 In 1937, Blumer introduced the term “symbolic interactionist,” to label those 
scholars of the pragmatist tradition of studying the nature of social phenomenon, an 
explicit acknowledgement of the contributions of Mead and the field’s other leading 
founders (Blumer, 2004). In 1986, Blumer articulated six “root images” that characterize 
the central preoccupations of SI: 1. human groups or societies; 2. social interaction; 3. 
objects; 4. the human being as actor; 5. human action; and 6. the interconnectedness of 
lines of action (qtd. in Blumer, 2004; p. xiii). Clarke (2005) elaborates Blumer’s “root 
image,” claiming that such “root metaphors” of SI function as somewhat tacit knowledge 
guiding interactionist projects. For Clarke, the framework of analysis often employed by 
Chicago symbolic interactionists is “tacitly rooted in a metaphor of human action as an 
arrow or arrows moving forward through time, where the key actions are to be specified 
during the research and the path of the arrow(s) may well thus become understood as 
convoluted” (p. 39). Denzin (1992) offers his perspective on what interactionists do: 
[Symbolic interactionists] study the intersections of interaction, biography, and 
social structure in particular historical moments. Interactional experience is 
assumed to be organized in terms of the motives and accounts that persons give 
themselves for acting. These accounts are learned from others, as well as from 
popular culture. These motives, gendered and nongendered, explain past behavior 
and are used to predict future behavior. They are ideological constructions which 




Clarke has argued that SI is “always-already” postmodern to the extent that its root 
metaphors reflect a troubled relationship to the modernist investments of traditional 
social psychological approaches to the self in social and cultural interaction. Other 
contemporary interactionists, such as Ken Plummer (1996; 2003; see also Stein & 
Plummer, 1996), have integrated queer theories and postmodern perspectives that unsettle 
some fundamental assumptions of SI that had been taken for granted in earlier 
interactionist work. As Plummer (2003) explicates, “Queer is seen as partially 
deconstructing our own discourses and creating a greater openness in the way we think 
through our categories,” including the nature of ‘identity’ and ‘the self’ (p. 522). To 
interactionists, queer theory poses the question: what happens to the practices and 
performance of ‘sexuality,’ when the ontology of sexual identity categories is thoroughly 
disrupted by the process of queering SI? The implications of such a question are 
significant to re-thinking implicit structures of heteronormativity that have influences the 
SI intellectual project during the 20th and 21st centuries. However, Clarke, Plummer, 
Denzin and other contemporary interactionists retain pragmatism’s investment in political 
action, democratic knowledge production and social justice, which are all arguably 
“modern” concepts reflective of pragmatism’s modernist tendencies. Similarly, Plummer 
notes that “…interactionism – unlike much postmodernism – does not wish to lose its 
grip on the ‘obdurate empirical world’ and its search for a truth that will at least hold for 
the time being” (p. 520). Moreover, it is precisely the provisional and critical willingness 
to adopt identity categories, to emphasize the utility of said labels and to be preoccupied 




compatibility with Black feminist epistemology and the methodology of intersectionality, 
which itself maintains a complicated relationship with postmodernism.  
From variables to intersections. Efforts to treat race, gender, sexuality and other 
“dimensions of difference” as separate and isolated variables of human experience, as 
sociologist and Black feminist theorist Patricia Hill Collins (2000) has argued, elide the 
reality of human experiences. In actuality, lived experiences are framed by the 
intersections of social identity categories, or “intersectionality.” Collins first defines 
“intersectionality” as a concept: “particular forms of intersecting oppressions,” such as 
race and gender, or race and nation (p. 18). Intersectional scholarship thereby explores 
the ways in which intersecting oppressions shape social life, historically and 
contemporarily. Intersectionality “remind[s] us that oppression cannot be reduced to one 
fundamental type, and that oppressions work together in producing injustice” (p. 18). For 
Collins, analyses that privilege race at the expense of other organizing categories of 
social experience obfuscate the ways in which race is shaped by other meaningful 
identities. Race does not have to be marginalized in order to examine other categories 
simultaneously; intersectional theoretical and methodological innovations have 
demonstrated instead how we can better understand race and all structures of identity and 
oppression in the context of multi-dimensional experiences. 
 Intersectional analyses are purposefully distinct from additive models that simply 
incorporate multiple axes of difference and treat identity categories as discreet variables 
(see Cole, 2009, for an explanation of what this looks like). Moreover, Dill (1979) argues 
that Black women’s knowledge about their social worlds may at best not easily fit into 




reduce Black women’s lived experiences into one-dimensional narratives that deny the 
inter-related meanings of race, class and gender for the very people being studied. In the 
late 1970s, before intersectionality had been fully articulated, Dill and others were 
arguing for a new paradigm – for and by Black women – that could rely on Black 
women’s experiences (i.e., histories) to destabilize supposedly given or static categories 
(e.g., race, gender) and racial formations. By the late 1990s, intersectional scholars had 
asserted that dimensions of difference could no longer be treated merely as variables, as 
Zinn and Dill (1996) insisted: “Race, class, gender and sexuality are not reducible to 
individual attributes to be measured and assessed for their separate contribution in 
explaining social outcomes…where a woman’s identity consists of the sum of parts 
neatly divisible from one another” (p. 327).  
 Though this brief genealogy of intersectionality begins in race, class and gender 
studies, intersectional theory and methods have ushered transformations in areas of 
research and teaching across the social sciences and humanities. Intersectionality can 
even be found in such fields as environmental policy, epidemiology and public health. 
Scholars of color working in sexuality studies have used intersectional analyses to 
highlight the ways in which much of what came to be known as “queer theory” was 
flawed by an inherent bias toward the experiences of White, middle-class, gay men; a 
resulting “queer of color critique” has emerged (Ferguson, 2004; Johnson & Henderson, 
2005; Muñoz, 1999). Similar critiques have occurred in disability studies (Thomson, 
1997), and throughout ethnic studies projects (Reed, 2001). Black feminist thought has 
also turned the intersectional critique on itself in recent years, exposing an investment in 




scholarship (Collins, 2005). Intersectionality, though grounded and originating in the 
lived experiences of U.S. Black women (Crenshaw, 1989, 1993), has proven to be a 
potent and productive critique throughout the humanities and social sciences and across 
diverse areas of study and policy projects (McCall, 2005). In other words, though social 
justice is always at the center of it, intersectionality is not exclusively relevant to the 
study of Black women’s issues; Black feminist thought, as Collins (2000) asserts, is 
committed to social and economic justice for U.S. Black women and similarly oppressed 
groups around the world (p. 9). Indeed, intervening in the discourses of racism, sexism, 
heterosexism and other systems of oppression requires uncovering and challenging 
injustices throughout human experience. Black feminists have long argued that we are all 
in this – the fight for justice – together. Accordingly, Black feminists such as Collins 
(1998) have maintained a critical distance from those postmodern approaches, such as 
deconstruction, that privilege analyses of mediated discourse above all other forms of 
social interaction and which describe hegemony as impenetrable and inequality as 
inevitable. This kind of method and theoretical position negates the possibility for claims 
to and strategies for social justice by turning identities and inequalities into linguistic 
tropes and rhetorical moves that are divorced from materiality (Butler, 1993). As Collins 
(1998) has astutely argued, this kind of scholarship tends to only benefit those kinds of 
multiply privileged -- and traditionally White male – academics who produce it. 
 Investigating how the phenomenology of White guilt shifts along axes of 
sexuality, class and gender is not an optional pursuit. Principally, both the racial category 
“White” and the emotion of “guilt” are constituted within historical matrices of identity 




inequality and class discrimination. As Ahmed (2004b) detailed, the history of emotions 
reveals a persistent gendering of emotionality that locates feeling(s) within a feminized 
body – one that can be both female and/or queer8. Psychologists have found empirical 
evidence to suggests that women and men “learn” guilt and shame in different ways; the 
propensity to feel guilty and shameful, as well as what these emotions look like, is further 
complicated by sexual identity (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Roberts & Goldberg, 2007). 
If we accept what Ahmed (2004b) theorizes, which is that, “Shame can also be 
experienced as the affective cost of not following the scripts of normative existence,” then 
we must at least consider the possibility that White guilt may feel and be different for 
those people whose identities are culturally constructed as inherently worthy of shame (p. 
107; see also Sedgwick, 2003; Perez, DeBord & Bieschke, 2000; Herek, Gillis & Cogan, 
2009). Furthermore, cultural differences are afforded great power in the study of self-
conscious emotions, but typically focus on how Other people’s feelings differ from 
Americans or those in the West (Markus & Kitayama, 1994; Kitayama & Markus, 1994). 
In this dissertation, the Americanness of White guilt is hardly considered neutral or the 
standard from which other forms of guilt should be evaluated; instead, this White guilt is 
                                                
8 The term “queer” is contested knowledge; furthermore, the concept has multiple 
ontologies, which are dependent upon on culture, politics, historical situatedness, etc. In 
this dissertation, I will use the term “queer” in two capacities. First, it will serve as an 
umbrella term to describe people with non-normative sexual identities and who engage in 
non-normative sexual practices, including those people more typically identified by the 
rubric LGBTQ. I do recognize, and will make clear when appropriate, that “queer” is also 
a particular kind of politicized sexual identity – one that I embrace myself and sometimes 
distinguish from the term “gay,” which has contemporary neoliberal connotations in 21st 
century gay politics (see Duggan, 2003). Second, I will use “queer” in the context of 
queer theories and the analytic mode of destabilizing heternormative foundations of 
Western epistemology, ontology, methodology, etc. Nikki Sullivan (2003) offers an 
accessible primer on the debates over “queer” in her Critical Introduction to Queer 




posited as a particularized and situated cultural practice. Critical studies of Whiteness 
have sufficiently demonstrated the centrality of class to the historical ontology and lived 
experience of White racial identity (Roediger, 2007), so it is less difficult in this context 
to conceptualize (and literally see) the intersectionality of race and class. However, the 
intersectionality of race, sexuality and gender is more tricky because race is over-
privileged in the discourse on White guilt as the determinant factor of its history (Steele, 
2006) and the only social identity variable principally relevant to its empirical 
investigation (Swim & Miller, 1999). Furthermore, moving beyond a gender and sexual 
differences model that treats gender and sexuality as merely independent variables and 
signifiers of inherent differences is particularly challenging, because some amount of 
categorical simplicity is necessary in order to make sense of the complexity of 
intersectional experiences (McCall, 2005; Cole, 2009). Nevertheless, the analytic 
orientations and rhetorical tendencies of both SI and intersectionality privilege the 
emergent – those previously unrecognized and taken-for-granted circumstances of human 
experience that emerge though critical social research (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Dill, 
McLaughlin & Nieves, 2007). In this project, mixed-methods, which are innovative 
strategies of approaching objects of study using traditionally disparate means of 
constructing knowledge, will be used to develop “diffractions” that expose emergent, 
intersectional configurations of racialized affect (Haraway, 1997). 
 In summary, intersectionalists and interactionists share a commitment to the 
following: 1) empiricism, in that both approaches aim to reflect reality and lived 
experiences; 2) reflexivity, because both value deep historicism and conceptualize the 




are invested in the production of democratic knowledges for social justice. Some 
interactionists have already demonstrated the compatibility of these approaches; their 
work strongly influences my own and shapes what I see as an emerging intersectional 
interactionist paradigm (see Mamo, 2007). For example, Janet Shim’s (2005) impressive 
ethnographic work on cardiovascular disease (CVD) finds meaningful distinctions 
between how epidemiologists and people with CVD conceive of race as a factor 
contributing to risk, prevalence and experience of CVD. Her interactionist work is 
pointedly intersectional, as she a) conceptualizes race as a social difference that is 
inextricably linked to other dimensions of difference relative to context (situation) and 
subject to change over time and space (social and individual life history), and b) 
interrogates the construction of categories of difference (especially race, gender and 
class) and the ways in which their deployment by medical researchers and practitioners 
shapes social interactions. Accordingly, and echoing Foucault (1970; 1972) and Haraway 
(1997), she posits that racial differences are common “objects of study” in epidemiology, 
and that they serve to create natures of bodies, difference and diseases, that order power 
relations and frame representations of human interaction. She focuses on the disciplinary 
authority of epidemiology, explaining how its disciplinary power has the result of 
shaping what “we” – the lay public – believe about our bodies and differences between 
our bodies and Others’ bodies. Shim offers important critique of disciplinary 
epidemiology, which tends to view (the material effects, or materiality of) 
intersectionality as a technical conundrum or statistical nuisance, even though her 
participants emphasize the importance of structural inequalities in their personal health 




and mean different things to different people. Shim’s interactionist intersectionality 
demonstrates the fruitfulness of approaching representations and structures with an 
integrative lens directed toward sites of silence. 
A “new” White guilt? I have devoted substantial space in this chapter to 
explaining the epistemological configurations of intersectionality and SI in order to make 
explicit the analytic tools with which I interrogate White guilt within this project. An 
intersectional interactionist perspective offers a productive, critical framework with 
which to begin a conversation that re-grounds White guilt in the reality of Whiteness, 
racism and discourses of responsibility in the early 21st century. Through this review of 
literature, I have attempted to show how diverse disciplinary approaches to White guilt 
have created an particular, historicized object of study – one that is reflective as much of 
assumptions about White guilt as its “materiality,” which refers to the citational, 
discursive practices that shape its constitution within contemporary race relations (Butler, 
1993). These varying approaches have explored White guilt and race relations at different 
levels of analyses, ranging from the intrapsychic work of Tangney and Dearing (2002) 
and the micro-sociology of Clarke (2003), to the historicized rhetoric of Ahmed’s (2006) 
nonperformative antiracist speech acts and the macro-sociology of Omi and Winant 
(1994). All of these levels – once critically and vertically integrated – contribute to a 
multidimensional rendering of the constructs and situations at-hand. I have argued that a 
static understanding of race and guilt limits our ability to account of the diversity and 
complexity of experiences that are engendered by multiculturalism and neoliberalism, 
which describes the historical conditions in which Whiteness is given meaning today. 




accounted for so we can better understand how White guilt is experienced differently and 
means different things to diverse White peoples, while balancing a need for conceptual 
precision (McCall, 2005; Cole, 2009). Up to this point, however, my argument has been 
primarily analytical and theoretical. The remainder of this dissertation retains an 
emphasis on critical analysis, but shifts my focus to the descriptive and empirical. Indeed, 
empirical evidence – the lived experiences of White people and discourse found in the 
archives of popular media – must drive the attempt herein to unsettle these assumptions 
about White guilt and to construct a more psychologically and culturally astute account 






I first moved to Columbia Heights in June 2005. The neighborhood is situated at 
the center of Washington, D.C. both literally and figuratively. The relatively large 
rectangle-shaped neighborhood straddles 14th Street NW and begins at Florida Ave, 
spanning from midtown to uptown and serving as the transitional space between what 
looks like the city and what begins to resemble the suburbs. 
 The story of Columbia Heights is well chronicled by the local press, city 
historians and ordinary Washingtonians, including longtime residents, recent transplants, 
people who visit the neighborhood for shopping and nightlife, and folks who have never 
(and would never) step inside its boundaries. Once rural and briefly home to what would 
become George Washington University, Columbia Heights became a middle- and 
working-class African American neighborhood during the first half of the 20th century. 
The neighborhood sits just north of the U Street corridor of the Shaw neighborhood, 
sometimes referred to as D.C.’s version of Harlem and long considered the center of 
Black arts and culture in the city. In 1968, when the city erupted in riots after the 
assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., rioters traveled up 14th Street from U Street and 
devastated Columbia Heights, especially the mostly Black-owned businesses along 14th. 
In the wake of the riots, which effectively eviscerated several Black neighborhoods 
across Northwest and Northeast Washington, the city and federal government quickly 
modified its plans for a subway system, rerouting a mid-city line to the areas hardest hit 
by the riots. The idea was to provide mass transit to these areas and connect them to the 
rest of the District and suburbs, which would eventually spark economic development 




Northwest quadrant. The Metro subway system opened in 1976 with the debut of the Red 
Line, which dips into the city like a horseshoe with both of its ends in affluent 
Montgomery County, Maryland, home to the some of the wealthiest areas of the planet, 
such as Bethesda, Potomac and Chevy Chase. The mid-city Green Line was finally fully 
functional in 2001, 33 years after the riots and 25 years after the opening of Metro. 
 The story of Columbia Heights epitomizes the District of Columbia in the 21st 
century because it became a hotspot of gentrification in the wave of re-urbanization and 
the astronomical housing bubble that lasted for most of the first decade of the century. If 
subtle forms of gentrification were happening across the region, Columbia Heights 
exemplified the real estate frenzy and how young White college-graduates and 
professionals from across the country were creating a new urban oasis in what had been a 
largely abandoned and disinvested region of the city. In the early 2000s, Columbia 
Heights was known simultaneously and contradictorily as a haven of hipster coolness that 
promised to be the newest real estate goldmine and as a hotbed of gang activity, drug 
dealing and general violence perpetrated by young African Americans. Columbia Heights 
was a veritable borderlands – both ‘ghetto’ and ‘cool,’ ‘edgy’ and ‘scary.’ 
I was 21 when I moved to the neighborhood, having spent some time there in the 
preceding months and getting comfortable in what was surely the most urban area I had 
ever contemplated living. I moved into a converted Victorian rowhouse on Fairmont 
Street NW with a roommate (a White woman) on the eve of the opening of a new 
gourmet Giant grocery store and just as plans were announced to bring a Target store to 
the neighborhood within the next few years. There was a subsidized housing complex at 




around by myself at night. But I became comfortable by the end of the summer and began 
to feel at home in the neighborhood. No one called me a ‘faggot,’ and the teenagers who 
were making headlines for gang-related ‘pack attacks’ and daytime shootings weren’t 
giving my boyfriend and me any trouble. Also, living in ‘CH’ came with some social 
capital and street cred, among White folks at least. For example, local friends and I would 
frequently engage in conversations filled with hipster- and yuppie-bashing in which we 
use our committed antiracism and awareness of structural inequity to distinguish 
ourselves from those other White people in Columbia Heights. Most importantly, I could 
afford to live there and was happy, so I ultimately chose to stay in the ‘hood after my 
roommate and I split. I got a new apartment a few blocks away in adjacent Mt. Pleasant, 
and moved once more back to Fairmont Street in April 2007.  
My new apartment was in the basement of a home owned by a French immigrant 
and his American wife; both were White. I met my neighbor, Tommy, within a day or 
two of moving in. Tommy was a lifelong Washingtonian who had lived his whole life in 
his house on Fairmont. His brother was a prominent local jazz musician, and they both 
were deeply involved in the city’s arts community. Tommy, who had long since retired 
from fulltime work, had sold real estate professionally and knew who occupied most 
every home on the block. In random meetings outside our houses, he would tell me 
stories about the neighborhood, including what famous people had lived on the street and 
which prominent Washingtonians quietly called Fairmont Street their home. He told me 
how things had changed, and how much of the neighborhood had stayed the same while 
Columbia Heights became the new ‘It’ location. I helped him with his groceries and yard 




a theatre restoration project he was spearheading on T Street NW. Our friendship was 
comforting to me, because Tommy was a kind person with knowledge that I found 
meaningful and because we represented something important to me. In a neighborhood 
that was characterized by interracial conflict between White yuppie newcomers, poor 
Latino immigrants and longtime Black residents of the middle and working class, 
Tommy and I got along just fine. We weren’t going to change the culture of the 
neighborhood together or end the structural inequities that were so endemic to the rapid 
gentrification of Columbia Heights, but we did work. Older, Black, lifetime 
Washingtonian, and new, younger, White, gay Washingtonian. Somehow, we 
transcended the narrative that defined the “new” Columbia Heights. We were alright.  
One night in late May, my boyfriend and I walked home to his apartment, which 
was just up the block from mine. This was our routine, because Joe had a dog that needed 
to be fed and let out. We did this all the time. That night, I was wearing flip-flops and a 
bright green track jacket that had the word “Ireland” on the back. We were not holding 
hands. We were laughing. Just after midnight, as we turned onto Fairmont Street, a young 
man about my height hit me on the back of my head, knocking my glasses off as he ran in 
front of me. I didn’t know what was happening, but my boyfriend started to scream. I got 
hit again by someone else and fell on the ground. I had never been hit before. Joe was in 
front of me on the ground. He kept screaming as they kicked and hit us. I covered my 
head, because there were several guys hitting me in the face. They kept yelling, “Give us 
the money!” I was afraid, but I wasn’t panicking. I thought I might die, but I remembered 
what my mother always told me: give them your money. I tried to reach for my wallet in 




enough to get my wallet. I think Joe said we didn’t have any cash, but mostly he just kept 
screaming for help, and for them to stop. It went on for some amount of time, but I’m not 
sure how long. More then seconds, less than minutes. It was painful. I thought I might 
die. I tried to cover Joe’s head, because he was screaming so much. They were laughing.  
At some point, it was over. I learned later that a couple who was walking home 
had started to yell at our attackers and said they were calling the cops. This is probably 
what scared the guys away. Joe got up and started calling 911 and asking if I was OK. I 
remember that my head did not hurt, but I couldn’t see through a swollen eye and the 
blood all over my face. My feet and knees were scraped and bleeding; that’s the pain I 
remember. Joe kept looking at me. The police and ambulance came. I don’t remember 
much of what they said, except that I had to get in the ambulance. One officer, a Black 
woman, said she was sorry. She had been around the corner on patrol. She said she could 
have stopped them. They tried to give me an IV en route to George Washington 
University Hospital; I wouldn’t let them, because the ambulance ride was bumpy and I 
was scared. Joe was crying and looking at me.   
The hospital staff made Joe wait in the lobby for awhile when they took me back 
on the stretcher. I gave a statement to a detective, who asked me if I could offer any 
description of the attackers. I couldn’t describe their faces, but I remembered one was 
wearing a red hoodie. I only really saw their arms and fists. They were Black, I told him. 
He was Black, too. He left and I never saw or heard from him again. In the police report, 
he said that I had sustained minor injuries and that I was discharged. This made me 
angry, because he didn’t know if I was discharged and didn’t speak to my doctors. 




By 8 a.m., I had 12 sutures in my face and had undergone a CT-scan to confirm 
that there were broken bones in my face. I had no fewer than seven follow-up 
appointments with an ear-nose-and-throat specialist and an ophthalmologist, who had to 
watch to see if my right eye was slowly sinking into my head. It wasn’t. My bones healed 
on their own, without surgery. I still see the scars on my face, but no one else says they 
can see them. I see them everyday. 
In the aftermath, Joe got angry. He wishes he could have fought back, hit them, 
protected us. I got sad and scared. I didn’t want to walk anywhere at night. I sometimes 
couldn’t leave my house during the day. I used to tell my students that personal safety 
should always be attended to, but that it was important to interrogate feelings of fear, 
especially when the fear is directed at particular groups of people. I was upset, because I 
became terrified of Black teenagers. In the Metro. On campus. In broad daylight. 
I thought about what would happen to those young men, whom I call boys 
because I think they were very young – like 16, 17. What were the chances of their lives 
turning out OK? My bones would heal, and so would my psyche – eventually. But how 
do you come back from beating someone on the ground as they scream for help? How do 
you love someone after that? How do you build a family? How do you not do it again? I 
worried about the next time they would do it, and when they would be arrested, and what 
kinds of prison sentences they would get. There was a long time when I didn’t want them 
to be punished at all – I’m still not sure I see the point of it. I wanted them to have to 
come to school with me and learn. How could a person be well educated and beat 
someone while they scream for help, I thought? At least learning about the world and 




someone up again, or worse. I would talk about this with my parents on the phone and 
with my friends in our backyard on Fairmont Street. My answers are simple and naïve. I 
don’t know anything about poverty or violence. I feel like a foolish White liberal. I feel 
like a fraud, because I’m scared now. Just like the script is supposed to go, I’m afraid of 
Black kids. 
I had bruising and scabs on my face, legs and feet for weeks, so I stayed away 
from people with whom I didn’t want to talk about “the attack.” I avoided my landlords, 
because I didn’t want them to get upset. I never told them. I saw Tommy the next week, 
from afar. I waved and walked away quickly. I didn’t want to tell him what happened. I 
imagined versions of the conversation in my head, but I didn’t want to do that with him. I 
didn’t want him to express the requisite sympathy about what had happened, and to feel 
sad for me, and to bring into our relationship the harsher reality of race, which we had 
been able to avoid. It wasn’t that we had never discussed race, but we hadn’t talked about 
Black boys beating up White men down the street. 
More than fear, unsafe, worried, awkward, nervous or self-conscious, I felt….I 
felt small and victimized and it was all wrapped up in my race and my work and 
Columbia Heights. I never wore that green Ireland jacket in public again. I was 
embarrassed about what had happened. I felt disgust at myself for imagining that my 
academic knowledge about race and my antiracist politics would somehow shield me 
from the reality of my gentrifying neighborhood and my role in it. I had committed 
symbolic violence, and they had committed physical violence. I thought: I never should 




Columbia Heights. It was stupid and foolish. I helped gentrify a neighborhood. A few 
stitches are what I deserve. 
I don’t feel the same way today. I healed a bit. I cannot remember how my life 
felt before the attack, but it was impossible for me to predict how profoundly the attack 
has and will continue to affect my relationships with others and my various social worlds. 
My mother told me that she initially kept it a secret from her friends and most of our 
extended family, because she couldn’t re-conceptualize herself as the mother of a victim 







Finding White Guilt: Popular Culture and Three Moments of Crisis 
 
“We are increasingly aware of our role in informing the market that we will no 
longer pay for entertainment that capitalizes on our degradation. We are joined 
by many white men who, though not the direct targets of verbal assaults, 
understand the injury they cause.” 
 -Anita F. Hill, (May 3, 2007) in “Our wallets can shock the jocks” (The 
Boston Globe) 
 
 Sara Ahmed (2004a, 2004b) has argued that emotions should not be 
conceptualized as emanating from within the self or as constituted solely through group 
interaction (i.e., from without). Rather, she insists that emotions are the cultural practices 
that actually enable us to understand and define social groups and the self, demarcating 
and transforming the boundaries and fixities of identities. In Chapter 1, I offered a 
critique of academic thinking about White guilt using insight from Ahmed and others to 
shift critical attention from intra-psychic psychology or social history toward a more 
dynamic, interactional and culturally grounded theory of racial affect. In Chapter 2, I 
establish a critical account of the cultural contexts in which contemporary experiences of 
White guilt manifest in the early 21st century United States. In this chapter, I investigate 
the journalistic discourse about race and responsibility in three controversial episodes of 
identity-based conflict involving public figures in U.S. popular culture. I follow cultural 
theorists Hall (1997c), Ahmed (2004b) and Gergen (1990/2000), as well as social 
psychologists Stangor and Shaller (1996), in identifying mass-mediated discourse as a 




historical and cultural conditions of postmodern media culture, mass-mediated news and 
information become meaningful sources of ‘data’ with which we come to know ourselves 
and Others. Distinguishing between these mass-mediated interactions and “real” physical, 
interpersonal relationships is generally reductive and artificial, because all of these forms 
of symbolic interaction come to inform our sense of self and social worlds, albeit in 
differential and complex ways. Interactions with mass-mediated words and images are 
not equivalent to face-to-face interactions, but they co-exist and complicate our 
interpersonal experiences. In this chapter, I do not posit a causal relationship between the 
news media’s talk about race, identity and responsibility and the contemporary 
phenomenology of White guilt, but I do position this discourse as the cultural context in 
which racialized forms of affect and produced and negotiated.   
  Through a primarily descriptive analysis of these “crisis” moments, I attempt to 
offer an empirically grounded explication of the written language produced about these 
conflicts, which are situated within neoliberal multiculturalism and associated 
“colorblind” racial projects (Melamed, 2006; Omi & Winant, 1994; Bonilla-Silva, 2006). 
These controversial episodes are not positioned as deterministic of race relations or the 
contours of other identity-based social relations, but they are identified as fruitful arenas 
of inquiry because of their relative discursive prominence in U.S. media culture and for 
the ways in which each conflict made specific forms of identity-based conflicts come to 
the surface of discourse. Though these moments certainly retain meaningful “sites of 
silence” (Clarke, 2005), each involved articulations of how social identity categories, 
namely race, gender and sexuality, influence the ways in which individuals and groups of 




individual and collective/group levels. As I have previously asserted herein (see Chapter 
1), neoliberal multiculturalism necessarily makes such explicit articulations relatively 
rare – at least in ‘mainstream’ discourse – so these moments are especially productive of 
meaning and can be insightful into how people in the United States think about and 
literally feel race, guilt and shame. 
 The present chapter takes the following form: first, I explicate the logic that 
informs the selection of these three crisis moments from among a much larger pool of 
potential candidates. This is proceeded by a discussion of the methods of analysis, which 
include a modified form of grounded theory developed by Adele Clarke (2005) and 
which involves the construction of topographical visualizations of narrative discourse. 
Three “positional maps” are integrated throughout the chapter to inform the rendering of 
this discursive terrain. I investigate these narratives for evidence of how major public 
figures, reporters, commentators, and implicated actors in the three crises collectively 
construct an epistemology of race and responsibility that encompasses a variety of 
politics, subject positions, attitudes and feelings. Though each episode is discussed and 
analyzed independently, I conclude by offering some preliminary theorizing to describe 
the patterns of discourse that come to characterize such crises and which shape the 
articulation of race and responsibility in the public sphere. 
Methodologies/Methods 
 As my larger project on White guilt developed in early 2007, I endeavored to 





1. Involved one or more public figures engaging in behavior that some 
interpreted as reprehensible or warranting punishment 
2. Included both Black and White (social) actors 
3. Received sufficient journalist attention to enable analysis of print news 
coverage from multiple sources 
4. Occurred within the prior three years (early 2007-2004) 
Note that explicit talk of White guilt or shame was purposefully not a criterion for 
consideration. Rather than insist on analyzing only those moments in which journalists or 
their sources invoked “White guilt” as a specific and consciously deployed linguistic 
term, I sought to analyze moments in which White guilt as a multifaceted process might 
become implicated. Accordingly, this opened up the possibilities of finding the stuff of 
White guilt in extraordinary or unexpected contexts and conditions, including those 
controversies that might not obviously implicate and motivate negative affect from White 
people. Based on my (working) ontology of White guilt, I identified the major, requisite 
components of a discourse to at least implicate (i.e., not necessarily invoke explicitly) 
White guilt, which include but are not limited to: race, responsibility and blame. Other 
constructs of interest included gender, sexuality, punishment, emotions and collective 
identity. 
The first decade of the 21st century was marked by several high profile racial 
controversies that met the criteria above. In preliminary research, I identified a group of 
potential “scandals” that included: the Duke lacrosse team rape scandal, which involved 
several White heterosexual men and a Black woman dancer who accused three players of 




exit from his self-titled and wildly successful sketch comedy show on Comedy Central 
cable network; and pop stars Janet Jackson and Justin Timberlake’s infamous “wardrobe 
malfunction” during the 2004 Super Bowl XXXVIII halftime show that came to be 
known as “Nipplegate.” Choosing the events on which to focus was especially important 
because they would also serve to structure the in-depth interviews that constitute the 
ethnographic portion of this project (see Chapter 4). Initially, I selected the following 
three controversies: “Nipplegate”; broadcaster Anderson Cooper’s well-publicized and 
highly emotional coverage of Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath; and actor Isaiah 
Washington’s termination from the popular ABC network television drama Grey’s 
Anatomy after allegedly referring to co-star T. R. Knight as a “faggot.” Then, Don Imus 
called the Rutgers University women’s basketball team “nappy-headed ho’s” in early 
April 2007, and I substituted this rapidly unfolding scandal for the older Nipplegate. 
Though I felt that Jackson and Timberlake’s public condemnation was quite appropriate 
for the present investigation, I ultimately made the choice to analyze Imus’s comments 
and subsequent firing because I wanted to increase the likelihood that college-aged 
students would be familiar with the event when asked questions about it in interviews. 
Cooper’s coverage of Katrina was especially intriguing to me because of speculation 
about the anchor’s sexuality and how this may have influenced reception of his perceived 
emotionality while he covered the horrific aftermath of the hurricane. The Grey’s 
Anatomy crisis is different from the other two because it was largely framed as an issue of 
sexuality and not race. However, some journalists and commentators did react to the 
racialized aspect of the conflict, which was perceived as a fight between a Black, straight 




world about the so-called “down low” vis a vis author J. L. King and the Republican 
Party’s mobilization of conservative Black church leaders during the 2004 presidential 
election (Wilds Lawson, 2009; Collins, 2005), the Washington-Knight conflict became 
particularly compelling because, as I will argue, it implicated a growing cultural 
perception that the African American community is more “homophobic” or “anti-gay” 
then the rest of Americans (i.e., White people). Furthermore, this off-camera drama sat in 
stark contrast to the multicultural utopia depicted on-screen in the televisual landscape of 
Grey’s Anatomy producer Shonda Rhimes’ colorblind and sexually liberated Seattle 
Grace Hospital. 
Each of these episodes in recent history could be satisfactorily labeled as 
“scandals,” “controversies,” “flash points,” and “conflicts,” among other descriptors. 
However, I quickly began to refer to these moments as “crises,” which is a theoretical 
move that has bearing on how I analyze and make meaning out of these events. 
Descendant from the Frankfurt School tradition of Critical Theory, Jurgen Habermas’ 
theory of legitimation crisis complements the concept of hegemony – and neoliberal 
hegemony, specifically – to the extent that Habermas explains the potential for 
hegemonic systems to fall apart. Habermas (1975) is a modernist whose social theory is 
typically too formulaic and rigid to be synthesized with poststructural or postmodern 
perspectives, especially because of Habermas’ investment in Enlightenment ideals. Here I 
employ a neo-Habermasian approach; taken as an interpretive framework, as opposed to 
an inflexible prescription, I assert that his concept of legitimation crisis can be read as 




identity politics and U.S. racial hegemony without reifying his commitment to the 
modernist project of Enlightenment. 
According to Habermas (1975), the state (in democracy) must limit its 
intervention into cultural or ideological affairs for fear of being perceived as authoritarian 
or totalitarian. This by no means implies that governments do not have a stake or control 
in ideological affairs; merely that they cannot appear to be overly involved in culture. 
There is no absolute value of such over-involvement, according to Habermas, because 
levels of government intervention in culture are relative to how legitimate a particular 
government is perceived to be at a given time. Legitimation is similar to Gramsci’s 
(1971) hegemony: it connotes a system of ruling (or even domination) that at least 
appears to be democratic and inclusive, even if the material reality is quite the opposite. 
In order to sustain legitimation, the state or ruling class must give participatory rewards 
(material, symbolic or otherwise) to its constituency relative to the degree of current 
legitimation. “A legitimation crisis arises as soon as the demands for such rewards rise 
faster than the available quantity of value, or when expectations arise that cannot be 
satisfied with such rewards,” asserts Habermas. Habermas largely frames state and 
constituency interactions in socio-economic-political terms, but legitimation crises are 
ideological and communicative in nature. U.S. race relations, for example, are currently 
sustained as legitimate by neoliberal mulitculturalism, which manifests in the field of 
cultural production (Bourdieu, 1993). As Duggan (2003) and Melamed (2006) have 
argued, neoliberalism organizes inequity in terms of race, class, gender and sexuality, but 
multicultural discourses obscure the reality of this organization. In terms of the 




racial category, Whiteness, must not collectively perceive – or, I would argue: feel – that 
social policies or cultural movements are unfairly privileging White people or 
disadvantaging racial Others, especially African Americans. Overt racists are not the key 
components of this legitimation; instead, well-intentioned and even politically left-
leaning intellectuals are the critical, constitutive variables in the U.S. racial legitimation 
model (Lott, 2004). The discursive noise of multiculturalism insists upon a post-racial 
and post-identity American politics in which personal choices and agency are the 
determining factors of all social relationships. This noise is not an after-effect or 
symptom, but is actually endemic, vital part of the multiculturalism constructed by 
neoliberalism. What we observe in these three moments of crisis is the potential for this 
legitimation to be challenged and to move toward Habermas’ conception of crisis. The 
state is directly involved in only one crisis (Katrina), but is invoked in all three crises 
because of neoliberalism’s emphasis on the state-supported division of public and private 
lives, including individual rights to privacy and freedom of expression in certain domains 
but not others (Duggan). Moreover, it is cultural consensus about the inherent equity and 
fairness of American culture that becomes potentially destabilized in these moments: 
when journalists, major public figures and members of the lay public begin to articulate 
and take up positions that challenge the multicultural framework in which identity only 
matters in terms of commodifiable difference (i.e., food, festivals and fashion), not power 
(Grzanka & Maher, 2009; Melamed). 
The intersectionality of these crises was palpable and undeniable. Though a 
primary marker of difference may have been narratively constructed by the American 




Washington=sexuality, Imus=race or gender), multiple, intersecting dimensions of 
identity and oppression shaped the events themselves and their diverse responses in the 
popular, mass-mediated imaginary. To discover how these moments have been 
interpreted and taken up in discourse necessitates an analytic lens carefully tuned to hear 
and see the interconnectedness of identity categories and to capture intersectional 
complexity that would otherwise be obscured by a one-dimensional approach and are 
already obfuscated by the rhetoric of neoliberal multiculturalism (McCall, 2005; Duggan, 
2003). Rather than mine for guilt, specifically, I take these moments on their own terms. 
The goal is to see (literally, to diffract) how people other than myself – but who 
command media-based attention and some greater amount of power – talk about what 
happens when people behave in ways that are perceived as blame-worthy and how, in 
turn, these actions affect the ways in which social groups perceive each other (Haraway, 
1997; Joyce, 2008).  
Unlike other traditional forms of qualitative social research that involve analyses 
of researcher-conducted interview transcripts and field notes (Corbin & Strauss, 2008), 
the “data” for this chapter existed prior to this dissertation project. These “data” are a 
particular kind of discourse, which can include visual materials, bodies, music, digital 
objects of all kinds, multi- and mixed-media images and non-linguistic objects – a 
virtually infinite variety of forms. Incorporating multiple forms of data into a single 
“multisited” project is especially important for the task at-hand so that affect, including 
the phenomenology of White guilt, is not restricted to an artificially and arbitrarily 
constructed White, omniscient and omnipresent subject (Clarke, 2005). Symbolic 




making in micro- and macro-interactional settings (see Goffman, 1959, 1963, 1979; 
Mamo & Fishman, 2001; Joyce, 2008). Traditional discourse analyses, as Clarke (2005) 
describes, are those analytic techniques that explore how meaning is created through 
discursive practices organized around a given subject, theme or topic and/or produced by 
a given group of social actors. Critical discourse analyses, on the other hand, are 
“predicated on a Foucauldian analytics of power wherein power is potentially productive 
as well as controlling and destructive, and circulates at every level of action and 
interaction – preventing, enabling, serving as a resource, flowing sometimes wildly 
about” (Clarke, 2005; p. 150). Ahmed (2006) elaborates this process, which she calls, 
”ethnography of texts”: 
Such an approach still considers texts as actions, which “do things,” but it also 
suggests that “texts” are not “finished” as forms of action, as what they “do” 
depends on how they are “taken up.” To track what texts do, we need to follow 
them around. If texts circulate as documents or objects within public culture, then 
our task is to follow them, to see how they move as well as how they get stuck. (p. 
105) 
I elaborate on the methodological assumptions of this approach, because they are the 
epistemological foundation of my methods, which refers to the practical tools of analysis. 
I tend to locate myself in the postmodern, feminist, constructionist camp, including 
Foucault, Clarke, Haraway, etc., and centralize concerns about the constructedness of any 
research, regardless of data type. For example, I disagree with Ahmed’s (2004) elaborate 
distinction of extant data types, such as journalism news sources or creative fiction, from 




is correct, but she asserts that “the distinction between my research and interview-based 
research on emotions is in the different nature of the texts generated; the texts I read are 
ones that already ‘out there’ in the public, rather than being generated by the research 
itself” (p. 19). Though I recognize that these sources are different, those differences do 
not affect the reflexivity or sensitivity of my approach to them. In the same way that the 
interview and survey data produced, collected, digitized, transcribed and analyzed in 
chapters 3 and 4 are unique to and situated within this research, so are the texts collected 
for this discourse analysis. Ahmed’s assertion also elides how the texts got “out there.” 
As I will describe in detail, the collection and constitution of these news sources together 
as an archive of data is just as constructed and constructing as any interview or survey 
research. 
 The collection of these data involved theoretical sampling (Clarke, 2005), which 
refers to the qualitative methods approach of collecting data as informed by one’s 
theoretical approach and ongoing analyses of data already collected. In other words, 
theoretical sampling allows the data itself to guide collection of other data in order to fill 
in gaps and illuminate meaningful points of analysis (see also Corbin & Strauss, 2008; 
Fassinger, 2006). Moreover, my approach was systemic but flexible. Based in the 
feasibility of this project and my ability to collect and examine the data over an extended 
period of time, I limited the universe of potential data to print and online journalism 
sources, which includes English-language magazines, newspapers published in major 
metropolitan areas and the online components of both. I did use video of the major 
controversial infractions to learn more about what specifically happened in each crisis to 




argumentative interview with Senator Mary Landrieu, Isaiah Washington’s utterance of 
“faggot” at the Golden Globe Awards ceremony press conference and T. R. Knight’s 
interview on the Ellen DeGeneres show later that same week; all of these videos were 
obtained via YouTube. 
In the interest of obtaining sources that were likely to have been widely 
disseminated, I focused my search to two kinds of publication groups organized by 
database service-provider Lexis-Nexis, though Lexis-Nexis itself was not the only means 
by which I obtained data. First, I searched for articles about each of the three 
controversies in “major” world news sources; however, only one international editorial 
was included, and prominent journalist and author Andrew Sullivan wrote it. I 
purposefully used only sources within the United States because I wanted to learn how 
these topics were being articulated in an American context, however amorphous and 
superficial the concept “American” is materially and symbolically. “Major” is a term 
defined by Lexis-Nexis and is, as of 2009, based on combination of circulation-levels and 
professional esteem: “The Major World Publications group file, MWP, contains full-text 
news sources from around the world which are held in high esteem for their content 
reliability. This includes the world's major newspapers, magazines and trade publications 
which are relied upon for the accuracy and integrity of their reporting.” Next, I searched 
within the “U.S. Newspapers and Wires,” which is defined as: “The US Newspapers and 
Wires group source contains: 1) newspapers published in the United States and  2) wire 
services where more than 60% of the stories originate in the United States.” From this 
group, I used my own judgment to filter out stories from smaller local papers in favor of 




areas. This undoubtedly skewed my results toward a more metropolitan authorship and 
audience; though, I found that relatively little coverage was given to these national crises 
by small papers beyond re-printing of Associated Press and other wire service stories. 
Generally, I excluded all independent and alternative press, especially those with very 
small readership or no online presence. I obtained a relatively equal amount of copy for 
each crisis, which included a total of 120 articles. 
 
Figure 1. Visual representation of relationships between the crises based on journalism 
coverage. Note that there was much more overlap between articles about Imus and 













I conducted “thick” readings of each article fully before formal analyses began. 
Then, each article was read with its relevant topic area (Cooper/Katrina, Imus/Rutgers, 
Washington/Knight); however, there was significant overlap between topics pieces as 
journalists and commentators compared events, especially Imus and Washington (see 
Figure 1). The articles were annotated with extensive memoing for the creation of general 
thematic codes that corresponded to relevant psychological and cultural topics, including 
the following primary codes: externalization of blame; articulations and explanations of 
racism; articulations and explanations of sexism; articulations and explanations of 
heteronormativity and homonegativity9; causal explanations of social phenomena; 
expressions and labeling of guilt; expressions and labeling of shame; and detachment. 
 This analytic process followed the principles of situational analysis explicated by 
Clarke (2005) and was centered on the production of positional maps. According to 
Clarke, the goal of positional maps is to “represent the positions articulated [in the data] 
on their own terms” (p. 126). She explains that, “Positional maps lay out most of the 
major positions taken in the data on major discursive issues therein – topics of focus, 
concern, and often but not always contestation. Issues, positions on issues, absences of 
positions where they might be expected (sites of discursive silence), and differences in 
the discursive positions…” (p. 126). Distinct from traditional position organization 
                                                
9 Throughout this dissertation, I will typically use the term “homonegativity” to describe 
negative attitudes toward queer people. This term, initially proposed by Hudson and 
Ricketts (1980), is a more accurate and psychologically appropriate term than 
“homophobia” to describe hate and discrimination directed at gay, lesbian, bisexual and 
transgender, questioning and gender-queer people, as well as people who may be 
associated with or allied with queer people. I will use “heteronormativity” to describe the 
systemic, hegemonic inequality that positions heterosexuality as the unmarked norm in 
contemporary U.S. society and cultures. “Heterosexism,” is closely related and refers 
herein to the practice and effects of heteronormativity. I will use “homophobia” only 




advocated in earlier forms of grounded theory methodology is that positional maps in 
Clarke’s postmodernism-inflected situational analysis do not correlate directly with 
persons, groups or institutions. To the contrary, they are literally positions taken or not 
taken in discourses. Therefore, Clarke’s position mapping helps accommodate the lived 
experiences of person, groups and institutions which typically hold multiple, disparate 
and contradictory positions on the same issue, topic or controversy. Specifically, the 
positions visualized in the maps herein do not reflect positions taken formally by a 
particular social, political or professional group, i.e., liberal journalists, White people, 
conservative pundits, African Americans, etc. The analytic emphasis is on the positions 
themselves and the relationships between positions taken and not taken; in other words, 
the focus is on the map itself, which represents the discursive arena to which we now turn 
our attention.  
 
“I-Mess”: Don Imus and the Rutgers Women’s Basketball Team 
 
“That’s why a flicker became a firestorm – not because bloggers suddenly run 
America, but because the comment resonated way beyond itself. Once Imus was 
portrayed as representing the weight of America’s racial history, he never had a 
chance.” 
 -David Hinckley, journalist (April 16, 2007, The (New York) Daily News) 
 
 On Wednesday, April 4, 2007, radio personality Don Imus was discussing the 
Rutgers-Tennessee women’s basketball game from the previous night, which ended 




Stringer, the unlikely Final Four contenders had come from behind that season to emerge 
as one of the strongest teams in the country. The unexpected success of Rutgers’ team 
was what earned them Imus’s attention on his CBS radio show “Imus in the Morning,” 
which was simulcast on MSNBC cable television network. In describing the team, 
composed of eight Black women and two White women, Imus began to compare them to 
the Tennessee team, which was composed of White women. A partial transcript of the 
conversation between these White men – Imus; executive producer Bernard McGuirk, co-
host Charles McCord and former Imus sports announcer Sid Rosenberg – follows (see 
Appendix B for the complete exchange): 
ROSENBERG: Yeah, Tennessee won last night -- seventh championship for 
[Tennessee coach] Pat Summitt, I-Man. They beat Rutgers by 13 points. 
IMUS: That's some rough girls from Rutgers. Man, they got tattoos and -- 
McGUIRK: Some hard-core hos. 
IMUS: That's some nappy-headed hos there. I'm gonna tell you that now, man, 
that's some -- woo. And the girls from Tennessee, they all look cute, you know, 
so, like -- kinda like -- I don't know. 
McGUIRK: A Spike Lee thing. 
IMUS: Yeah. 
McGUIRK: The Jigaboos vs. the Wannabes -- that movie that he had. 




McCORD: Do The Right Thing. (Media Matters, 2007) 
 
Within days, the incident had erupted into a huge scandal that garnered enormous 
amounts of attention from national news and entertainment media outlets. According to 
The New York Times, more than 350,000 people watched Imus’s show everyday on 
MSNBC and he had millions of listeners on over 70 radio stations across the United 
States. On Thursday, Imus has yet to apologize but “wondered aloud on his show what 
the big deal was, saying people should not be offended by ‘some idiot comment meant to 
be amusing’” (Carr, 2007; p. B7). Criticism from other public figures, including sports 
commentator and journalist Michael Wilbon, national weatherman Al Roker and civil 
rights activist Rev. Al Sharpton, targeted the racial and gendered dynamics of the 
situation. By Friday, apologies began: first from MSNBC, then from CBS Radio and 
Imus himself. The following week, he was first suspended for two weeks and then fired 
from MSNBC; CBS once again quickly followed suit. Imus continued to apologize, but 
the comments cost him his job. However, after meeting with and being forgiven by the 
Rutgers basketball team later in April, he was eventually hired to host a new radio show – 
simulcast on upstart, rural-oriented television network RFD-TV – by the end of 2007.  
The narrative construction of responsibility and blame was fairly straightforward 
in this case. Imus and his colleagues made patently hurtful comments toward a group of 
young people who were not famous; they were also not engaged in any kind of debate or 
argument with the Imus team. Journalists and commentators described the language 
differentially as “stupid,” “vile,” “despicable,” and “disgusting.” Almost immediately, 




McGuirk and the others. While the defenders of Imus were not the most vocal or 
significant part of the discourse, Imus’s critics hardly maintained a uniform voice or 
singular explanation for the outrage over his behavior. However, identity – from Imus’s 
reputation, professional role, race and gender – was at the center of the talk over why 
Imus was wrong, including if and how he should be held responsible for his words and 
actions. Figure 2 is a representative, alphabetical list of the terms used in my sources to 
describe Imus’s behavior and his actual comments.  
Abhorrent Hate(ful) Second-class 
Adolescent Hurtful Sexist 
Bigotry Inappropriate Sexually charged 
Bile Inexcusable Stupid 
Contemptible Infamous Thoughtless 
Counterproductive Misogynistic Toxic 
Crude Morally wrong Unalloyed racial insult 
Defamatory Offensive Unconscionable 
Deplorable Patently unfair Unsavory 
Despicable Pathetically infantile Verbal assault 
Disgusting Racial Vile 
Disparaging Racially charged Vitriol 
Disrespect(ful) Racist  
Filthy Racist/sexist  
Foul Repugnant  
Figure 2. Words used (by journalists, Imus, commentators, corporations and others) to 
describe Imus’s comments 
Identity complicates this situation in multiple ways. First, the major actors in the 
conflict are different in at least three primary axes of difference that were articulated in 
journalistic coverage: gender, race and age. Imus and his team of commentators were 
middle-aged or older, White men; the women of the Rutgers basketball team were much 
young and predominantly Black (i.e., all but two team members). Furthermore, the words 
that became the primary locus of criticism – “nappy-headed hos” – invoked race, gender 




this racist and sexist radio patter warrant our attention?” asked columnist Phil Sheridan 
(2007) in the Philadelphia Inquirer (p. C01). “We’ll count the ways,” he continued. 
Sheridan and others used like “vitriol” to describe Imus, while the Rutgers players and 
coach Stringer were called “one of the classiest acts in all of sports.” “What kind of man 
feels the need to heap scorn on young women who play college basketball? Take the 
racism out and the remarks are merely unnecessary and cruel,” wrote Sheridan. 
Commentary consistently labeled comments and both racist and sexist and frequently 
invoked the term “misogynistic.” As David Hinckley (2007) wrote in the New York 
Daily News about Imus’s language, “…from the mouth of a white guy, where calculated 
or incidental, sounds like ugly code. It suggests something about black people – in this 
case hair, but it could be any other attribute, including skin color – is the punchline of a 
joke” (p. 72). The concepts or racism and sexism were used not only to identify why 
Imus’s comments were wrong, but why he should be punished for such actions in the 
workplace of corporate America. “Imus’s [sic] advertisers’ couldn’t afford to be 
associated with racist, misogynistic views, and neither could NBC…It doesn’t mean that 
white males are being relegated to the dustbin of history. Last time I checked, guys, you 





Figure 3. Positional Map: Discursive Response to Imus Scandal in Journalistic Sphere  
Some who agreed with and shared in the outrage over Imus’s comments 
questioned why it had taken so long for the public to speak up about his consistently 
offensive on-air statements and to shift the rhetoric toward blame and punishment. 
Several authors, including David Carr (2007) of The New York Times, invoked Imus’s 
calling prominent journalist Gwen Ifill “a cleaning lady” in the 1990s and his regularly 
inflammatory remarks targeting politicians, celebrities and public figures of all kinds. 
Imus was called a “shock jock” and this label was used as if it was common knowledge 
that this kind of behavior was to be expected from Imus and others who earned this title, 
such as Howard Stern. But some explained that the contradictions in Imus’s professional 
identity and on-air persona were the source of the controversy. The situation was 
explained as a case of wanting to have it both ways: respect as a legitimate journalist and 




politicians, big of small, pass up a chance to bump knees with Mr. Imus, in part because 
his show is one of the few places where they can talk seriously and at length about public 
issues.” In the months before the Rutgers comments, Imus had interviewed at least three 
one-time U.S. presidential candidates, including senators John Kerry, John McCain and 
Barack Obama; respected NBC journalists Tom Brokaw, Andrea Mitchell, Tim Russert 
and David Gregory were reported to have appeared on Imus in the Morning with some 
regularity. Perceived as more respectable and intelligent than Howard Stern, Imus 
occupied a kind of liminal space in the media imaginary where he could – up until he 
aimed his talk at Rutgers – be both abject comedian and legitimate commentator. He 
arguably negotiated the role with success: “Part of the reason that his corporate owners 
are eager to apologize, eager for the latest gaffe to blow over,” wrote Carr on April 9, 
2007, “is so that they can get back to counting the lucre he generates” (p. C1). To Carr 
and others, this liminality was more of the source of the problem with the “nappy-headed 
hos” comment than the comment itself or the identities of Imus’s targets. From his 
perspective, Carr believes the public might not have reacted if Stern had said it, but that 
Imus’s credibility made the statement unacceptable to the media analysts and public.  
 Retrospectively, stories on the “I-Mess” explained that the scandal fit into a 
developing schema of celebrity/public figure misbehavior from the early 21st century, and 
Imus was compared to Mel Gibson, Michael Richards and U.S. Senator (and eventual 
Vice President) Joseph Biden, who had contrasted the race of his then-rival Barack 
Obama by describing Obama as “clean” and “articulate.” For example, Brown and Fears 
(2007) wrote in the Washington Post months after the scandal that Imus could be grouped 




the Duke University lacrosse team’s rape accusation; the federal government’s 
dysfunctional response to Hurricane Katrina, which I will discuss below; and the noose 
hangings in Jena, Louisiana, the University of Maryland, Columbia University and the 
U.S. Coast Guard Academy, which constituted a string of hate crimes on school 
campuses in 2006 and 2007. They all share a formulaic, mass-mediated constructedness, 
according to Brown and Fears, that is best described as the “long-running Saga of Race in 
America”: 
…a string of characters lines up to react to the latest eruption. The media records 
them as they take up positions in the Great Race Debate. The media stokes the 
discussion as self-proclaimed black leaders scream outrage while opponents – 
often white, sometimes black – scream counter-outrage. The “colorblind” wonder 
why we all just can’t get along. And the rest of us watch from ringside, rooting for 
one camp or another, sometimes in silence. Then inevitably, the media turns 
away. The outrage fades. The talking heads go silent. The curtain falls, and the 
debate recedes to wherever it goes until the next eruption. (p. M01) 
The focus on Brown and Fears piece is on the deferral of a serious public conversation 
about race; they clearly identify race as the primary marker of difference and explanatory 
factor in each “eruption.” A central part of this “show” is the prominent Black political 
icon, personified by Revs. Al Sharpton and Jesse Jackson. Sharpton and Jackson are 
figured as central actors (in the dramaturgical and sociological sense of the term) in these 
scandals, though their purpose and effects are characterized in diverse ways. Citing John 
McWhorter, a Black scholar at a conservative think-tank, Brown and Fears signal that 




absolution to its perpetrators – as well as to White Americans, generally. Brown and 
Fears quote Whorter as saying, “We know now and we knew then that what Michael 
Richards said some night in some club, in the grand scheme of things, was utterly 
insignificant. But there is a ritual that American has been going through for 40 years 
where we grab on to all and any opportunity to show we are morally pure in not being 
racist.” The authors continue: “[Sharpton] knows about this pattern, of course. Those 
accused of racism often go to him or to [Jackson] seeking absolution” (p. M01).  
 Whereas Brown and Fears (2007) render Sharpton and Jackson as agents of blame 
who call out racism and posses the power to forgive its perpetrators, others accuse 
Jackson and Sharpton as stoking the fires of otherwise non-incidents and for being 
opportunistic hypocrites. Describing Imus as “an equal-opportunity attacker” and his 
controversial statements as “cranky quips,” Bill Maxwell (2007) of the St. Petersburg 
Times wrote, “Let’s keep it real: Black people have a double-standard regarding who can 
and who cannot insult us. Blacks can. Whites and other cannot” (p. 3P). Accordingly, 
Maxwell, who self-identifies as a “black American” in his op-ed, condemns the NAACP, 
Chris Rock, the National Association of Black Journalists (NABJ) and Sharpton for 
hypocritical behavior. Maxwell’s piece is representative of a position taken up throughout 
the Imus crisis – primarily but not exclusively by conservative critics in conservative 
publications, such as The Washington Times – in which Sharpton, Jackson and Black 
advocacy organizations are held at least partially responsible for the “I-Mess.” 
Differentially characterized as exacerbating the situation or blamed for actually causing 
it, Sharpton and Jackson are faulted for failing to simultaneously criticize rap and hip hop 




language. On April 11, 2007, just days after the story broke, The Washington Times 
published an editorial in which the newspaper asserted that criticism of Imus was 
warranted, but went on to externalize responsibility for Imus’s comments by blaming 
media corporations, including Imus’s employers MSNBC and CBS, for “failing to pull 
other entertainment offerings” that promote offensive language similar to Imus’s, namely 
rap music played on MTV and BET. Sharpton and Jackson are explicitly implicated by 
the Times’s logic:  
The fact that the outrage [over Imus] was led by the Revs. Al Sharpton and Jesse 
Jackson, who have dabbled in vicious racism themselves from time to time (Mr. 
Sharpton encouraged a deadly riot against Jews in Crown Heights and Mr. 
Jackson once called New York City ‘Hymietown’), does nothing to soften the 
Imus offense. Messrs. Sharpton and Jackson, who have demanded that Mr. Imus 
be fired, might now lead a campaign to clean up offensive language throughout 
the entertainment industry. Such a campaign is long overdue, but we won’t hold 
our breath. (p. A16)  
Though the editorial does not go so far as to actually specify which aspects of the 
“entertainment industry” are to blame, others made their accusations clearer. Republican 
strategist Karen Hanretty (2007) wrote in the editorial pages of the Washington Post that, 
“Malcolm X would be proud, wouldn’t he? No matter that Sharpton and Jackson picked 
the wrong fight by pressuring corporate advertisers to drop an old coot who stopped 
being influential years ago rather than pressuring corporate advertisers (such as Chrysler) 
to drop misogynistic rappers who affect young men’s perceptions of women.” Notably 




because the young women were exceptionally talented (e.g., “Fight the power? Honey 
those women are the power.”), Hanretty describes Imus’s critics as feigning outrage 
about racism. “Too bad old Imus didn’t direct his attention toward a group of Caucasian 
women with slutty ‘stripper roots,’” wrote Hanretty. “He’d still have a radio show today.” 
Hanretty and others foreclose on Sharpton and Jackson’s ability to object to Imus’s 
behavior because the term allegedly originated in Black music and culture. Adrianne T. 
Washington (2007), a Black woman, wrote (also in The Washington Times) “Mr. Imus is 
not the first person to call black women disparaging and disrespectful names. Just tune in 
to any urban radio station” (p. B02). Enough discourse about the illegitimacy of Sharpton 
and Jackson’s circulated in journalistic discourse that Sharpton and Jackson became as 
much a central figure in the story as Imus himself. On the other end of the political 
spectrum, Colbert King (2007) wrote in the Washington Post that, “To shift the argument, 
as some have done, from Imus to the legitimacy of the Revs. Al Sharpton and Jesse 
Jackson criticizing Imus, given their own past insensitive remarks, is a smoke screen” (p. 
A19). To Colbert and those on the left, the responsibility for Imus’s comments laid with 
him and the organizations that facilitate/perpetuate his public persona.  
 Discourse about responsibility and blame in the Imus scandal complicates 
traditional psychological literature on the externalization of blame and the relationship 
between externalization, guilt and shame. Tangney and Dearing (2002) argue that both 
externalization of blame and detachment are closely connected to the affective 
experiences of guilt and shame; the presence of either of these cognitive-affective 
strategies can indicate that a person is trying to avoid or defer guilt and shame, or might 




arguing for others’ responsibility. This conceptualization of detachment and 
externalization produces a generic guilty and/or ashamed subject who a) has actually 
done something wrong or should feel badly, and b) who uses these strategies to deny, 
defer or negate his guilt/shame-worthy behavior or connection to others’ guilt/shame-
inducing behavior.  
In the Imus scandal, the externalization of blame regarding Imus’s behavior was 
not only limited to attacks of Sharpton and Jackson from journalists and public figures. 
From coverage of “I-Mess,” we see that there multiple ways to externalize blame and 
label others’ responsibility for Imus’s words/behavior, in particular, and racism or 
sexism, in general. For example, then-U.S. Senator Hillary Clinton was in the middle of a 
presidential campaign during the Imus scandal and made an appearance at Rutgers days 
after his initial remarks. According to the Washington Post, Clinton had previously been 
invited to the University, but made the choice to come only after the Imus flap (Bacon, 
2007; p. A02). Staff writer Perry Bacon Jr. characterized Clinton’s visit as a political 
opportunity to connect her campaign to women and Blacks’ struggle for equality in the 
United States. Her speech at Rutgers personalized her own experiences of discrimination 
as a woman while simultaneously distancing herself from White racism. “Marginalization 
like that happens all too often. It happens every day, in ways large and small, in places 
private and public. We’ve all seen it and we’ve all heard it,” Clinton was quoted by 
Bacon as saying. One would not expect a presidential candidate to freely admit past or 
present unfavorable behavior or attitudes, such as racism, but Clinton’s rhetoric is 
especially compelling from a psychosocial perspective, because it locates the perpetrators 




creating an imagined “we” and “them.” Neither Clinton nor members of the Rutgers 
community are implicated in any of this racist or sexist behavior, though Clinton 
simultaneously said that the Imus’s comments could be transformed into a substantive, 
“teachable” moment – a serious conversation about race and racism today. However, her 
language intimates that such a conversation needs to happen among others – people like 
Imus and those connected to him, such as rival politicians who had been on his show – 
not Clinton herself or the diverse community at Rutgers. In this instance, the 
externalization of blame is happening by a social actor who had no obvious connection to 
Imus or his comments, but is identifying blame and distancing herself from the cultural 
conditions that perpetuate the behavior of people like Imus. One aspect of her identity – 
her gender – was made salient in the interest of relating Clinton to the young women who 
were the target of Imus’s misogyny; her race, on the other hand, was not highlighted. 
Rather, prior behavior and her public political convictions were used to distinguish 
Clinton as meaningfully different from Imus in multiple ways.  
Throughout the coverage of the Imus scandal, public figures such as Clinton made 
rhetoric gestures of sympathy with the Rutgers team and distanced themselves from 
Imus; even then-President George W. Bush’s spokeswoman said that Bush thought 
Imus’s apology was warranted (Page, 2007). Cal Ripken Jr. announced that he would not 
appear on the Imus show as previously scheduled to promote the release of his two new 
books (Loverro, 2007). Their actions to move symbolically away from Imus in the public 
imaginary serve to express and represent condemnation of his behavior as well as 
differences between Imus and themselves. In cases such as Clinton, Bush and Ripken, the 




thereby incur some form or associative responsibility for his comments, which had been 
labeled racist and sexist (among other things; see Figure 2).  
 The mass-mediated, public dimension of this scandal cannot be understated, 
especially because the distinction between public and private offensive comments was 
frequently made explicit. Writers and their sources highlighted how Imus’s comments 
would not have been notable had they not been articulated in such a public arena, 
inferring or insisting that the forum was what distinguished Imus’s comments – not the 
slur itself. Andrew Sullivan (2007) wrote that “Imus simply said on the air what [Imus’s 
predominantly White male listeners] all say in the privacy of their own homes. Getting 
close to it in public was as close to authentic as many of these politicians and pundits get” 
(p. 4). Regardless of Imus’s “true” feelings and attitudes, some journalists’ insisted that 
the consistency of his remarks in the public domain offer sufficient data to label Imus a 
racist. “What characteristics, do you suppose, could possibly identify a person who was 
indeed a racist?” asked Eugene Robinson (2007, p. A17). “You think that maybe saying 
racist things might be a fairly reliable clue?” Al Sharpton was quoted as saying, “What he 
did was a public, racist act….He should be fired” (Fenner & Siemaszko, 2007; p. 9). In 
an April 10 column titled “Misogyny in the Morning,” Robinson (2007) characterized the 
medium of drive-time radio as a “free-fire zone, a forum for crude and objectionable 
speech that would be out of bounds anywhere else” (p. A17). The solitary nature of 
highway commuting helps construct a superficial relationship between the talk-jock and 
driver-listener, according to Robinson. “There’s an intimacy about radio. The medium 
creates the illusion of privacy – it’s the jock and his or her entourage speaking to you, the 




calculation, the medium itself is paradoxically what encourages radio jocks to “spew [sic] 
racism, misogyny and other forms of cruelty for the amusement of gridlock-bound 
commuters” and the very thing that gets them into trouble. The privacy, of course, is 
artificial; once the content of the broadcast penetrates discourse outside of the arbitrary 
boundaries of drive-time, it is evaluated by those outside of the jock-listener diad 
relationship. Sometimes, the offense goes ignored. In Imus’s case, it becomes a crisis of 
the jock’s professional legitimacy and opens a discussion about what is or is not 
acceptable in the public sphere. Regardless, the so-called “private” amusement of 
listeners remains unarticulated and un-interrogated in this ontology of racism.  
Emphasis on the public/private binary has two final implications for our analysis. 
First, neoliberalism pivots upon a firm division between notions of public and private. In 
social policy, this manifests in rhetoric and legislation about what one is allowed to do in 
the privacy of one’s own home versus behaviors (literally: civil rights) that are 
discouraged or prohibited in the public sphere. Lisa Duggan (2003) argues that 
contemporary debates about same-sex marriage take this form, whereby anti-gay activists 
and politicians are able to frame heterosexist and homonegative discourse as not about 
identity or inequality. The “defenders of marriage,” according to this logic, only want to 
distinguish between what the government does and does not have to recognize legally in 
the public sphere. In the Imus scandal, we see the public/private binary mobilized to 
distinguish between what Imus and every American should be allowed to say in private, 
versus what kinds of discourse are appropriate in the public sphere. The debate about 




discussion on race” (p. M01). Instead, public debate pivoted upon whether or not Imus 
should be punished for making the comments on the air, in public.  
Second, the mass-mediated construction of the Imus scandal has implications for 
what Charis Thompson (2005) calls the “ontological choreography” of White guilt and 
White shame, particularly in terms of their parsimony and mutual exclusivity as concepts. 
In Thompson’s ethnographic research, she found that people who use alterative and 
technoscientific-assisted forms of reproduction to become parents engage in discursive 
practices that re-make definition of parenthood. In the Imus scandal, journalists, pundits, 
celebrities and other public figures worked through the contemporary ontology of White 
guilt and shame.  
Both terms (i.e., guilt and shame) were used to describe Imus and the aftermath of 
his comments, but I would argue that the escalation of public outrage directed at Imus 
represents a choreographic shift from White guilt to White shame. Whereas his 
comments about the Rutgers basketball team were initially constructed as inappropriate 
but perhaps forgivable – something he should be guilty about – discourse only days later 
shifted toward rhetoric of inexcusability and unforgivable-ness. By the time he appeared 
on Al Sharpton’s show, the possibility of redemption was negated. In other words, the 
problem became less about what Imus did this time and more about who he is. 
Highlighted by the emphasis on the public nature of the comments and fallout, which is 
sometimes characterized as a factor of psychological shame as opposed to guilt (Tangney 
& Dearing, 2002), coverage constructed Imus as a site of White shame – an ontological 
exemplar of the phenomenon. As Lisa de Moraes (2007) phrased it in The Washington 




Isaiah Washington, Imus yesterday began his Walk of Shame” (p. C01). We will later 
explore how Washington, as a Black man embroiled in a scandal over a gay slur directed 
at a White man, figures into contemporary discourse of racial guilt and shame. Now, 
however, we turn our attention toward reporter Anderson Cooper and his celebrated 
coverage of Hurricane Katrina. 
 
Our Reporter, Ourselves: Anderson Cooper Covers Katrina 
 
“At times I feel like a failure, as if I’m not up to the responsibility. At night, when 
I try to sleep, I go over the questions I’ve asked interview subjects, the wording, 
the accuracy. Did I stutter and stammer and beat around the bush? Was I fair? 
Was I too emotional? Did I give the guest a chance to answer? Did I let him 
ramble on too much? Did I get spin? I worry that our cameras are not capturing 
enough. I worry that I’m letting New Orleans down.” 
 -Anderson Cooper, journalist (June 2006, Vanity Fair) 
 
 As I explained above, the “I-Mess” discourse I surveyed was predominantly about 
the assignment and avoidance of blame and the production of racialized guilt and shame, 
which intersected principally with gender and sexual politics. Discourse about CNN 
anchor Anderson Cooper’s coverage of Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath – coverage of the 
coverage, in other words – provides insight into a different but nonetheless essential 
component of White guilt and White shame: how people deal with it. The management of 
guilt and shame becomes central to Cooper’s journalistic performance and the American 
public’s reaction to it. As I will demonstrate, other journalists’ evaluation of Cooper’s 
dramatic, “emotional” reporting in New Orleans reveals how Cooper came to manage 




breaches the mainstream – that is, becomes visible or articulated – I read Cooper’s 
closeted-queer gender performance as central to his ability to feel in the public sphere and 
to help viewers work through and out of White guilt and shame.  
 Cooper’s rise to fame is attributed to his reporting during the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina in late-August and September 2005. It was in the days and weeks 
following the storm that Cooper was crowned television journalism’s new “It” boy by 
well-known columnists such as Gail Shister (2005) of the Philadelphia Inquirer. 
Cooper’s somewhat erratic professional resume did not make him the predictable heir to 
Aaron Brown’s anchor chair at CNN, though he is the heir to part of the Vanderbilt 
fortune via his mother, Gloria Vanderbilt. After working for Channel One, the closed-
circuit classroom news network, and as a freelancer during the 1990s, he joined ABC 
News but left journalism altogether in 2000 to host ABC’s The Mole reality television 
series when he was dissatisfied with his reporting assignments with ABC (Jensen, 2005). 
According to Jonathan Van Meter (2005) of New York Magazine, “it seemed doubtful at 
the time that he could ever go back to serious news,” but managed to secure a spot in 
2002 co-hosting CNN’s morning show with Paula Zahn. It was only once he subbed in 
for Brown on CNN’s flagship NewsNight that Cooper caught his big break and found his 
niche at CNN. He described the experience on NewsNight as finally allowing him to be 
authentic on camera: “…they let me play with stuff and morph things around, and the 
audience responded because I was just being real, being myself because I had nothing to 
lose” (qtd. in Van Meter, 2005). He was awarded his own show, Anderson Cooper 360, 
in September 2003. Two years later, when Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, Cooper would 




and Shepard Smith of Fox News Channel, to serve as the voices of the storm, whose 
subjects were overwhelmingly Black.10 Cooper’s performance, however, was the most 
memorable. By November 2005, he had replaced Aaron Brown as CNN’s premiere 
anchor and CNN/U.S. president Jonathan Klein was willing to risk his job – and CNN’s 
ratings – on Cooper’s appeal (Shister, 2005). “He is the anchorperson of the future…an 
anti-anchorperson….He’s all human. He’s not putting it on,” said Klein (Jensen, 2005; p., 
1E).  
 Klein and others attributed Cooper’s ratings success, as well as his praise and 
criticism as a journalist, to his emotionality – literally, his “magical” qualities. With 
remarkable consistency, other journalists wrote about Cooper’s “emotion” during Katrina 
and said that his ability to connect with audiences by letting his guard down – by 
displaying emotions and feelings – was the key to his newfound celebrity. Moreover, 
journalists mark the start of his accelerated, meteoric rise to professional preeminence 
and general American celebrity status with one specific, emotional interview. On 
September 1, 2005, Cooper interviewed Senator Mary L. Landrieu, Democrat from 
Louisiana, four days after Hurricane Katrina had come ashore in southeastern Louisiana 
and Mississippi and became the largest natural disaster in modern U.S. history. 
Journalists like Cooper, Smith and others helped reveal to the American people and the 
world that many aspects of the disaster were, however, quite man-made. Even Cooper’s 
                                                
10 It is beyond the scope of the present investigation, but it is interesting to note that – 
despite a relatively racially and ethnically diverse anchor staff at CNN and the other 
major new networks – White men became the journalistic voices of this storm. Darnell 
Hunt (2005) offers analysis of this kind of phenomena in his important work, Channeling 
Blackness, with a particular emphasis on how White men tend to control networks even 




critics, such as Jonah Goldberg (2005) of the conservative National Review, identify this 
interview as a turning point in the news media’s coverage of the storm. 
 As Landrieu thanked President George W. Bush for his “strong statements of 
support and comfort,” as well as the members of Congress for responding to Katrina with 
the approval of federal disaster relief funds, Cooper interrupted her and delivered the 
most important monologue of his career (see Appendix B for a transcript of the entire 
interview): 
I got to tell you, there are a lot of people here who are very upset, and very angry, 
and very frustrated, And when they hear politicians…thanking one another, it just 
you know, it kind of cuts them the wrong way right now. Because literally there 
was a body on the streets of this town yesterday being eaten by rats, because this 
woman had been laying in the street for 48 hours. And there’s not enough 
facilities to take her up. Do you get the anger that is out here? (qtd. in Van Meter, 
2005) 
Landrieu was obviously taken aback and recited her connection to New Orleans’ past and 
present in an apparent attempt to cast herself and her family as victims and to avoid any 
further scorn from and exasperated Cooper. The next day, Cooper told reporter Van 
Meter that he had not planned to go after the senator; it was an organic response rooted in 
his emotions. “I didn’t really plan on that. I just, uh, I guess I was just surprised. Yeah, I 
could prefer not to be emotional and I would prefer not to get upset, but it’s hard not to 
when you’re surrounded by brave people who are suffering and in need,” Van Meter 
quoted Cooper as saying. Though this interview represented the most notable eruption of 




and occasionally allowing the rawness of his feelings to be expressed on camera. Vanity 
Fair, which later put Cooper’s face on the cover of the magazine and printed an excerpt 
from his biography Dispatches from the Edge in June 2006, said that Cooper broke the 
status quo during Katrina: “In response [to Landrieu], Cooper unleashed an emotion 
rarely expressed on national newscasts: genuine, full-bore indignation” (Halberstam, 
2005). His outburst at Landrieu, in particular, “signaled a watershed of sorts. Many in the 
audience (after years of watching news personalities tow the party link in the wake of a 
different deadly crisis) felt release as Cooper vented,“ wrote Halberstam. Journalistic 
interpretation of the Landrieu interview was that Cooper not only critically reported the 
news – a rarity of “mainstream” coverage during the Bush administration – but that he 
served in a kind of emotional capacity for the American collective, as well. He captivated 
national audiences, in particular, because he helped us both to know and feel the news of 
Katrina. As CNN head Jonathan Klein was firing Aaron Brown, he told The New York 
Times in November 2005 that, “Clearly, America is embracing Anderson Cooper” (p. 
C3).  
 By some experts’ estimation, Cooper’s feelings became the news as much as the 
devastation in the Gulf Coast was the story. The Capital (2006) ran a piece in which 
Knight Ridder quoted professor Andrew Clark from the University of Texas at Arlington 
as saying “He becomes the news, instead of the story, and he has done nothing to 
downplay that…I would have to think he’s less sensationalist than Geraldo (Rivera) but 
it’s that sentimental aspect to what he’s doing. The tears on Katrina, I’m not going to say 
if it’s genuine or not, but it’s going over the top a bit” (p. B6). In The Washington Post, 




somewhat overwrought one” (p. A19). For Kinsley, Cooper’s style of journalism heralds 
“the twilight of objectivity,” when reporting itself may transform into something “more 
personalized, more interactive, more opinionated, more communal, less objective” (p. 
A19). According to Kinsley, so-called “opinion journalism” does not necessarily 
preclude telling the truth – it just usually winds up that way in the United States and 
especially on TV. In coverage of Cooper’s Katrina, even those who celebrated his 
breaking through the fourth wall continually reinforced the binary opposition between 
feelings and truth –subjectivity and objectivity, in clichéd journalism terminology. The 
second position map of this chapter illustrates the differing reactions to Cooper’s 
emotionality and the perception of his coverage (see Figure 4). “Advocacy journalism” 
and comparisons to legendary Edward R. Morrow were relatively frequent, if hesitant. 
Whereas Tim Cuprinson (2005) of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel collected opinions 
from a range of sources who differentially positioned Cooper amid a cast of Murrow-
esque figures that included the aforementioned Smith, Williams, Ted Koppel and 
veterans Mike Wallace and Dan Rather, Peter Ames Carlin (2005) of the The Oregonian 
was more certain of Cooper’s similarities to Murrow. According to Carlin, Cooper’s 
reporting, along with that of Shep Smith, “changed the course of the government 
response to the disaster,” namely because Cooper brought “morality” into the equation (p. 
E07). Neal Gabler (2005) echoed in The New York Times that Cooper and other 






Figure 4. Positional Map: Evaluation of Anderson Cooper’s Coverage of Hurricane 
Katrina in the Journalistic Sphere 
Cooper was not the only reporter feeling his way through the story, but he was the 
central one. Nicholas Lemann, dean of Columbia University’s Columbia School of 
Journalism, remarked in the New York Observer that, while the emotion of Katrina was 
not particularly surprising to him, the level of reporters’ anger was unusual. “My 
impression is, if you were there, the conditions were so shocking, it led people to emote 
more than [the] general professional standard in journalism, which is now being widely 
applauded,” he said (qtd. in Kolhatkar, 2005; p. 1). Neil Justin (2005) wrote in the 
Minneapolis Star Tribune that “the press got angry over rescue efforts in the aftermath of 




Debates over the appropriateness of such emotionality were, not surprisingly, fascinating 
to journalists, who devoted considerable editorial real estate to thinking through Cooper’s 
emotive behavior. Some, such as Fox News correspondent Rick Leventhal, said “I don’t 
feel like it’s my role to cry” (qtd. in Justin, 2005; p. 21E). But Leventhal’s coverage of 
Katrina was inconsequential; Cooper’s became the litmus for talented breaking news 
reporting – and a magnet of discursive activity. Journalism experts Tom Rosensteil and 
Bill Kovach (2005) wrote in a Washington Post editorial about the relationship between 
reporters’ emotion and aggression, and figured this kind of emotionality as fairly natural 
but not necessarily helpful – it can “distort coverage” (p. B07). Nevertheless, they said, 
“It would have been odd, even distressing to most, if reporters had reacted like 
journalistic robots to the devastation in the Gulf Coast.” Such “emotional isolationism” 
does not achieve the goal of helping audiences “reconnect” with citizens to present news 
that feels “relevant” and helps audiences “bond” with reporters. “Human emotion,” they 
argue, “is at the heard of what makes something news. But if journalists try to 
manufacture it or use it to bring attention to themselves, they’re into something there is 
already enough of: reality entertainment” (p. B07). 
According to the press, Cooper’s “Andersonian emotionality” enabled him to 
serve as an emotional proxy for what was arguably the most important racial/racist event 
(so far) in the 21st century (Van Meter, 2005). I assert that his race, gender and sexuality 
together contributed to his central role in covering Katrina and his positive evaluation by 
fellow journalists. Much has been written about racial and class dynamics of the Katrina 
disaster by academics (see Lipsitz, 2006; also Clyde Woods’ 2009 special issue of 




and Katrina. For example, an in-depth report by Vanity Fair contributing editor James 
Wolcott (2005) noted that Williams, Smith and Cooper “spoke truth to power” during the 
coverage, but ultimately concluded that class was the primary factor underlying the 
Katrina disaster, negating a multidimensional, intersectional epistemology of the storm. 
Howard Kurtz (2005) wrote in his Washington Post column the weekend after the 
hurricane struck that, especially on cable television, Katrina threw off the traditional 
focus on the missing White woman of the week; accordingly, reporters and producers did 
not know how to handle the socio-cultural complexity of the story. Kurtz quoted Slate 
columnist Jack Shafer, who said, “Race remains largely untouchable for TV because 
broadcasters sense that they can’t make an error without destroying careers. That’s a true 
pity” (p. C01). Race was on the minds of White reporters, even if they failed to 
effectively articulate what race meant to the story. For example, CNN’s Wolf Blitzer 
(in)famously said, “They are so black,” on air as cameras panned across the flooded 
terrain of Katrina “refugees.” On Fox, conservative pundit Glenn Beck expressed literal 
hatred for the Katrina victims, because he interpreted them as unpatriotically critiquing 
the federal government after irresponsibly failing to evacuate New Orleans. Even in the 
face of these incidents, Wolcott confidently asserted: “It’s class, not race, that’s been the 
great undiscussable. The true eye-opener from Katrina was having the flap lifted on the 
specter of lower-depths poverty in this country….Poverty has been scrubbed from the 
American screen with a sanity wipe” (p. 176). One high-profile cover story in Newsweek 
discussed “Poverty, Race and Katrina: Lessons of a National Shame” (Alter, 2005), but it 
was only one of three stories I surveyed that tackled race and Katrina. Even in the light of 




including Cooper’s reporting – focused on the (colorblind, but maybe classist) failures of 
the Bush administration – not institutional or structural racism that created economic 
stratification in New Orleans and a cultural environment in which the death and 
displacement of thousands of Black people could be sustained by the nation. As Black 
woman journalist Ziba Kashef (2005) elucidated, “we” got upset – but we still let it 
happen.  
In Color Lines Magazine, which in late 2009 still lists “Katrina” as a “hot topic” 
on its home page, Ziba Kashef wrote about how “as these critical conversations about 
race, class and equity unfolded” in the media, “they were simultaneously undermined by 
charges of looting, exaggerations of crime and bizarre characterizations of the largely 
Black population of New Orleans as refugees wandering through an American Third 
World” (p. 5). Reporters and commentators “…analyzed the class angle as if it could be 
entirely separated from race, rendering discussions about discrimination moot,” 
according to Kashef. In the most racist rhetorics, led by zealous conservatives such as 
Lou Dobbs, “Blame-shifting not only went from federal to local officials, but from whites 
to Blacks,” wrote Kashef. She is the only reporter in my research who racialized any kind 
of collective or group-based responsibility for Katrina beyond “Americans” or the “Bush 
administration.” Kashef was also one of the most aggressive critics of Cooper, whom she 
painted as racist, privileged and paternalistic; she argued that he relied on his White, 
masculinist gaze – a “cruel microscope” – to objectify victims of Katrina in the midst of 
his surging popularity while transforming their trauma into ratings capital. Citing a 
specific instance in which he brought a homeless Black girl to tears during an interview 




federal response would have been if the victims had been “soccer moms,” Kashef 
concludes that his “emotionalism” was privileged over the structural inequities that 
caused Katrina to result in such racialized devastation. From Kashef’s perspective as a 
woman of color – and potentially representing multiple communities of color whose 
voices are not well represented in the White-dominated new media (Hunt, 2006) – 
Cooper was not a useful proxy at all for connecting with and working through the 
emotions connected to Katrina. Instead, according to Kashef, he reified hegemonic 
knowledge that does not validate or reflect African American lived experiences of racial 
inequity nor explanations of how Katrina happened (and continues to happen as New 
Orleans remains largely unrepaired and resettled) (Lipsitz, 2006). His identity – and the 
performance of his social location as an affluent White man – mired him in a self-
conscious affectivity that, according to Kashef, could not possibly bridge the divide 
between White and Black experiences of Katrina, much less the feelings of viewers and 
those directly endangered or displaced by the storm.   
Meanwhile, from the perspectives of journalists writing in the proverbial 
“mainstream,” Cooper helped White Americans – myself included – deal with it, “it” 
being the affective process of facing the persistence racial inequality in the United States. 
As I discussed in Chapter 1, contemporary neoliberal racial hegemony remains and 
remakes itself as legitimate in the absence of images of identity-based inequality and in 
the silencing of counter-discourses that resist the dominant narrative of U.S. post-
raciality. Normally, as Bonilla-Silva (2006) puts it, this colorblind ideology helps White 
people maintain an affective homeostasis: “Whites’ collective denial of about the true 




colorblind ideology and the presumed fairness of neoliberalism are challenged in 
moments such as Katrina, feeling good becomes difficult. As Atler (2005) wrote in 
Newsweek, Katrina was shameful and shaming. At least during the coverage itself, when 
avoiding images and coverage of Katrina was relatively difficult, Katrina taught painful 
lessons about how impoverished the United States is and how racialized this poverty 
remains, effectively making salient various latent forms of collective White shame. 
Katrina destabilized neoliberal ideology that insists upon American exceptionalism and 
those intrinsically positive qualities of the U.S. nation-state, which are built upon 
concepts of democracy, opportunity, justice and equality. Katrina, on the other hand, was 
about disenfranchisement, foreclosed opportunities, injustice, cruelty and inequality. 
Katrina was discursively productive of collective shame. Based on the social identities of 
these reporters and commentators, as well as their assessment of the storm and its 
emotional aftermath, this shame was arguably felt more often by those people in groups 
not well represented among Katrina’s victims: namely, the White middle- and upper-
class. 
In reading the process of White shame in journalists’ writing about Cooper and 
Katrina, I do not intend to inscribe a deterministic or unidimensional interpretation of the 
discourse that forecloses on other diverse and complex readings. However, shame itself is 
a complex and multidimensional form of affect. Shame is associated with many other 
forms of feeling and behaviors, and may function on conscious and non-conscious levels. 
Shame may be articulated or remain unarticulated; it can be owned or disowned. It may 
be avoided or embraced; it may be deferred, accepted and rejected. In this sense, 




feelings about White Americans – and a process that is bound up in related forms of 
affect, cognition and behavior. Cooper’s coverage represented and expressed at least two 
of these emotions: anger and sadness. Cooper cried, empathized and described feelings of 
depression while covering Katrina and bearing witness to the devastation in the Gulf 
Coast region. Cooper’s emotional experience and expression resonated with at least some 
meaningful portion of viewers who were feeling similarly as they faced scenes of horror 
from the Superdome and New Orleans Convention Center on their television screens. But 
Cooper also expressed anger; undoubtedly, there were many reasons to be angry as the 
government failed to respond to Katrina. For example, there was a deep sense among 
many African Americans and of citizens of New Orleans that a Katrina-scale disaster was 
inevitable, and that they had been ignored for a length of period stretching much longer 
than the days it took FEMA to arrive. But for Cooper and other White people, anger may 
have been a cognitive-affective strategy to cope with – or to avoid – the painful feelings 
of shame associated with having one’s worldview challenged by a disaster and 
stratification once thought impossible. His anger, as the Mary Landrieu interview 
illuminates, was most often directed at other White people, which serves to distance 
Cooper from other White people (i.e., collective group identity) in a similar way to how 
Hillary Clinton distinguished herself from Don Imus and racist Whites. Cooper pointed 
his anger at political figures, such as President Bush and Senator Landrieu, and at the 
federal government. He and other White journalists, such as Shepard Smith, used anger to 
craft a story about Katrina that blamed several levels of government for ineptitude and 
inaction that resulted in unnecessary death and suffering. Their emotional, anger-fueled 




affectively preferable – i.e., feels better – than a framing of Katrina in which Americans, 
especially White, middle- and upper-class Americans, take collective responsibility for 
ignoring structural racism and holding prejudicial attitudes in the present that precipitate 
infrastructural deficiencies and facilitate disasters such as Katrina. Such a claiming of 
responsibility or relationship with systems of inequity does not necessarily require a 
sense of shame or guilt and could engender action rather than self-conscious depression. 
At the very least, this ownership of responsibility or relationality to Katrina very least 
likely incorporates some kind of negative, self-directed feelings. Cooper’s outward-
directed anger, in this sense, becomes a desirable proxy through which to work through 
bad feelings associated with the storm without addressing macro-sociological factors, 
which explain the Katrina disaster and have implications for how one makes sense of 
persistent inequity in the United States. In discourse – specifically, the interactions 
between audiences and reporters – Cooper can become a metaphorical receptacle of 
White shame, while his anger becomes the phenomenological route through which 
negative affect is performed and released.  
When we examine Cooper’s gender performance and ambiguous sexuality, his 
appeal in this moment of “crisis” becomes more obvious and apparent. Indeed, there are 
meaningful connections between the characterization of Cooper as emotional and the 
feminine gendering endemic to such a label. Furthermore, in contemporary American 
culture, ‘emotional’ men are subject to suspicion about their presumed heterosexuality. 
Almost as uniformly as journalists’ writing about Cooper emphasized his emotional 
reporting, journalists explicitly described his body and demeanor. For example, a Knight 




Anderson Cooper’s steely baby-blues these days. He’s the youthful, prematurely gray 
Kim Jong-Il of media cool, his image plastered all over the pop-culture landscape” (p. 
B6). “He looks suave and debonair,” writes Shister (2005) in the Philadelphia Inquirer. 
Van Meter (2005) wrote, “…his sleek good looks and boyish charm inspire an awful lot 
of I-love-Anderson mania on the Internet.” People magazine named him one of its sexiest 
men (Gabler, 2006). His age (38 during Katrina) and relative youth was juxtaposed to 
Aaron Brown’s middle-age milieu (he was 56 when Katrina struck). His prematurely 
gray hair is a constant staple and aesthetic trademark. Shister and others note his fast 
speech, because it helps to tell the story of Cooper’s novelty in the journalism world. His 
voice, not particularly deep or commanding, sits in contrast to the traditionally 
commanding sound of Peter Jennings, Tom Brokaw and Dan Rather – the old-guard 
anchor icons. Cooper appeared in a fashion spread in the September 2005 issue of men’s 
magazine Maxim during the same month he covered Katrina; he appeared in Esquire 
simultaneously (Jensen, 2005). Van Meter noted during an August 2005 interview, days 
before Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, that Cooper’s appearance lends him an aura that 
commands attention:  
Though it was midday on one of the hottest days of the year, Cooper couldn’t 
have looked more put-together in his impeccably modern black suit, crisp pink 
shirt, and perfectly knotted purple-and-blue tie. What is it about people with that 
particular combination of icy blue eyes, pale skin, and silver hair? Cooper’s 
appearance lends him an aspect of otherworldly knowingness and inner calm. But 




This aesthetic deception, according to Van Meter, is rooted in Cooper’s nervous off- (and 
sometimes on-) camera demeanor, which includes his often-stuttering, rapid-fire speech; 
his awkward avoidance of any conversation about his sexuality and sexual orientation; 
and a public, dark and troubling past of privilege and tragedy, which involved a famous 
fashion-designer mother (Gloria Vanderbilt) and a brutal suicide of a sibling. Notably, 
Carter Cooper, his older brother, jumped to his death from Anderson’s bedroom terrace 
on the 14th story of their family home in Manhattan on July 22, 1988. Despite his wealthy 
background, Anderson Cooper chose to make money on his own as a child by modeling 
for Ralph Lauren, Calvin Klein and Macy’s. He told Van Meter that he quit at age 13 
when “a creepy male photographer propositioned him.” 
 Van Meter is one of the only reporters to write about Cooper’s sexuality, which 
Anderson himself avoids discussing with the press. However, according to Van Meter, 
“his sexuality is regularly discussed just under the radar….There has been a lot of chatter 
on the Internet about the fact that Cooper may or may not be gay….” Van Meter cites a 
gay magazine, Metrosource, that goes so far as to refer to Cooper as “the openly gay 
news anchor.” He reportedly lives a “gay social life,” associating with high-profile gay 
celebrities. In a heated 2004 interview with Jerry Falwell about gay marriage, he 
reportedly said, “We pay taxes,” though this has been difficult to verify. On Salon.com, 
Neal Gabler characterizes Cooper as a “method” anchor, referring to the acting technique 
in which actors tap prior experiences to construct their characters. Cooper’s “method” 
style is rooted in his emotionality: “He is a professional emoter – the ‘conscience of the 
nation,’ Vanity Fair called him. His job is to feel.” Gabler gently connects this 




“Added to all this attention,” writes Gabler, “is the frisson of his sexuality and the 
hanging question – hanging because Cooper refuses to address it – of whether he is gay 
or not, which raises the possibility of his being America’s first gay anchor.” In April 
2007, Out magazine put Cooper’s face on the cover of a model (next to another model 
sporting a Jodie Foster mask) with a headline reading: “The Glass Closet: Why the Stars 
Won’t Come Out and Play.” In the article, author Michael Musto positions Cooper as one 
of the celebrities who is barely closeted or in “the glass closet,” i.e., will not talk about 
his sexuality, but everyone knows he is gay. Musto quotes controversial outing journalist 
Michelangelo Signorole, who disparagingly said, “Anderson Cooper has finessed it 
where straight women who have a crush on him think he’s straight and gay men actually 
think he’s out. [The glass closeters] are able to play different niche audiences to whatever 
sexual orientation those people want, and they believe it!” In summary, Cooper’s 
resistance to being identified with a sexual orientation label and persistent speculation 
about his sexuality suggests that representation of Cooper resists a stable rendering of his 
sexual identity. Cooper performs gender normatively enough to avoid overwhelming 
suspicion of homosexuality from a heterosexual audience, but does not foreclose 
conversation about his perceived queerness sufficiently to silence alternative narratives 
about his alleged gay identity and/or behavior. 
 If Cooper’s identity is examined solely through the prism of race, one can 
recognize how Cooper’s Whiteness positions him as a sympathetic ally to the guilty or 
shameful White viewer wrestling with the anxiety (e.g., anger, sadness, depression) that 
coverage of Katrina provoked. However, a critical lens that accounts for the 




discourse about him engenders a more nuanced and comprehensive explanation of his 
appeal to White audiences. Cooper does not “do” White masculinity in the same vein as 
Shepard Smith or Brian Williams, both of whom are accepted as heterosexual and 
sufficiently heteromasculine. Cooper feels more than both of them, which served him 
well professionally during Katrina. His ‘softer’ performance of masculinity and his non-
threatening sexuality, which are evidenced by his speech, attire, celebrity appearances 
and avoidance of sexual labeling, enabled him to emote throughout the storm and to do so 
in a way that was perceived as authentic and genuine – he could just be read as Details-
reading “metrosexual.” He was not too feminine so as to turn heteronormative audiences 
off; to the contrary, he embodied a kind of neoliberal, heteromasculinized homosexuality 
akin to other popular out celebrities, such as actor Neil Patrick Harris, who do not feel 
(homo)sexual at all (Harris, 2006; for an academic perspective, see Duggan, 2003). For 
the CNN-viewing audience, his refined good looks and affective demeanor were as 
inviting and non-threatening as the fictional Will Truman from Will & Grace. One cannot 
know exactly how the viewing public would have responded if Brian Williams had yelled 
at Senator Landrieu with his authoritative masculinity and deep voice. However, one can 
imagine that the reception of Cooper’s rant at Landrieu might have been different if his 
gender performance was more heterosexual; would his response have been perceived as 
an honest expression of deep sadness and frustration? Could audiences tolerate a 
commanding White straight man yelling at a heterosexual White woman, obviously 
upsetting her on camera? Would Landrieu herself have behaved differently? 
By my reading of journalistic coverage of Cooper, the anchor’s “limpid blue 




from his sympathetic Whiteness and his central positionality in the narrative of Hurricane 
Katrina (Gabler, 2006). Evaluating whether or not Cooper was an effective journalist in 
the wake of Katrina is outside the scope, purpose and bounds of my present investigation. 
I found, however, that other journalists were fixated on Cooper’s intriguing persona 
throughout the aftermath of Katrina. In their evaluations of his coverage, other journalists 
and media experts celebrated Cooper’s ability and willingness to emote on camera – to 
overcome the boundary between the televisual viewing public and the subject-victims of 
the storm. His propensity for affectivity mediated the painful shame of Katrina, providing 
a discursive proxy through which viewing audiences could feel with him. In the context 
of negotiating Hurricane Katrina as a national shame, Cooper expressed shame-
associated feelings of anger and painful sadness and worked through these affective 
experiences on camera. In doing so, he is representative of how the White guilt and 
White shame of contemporary American discourse resists the simplistic rendering of a 
universal guilty subject who feels bad about racism. To the contrary, Cooper’s 
personification and performance of White shame cannot be understood through the 
binary of individual/collective, because he was emoting individually as audiences were 
feeling with him. Furthermore, his subtle and complex gender and sexual identity 
intersect with his Whiteness to position him as a sympathetic White figure – at least to 
White audiences – in the midst of a horrific racist crisis.  
 





“Forgive my skepticism, but I’m not a huge fan of apologies that come only after 
an evident threat to one’s livelihood; I have difficulty believing that they spring 
spontaneously from a troubled soul.” 
 -Mark Harris, editor (June 2007, Entertainment Weekly) 
 
In August 2007, Entertainment Weekly ranked the top 25 “biggest scandals” of 
the past 25 years. “Don Imus Fouls Out!” was ranked number 16, and the impact on his 
career was called “major.” Imus’s controversy was ranked two places behind Michael 
Richards’ well publicized “Racist Rant!” at Los Angeles’ Laugh Factory comedy club in 
2006. Mel Gibson earned the number two spot with his anti-Semitic and misogynist 
tirade (“Mel(t) Down!”), which was directed at L.A. County police who had pulled him 
over for a suspected DUI. The number one scandal was “Nipplegate!” the infamous 
“wardrobe malfunction” that cost CBS half a million dollars in 2004 when Justin 
Timberlake exposed Janet Jackson’s breast during the Super Bowl halftime performance. 
“Isaiah Mouths Off, Shoots Self in Foot!” was ranked right in the middle, at number 12. 
“Just when you thought the drama on ABC’s Grey’s Anatomy couldn’t get more 
overwrought, it did behind the scenes,” wrote reporter Ty Burr (p. 22). As the magazine’s 
humorous and non-scientific rankings suggest, Isaiah Washington’s “F-word” debacle 
was situated within a decade full of major celebrity scandals, several of which included 
identity-based slurs and all of which implicated complex, culturally embedded relations 
of race, gender and sexuality. Moreover, the nature of these scandals is such that each 
invoked discourses of responsibility, blame, apology, punishment and redemption, which 




 “Isaiahgate,” as it came to be known, is the final crisis explored in this chapter, 
and is simultaneously similar and distinct from the other two crises in terms of 
journalists’ narrative mapping of the stories. “Isaiahgate,” like the “I-Mess,” involved a 
celebrity behaving in such a manner so as to warrant the assignment of blame and 
punishment. Isaiah Washington’s ‘bad’ behavior also similarly involved the use of a 
culturally loaded and offensive term.  However, Washington’s slur was anti-gay: the 
word of interest was “faggot,” and Washington’s alleged use of the term targeted another 
man. As such, the story was taken up journalistically as centering on the theme of 
homophobia, not racism or sexism. Indeed, discourse about Washington’s race only 
surfaced once he had been fired, months after the controversy began to receive media 
coverage. The identity labels most salient in discourse about Washington were straight 
and gay, or heterosexual and homosexual, and Washington’s race was rarely articulated. 
Furthermore, whereas Imus quickly accepted responsibility and apologized for calling the 
Rutgers players “nappy-headed hos,” Washington’s acceptance of responsibility – or lack 
thereof – was much more complicated and inconsistent. As I will explore, though, 
Washington’s Blackness and his alleged victim’s Whiteness were central to the discourse 
of “Isaiahgate” and the racialized rhetorics of responsibility and blame. Limiting analysis 
of “Isaiahgate” solely to racial dynamics paints a reductionist and overly simplistic 
portrait of this ‘crisis.’ To understand “Isaiahgate” is to recognize the intersecting 
dimensions of difference and oppression that co-constitute the axes of power through 
which this story played itself out and was understood by the public, i.e., its audience. 
Race, gender and sexuality are concurrently salient in the rendering of victims, 




 Most Americans did not hear Don Imus slander the Rutgers’ team or watch 
Anderson Cooper yell at Mary Landrieu on live television or radio. However, journalistic 
coverage of the events – and the ability to actually replay them on television and the 
Internet – ensured that many people following the story could actually witness for 
themselves the newsworthy moments. This also meant that reporters could write with 
authority about what happened, because there was tangible proof. Imus didn’t ‘allegedly’ 
do anything: we heard and saw exactly what he did. Ironically, Isaiah Washington might 
have benefited from an audio transcript or video recording of his off-camera fight with 
co-star Patrick Dempsey, which started the scandal that resulted in his eventual forced 
exit from Grey’s Anatomy. Hypothetically, he could have used such hard evidence to 
make a stronger case that he said “faggot” but did not mean to imply that co-star T. R. 
Knight was gay. Or, the same recording could have made it clear that Washington did 
invoke Knight’s name alongside “faggot,” which likely would have resulted in swifter, 
harsher punishment. At the very least, such an archiving of the actual altercation would 
have made this a simpler story. Instead, “Isaiahgate” was such a compelling news story 
because it became a high-stakes and high-profile round of celebrity he-said, she-said, he-
said.  
 To review: in October 2006, rumors surfaced that Washington, a black actor, and 
Dempsey, a more well-known White actor, had gotten into an loud argument off camera 
on the set of their hit ABC television series, Grey’s Anatomy. Allegedly, Washington 
referred to T. R. Knight, a White man and co-star, as a “faggot” during this fight. Knight 
came out (as gay) in October shortly after the story broke by revealing his sexual 




using the term. Washington was quoted by the Associated Press (2007) as issuing a 
statement in which he “expressed regret for ‘the unfortunate use of words’ he called 
‘beneath my own personal standards.’” According to the Chicago Sun-Times, “The 
controversy simmered for months, reaching a crescendo” when Washington said “faggot” 
at the January 2007 Golden Globes – this time on camera – to deny saying it in the first 
place. “I did not call T. R. a ‘faggot.’ Never,” said Washington backstage at the Golden 
Globes ceremony press conference to a reporter who had asked about the October 
incident, according to the Associated Press (Elber, 2007). The next day, January 17, 
2007, T. R. Knight was a guest The Ellen DeGeneres Show and said to DeGeneres: “He 
referred to me as a faggot….Everyone heard it” (Elber, 2007). After apologizing again 
and entering treatment for his anger management and alleged homophobia, ABC and 
Grey’s Anatomy creator Shonda Rhimes, a black woman, chastised Washington. “I speak 
for all of the executive producers here at Grey’s Anatomy when I say that Isaiah 
Washington’s use of such a disturbing word was a shocking and dismaying event that 
insulted not only gays and lesbians everywhere, but anyone who has ever struggled for 
respect in a world that is not always accepting of difference,” said Rhimes in a statement 
released January 24, 2007 (Bruno, 2007). Eventually, on June 7, 2007, it was announced 
that Washington was fired from the series and would not be returning to the show for the 
2007-2008 season (Katz, 2007). 
 In October 2006, it was immediately unclear what exactly Washington had done 
and whose story was the most accurate reflection of the events that had unfolded off 
camera. Besides Knight’s coming out, the initial story did not provoke much coverage – 




become enraged about what it does not know. Some felt differently and were ready to lay 
blame on Washington. Entertainment Weekly editor Mark Harris (2007), for example, 
wrote in that magazine:  
For a while, Isaiah Washington was actually going to get away with it. I’m talking 
about how things felt before the Official Entertainment Remorse Machine kicked 
in – the denial, then the half-baked small apology, then the more impressive, 
bigger, ‘I’m scared’ apology (the one that goes, ‘I have sinned, I must look deep 
inside myself and deal with my issues, I shall summon leaders of the offended 
community to meet with me’) with a side order of official corporate rebuke, 
presumably followed by regret-soaked on-air interviews and a group hug. For 
three months, all the evidence suggested that everyone – Washington, Grey’s 
Anatomy creator Shonda Rhimes, Touchstone TV, and ABC – had decided it was 
no big deal for an actor to refer to a gay colleague as a ‘faggot’ on the set and that 
if everyone just averted their eyes, the word would become a tiny speed bump that 
a show could bounce over without looking back. 
Harris notably expressed outright hostility toward Washington and the other players in 
the situation, criticizing them for failing to act and react until after the Golden Globes 
incident: “…everyone in a position to do anything about it was content to let the word 
faggot hand in the air all winter….” Until journalists wrote about the story and talked 
about it on camera, however, the word itself had not been actually uttered in the public in 
the context of this controversy – it was journalists’ coverage of the rumored argument 
that brought Washington’s use of the term into discourse and journalistic rotation. 




dependable accusation; reporters decided that he had called Knight a faggot based on 
Washington’s first (and second) apology. The second utterance, at the Golden Globes, 
was more complicated, because he had used it to defend himself. Reporting about the 
Globes’ press conference reflects this confusion and the diversity of reactions to 
Washington’s statement. Harris, for example, said that Washington used the word again 
in his denial, and Zeller (2007) wrote a The New York Times media blog that, “…Mr. 
Washington apparently made matters worse by saying the word again in denial at the 
Golden Globes on Monday….Seems [he] caused jaws to drop when he boldly re-issued a 
slur…in the context of what appears to have been an unsolicited denial of having used the 
slur back in October, in reference to co-star [Knight], who is gay.” On the other hand, a 
New York Times Style section story printed the same week, began: “Executives at ABC 
and its parent, Disney, are mulling the future of [Washington] after Mr. Washington last 
week publicly used an anti-gay slur for the second time in roughly three months, a Disney 
executive said Monday” (Wyatt, 2007; p. E1). US Weekly (2007) wrote, “D’oh! There he 
goes again” (“‘Grey’s Anatomy’ smackdown, round 2: Heigl vs. Washington”). Reports 
differentially constructed the incident as the only, second or quasi-second use of the term. 
 In addition to mulling over what actually happened – i.e., what constituted this 
(as) news – journalists tapped public opinion about the relative offensiveness of 
Washington’s alleged comments. In the wake of Washington’s firing and the several 
other celebrity slur-scandals listed above, Business Wire released a May 2007 Harris 
Interactive (2007) online poll of 2,383 U.S. adults opinions regarding the Washington, 
Richards, Imus and Gibson scandals, among others. Sixty-nine percent of those polled 




offensive and 63 percent found Gibson’s anti-Semitic slurs to be offensive. Meanwhile, 
54 percent felt Washington’s use of “faggot” was offensive, just above Rush Limbaugh’s 
use of the phrase “Obama Osama” to describe then-Senator Barack Obama. Forty percent 
of those surveyed did not find the Washington incident to be offensive, but only one in 
two surveyed was actually familiar with the Washington scandal. A full 80 percent were 
familiar with the Imus’s Rutgers comments.  
Differences emerged in the 2007 Harris poll based on social identity group 
membership. For example, 88 percent and 83 percent and African Americans were 
“extremely” or “very” offended by Imus’s and Richards’ comments, respectively. 
Washington “extremely/very” offended a smaller proportion, 66 percent, of GLBT adults 
surveyed; less than half, 40 percent, of GLBT survey respondents were “extremely/very” 
offended by Don Imus. There were racial differences in the perception of offensiveness 
regarding “Isaiahgate,” as well. Thirty-four percent of those surveyed found 
Washington’s use of “faggot” to be “extremely/very” offensive; however, a larger 
proportion of African Americans (46 percent) found this to be “extremely/very” offensive 
than Whites (33 percent), perhaps reflecting some feelings of collective responsibility or 
stronger levels of group entiativity on behalf of Black people. A higher percent (37) of 
Hispanic respondents found the term more offensive than Whites, as well. Though this 
research does not constitute an academic study subject to the rigors of peer review, it is 
meaningful in that it was disseminated as sociological evidence of how American 
actually reacted to these incidents by demographic variables. 
After Washington was fired, Kevin Nance (2007) wrote in the Chicago Sun-Times 




name-calling arsenal, rivaling the N-word in sheer wounding power” (p. B1). In 
discussing Washington, Nance asserted, “Today, ‘faggot’ seems to have grown even 
more offensive, and to more people, than ever before” (p. B1). “In fact,” he continued, 
“’faggot’ shows signs of becoming the new N-word….” Some papers, such as the 
Washington Post, did not print the term; others, such as The New York Times and the 
Chicago Sun-Times, did print “faggot,” as opposed to the increasingly commonplace 
“anti-gay epithet.” In the midst of several highly publicized racist, sexist and 
homonegative articulations by public figures, such comparisons to other slurs were 
inevitable and constituted news – or entertainment, at least. In the Philadelphia Inquirer, 
Michael Smerconish (2007) ranked these “bone-headed and off-color comments” with a 
“Muzzle Meter” (p. D03). Gibson and Richards earned a 10 out of 10, while Washington 
earned a 9. In contrast, Joe Biden earned a 0 for calling Obama “‘articulate and bright and 
clean and a nice-looking guy,’” because, “He was complimenting Obama,” according to 
Smerconish (p. B03). Coverage such as the Harris poll and Nance’s column, intriguingly, 
turned comparison into an opportunity for normative ranking. In other words, in talking 
about Imus, Washington, Gibson, Richards and others together, the discourse consistently 
shifted toward deciding which words or phrases are worse and worst.  
As in the Imus scandal, the attribution of blame and speculation about punishment 
were common themes in coverage of “Isaiahgate.” A few months prior to his column 
about the term “faggot,” Nance (2007) wrote: “Poor Isaiah Washington, forced to 
apologize…: If you were about to lose your lucrative gig on one of the highest-rated 
shows, you’d have agreed to go to rehab, too” (p. 37). The Chicago Sun-Times (2007) 




guy a naughty name” (p. B2). The Times also quoted Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against 
Defamation (GLAAD) President Neil G. Giuliano, who said, “This kind of anti-gay slur – 
whether on set or in front of the press – does more than create a hostile environment for 
his cast mates and crew. It also feeds a climate of hatred and intolerance that contributes 
to putting our community in harm’s way” (p. B2). Actor and playwright Harvey Fierstein 
wrote in an op-ed for The New York Times that: 
What surprises me, I guess, is how choosy the anti-P.C. crowd is about which hate 
speech it will not tolerate. Sure, there were voices of protest when the TV actor 
Isaiah Washington called a gay colleague a “faggot.” But corporate American 
didn’t pull its advertising from “Grey’s Anatomy,” as it did with Mr. Imus, did it? 
Washington and Knight’s co-star Katherine Heigl, who is White, became a more 
prominent figure in the controversy than Dempsey because of her comments in defense 
of Knight and the reality of her bigger stardom. “I’m going to be really honest right now, 
[Washington] needs to just not speak in public. Period. I’m sorry, that did not need to be 
said. I’m not okay with it,” she told a reporter after the Golden Globes (“‘Grey’s 
Anatomy’ smackdown, round 2: Heigl vs. Washington”). Though it is unclear if she 
actually defended Knight to the press on more than one occasion, she was scripted as the 
Knight’s stereotypical best straight girlfriend who was not afraid to stand up to an angry 
Black man, and her comments were frequently reprinted. 
After the Golden Globes, the Associated Press reported that Washington was, “in 
therapy for his use of an anti-gay slur against a castmate” (Elber, 2007). The AP also 
noted, “Whether Washington was receiving outpatient counseling or had entered a 




her own in March 2007 when she made a reference to rhetoric of Washington’s treatment 
as “rehab” for homophobia and insinuated that then South Carolina Senator John 
Edwards was gay. The Washington Times reported that, while addressing a question 
during a presentation at a conservative conference, she responded that she “was going to 
have a few comments on the other Democratic presidential candidate, John Edwards, but 
it turns out you have to go into rehab if you use the word ‘faggot” (qtd. in McCain & 
Morton, 2007; p. A02). The New York Daily News reported that acquaintances of 
Washington thought he had anger problems for years and his 30-day anger management 
program was the right move. A former co-star was quoted as saying, “I’m just really 
happy that he’s going to stand up and take responsibility and fix this.” (qtd. in Rush & 
Rush Molloy, 2007; p. 18). Washington released his own statement after entering 
counseling, saying “I appreciate the fact that I have been given this opportunity and I 
remain committed to transforming my negative actions into positive results, personally 
and professionally” (qtd. in Elber, 2007). The AP also was reported to have met with gay 
activists from GLAAD and the Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education Network (Elber, 
2007). Journalists and commentators speculated as to the outcome, which was perceived 
by Harris (2007) and others, including Lisa de Moraes (2007) of The Washington Post, as 
fitting seamlessly into an increasingly standardized celebrity apology-cycle, a la Imus, 
Richards, Gibson, etc. Washington’s apologies and attempts to seek forgiveness were 
deemed either insufficient, fruitless or both, and he was ultimately fired in June 2007.  
Though perhaps not obviously so, this crisis represents a productive opportunity 
to consider about how multiple axes of oppression influence discourse about and 




unarticulated and characterized by discursive silences. I do not imply that White people 
did feel or should have felt racial guilt during the “Isaiahgate” crisis. Nevertheless, the 
discursive silence around Washington and Knight’s respective racial identities, as well as 
attribution of collective blame for “homophobia” when Washington’s race was named, 
point to group-based power relations that operated implicitly during this moment. 
Consistently, the racial dynamics of the controversy – which from some perspectives, 
including my own, was unavoidable – remained unspoken. A dark-skinned, tall, 
angered/angry Black man was fighting with at least one White man when he referred to 
one of them, the shorter and less (hetero)sexual one, as a “faggot.” All of this unfolded in 
the context of Grey’s Anatomy, an exemplar of neoliberal multiculturalism in which 
racial, ethnic, gender and sexual differences abound but are largely ignored (Brennan, 
2005). The ideological hegemony of neoliberal multiculturalism was on full display 
during “Isaiahgate,” as reporters avoided dealing with any dimension of difference, 
besides the unavoidable one: sexuality. But even then, references to Knight’s sexuality 
were routinely buried in stories or avoided altogether. The raciality of the situation was 
rhetorically detached in exchange for a unidimensional approach to thinking and talking 
about hate, oppression and inequality. Unlike the recent Gibson, Imus and Richards 
incidents, not to mention the Duke lacrosse scandal and Hurricane Katrina, a White 
person was not culpable for this hate speech, making “Isaiahgate” a politically and 
affectively appealing story for White news media and audiences. Based on the recent 
barrage of stories about racist White public figures, a potential lede could have read 
something like: “For the first time in months, a non-White celebrity has become 




their sources refused to address the racial dynamics but covered the story with voracity – 
despite relatively few actual points at which something verifiable happened. At least one 
avenue of interpretation could lead to the conclusion that journalists did not have to say it 
out loud: the differences between Washington and Knight were so stark that their mere 
juxtaposition conveyed the racial dynamics without needing to be made explicit. The 
script was so schematic it did not warrant explanation; it could operate silently.  
“Isaiahgate” was both always already and never allowed to be about race. In the 
few instances in which race was articulated, Washington’s Blackness was the only 
raciality mentioned. “I’m sorry that the overall non-reaction to Washington’s behavior 
helped to reinforce a perception that some quarters of the African-American community 
tolerate homophobia, a stereotype that is only going to divide us more unless both groups 
fight it at every turn,” asserted Mark Harris (2007) in Entertainment Weekly. Harris’ 
comments are notable for their explicit references to stereotypes about Black attitudes 
toward gay people, but he was not the only reporter to make such connections. In “Diary 
of an Angry Black Man,” Newsweek reporter Allison Samuels (2007) writes about 
Washington’s public statements after being fired from Grey’s Anatomy. “Washington is 
bitter about the whole situation,” she said, “especially since he did everything the 
network asked to atone for his mistakes.” Similarly to Imus, Washington’s acts of 
contrition did not ultimately suffice. From Samuels’ perspective, race does not explain 
the reaction to Washington’s comments, but it does explain why he said them. Samuels 
waxed sociologically about his predicament:  
Washington’s use of the “F” word seems surprising, given that he portrayed a gay 




condemning homophobia in the black community a few years back. One thing 
that’s also been lost with so much focus on Washington is the sad reality of 
homophobia in the Black community. From rap music to Eddie Murphy jokes, 
insensitivity to the homosexual community seems to be a mainstay of African-
American culture. 
Samuels’ observations seem peculiar in light of the tremendous consumption and 
cooptation of Black culture by White American consumers, not to mention Ann Coulter’s 
simultaneous and related use of the term, which arguably became a much bigger story 
than Washington’s. Why does Washington’s use and – albeit bizarre – denial of the use 
of the term confirm Black people’s deep-seated hatred about queer people, who are 
presumably distinct groups in Samuels’ framing? Why come to this conclusion when the 
most outspoken and powerful advocates against gay rights are White men and women, 
such as Coulter, George W. Bush, Sarah Palin, Mike Huckabee, David Duke, Jerry 
Falwell, James Dobson, etc.? Why, indeed, is Blackness and Black people constructed as 
a site to deposit the majority of and responsibility for “homophobia”?  
 By Washington’s estimation, the answer is racism. “It was a fight between two 
men that shouldn’t have happened,” Washington told Samuels (2007). “But someone 
heard the booming voice of a black man and got really scared and that was the beginning 
of the end for me. I see that now, but I didn’t then,” he said (Samuels, 2007; also cited by 
Fromm, 2007 in People). Washington’s perspective is as culturally situated as 
Entertainment Weekly’s Mark Harris, a White gay man whose social minority group 
Harris perceived as victimized by Washington’s actions. “The problem is a lot bigger 




wrapped in the words ‘I’m sorry.’” From Washington’s perspective, he was at fault for 
his saying “faggot”; but in admitting fault, Washington claims he was then made into a 
victim himself because of racial and gender discrimination toward Black men: 
Well, it didn’t help me on the set that I as a black man who wasn’t a mush-mouth 
Negro walking around with his head in his hands all the time. I didn’t speak like 
I’d just left the plantation and that can be a problem for people sometime….I had 
a person in human resources tell me after this thing played out that ‘some people’ 
were afraid of me around the studio. I asked her why, because I’m a 6-foot-1 
black man with dark skin and who doesn’t go around saying ‘Yessah, massa sir’ 
and ‘No sir, massa’ to everyone? It’s nuts when your presence alone can just scare 
people, and that made me a prime candidate to take the heat in a dysfunctional 
family….My mistake was believing I could correct a wrong thing with honesty 
and sincerity. My mistake was thinking black people get second chances….I was 
wrong on all fronts. (qtd. in Samuels, 2007) 
Samuels and others describe Washington as both externalizing blame for his actions and 
detaching from the situation – i.e., failing to sufficiently see and own his responsibility. 
Despite the fact that “faggot” is an infinitely more commonly used and socially accepted 
term (e.g., I just heard a group of young White men use it outside a dining hall on campus 
today), Washington’s culpability is framed throughout journalistic discourse on 
“Isaiahgate” as comparable to if not the same as Gibson’s and Richards’ racist 
infractions. Leonard Pitts Jr. (2007), a Black columnist, wrote in the Houston Chronicle 
that Washington is exemplary of the practice of finding racism “where it does not exist.” 




jerk? Or that a white actor of middling fame who disrupted his workplace would have 
also been fired?” said Pitts. He sees the incident from a Black standpoint, but one quite 
different from Washington. “He lost his job for saying an awful thing. I wish he’d stop 
whining and deal with that. Step one is to realize that black is not an excuse,” Pitts 
concluded. The conclusion to be derived from Pitts’ argument is that race only matters in 
issues of racism. But how do we identify and deconstructed to “epidemic racism in this 
country” to which Pitts refers if claims such as Washington’s are so easily discredited and 
we do not talk about race unless a shock jock calls a women’s basketball team a bunch of 
“nappy headed hos”? Figure 5 lays out some of the positions taken with relation to 
blaming Washington and perceptions of whether or Washington’s social identity group 





Figure 5: Positional Map: Isaiah Washington and the Grey’s Anatomy “Isaiahgate” 
Scandal 
 My purpose in investigating the discourse of blame and responsibility of this 
crisis is not to defend Isaiah Washington’s actions or to insinuate that he should not have 
been fired from Grey’s Anatomy. At least one time and likely twice, he used a hateful 
word – his inability to initially recognize the severity of his actions and the significance 
of his role as a public figure both reflects and reifies the notion the such language is 
merely in poor taste, but ultimately tolerable. However, Washington’s actions are 
historically situated within a cultural moment in which multiple White celebrities and 
public figures became embroiled in scandals related to problematic behavior. Though 
each of these controversies mentioned in this chapter are different, it would be a mistake 




one another (indeed, they did quite often), or that ideologies of race, gender and sexuality 
do not together influence the constitution of these crises in the journalistic sphere, as if 
some how Imus, Richards and Gibson’s comments and the Duke lacross scandal were 
only about race; “Nipplegate” was only about gender; Katrina was only about class; and 
Isaiahgate was only about sexuality. Just as these controversies are discursively organized 
and experienced via multiple dimensions of difference and inequality, those implicated in 
these crises are rarely limited to singular social actors. To the contrary, each of these 
events sparks talk about and feelings of collective responsibility, particularly collective 
anxiety and guilt. Though White guilt is the topic of this conversation, we see different 
kinds of collective guilt – potential or actualized – circulating through, around and within 
these discourses. In “Isaiahgate,” White people may have experienced temporary relief 
from the consistent pangs of White guilt and taken distinct affective pleasure and/or 
release in the culpability of a Black man’s use of an identity-based slur. Did 
Washington’s admission of guilt and responsibility materialize a new form of collective 
guilt – straight guilt – through which to defer so-called serious conversations about 
identity and inequality? Might Washington’s Blackness served to alleviate heterosexual 
White people’s straight guilt, as well, while all Black people were assigned differential 
and disproportionate responsibility for heterosexism? How might some Black people’s 
negative attitudes toward queer people alleviate some White people’s racial guilt through 
the positioning of all Black people as generally more “homophobic” than Whites? How 
are gay White men’s lived experiences and politics uniquely positioned in these 
discourses? Mark Harris was an out-spoken critic of Washington who expressed 




is White gay men’s raciality ignored and their collective responsibility for racism 
alleviated somehow because of persistent homonegativity and heteronormativity? 
Discourse analysis does not answer these questions, but opens up these questions for 
further empirical investigation. We see in “Isaiahgate,” as well as coverage of Cooper’s 
reporting during Katrina and the Don Imus scandal, that multiple dimensions of 
difference co-constitute these crises – whether or not anyone is saying it. 
Conclusion: Crisis Averted 
 Arriving at a more empirically grounded and feminist-objective understanding of 
White guilt means situating the construct within concurrent and contradictory, identity-
based, affective processes (Haraway, 1988). The actions of Cooper, Imus and 
Washington motivated tremendous discursive activity, which offered insight into 
contemporary epistemologies of race, multiple social identities and inequalities. By 
foregrounding neoliberalism and multicultural hegemony in the analysis of these 
discourses, we can identify and articulate nuanced and typically invisible cultural 
processes, such as the ways in which race, sexuality and gender frame social interactions 
even as they remain unspoken. These nuanced, qualitative data help to contextualize and 
historicize the emerging cultural psychology of White guilt in this dissertation.  
 During each of these crises, various social actors – celebrities, public figures, 
journalists, commentators, pundits, business executives, audiences – were working 
through negative, self-conscious affect by way of producing and redistributing 
responsibility, blame, punishment, guilt and shame. These processes are not mutually 
exclusive, but they also occurred in different moments and ways. Anderson Cooper 




tragedy without interrogating the role of Whiteness in producing Black victims of 
Katrina. Journalists differentially celebrated Cooper’s empathy or critiqued his 
emotionality, but most at least articulated Cooper’s unique style of affect – largely 
without explicating how his sexuality shapes the performance and perception of his 
affectivity. Katrina was a “national shame,” but Cooper’s performance of guilt and 
anxiety helped position him as a righteous hero in discourse about journalists’ coverage 
of the storm and its aftermath. Though Isaiah Washington was ultimately fired from 
Grey’s Anatomy, there is little discursive evidence that “Isaiahgate” was about his public 
shaming. This may be attributable to his ultimate refusal to embrace guilt or culpability 
after losing his job. Discourse about Washington remained focused on what he did or did 
not do, and how his actions might be reflective of pathological attitudes of an imagined 
collectivity of African Americans. On the other hand, Don Imus was constructed as guilty 
and shameful throughout the “I-Mess,” but especially once he was fired. Journalistic 
rendering of Imus illustrates the centrality of identity in the rhetorical construction of 
guilt and shame: his culpability was dependent not only on his actions, but about what his 
personality and identity (e.g., race and gender) came to signify. Moreover, a consistent 
discursive trend in each of these crises is the complexity and interconnectivity of guilt, 
shame and responsibility.  
 If conclusions can be drawn from this diversity of data, it is that the epistemology 
of neoliberalism – where agency is the dominant factor in social relationship and the 
significance of identity in minimized – is the framework through which guilt and shame 
are experienced, deferred and negated. In each of the crisis moments explored in this 




hegemony is ultimately sustained. The inherent instability of neoliberalism, whereby the 
logics of neoliberal policy and ideology must constantly adapt to incorporate 
contradictions and inconsistencies, is trumped by the stability and power of 
neoliberalism. Don Imus’s hate speech could have changed the position of racist, sexist 
and homonegative shock jocks in contemporary American entertainment media, but Imus 
is already back on the air. Washington, meanwhile, has largely disappeared from popular 
culture. Cooper’s emotional coverage could have motivated Americans to seriously 
consider and change the ways in which race and class together position so many people 
in vulnerable geographies and cultural spaces; instead, New Orleans remains in disrepair 
and Cooper is famous. Washington’s “faggot” comments could have motivated leaders in 
the entertainment media to begin a conversation about how all Americans continue to 
harbor or tolerate negative attitudes toward queer people; instead, Washington, 
specifically, and Black people, generally, took the blame. Nonetheless, these crises – and 
their subsequent re-stabilizations of neoliberal hegemony – are illustrative of situations in 
which contemporary White people in the United States may be forced to face the 
significance of race and other dimensions of identity as structuring factors of everyday 
life, as well as their own roles in these processes. In other words, these are the situations 
on which potential experiences of White guilt are dependent. From here, we can begin to 
investigate the affective and cognitive strategies that everyday White people use to 






The words “externalize” and “detachment” sounds so clinical, but they are fairly 
accurate descriptors of what happens when you try to blame someone else for something 
you did or pretend that you’re not implicated in a conflict. I’ve done both of them before, 
and you have, too. To me, externalization and detachment are ultimately just as painful as 
shame or guilt, and that’s probably because I can’t remember ever doing this when it 
wasn’t actually my fault. In my experience, externalization and detachment wind up 
feeling as gross and horrible as the pangs of shame, because they’re fairly ineffective as 
avoidance strategies. I am motivated by my values and beliefs to try – every day – to be 
the best kind of White person I can be: antiracist; conscious of identity and inequality; 
perceptive of mine and others’ problematic behaviors. My strongest memories of 
externalization and detachment –what together I refer to as “negation” – are those 
moments when I failed miserably at embodying any of these qualities. 
This is ugly. Are you ready? 
 On Monday, July 25, 2005, the Washington Post published an op-ed titled “Why 
Our Black Families Are Failing,” by William Raspberry, a socially conservative African 
American columnist. The provocative title grabbed my attention on the home page of the 
Post’s Web site while I was taking a break from work. That summer I was employed full 
time as a research assistant and Webmaster at the Consortium on Race, Gender and 
Ethnicity, a think-tank on the University of Maryland’s campus devoted to the study of 
“intersecting inequalities.” That summer I was building the “Intersectional Research 
Database,” the world’s first archive of annotated intersectional research. I had just 




because it will help you understand the profound arrogance with which I approached this 
situation. 
 Raspberry’s column made me furious, and I stand by my initial reaction to his 
writing – even today. At this point in his career, Raspberry’s ideas about the sociology of 
race and inequality were outdated and offensive. In his column, he resurrected the 
Moynihan report, a political-rhetorical strategy that was picking up steam at the time as 
Bill Cosby traveled the country lecturing to mixed audiences about how Black people 
needed to get their shit together and spot whining about racism. Grab onto your 
bootstraps, folks.  
 Come on, people. 
 I had just encountered Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s influential report on “The 
Negro Family” that year in my graduate coursework in American Studies, but it does not 
take graduate education to glean the racism, misogyny, heterosexism and classism that 
oozes from the ‘well-intentioned’ document, which was initially commissioned by 
President John F. Kennedy, Jr. Just like Raspberry’s conclusion that Black families are 
failing primarily because of single-parent households, Moynihan concluded that Black 
women were the problem with Black America. Not criminalization. Not Vietnam. Not 
racism. Black women’s strength through profound adversity was once again being 
attacked and blamed for the macro-sociological consequences of structural racism. 
Patricia Hill Collins calls this the ideological dimension of African American women’s 
oppression: persistent racist and sexist imagery and logic that attributes negative 




 Therapists and physicians also have a phrase for this: treating the symptom, not 
the problem. 
 As a budding Black feminist who was working at an organization founded by a 
leading Black feminist, I felt particularly motivated to do something about what I read as 
Raspberry’s hateful diatribe. I asked my boss, a White woman, for a few hours to write a 
response. I carefully crafted a letter to the editor in which I expressed my displeasure 
with Raspberry’s writing and the decision of the Post’s editorial staff to publish this 
antiquated argument, which only fuels the racist logic of White neoliberals and 
(hetero)sexists everywhere. In my letter, I made sure to note that I worked at the 
Consortium, was a Ph.D. student and an alumnus of the prestigious Philip Merrill College 
of Journalism.  
 Empowered, or at least self-congratulating, I drove home from work to my new 
apartment in Columbia Heights, the predominantly Black but rapidly gentrifying 
neighborhood to which I had moved the month prior. As I drove onto the 1300 block of 
Fairmont Street, I saw that there were no parking spots available and proceeded to drive 
east onto following block, which was a more attractive and middle-class block than my 
own. I must have come home later than normal, because I remember distinctly that it was 
dark outside, even though it was the middle of the summer, and there were lots of cars 
looking for very few remaining spots. I saw a person pulling out of a spot on the 
opposite, westbound side of the street. 
 Here’s where I made my mistake. It is not fair or civil or neighorborly to do this, 
but I wanted the parking spot, so I turned my blinker on to signal that it was mine – even 




empty spot once the person who was leaving had pulled away. While I was waiting to 
take the spot, a car came up the street in the opposite direction. The man who was driving 
this oncoming car drove past my car and the coveted spot. He then proceeded to turn his 
blinkers on and got into position to parallel park his car in the spot I had been waiting for. 
This really pissed me off, because – from my perspective – he had obviously seen me 
waiting for the spot.   
 As soon as the car finally pulled out of the spot, I floored the nose of my car into 
the spot. Just as I did this, the man who was in position to parallel park started backing 
into the spot, effectively blocking me in. So now I’m perpendicular to the flow of traffic 
and stuck. I cannot move my car. Other cars begin to back up on both sides of me, 
because there is no way to get around me. Meanwhile, this old man won’t move. His 
trunk is less than 10 feet from my driver’s side door and he’s just sitting there. I begin to 
honk for him to move. At this point, I realize that I’ve lost the fight and just want to get 
out of this situation, but I suppose that my honking was not an effective way to 
communicate my capitulation. After what feels like a few minutes of this stalemate, the 
man emerges from his car. 
 I’d like to think that I waited patiently for him to come to my car. I’d like to think 
that I was prepared to have a polite conversation and to apologize for what I’d done. In 
reality, I think that I lowered my window and started yelling at him. He was an older 
Black man, and his companion in the passenger seat was an older Black woman.  
He came up to my car and interrupted my belligerence. I stopped talking. There is 
something about an older, distinguished-looking Black man that just has a way of 




“Son, let me explain something to you.” 
Don’t call me “son,” you asshole. 
“This is my spot. I drove around the block to get it. That woman waited for me to 
drive around the block, and that’s why it took so long for her to leave. She was politely 
waiting for me.” 
Sorry, but this isn’t a deli. They don’t give out tickets corresponding to the order 
in which we park. 
“Now you created this mess, and here’s what’s going to happen. I’m going to pull 
up a few feet so that you can get yourself out of here. Go find your own spot now.” 
Do not tell me what to do. Who the hell do you think you are? Are you the 
fucking goddamn mayor of Columbia fucking Heights? 
I speak up and protest, but before I can even utter a coherent protest, he talks over 
me. 
“Welcome to the neighborhood.” 
 
I rolled my window up and started screaming. I was rageful. I watched him 
calmly walk back to his car and I wanted to throw something at him. I literally lost 
control of my emotions. I almost cried I was so angry. 
 I found a parking spot around the block and stormed into my apartment to relay 
this dramatic encounter to my roommate, a White woman my age. I told Alexis some 
edited version of the story that likely made me sound like the victim of this old-timer’s 
patronizing and senile logic. 




“To the Man Who Ruined My Night and Took My Parking Spot: You don’t know me. 
You don’t know my name and you don’t know anything about me. You have no idea how 
if I’ve lived here for 5 months, 5 years or my entire life. You are a disgrace to yourself 
and to Columbia Heights. I hope we never see each other again. Sincerely, Your 
Neighbor.” 
 I walked down the block and looked for his car. I’m not even sure that I found his 
car exactly, but I looked for an old Buick or Oldsmobile, which I thought was his. It 
didn’t even matter, probably. I just had to get rid of my rage – I had to deposit it 
somewhere. I put the letter under his windshield wiper and walked home feeling 
vindicated. 
 
 I never told anyone else about this. Even though it was months before I stopped 
being angry and admitted how truly wrong I was, I knew right away that I needed to keep 
this one to myself. I felt hung-over the next day, as if I had gone on a bender and 
drunkenly embarrassed myself in public. The contrast between my self-righteous 
antiracism earlier in the day and the reality of my horribly inappropriate behavior was 
sickening. It wasn’t a racist act to take that parking spot, but what he said to me…he 
made crystal clear the dynamic that I wanted to ignore. It was all his fault, I thought. He 
was an arrogant asshole and I had done nothing besides try to get myself a parking spot. 
First come, first served. Right? 
My logic was a racist house of cards that soon collapsed, and I was no longer able 
to blame him for my behavior. I gave into the guilt. It’s not the kind we normally think 






The Differences Between and Within Guilt and Shame: Quantitative Perspectives 
Introduction 
The previous two chapters have critiqued traditional academic approaches to the 
study of White guilt and analyzed recent journalistic discourse about race, responsibility 
and social identities in the U.S. public sphere. Chapter 3 turns toward the project of 
refining the construct and assessment of White guilt11 in the field of psychology and 
specifically the domain of psychometric survey research. This chapter represents the first 
stage in the development of a new survey-based instrument to measure individual 
respondents’ proneness to the construct “White guilt,” and to distinguish between White 
guilt and White shame. White guilt is defined as negative, self-directed feelings about 
one’s White racial identity (Swim & Miller, 1999). White guilt is typically motivated by 
recognition of unearned and unfair racial privilege, the acknowledgement of personal 
racist attitudes or behavior, and/or feelings of responsibility for others’ racist attitudes or 
behavior (Iyer, Leach & Crosby, 2003; Tatum, 1992; Steele, 1990). White guilt is 
somewhat ambivalent: it appears to predict certain antiracist attitudes, such as support for 
compensatory affirmative action programs, but it is also self-focused and demonstrates 
limited political utility (Swim & Miller; Iyer et al.). When learning about historical and 
contemporary racism in the classroom, White students may sometimes become mired in 
feelings of racial guilt to the extent that more extreme forms of negative, self-conscious 
                                                
11 In this chapter, “White Guilt” and “White Shame” are capitalized when referring to 
specific measurement instruments or factors, such as Swim and Miller’s (1999) White 
Guilt scale. When referring generally to emotions or constructs, only “White” will be 
capitalized. The terms “White” and “Whiteness” are only written in lowercase when 




affect manifest, including depression and profound anxiety (Romney, Tatum & Jones, 
1992; Tatum, 1994). Some scholars, such as Spanierman and Heppner (2004) have 
researched the affective dimensions of racism and asked whether or not the presence of 
White shame – a more severe form of White guilt directed at the whole racial self – might 
influence some White people’s racial attitudes and identity-contingent emotions. 
A clearer understanding of the construct White guilt necessitates a) refining the 
research instruments with which we assess the construct, b) parsing it out from White 
shame, and c) ultimately exploring the relationships between White guilt, White shame 
and other dimensions of social identity, including gender and sexuality. This project 
extends and expands prior approaches to the empirical study of White guilt in at least 
three primary ways. First, as opposed to extant psychological research on White guilt that 
assumes that race is the only dimension of social identity pertinent to the study of racial 
affect, this project centralizes the intersectional complexity of experience and draws upon 
queer theories and psychological research on guilt and shame that have shown 
meaningful differences in affective experience along the intersecting axes of gender, 
sexuality and race (Cole, 2009; McCall, 2005; Stein & Plummer, 1996). Second, this 
study seeks to integrate the literature on “generic” guilt and shame (i.e., self-conscious 
and moral emotions research) with the literature on White guilt, which has conflated guilt 
and shame. Exemplified by the scholarship of June Price Tangney, psychological 
research on self-conscious, negative affect has conceptualized guilt and shame as distinct 
but related emotions with unique behavioral and emotional antecedents as well as 
consequences (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek, 2007). These 




influences White people’s experiences. Third, unlike much psychological research on 
race and affect that fails to adequately address how cultural conditions and popular 
discourse influence the phenomenology of affect, this project aims to ground the 
psychology of White guilt and shame in a situated socio-historical moment: namely, the 
United States in the early 21st century in the era of neoliberal multiculturalism (Gergen, 
1973; Kitayama & Markus, 1994; Melamed, 2006; Duggan, 2003; Ahmed, 2004b).    
Review of Literature 
Race, Gender and Sexuality: The Intersectionality of White Affect  
As the title of the chapter indicates, our attention here is focused on the 
differences between and within White guilt and White shame, which points to an 
underlying assumption that racialized, negative, self-conscious affect is not experienced 
in the same ways by all White people in the U.S. today.12 However, meaningful 
similarities in experience do likely exist. As Frankenberg (1993) famously asserted in her 
landmark text of critical Whiteness studies: 
First, whiteness is a location of structural advantage, of race privilege. Second, it 
is a “standpoint,” a place from which white people look at ourselves, at others, 
and at society. Third, “whiteness” refers to a set of cultural practices that are 
usually unmarked and unnamed. (p. 1) 
Whether explicitly recognized or not by White people living in the U.S. today, White 
raciality is a structuring structure of experience for all people living in this contemporary 
racial formation (Omi & Winant, 1994). For the people who are generally able to claim 
                                                
12 Following the traditional rhetorical practices of disciplinary psychology, I will use the 
plural first person throughout this chapter. Herein, “we” and “our” refer specifically to 
the following persons: Dr. Sheri L. Parks, dissertation director; Dr. Ruth E. Fassinger, the 




membership in the large and dynamic social group of White identity, Whiteness 
influences, as Frankenberg (1993), Helms (1990) and many others have shown, how one 
sees the world. Nonetheless, not all White people share the “same” perspective, and there 
is tremendous diversity of White experiences, even as White people’s lives are linked 
through unfair and unearned privilege in U.S. racial hierarchy. “While whiteness is 
understood as a socially constructed category, the internal variation within this category 
is often leveled,” noted Gallagher (2008) in his discussion of the epistemological and 
methodological issues that arise when studying contemporary White racial attitudes (p. 
173). “Without acknowledging how culture, politics, geography, ideology, and 
economics come together to produce numerous versions of whiteness, researchers will 
continue to frame and define whiteness monolithically,” according to Gallagher (p. 173). 
This diversity is meaningful in multiple ways, but we are most concerned here with how 
differences in identity and social location influence White affect, i.e., racialized emotions 
and feelings. 
 Sara Ahmed (2004b) argues that emotions are discursive formations created 
through political interactions between people and things. Affect, according to Ahmed, is 
literally how we come to know others and ourselves. In the contemporary United States, 
emotions themselves are gendered as feminine; feeling is associated with femininity, 
vulnerability and sometimes weakness, and feeling is constructed in discourse as opposed 
to rationality, logic and reason (Ahmed, 2004a). Psychologists have successfully 
documented differences between men and women’s experiences of affect, including guilt 
and shame. In the United States, sexism and misogyny create cultural environments in 




accountable for things that are endemic to social systems, as opposed to individual 
choices and behaviors. Similarly, women may be prone to disproportionate amounts of 
stress and anxiety related to culturally situated discourses (both symbolic and material, or 
“material-semiotic”) of fear, violence, unequal distribution of labor and family work, as 
well as other unequal gendered power relations (Haraway, 1997). Simultaneously, 
women may be encouraged to express themselves in certain social settings and to be 
more “in touch” with their feelings than men. Men, on the other hand, receive covert and 
overt social messages that consistently silence their emotionality; however, men are not 
inherently less likely to feel. Nonetheless, depending on how a man performs his gender 
and conceptualizes his gender role, he may be less prepared to deal with these feelings in 
productive and self-supportive ways. Accordingly, it is reductive and inaccurate to think 
simply that women feel more (everything) than men, or that men experience feelings of 
shame more than guilt. In certain circumstances, and in the context of particular 
formulations of affect, women and men may feel differently, and their emotional 
experiences of guilt and shame may differ in general, observable ways (Roberts & 
Goldberg, 2007; Benetti-McQuoid & Bursik, 2005; Sedgwick, 2003; Tangney & 
Dearing, 2002).  
 Sexuality and sexual identity further complicate a simplistic rendering of gender 
differences in the phenomenology of guilt and shame. As a founding mother of queer 
theory, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (1990) prominently argued that, a) many (most) major 
Western modes of knowing since the 19th century are structured by the hetero-homo 
binary, which was explicated and historicized by Foucault (1978), and furthermore b) any 




of the hetero-homo binary is “not merely incomplete, but damaged” (p. 1). Gender and 
sexuality are not the same, but the experience of gender identity and oppression is closely 
linked to the expression and practice of sexuality and sexual identity, especially in the 
contemporary context of heteronormative and sexually oppressive/repressive social 
structures that position heterosexuality as the unmarked and privileged norm (Stein & 
Plummer, 1996; Butler, 1993; Sullivan, 2003).  
Much work in psychology has yet to be done, as Fausto-Sterling (2000) expertly 
highlighted, to reconcile the connectedness of sexuality and gender and to reveal how 
heterosexuality structures the assumptions that undergird much psychological research 
into sexuality, especially sexual difference. Mallinckrodt (2009) reported that only 18 
empirical studies of lesbian, gay or bisexual identified persons were published in the 
Journal of Counseling Psychology prior to 2009. Some psychologists, however, have 
begun to foreground concerns about sexuality in their research and praxis that resist the 
legacy of social scientific and clinical “treatment” of non-normative sexuality that 
approached anything but heterosexuality through the lens of deviance and which posited 
queer identities and practices as inherently pathological (Stein & Plummer, 1996; 
Foucault, 1970, 1978). Perez, DeBord and Bieschke (2000) published the first handbook 
of counseling and psychotherapy with lesbian, gay and bisexual clients at the turn of 21st 
century and offered a research-based guide to sexuality-positive and respectful treatment 
of gay, lesbian and bisexual identified clients, as well as those who may live in various 
forms of “the closet.” Perez et al. illuminate the implications of hostile environments and 
heteronormative social institutions (e.g., workplaces, governments, families, churches 




gay and bisexual people (in the U.S.). Fassinger and Arseneau’s (2007) sexual identity 
enactment model anchors the second edition of the handbook, which notably incorporates 
transgender clients and issues. Fassinger and Arseneau argue for a re-thinking of sexual 
identity development and categories to account for the inconsistencies and variations in 
diverse LGBT peoples’ lives which contradict the static, linear and mechanistic models 
of social identity development commonly employed by social scientists, especially 
psychologists, and which negate the co-constitution of gender and sexuality. 
A recent special issue of the flagship Journal of Counseling Psychology featured a 
range of innovative theoretical and empirical approaches to the study of sexuality that 
addressed issues ranging from sampling difficulty and multiple social 
identities/categorization; much of this work implicates the study of identity and affect. 
For example, Moradi, Mohr, Worthington and Fassinger (2009) outline the conceptual 
issues facing psychologists before empirical research begins; namely, what do we mean 
by “sexuality,” and how is this term related to and distinct from “sexuality identity” (i.e., 
labeling of the self), “sexual orientation” (i.e., manifestations of sexuality as related to 
other persons on the basis of their gender(s)) and “sexual orientation identity,” (i.e., the 
conscious claiming of predispositions toward particular sexual feelings and practices) (p. 
6). Herek, Gillis and Cohen (2009) used social psychology to explore how sexual 
minority adults deal with sexual stigma, including overt prejudice (e.g., hate crimes) and 
institutional forms of discrimination (i.e., heterosexism). Their framework incorporates 
the effects of self-stigma, which refers to the internalization of negative attitudes about 
sexuality that are directed at the self. Their definition of self-stigma is congruent with our 




people may be susceptible to painful and maladaptive affective experiences, including 
persistent shame about one’s sexuality. Moradi, van den Berg and Epting (2009) explore 
how internalized anti-lesbian and gay prejudice manifests in feelings of “guilt” about the 
self, which we would read here as shame, as well. Internalized negative attitudes about 
sexuality, which encompass the terms homonegativity, heterosexism and homophobia, 
are “…used to reflect that growing up in families, institutions, and societies that denigrate 
lesbian and gay identities may drive some lesbian and gay individuals to internalize such 
prejudice and direct it toward the self” (Moradi et al., 2009; p. 119). Indeed, it is likely 
that marginalized sexual identity has profound influences on a wide range of affect and 
identity formation processes. Though queer and otherwise non-normative sexuality may 
not necessarily intersect in meaningful ways with the experience of White guilt and 
White shame, it is essential to conduct research that enables these interactions to be seen 
and heard – to open possibilities for interactions and co-constitution of sexuality, gender, 
race and affect. This chapter and the following one, which involves qualitative 
interviews, are designed to allow these experiences to emerge.    
 “Intersectional” perspectives not only highlight the differences in experiences, but 
primarily explore how identity categories actually constitute the social, historical and 
cultural relations of power that create identities and inequalities (Dill, Nettles & Weber, 
2001; Dill, McLaughlin & Nieves, 2007). In this sense, intersectionality is not merely 
about the study of within- or between-group differences (e.g., Worthington & Reynolds, 
2009; Szymanski & Gupta, 2009), but how unique cultural conditions create unique 
experiences that may challenge normative – academic, middle class, White, male, 




(Collins, 1998). Elizabeth Cole (2009) encourages psychologists to conduct intersectional 
research using the following interpretive strategy, which involves asking three 
methodologically oriented questions: 1) “Who is included within this category?”  2) 
“What role does inequality play?” and 3) “Where are there similarities?” Note that Cole’s 
third question “looks for commonalities cutting across categories often viewed as deeply 
different,” which purposefully disrupts those approaches, such as the gender-differences 
paradigm/hypothesis, which are preoccupied with perceived group-based differences that 
are rooted in the assumption that binary categories determine experience (p 171; see also: 
Cole & Stewart, 2001). In order to hear and see these similarities, as well as diversities, 
we as social researchers must let our respondents speak freely, even in the somewhat 
constrictive realm of quantitative survey research. Using instruments such as the 
Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSES) (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) alongside traditional 
demographic items (e.g., “What is your gender?”) is a method designed to give voice to 
respondents’ own thinking and feeling about their social and personal identities. The 
identity subscale of the CSES enables respondents to indicate how positively they feel 
about certain aspects of their identity, such as gender, sexuality and race, and how salient 
they believe these social identity group memberships are to how they live and view 
themselves, society and others. Though these self-report data about dominant group 
identities (e.g., heterosexuality, maleness and Whiteness) may not necessarily reflect 
more reliable or valid assessments than those conducted using implicit association tests 
(Knowles & Peng, 2005), in-depth interviews (Frankenberg, 1993) or sociological 
analyses (Perry, 2002), these methods do reflect a commitment to feminist, anti-racist and 




experience that (more) accurately reflect diverse people’s lived experiences (Haraway, 
1988). 
(White) Guilt Does Not Equal (White) Shame 
 One of the most problematic elements of prior psychological investigations of 
White guilt is rooted in the failure of these researchers to more seriously consider extant 
literature on “generic” guilt and shame and, accordingly, to adequately theorize White 
guilt as a construct that is measurable (i.e., quantifiable) using psychometric methods. 
This insufficient theorization has resulted in both conceptual and methodological 
problems; this project attempts to serve as a corrective to these interconnected issues. 
 First, as I stressed in Chapter 1, guilt and shame are not interchangeable terms, 
concepts or emotions; nor are they expressed or experienced in the same ways. Empirical 
research by Tangney (2002, 1996) and others (see Benetti-McQuoid & Bursik, 2005) 
have elucidated the ontological distinctions between these two forms of affect and their 
consequences for psychology. Tangney, Stuewig and Mashek (2007) explained that 
psychologists have used several conceptual definitions to taxonomize shame and guilt, 
which include distinctions of public (shame) versus private (guilt) and extreme (shame) 
versus mild (guilt) discomfort. They assert that the most empirically grounded distinction 
between the constructs is based on severity and target of the emotion. Guilt is 
operationalized as negative, unpleasant feelings about one’s actions, behavior or 
attitudes. People do not have to actually, personally engage in negative behavior in order 
to feel guilty; mere association with a group that is viewed negatively in the past or 
present can trigger feelings of guilt (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears & Manstead, 1998). 




some amount of guilt is likely a positive element of the self and productive social 
behavior. These positive or adaptive characteristics are what motivate psychologists to 
classify guilt as a “moral emotion” (Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek).  For example, 
Benetti-McQuoid and Bursik emphasize that “Many researchers espouse the adaptive 
nature of guilt,” which may aid psychosocial development (p. 134). Notably, guilt is not 
characterized by negative feelings about the global self. Rather, when feeling guilty, the 
negative evaluation is aimed at behaviors, i.e., what one has done. Conversely, shame is 
operationalized as a more unpleasant and painful emotion that targets the entire self. 
When contrasting guilt and shame, these primary differences in degree and target can be 
anecdotally characterized as: “I feel bad about what I did,” versus “I hate myself.” Shame 
does not have adaptive properties, and tends to coincide with other maladaptive feelings 
and behaviors, including depression, anxiety, anger and frustration (Tangney & Dearing; 
Tangney et al., 1996). Tangney & Dearing argue that shame is closely associated with 
cognitive-affective strategies to avoid or defer shameful feelings, which they group into 
two categories: detachment and externalization of blame. Though an individual who is 
feeling guilty or the threat of guilt may engage in these strategies, those feeling shame or 
the threat of shame may more commonly use detachment or externalization to alleviate or 
cover-up the painful feelings that are endemic to shame. Detachment is characterized by 
attempts to avoid whatever issue is provoking guilt and/or shame and cognitively 
removing one’s self from the controversy. A person who is detaching from a guilt- or 
shame-provoking situation might say: “I had nothing to do with this. Why are you 
looking at me?” In this conceptualization, total detachment is essentially impossible, 




other words, one would not feel the need to detach if one was not feeling the threat of 
culpability. Similarly, externalization is operationlized as cognitive-affective strategies 
that avoid guilt and shame and remove the self by putting blame on someone else: “It was 
his fault; not mine.” Though neither is about accepting guilt or shame, both are affective 
experiences and do not necessarily signal and absence of feeling. 
 These theoretical and definitional distinctions have meaningful implications for 
the measurement or assessment of guilt, especially when attempting to quantify this 
emotion and distinguish it from other feelings and attitudes in the constellation of self-
conscious affect. Accordingly, Tangney and Dearing (2002) developed the Test of Self-
Conscious Affect (TOSCA) to measure guilt- and shame-proneness, as well as the 
constructs of externalization and detachment.13 Through three major revisions, Tangney 
and Dearing arrived at the TOSCA-3, which is a scenario-based measured that presents 
respondents with brief vignettes designed to provoke hypothetical feelings of guilt and/or 
shame. The eight scenarios in the standard short-form of the TOSCA-3 are each 
accompanied by four items, each of which constitutes a potential response to the 
hypothetical situation. Respondents are asked to indicate how likely they would be to 
respond in each of the four ways, which reflect shame-proneness, guilt-proneness, 
externalization and detachment, respectively. This construction is quite purposeful, as 
Tangney and Dearing insist that guilt and shame can be experienced simultaneously and 
                                                
13 The long form of the TOSCA-3 also includes items to tap Alpha and Beta Pride, which 
are essentially forms of arrogance that may resist guilt and shame. In the realm of 
racialized affect, the analogs of these feelings are overt racism and White supremacy. 
Because an abundance of instruments already exist to measure racism, including Saucier 
& Miller’s (2002) Racial Argument Scale used in this study, the pride constructs and 
subscales are excluded from this present conversation and research. Furthermore, 
Tangney & Dearing (2002) report suboptimal estimates of internal consistency for both 




that significant correlations between likely responses may be indicative of guilt and 
shame, whereas exclusive rankings of items might mask such affectivity. Furthermore, 
Tangney and Dearing arrived at the scenario-based format of the instrument because of 
perceived weaknesses in extant guilt and shame measures that include the words “guilt” 
and “shame” in individual items, which necessitates respondents’’ willingness to endorse 
feeling these particular emotions. Shame and guilt can be experienced in different 
contexts (e.g., both shame and guilt are variably “public” and “private”) and both may be 
intimidating to respondents in the self-report process (Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek, 
2007). Furthermore, the validity of these instruments is dependent upon shared 
understanding of the constructs between the researcher and respondents. In other words, a 
person responding to a survey item that uses the terms “guilt” or “shame” should share a 
common definition of the term with the psychologist who administers the survey, as well 
as all other respondents taking the survey. Benetti-McQuoid and Bursik (2005) directed 
their respondents with definitions of both “guilt” and “shame” prior to administering the 
survey, but survey methodologists argue that this is a psychometric minefield and may 
produce artificial reliability (DeVellis, 2003; Fowler, 1995).  
 In light of these myriad psychometric concerns, the prevalence of the term “guilt” 
in survey components of White guilt research, as well as the absence of any distinction 
between guilt and shame prior to survey administration, is troubling. Swim and Miller’s 
(1999) five-item White guilt scale, the proverbial ‘gold standard’ in psychological White 
guilt research, is limited in at least two respects. First, the scale uses the term “guilt,” and 
its reliability and construct validity pivot upon a shared cultural understanding of the 




reduces White guilt to a generic racial attitudinal feeling, as opposed to a range of 
practices that may be differentially triggered by certain scenarios or actual social 
controversies. Though the “face” validity of Swim and Miller’s items may be strong, I 
have asserted that neoliberal multiculturalism complicates racial hierarchy and identity in 
the 21st century to the extent that explicit endorsement of “feeling guilty” about 
Whiteness is unlikely as a general social milieu. Not surprisingly, in the absence of 
priming for racial anxiety, observed levels of White guilt using Swim and Miller’s five-
item scale tend to be low, i.e., less than 2.5 on a 5-point Lickert scale (Swim & Miller; 
Iyer et al., 2003).  
 By focusing exclusively on White guilt, psychologists who use psychometric 
methods to study racial affect have foreclosed on the potentiality of White shame by 
artificially and arbitrarily limiting participants’ responses to feelings of White guilt (e.g., 
Swim & Miller, 1999). In other cases, items that may tap White shame have been 
included in measures of White guilt – a strategy that may unintentionally conflate the 
emotions. For example, Spanierman and Heppner’s (2004; see also Poteat & Spanierman, 
2008) Psychosocial Costs of Racism to White (PCRW) scale is psychometrically 
sophisticated in its multidimensionality and includes a White Guilt subscale in addition to 
scales of White Fear of Others and White Empathic Reactions toward Racism (p. 254). 
Nonetheless, the White Guilt subscale includes the following item: “I never feel ashamed 
about being White.” The White Guilt subscale demonstrated sufficient internal reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .73) in its initial validation, but we assert that the theoretical 
problems with using the term “ashamed” in the context of measuring White Guilt 




focus of inquiry for Spanierman and Heppner’s PCRW validation study, but future 
psychometric attempts to measure and analyze White Guilt should take into account the 
complexity of differences between guilt and shame and the well-documented challenges 
of assessing these self-conscious emotions using self-report measures. In fact, Swim and 
Miller (1999) and Spanierman and Heppner (2004) both recognize inconsistencies in 
survey response data and counter-intuitive patterns which may indicate the presence of 
White shame and its “invisible” influence on White experience. Spanierman and Heppner 
note: 
White individuals who experience high levels of guilt and shame may be too 
overwhelmed to empathize with people of other races. Similarly, sometimes 
Whites become “stuck” in guilt and shame (e.g., self-pity, self-absorption, and so 
forth), which consequently may inhibit them from increasing their racial 
awareness beyond their current levels and further prevent them from taking action 
to challenge racism. (p. 260) 
Swim and Miller offer this conjecture:  
The tendency to seek corrective action for guilt feelings is consistent with our 
findings that stronger feelings of White guilt are related to more support for 
affirmative action programs. It may be that White shame rather than White guilt 
would lead to lack of support for affirmative action or to the resistance to learn 
more about race and racism that Tatum (1994) described. (p. 512) 
In order to adequately address these astute observations and to establish the effects of 
White shame (if any) we must refine the instruments that we use to explore the 




 To summarize, there are at least three major advantages to using a scenario-based 
measure that does not use the terms “guilt” or “shame” and which measures proneness 
instead of state (i.e., at the time of test administration) levels of White guilt. First, by 
constructing items that describe a range of situations that may provoke guilt or shame 
about Whiteness, the researcher avoids the pitfall of abstraction. Abstract ideas about 
general or macro-level ‘sociological’ guilt may not help respondents reflect their genuine 
feelings when dealing with racial hierarchy, racism, White privilege, etc. Furthermore, 
“colorblind” and post-racial ideology and cultural contexts may even impede 
comprehension of items that insist upon the existence of racial hierarchy or which 
presume the presence of White guilt in White people’s lives. In other words, specific 
items about hypothetical but tangible interactions and anxiety-provoking concepts help 
respondents to refer to actual, material, psychosocial practices – i.e., lived experiences. 
Second, by describing hypothetical scenarios and potential responses, researchers may 
better access respondents’ feelings in terms of consistency and validity. Shame and guilt 
are emotions that people do not generally want to experience or to admit experiencing, so 
hypothetical measures may tap these feelings more accurately than measures that force 
respondents to indicate what they are feeling during the survey administration or 
interview itself. Finally, a scenario-based measure with multiple responses encourages 
the complexity of self-conscious emotions to emerge by allowing respondents to indicate 
simultaneous affective experiences, including detachment, externalization of blame, 
shame and guilt. Life does not typically feel as simple as psychological models or reflect 




permits respondents to indicate concurrent and potentially contradictory feelings better 
approximates reality, even if this increases statistical complexity.  
The Cultural Psychology of Whiteness 
 Cultural psychology is still an emergent, interdisciplinary domain of psychology 
that includes researchers in social, cognitive, cross-cultural, clinical, developmental, 
counseling and other areas. Cultural psychologists have argued, “…that psychologists 
may be prematurely settling on one psychology, that is, on one set of assumptions about 
what are the relevant or most important psychological states and processes, and on one 
set of generalizations about their nature and function” (Markus, Kitayama & Heiman, 
1996; p. 858). Cultural psychology fosters a culturally grounded psychology that relies 
primarily on cross-cultural perspectives to a) alter the assumptions that traditional 
psychologists make about the universality of basic principles, and b) to promote 
empirical science that accurately reflects human cultural diversity in a global(ized) 
context. Psyche and society are theoretically positioned as inextricable, and cultural 
psychologists have arrived at these core beliefs by drawing upon cultural, social and 
psychological theories of pragmatists, such as G. H. Mead, as well as poststructural 
critics, such as Foucault (Kitayama & Markus, 1994; Markus et al., 1996). In cultural 
psychology, the person is seen as cultural participant who is a social construction and a 
social constructor. 
 Though their methodologies and methods are different, pioneering cultural 
psychologists Kitayama and Markus (1994) agree with Sara Ahmed (2004b) in their 
assertion that emotions are “constructed and experiences within a social and cultural 




neurochemical patterns that accompany private feelings can also be constructed as the 
bodily elements of habitual tendencies of subjective emotional experience and 
expression, and that these habitual tendencies are themselves part of the vast repertoire of 
individual and collective social practices that make up a culture” (p. 340). For example, 
Menon and Sweder (1994) applied a cultural psychological framework and found that 
expression of lajya, which roughly translates to the Western, English language concept of 
“shame,” is bound up in religious imagery of the goddess Kali and is associated with 
other forms of affect, including happiness and shyness. A cursory understanding of 
Hinduism and Indian cultural imagery fundamentally impedes any attempts to 
empirically measure or understand the affective logics of shame in the Orisha 
community, according to Menon and Sweder. Their findings not only demonstrate that 
emotions are literally experienced and interpreted through the culture in which they are 
co-constituted, but highlight how much of what we – Western academics – call 
“psychology” is actually “Western, White psychology” that has been created through 
racist, sexist and colonialist social science (Bonilla-Silva & Zuberi, 2008). Cross-cultural 
approaches advocated by Markus, Kitayama and Heiman (1996) and others and push 
psychological science forward by developing nuanced frameworks for studying psyche 
and society together while refining and particularizing extant models that are 
conceptualized as “basic” (read: universal). In other words, these approaches demonstrate 
that in by better understanding others, we better understand ourselves.  
 Unlike the orientation here, the dominant research programs of cultural 
psychology have been directed toward cross-cultural and comparative work. This 




self/culture, public/private, individual/collective, etc. In developing a culturally grounded 
psychology of White guilt, we extend Markus and Kitayama’s (1994) conceptual 
framework of cultural emotions to refocus the particularities of White people’s affective 
lives in the 21st century United States. For example, they posit the following: 
In the United States, men and women, African-American or European-American, 
Jewish or Christian, may share similar culturally organized ways of thinking 
about the self and others because they share a single, broadly defined cultural and 
sociopolitical reality. However, each person must also respond to a set of cultural 
requirements that are associated with being of a particular ethnic group, gender, 
religion, age, generation, region of country, and so on. (p. 347) 
While Menon and Sweder (1994), Markus, Kitayama and others have expended 
substantial effort to incorporating cultural dimensions and considerations in their 
empirical projects that focus on communities outside the United States or to minority 
groups within the United States, the same attention has not been directed toward 
dominant groups, such as White people. But if we are to take seriously the quote above, 
the psychological study of White Americans’ emotions also must be localized and 
particularized by intersectional dimensions of age, geography, religion, gender and 
sexuality, which they neglect to mention. The effect of not doing this (i.e., giving the 
same critical attention to cultural factors when studying members of dominant identity 
groups, such as White people) is to reify the normative positionality of Whiteness, 
maleness, heterosexuality, Christianity, middle-class statues and “American” values by 
insinuating that dominant groups are culture-less. Indeed, the cultural psychology of 




pursuit of a more accurate reflection of how invisible, taken-for-granted and normative 
cultural practices influence the particular form and content of dominant groups’ affective 
experiences. In the context of critically studying Whiteness, we must centralize 
considerations of how historically specific racial ideologies, such as neoliberal 
multiculturalism, colorblind racism and persistent White supremacies, interact with 
sexism and heteronormativity to shape the lived experiences of racial guilt and shame. 
Extant research and theoretically informed critique constitute the exigency of this 
project, which is the first step in a series of questions that should explore the effects of 
consequences of White guilt and shame on social interactions, identity development, 
political attitudes and structures of cultural experience. Before those questions can be 
answered, we must develop a more theoretically and empirically sound tool of 
measurement. Accordingly, our attention now shifts toward the practical considerations 
of instrument development and our specific proposal of the Test of White Guilt and 
Shame (TOWGAS). Linking the psychological research on racial self-focus and moral 
emotions research demands attention to the multidimensionality of White guilt and shame 
with an instrument that a) distinguishes between White guilt and White shame, but b) 
allows these emotions to be experienced simultaneously, and c) incorporates the potential 
for feelings of detachment and externalization of blame. As such, the following 
hypotheses guided this study: 
Hypothesis 1: The TOWGAS will have a multidimensional, 4-factor structure of 
White shame, White guilt, externalization and detachment. 
Hypothesis 2: The TOWGAS subscales (White guilt, White shame, 




meaningful ways to measures of convergent validity (racism, White guilt, White shame, 
and each of four TOSCA-3 subscales, which will each be explicated in the Results 
section to follow). 
Method 
Scale Construction 
Construct definition. The constructs under investigation were labeled “White 
guilt,” “White shame,” “externalization of blame” and “detachment,” and were defined as 
follows. “White guilt” is the negative, self-conscious affective experience that White 
people may feel about behaviors or attitudes, as well as contemporary or historical 
injustices, that are perceived as racist. White guilt can be experienced on both individual 
and collective levels, whereby individuals may feel White guilt by association (Doosje et 
al., 1998). “White shame” is a more painful form of negative, self-conscious affect than 
White guilt and is directed toward the entire (White) self; the differences between White 
shame and White guilt are primarily located in severity of and target of affect. 
“Externalization of blame” denotes the cognitive-affective strategies taken by White 
people who may feel implicated by a racial injustice or controversy and who place blame 
and responsibility for the injustice/controversy on others. “Detachment” describes the 
resistance expressed by White people when they refuse to acknowledge that an issue or 
controversy has anything to do with race and structural inequity. Each of these constructs 
was derived from the integration of three groups of literature: a) critical studies of 
Whiteness (e.g., Wise, 2008; Ingatiev, 1995; Frankenberg, 1993; Roediger, 1991/2007), 
b) prior psychological approaches to White guilt (e.g., Swim & Miller, 1999; Spanierman 




(e.g., Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracy, Robins & Tangney, 2007). The specification of 
four unique factors was directly influenced by Tangney and Dearing’s most recent (2002) 
organization of the short-form TOSCA-3 into four factors and corresponding subscales: 
guilt-proneness, shame-proneness, externalization of blame and detachment.  
Item generation and response format. The response format of the TOWGAS was 
designed to be identical to the response format of the TOSCA-3 and reflective of the 
theoretical and methodological assumptions outlined in the preceding literature review. 
Accordingly, the TOWGAS response format is a Lickert-type scale ranging from 1 (“not 
likely” to respond in that way) to 5 (“very likely” to respond in that way). Scenarios and 
potential responses for the TOWGAS were developed first in consultation with a nine-
person team of counseling psychology doctoral students (all but one of whom were 
White) in an American Psychological Association-accredited program (which included 
myself and Dr. Fassinger), as well as with established scholars in humanities and social 
science fields, including American, African American and women’s studies; sociology; 
art history and visual culture studies; and literature. In consultation with these experts, we 
developed scenarios (i.e., situations) that could elicit guilt and/or shame based on group 
membership (i.e., the actions of other White people), as well as one’s personal behaviors 
or attitudes. Our rationale was that too little was empirically known about the constructs 
to distinguish between individual and collective experiences of White guilt. At the end of 
the item-development process, two White graduate students in American studies 
completed the survey and were asked to reflect qualitatively on the face validity of the 
items and suggest other alternative scenarios. Based on feedback from these experts, a 




item scale for the pilot study. Responses were scored such that lower scores indicated less 
proneness to affective experiences of White guilt, White shame, detachment and 
externalization of blame, whereas higher scores indicated a higher proneness to 
experiences of White guilt and these related forms of affect (see Appendix F). 
Part I: Pilot Study 
 The purpose of the pilot study was to conduct a preliminary, exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) and to examine the basic psychometric properties of the scale, including 
factor structure. We also hoped that any feedback from participants would help to 
identify and correct any potential problems with the instrument before deploying it 
among a larger sample, which would constitute the formal EFA and analysis of scores 
with the Collective Self-Esteem Scale and other demographic variables. These methods 
were informed by DeVellis’ (1995) guide to scale development and Worthington and 
Whitaker’s (2006) recommendations for best practices for instrument development in 
counseling psychology research. 
 The pilot study consisted of the demographic questionnaire intended for use in the 
main study (see Appendix C for complete list of measures), the TOSCA-3 short form, the 
proposed version of the TOWGAS, and the measures planned for later analysis of 
construct validity, including convergent validity (e.g., the Racial Argument Scale 
(Saucier & Miller, 2003), White guilt (Swim & Miller, 1999), the White guilt subscale 
PCRW (Spanierman & Heppner, 2003)). The survey also included three adaptations of 
the identity subscale of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), 




 A random sample of 500 White undergraduate students registered during the fall 
2007 semester at the University of Maryland, College Park, were recruited to participate 
via a list of randomly generated emails from the Office of the Registrar. Only 
undergraduate students who self-identified as White when enrolling at the University 
were eligible to be sampled. The University of Maryland, College Park, is a large public 
land-grant university with over 25,000 undergraduate students, of whom just under half 
are not White according to recently published demographic characteristics on the 
University’s Web site. We were interested in sampling young adults at the University, 
because this population would be used later to recruit interview participants for the study 
in Chapter 4. For the initial validation of the instrument, we preferred a controlled sample 
as opposed to “snowball” recruitment in the general population, which would be used in 
later validation tests of the instrument (Grzanka & Fassinger, 2009). Participants were 
contacted via email and incentivized with the opportunity to win one of five $25 gift 
cards, which would be distributed via random lottery (see Appendix D for sample 
recruitment email). The email included a link to the Survey Monkey address at which 
respondents were instructed to complete an informed consent form and were then 
directed to the actual survey. Survey Monkey is a widely used online survey service with 
which students are increasingly familiar. Per instructions from the Institutional Review 
Board, the informed consent form responses (which included an electronic signature) and 
the actual survey responses were collected via two different survey instruments, so that 
item responses could not be connected to respondents’ names (see Appendix E). 
 Participant response rate was disappointing and reflected that we had 




respondents began the survey, which represented only 16.2% of those sampled. Of that 
81, only 58 respondents completed the entire survey; only these 58 respondents’ surveys 
were analyzed. With a completion rate of just over 70 percent, we concluded that the 
survey was not prohibitively long and all existing demographic questions and validity 
measures would be retained for the main study. Respondents were divided equally among 
years in school, with roughly a quarter each representing one of four classes (i.e., 
freshmen, sophomore, junior, senior) and one student in the fifth or greater year of 
college. Sixty-four percent (n = 37) of respondents were women, and 36% (n =21) were 
men; none identified as transgender or other. Their political affiliations were as follows: 
57% (n = 33) Democrat; 17% (n =10) Republican; 16% (n = 9) Independent; 9% (n = 5) 
none; and one respondent identified as “Democratic Libertarian/Centrist.”  One lesbian 
and two bisexuals took the pilot survey; all others (n = 55) identified as heterosexual or 
straight. Only one non-U.S. citizen (an Australian) participated in the pilot, and that 
woman’s responses were retained.14 Respondents were skewed slightly toward the upper-
middle class, with a combined 72.4% (n = 42) selecting the 6th, 7th, or 8th highest points 
on the MacArthur Social Status Scale (SSS). Forty-six percent (n = 26) were not 
religious; 21% (n = 12) were religious and 37% (n = 21) were somewhat religious. Only 
four respondents (7%) indicated that fewer than half of their friends were White.  
 Though the total number of respondents (n = 58) was too small to conduct factor 
analysis according to DeVellis’ (2003) guidelines, these responses were reviewed and 
analyzed to consider the face validity of the items and the instruments’ basic 
                                                
14 The choice to retain this non-U.S. participant was motivated by the low sample size; 
we also realized that citizenship status alone does not say qualitatively much about an 




psychometric properties. We were especially concerned with variance in responses and 
found that our TOWGAS demonstrated at least as much variability of response as the 
TOSCA-3. When items responses were particularly skewed in one direction, this 
appeared to make conceptual sense. For example, items which we hypothesized to elicit 
White shame-proneness tended to demonstrate the least variability, with the majority of 
respondents indicating that they would not likely respond in that way particular way. This 
mirrored response patterns to items in the shame-proneness subscale of TOSCA-3. Based 
on feedback from the respondents, slight modifications were made before moving into 
the first study. For example, the initial survey instrument asked several times if 
respondents’ had read the instructions before they could proceed, and some respondents 
indicated in email correspondence that this was confusing (or at least annoying). No 
respondents emailed with questions or concerns about any of the TOWGAS items, but 
three did initiate contact about items in the Racial Argument Scale (RAS; Saucier & 
Miller, 2003). The RAS is also a scenario-based instrument that presents respondents 
with several correlational statements (i.e., the “argument”) about a race-based issue and 
concludes with a causal, racist statement. Respondents are asked to indicate how well 
they feel that the argument supports the conclusion, and this is thought to be an indicator 
of latent racial attitudes. In our experience using this instrument in a variety of survey 
research projects, respondents tend to take issue with these items and initiate contact with 
us to learn more about the instrument or to offer their opinion that it is unfair, misguiding, 
etc. Though we do not think it is the “perfect” measure of racism, respondents’ difficulty 
with the RAS items was viewed as reflective of the overall strength of the survey. Our 




their own racial attitudes before they arrived at the TOWGAS items, which were the final 
items in the survey. Based on the perceived success of the psychometric properties of the 
instrument, including means and standard deviations, all TOWGAS items were retained 
and the research moved forward with only those slight adjustments to the survey 
instrumentation already discussed.  
Part II: Exploratory Factor Analysis and Initial Validation 
 The following section describes the procedures used in the main EFA study, as 
well as further explication of the extant scales included in the survey. We also explore 
differences in TOWGAS scores based on CSES and race, gender and sexuality. 
 Participants 
 Participants in this study were White undergraduates recruited via a random 
sample of email addresses obtained through the University of Maryland’s Office of the 
Registrar; this random list was generated in the same way as the list in the pilot study. 
From the total pool of students emailed (n = 2,200), our response rate was 16 percent, 
with a survey completion rate of 76 percent. The final sample (n = 260) was split evenly 
between men (n = 130) and women (n = 130). No trans- or other-gendered participants 
indicated a non-normative gender on the survey. Table 1 presents additional demographic 
characteristics of the study participants. Further discussion of the potential impact of 
these characteristics, as well as variations in responses that correlated with particular 





Participant Demographic Characteristics (n = 260) 
 
Variable n %  M 
 
Age  253   21.3 
Year in College (not credit level) 260   3.12 
 First Year 23 8.8 
 Second Year 57 21.9 
 Third Year 70 26.9 
 Fourth Year 84 32.3 
 Fifth Year + 26 10.0  
Cumulative Grade Point Average 259   3.4 
Religiosity (Do you consider yourself to be religious?) 260 
 Yes 57 21.9 
 Somewhat 101 39.0 
 No 106 40.8 
Gender 
 Woman 130 50 
 Man  130 50 
 Transgender FTM 0 0 
 Transgender MTF 0 0 
 Other  0 0 
Sexual Orientation 
 Straight/Heterosexual 246 94.6 
 Gay or Lesbian 5 1.9 
 Bisexual 2 0.8 
 Queer 3 1.2 
 Questioning/Uncertain 1 0.4 
 Declined to answer 3 1.2 
Political Affiliation 




 Republican 55 21.2 
 Independent 40 15.4 
 None 39 15.1 
 Other 7 2.7 
Citizenship Status 257  
 U.S. Citizen 252 98.1 
 Dual U.S./Other 1 0.4 
 Europe  3 1.2 
 Resident 1 0.4 
Family Education Background 256 
 First Generation College 28 10.9 
 Second+ Generation College 228 89.1 
Subjective Social Status (lowest to highest) 257   6.7 
 1 0 0 
 2 1 0.4 
 3 5 1.9 
 4 11 4.3 
 5 23 8.9 
 6 67 26.1  
 7 81 31.5 
 8 55 21.4 
 9 13 5.1 
 10 1 0.4 
Percentage of Friends Who Are White 260 
 0-5% 2 0.8 
 6-25% 4 1.5 
 26-50% 11 4.2 
 51-75% 72 27.7 
 76-95% 136 52.3 






 Demographic questionnaire. The survey opened with a demographic 
questionnaire constructed for the purposes of this study. Respondents were asked in the 
following order to indicate: age, year in college, grade point average, religious affiliation, 
religiosity, race, gender, sexual orientation, political affiliation, citizenship status, first-
generation college, social class status (MacArthur SSS) and percentage of friends who 
are White (see Appendix C; Table 1). 
 Racial Argument Scale (RAS; Saucier & Miller, 2003). The RAS was developed 
as an alternative to the Modern Racism Scale (MRS), which Saucier and Miller (2003) 
assert is limited in its ability to tap aversive and non-conscious forms of discrimination 
and prejudice, and is subject to social desirability influences. On the spectrum of racism 
measures – with implicit association tests on one end and self-report measures on the 
other – the RAS can be characterized as taking a centrist approach. The 13-item scale 
presents short paragraphs about an “unresolved societal debate,” and then concludes with 
a statement that expresses either a positive or negative attitude toward Blacks. 
Participants are asked to rate how well the argument supports the conclusion on a 1 (not 
at all) to 5 (very much) scale; because the items do not ask for participants’ own beliefs, 
the RAS it thought not to inhibit racist responses. Positive items are reverse coded and 
scores are totaled to yield scores that range from 13 to 65, with higher scores indicating 
higher levels of racism. Saucier and Miller presented extensive psychometric data about 
the RAS in their initial validation studies of the instrument, including strong test-retest 




consistency of the RAS during this administration was similarly sufficient (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .75). 
 White Guilt (WG; Swim & Miller, 1999). The White Guilt scale consists of five 
items developed for Swim and Miller’s study of racial guilt and its consequences for 
affirmative action. Each of the items uses the term “guilt” and are phrased so that 
responses should reflect the participant’s self-perception of her experience (or lack 
thereof) of White guilt. Respondents indicate their endorsement of each of the five items 
on a 5-point Likert-type scale where 1 is strong disagree and 5 is strongly agree. Scores 
are summed with higher scores indicating higher levels of White guilt. Swim and Miller 
reported strong internal consistency of the scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .86), and this was 
confirmed in our administration (Cronbach’s alpha = .86).  
 Psychosocial Costs of Racism to Whites (PCRW; Spanierman & Heppner, 2003). 
The PCRW is a multidimensional instrument with three subscales: White Guilt, White 
Empathetic Reactions toward Racism and White Fear of Others. We included all 
subscales, but were most interested in the White Guilt subscale, which includes five items 
that tap racial guilt and anxiety (i.e., fear) about being a White person in a society that 
unfairly privileges White people and imposes discrimination on non-Whites. Items 
include the words “personally responsible,” “guilty,” “afraid” and “ashamed.” 
Respondents indicate their endorsement of each of the five items on a 5-point Likert-type 
scale where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree; two items are reverse-coded. 
The same format is used for the White empathy subscale (six items) and White fear 
subscale (5 items, one reverse-coded). Total scores were summed, with higher scores 




Heppner (2004) reported satisfactory levels of internal consistency for the White Guilt 
subscale (Cronbach’s alphas of .73 and .70) in the two studies that constituted the initial 
validation of the instrument; alphas for empathy (.78 and .79) and White fear (.63 and 
.69) were also strong. We examined the coefficient alphas in this administration and 
found similar data (White Empathetic Reactions toward Racism = .79; White Fear of 
Others = .69; White Guilt = .75). 
 Collective Self Esteem Scale, Importance to Identity subscale (CSES-R, CSES-
S, CSES-G; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). The Importance to Identity subscale of the 
CSES helps assess the degree to which a membership in a particular social identity group 
influences a respondent’s sense of self. Specifically, this subscale gauges the positive 
valence and centrality of identity-group memberships. The subscale is easily adaptable 
for use in the measurement of various identity categories, such as race, gender and 
sexuality. We adapted the scale for each of these three dimensions of difference. Sample 
items include: “Overall my [race, gender or sexual orientation] has very little to do with 
how I feel.” Two items in each of the five-item versions of the subscale are reverse-
coded; scores are summed, with higher scores on the five-point scale (1=strongly 
disagree and 5=strongly agree) indicating higher levels of CSE. In prior research, we 
found the race adaptation of the subscale to demonstrate strong internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .84); we did not have reliability data for the gender and sexual 
orientation versions of the subscale. In this administration, we found the subscales’ 
internal consistencies to be sufficient with each demonstrating high coefficient alphas: 




 Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3, short form (TOSCA-3; Tangney & Dearing, 
2002). The TOSCA-3 short form consists of 11 scenarios with four responses each. 
Respondents indicate how likely they would be to react in that particular way for each of 
the four responses by selecting one point on a five-point scale (1=not likely and 5=very 
likely). Scores are summed in each of four corresponding subscales: guilt-proneness, 
shame-proneness, externalization and detachment. Tangney and Dearing report sufficient 
internal consistency data for the subscales that are strongly correlated with the long-form 
version of the test, which includes two additional subscales excluded from the present 
study (alpha pride and beta pride). Reported Cronbach’s alphas were as follows: shame 
= .88; guilt = .83; externalization = .80; and detachment = .77. We did not replicate these 
high levels of reliability, and found that the TOSCA-3 did not retain its four-factor 
structure in our administration; these data are discussed in the results section. Cronbach’s 
alphas were: shame = .70; guilt = .75; externalization = .59; and detachment = .63.  
 Other items. We included some items that we developed in pilot research leading 
to this project, including a 10-item scale to measure White shame (Cronbach’s alpha = 
.83) via expressed anger and externalization of blame, as well as a previously untested 
14-item instrument to measure perception of racism in American television. These items 
were essentially fillers and were ultimately not included in our analysis. We included the 
13-item Marlowe-Crowne Form C test of social desirability (Reynolds, 1982; Crowne & 
Marlowe, 1960), but a data collection/scoring error prevented us from using this 





 Approval was obtained from the Institutional Review Board. Participants were 
contacted via email (see Appendix D) to participate in a study of racial attitudes 
(“Contemporary Racial Attitudes, Part 2”). Based on the response rate in the pilot study, 
we obtained a list of 2,200 White students who were registered for classes in spring 2008. 
Participation was incentivized via a random lottery for one of five $50 gift cards. The 
email contained a direct hyperlink and Web address for the informed consent form, which 
is the first part of the survey. After completing and informed consent form, students were 
asked if they would be willing to be contacted regarding a follow-up study (see Chapter 
4). Regardless of their willingness to participate in future research or volunteering an 
email address to enter the lottery, participants were forwarded to the actual survey, which 
was once again separate in order to protect participants’ anonymity. At the conclusion of 
the survey, respondents were thanked for their participation and provided once again with 
the researchers’ contact information. Of the respondents who took the survey (n = 342), 
we eliminated 82 respondents because they did not complete the survey, and therefore did 
not give responses to TOWGAS items. These 82 eliminated cases included all (n = 3) 
respondents who at some point in the survey indicated that they were not White. We 
asked the question “Do you identify as White?” twice so that students who might not 
identify as White in certain contexts (e.g., Jewish and Persian-identified persons) would 
self-select themselves out of the survey administration. Though these perspectives are 
quite valuable, we consider this kind of highly situation-contingent racial identity to be 
sufficiently distinct from the racial experiences of White people who always racially 





Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 Prior to conducting the exploratory factor analysis, we examined two indicators 
that help assess the suitability of a dataset to factory analyses. First, we used the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy to determine if the same size (n = 
260) was large enough to conduct a factor analysis. The KMO index was .87, which is 
quite strong; Worthington and Whittaker (2006) suggest levels greater than .60. DeVellis 
(2003) suggests that a sample size of 200 is usually adequate for a factor analysis 
involving 40 items or less. Second, Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (p < .001). 
The theoretical development of the items, which was based on the format of the TOSCA-
3, suggested that we perform principal axis factoring (PAF) with a four-factor solution 
and an oblique (i.e., Promax) rotation, because the factors should be correlated. For 
example, scores on the hypothesized factor White guilt should be negatively correlated 
with scores on both the detachment and externalization subscales. A Promax rotation, 
accordingly, is more appropriate than a simple orthogonal (i.e., Varimax) rotation 
(Worthington & Whittaker). However, the data resisted a four-factor solution. We 
examined the pattern and structure matrices, which indicated a fourth factor of only two 
items. Furthermore, analysis of the psychometric properties of the instrument indicated 
that the items were loading onto these four weak factors in ways did not make conceptual 
sense. At this point, following Spanierman and Heppner’s (2004) procedure for 
developing the PCRW and Worthington and Whittaker’s recommendation, we examined 
the scree plot, which suggested a three-factor solution because of a sharp drop in 
eigenvalues between the third and fourth factors. We then conducted an exploratory 




with loadings of less than .35 on any individual factor, which is a slightly more rigorous 
criterion for analyzing item cross-loadings than suggested by Worthington and Whittaker. 
Upon examination of the pattern matrix, we found that one scenario – about “driving 
while Black” – behaved erratically. We subsequently eliminated it, this increasing the 
parsimony and conceptual clarity of the instrument. Based on strong negative factor 
loadings, three items were made candidates for reverse coding. The three-factor structure 
had the best overall statistical characteristics: very few (< 5) cross-loadings, strong factor 
loadings and a relatively even distribution of items across factors. With two of the cross-
loadings, the ‘difference’ between the two loadings is sufficient enough to be confident in 
the items’ location on a single factor. These procedures resulted in a 32-item instrument 
with four responses each for eight scenarios. These three factors accounted for 42% of 
the cumulative variance. The pattern matrix produced in the final EFA for the 32-item 
TOWGAS is presented in Table 2. This matrix reflects the factor loadings for each item, 
controlling for the other factors in the solution. This table does not contain the final 
scenarios, which are presented in Appendix F. 
 Before proceeding to name the factors and assess other psychometric properties of 
the instrument, we wanted to examine the factor structure of the TOSCA-3 in this 
administration of the test because our design was so strongly influenced by that of the 
TOSCA-3. Furthermore, Tracy, Robins & Tangney (2007) report that scenario based 
measures, including the TOSCA-3, tend to exhibit lower levels of internal consistency 
and more complex psychometric properties that one-dimensional measures or ones 
without subscales. We ran the same EFA on the TOSCA-3 (PAF with Promax rotation) 




structure – was the better fit for the data. Similarly to the behavior of items on the 
TOWGAS, externalization and detachment items on the TOSCA-3 collapsed onto the 
same factor (3).  
Naming of the Factors 
 We entered the EFA having written a total of 36 items for four hypothesized 
subscales, predicting that each subscale would have 12 items. This format of four 
subscale items per scenario was derived directly from the TOSCA-3’s structure. We 
learned through the EFA process that our instrument instead demonstrated a three-factor 
structure, which nonetheless coalesced in conceptually meaningful ways. Factor 1, White 
Guilt, consisted of 11 items and accounted for approximately 26% of the variance. This 
factor included items that describe guilty reactions to White racial anxiety, including 
some corrective behaviors. This subscale also includes a reverse-coded item that reflects 
detachment from the racial elements of a scenario. A sample item is: “You would think: 
‘I wish there was something I could do to make up for all the harm slavery caused Black 
people.’” Higher scores indicated higher proneness to feeling guilty about being White. 
Factor 2, White Shame, consisted of 8 items and accounted for approximately 10% 
percent of the variance. This subscale includes items that describe painful feelings of 
White shame, which includes disdain for one’s racial identity. Only one item includes 
any corrective behavior, and two items are reverse-coded because they reflect aggressive 
detachment from racial issues. Higher scores indicate higher levels of proneness to 
feeling shame about one’s White racial identity. A sample item is: “You would wish you 
weren’t White.” Factor 3, Negation, consisted of 13 items and accounted for 




mixture of items developed for our hypothesized “detachment” and “externalization” 
subscales. By loading onto the same factor, these items behaved in such a way as to 
suggest that the cognitive and affective strategies for avoiding White guilt and feelings of 
race-based responsibility hang together. Accordingly, we termed the amalgamated 
processes of detachment and externalization “negation.” Higher scores indicate greater 
proneness to deny, defer or detach from the experience of White guilt and/or shame. A 
sample item is: “You would think: ‘I can’t be held responsible for being born White.’” 
Table 2 
Factor Loadings (Structure Coefficients) for Exploratory Factor Analysis with Promax 
Rotation of the TOWGAS and Item Descriptive Statistics 
Factor Loadings    
Item 1 2 3 M SD 
Factor 1: White Guilt          
You would feel depressed and sad 
about the history of racism in the 
United States. 0.774     3.52 1.25 
You would think: "I wish there was 
something I could do to make up for all 
the harm slavery caused Black people." 0.565     2.45 1.28 
You would think: “That’s so awful. I 
hope they have to face consequences 
for their behavior.” 0.536     3.32 1.39 
You would wish there was a way to 
make up for all your unfair advantages. 0.525     2.50 1.31 
You would apologize and ask your 
instructor for the correct/appropriate 
usage of the term. 0.516     3.57 1.31 
You would think: “People make way 




Factor Loadings    
Item 1 2 3 M SD 
You would stop laughing and tell the 
friend that you don’t think racist 
language is OK, even when joking. 0.491     3.07 1.44 
You would feel small and think about it 
for days. 0.487     2.09 1.26 
You would feel bad for not noticing 
earlier but probably be more critical of 
the show. 0.399 0.352   1.96 1.23 
You would think: “I’m ignorant.” 0.388     2.03 1.18 
You would feel sad and send whatever 
money you could to the relief effort. 0.38     2.94 1.25 
Factor 2: White Shame          
You would hate yourself for being 
White.   0.781   1.27 0.65 
You would feel bad for not noticing 
sooner and never watch the show 
again.   0.668   1.22 0.64 
You would wish you weren’t White.   0.552   1.58 0.94 
You would feel miserable because of 
all your privileges.   0.527   1.79 0.99 
You would feel horrible for ignoring 
the person and think about it all day.   0.521   1.93 1.12 
You would go about your day as usual. 
(R)   -0.516   2.04 1.15 
You would think: “I don’t care what 
the characters look like as long as the 
show is entertaining.” (R)   -0.463   1.75 1.02 
You would feel bad about ignoring the 




Factor Loadings    
Item 1 2 3 M SD 
the next person who asks. 
Factor 3: Negation          
You would think: "I would be broke if 
I gave money to every person who asks 
me for change." 0.54   0.632 3.25 1.43 
You would think: “If Black people can 
use the N-word, why can’t White 
people?”     0.605 2.60 1.43 
You would think: "Slavery was awful, 
but people need to get over it and move 
on." -0.364   0.519 3.01 1.38 
You would think: “Race doesn’t matter 
as much as people say it does.”     0.51 2.71 1.33 
You would think: “Labels don’t really 
matter.”     0.465 2.84 1.30 
You would think: “I can’t be held 
responsible for being born White.”     0.452 3.86 1.18 
You would think: “That’s not a race 
issue. That’s a social class issue.”     0.437 3.45 1.23 
You would think: “It wouldn’t be 
realistic if there were lots of minorities 
on the show."     0.426 2.11 1.20 
You would think: “It’s not my fault – I 
can’t keep up with all this political 
correctness.”     0.423 2.76 1.38 
You would think: “It was all in fun; it’s 
harmless.”     0.419 2.62 1.46 
You would wonder why slavery is still 
discussed because it happened so long 




Factor Loadings    
Item 1 2 3 M SD 
You would think: “I’m sure the 
students didn’t mean any harm.”     0.417 2.75 1.26 
You would think: “Those people chose 
to stay behind.”     0.353 1.83 1.12 
       
Eigenvalue 8.17 3.07 2.20    
% Variance 25.52 9.58 6.86    
M 2.79 1.71 2.74    
SD 0.83 0.63 0.73    
Coefficient alpha 0.86 0.79 0.82    
       
Total Variance 41.97      
Note: Factor loadings of absolute values less than .35 are suppressed in this table. “(R)” 
indicates that the item is reverse-coded. 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Factor Intercorrelations 
 Descriptive statistics for TOWGAS individual items, including subscale means 
and standard deviations, are presented in Table 2. White Guilt and Negation scores 
exhibited a normal distribution with limited skewness; Negation scores were slightly 
positively skewed (skewness = .12) and White Guilt was slightly negatively skewed 
(skewness = -.21). White Shame, on the other hand, was somewhat positively skewed 
(1.0). However, we examined scores for each TOWGAS item and found that, despite the 
mild skewness on White Shame, scores for each of 32 items ranged from 1 to 5. Unlike 
consistently low mean scores (M = < .2.5) for White Guilt reported by Spanierman and 
Heppner (2004) and Swim and Miller (1999), mean scores on our White Guilt subscale 
were above the midpoint (M = 2.79). Mean scores indicated that, as a group, participants 
were prone to experience White Guilt most; then Negation (M = 2.74), then White shame 




We examined two-tailed Pearson product-moment correlations between each of 
the three factors of the TOWGAS, using Cohen (1992) as a guide to interpret “small” 
(.10 and greater), “medium” (.30 and greater) and “large” (.50 and greater) effect sizes (p. 
157). These indicated several significant factor intercorrelations (see Table 3). White 
Guilt and White Shame exhibited a strong, positive correlation (r = .57, p < .01), whereas 
White Guilt and Negation exhibited a strong, negative correlation (r = -.51, p < .01). 
Meanwhile, analysis indicated a medium significant negative correlation between White 
Shame and Negation (r = -.28, p < .01).   
Reliability Estimates 
 We calculated estimates of internal consistency using Cronbach’s coefficient 
alphas, which were as follows: White guilt (.86), White shame (.80) and Negation (.82). 
Convergent Validity 
 We used several scales to provide estimates of convergent validity, one of the 
major elements of overall construct validity (DeVellis, 2003). We expected our White 
Guilt subscale to correlate positively with scores on the White Guilt subscale of the 
PCRW (Spanierman & Heppner, 2004) and Swim and Miller’s (1999) White Guilt scale, 
as well as the guilt-proneness subscale of the TOSCA-3 (Tangney & Dearing, 2002); we 
predicted a negative correlation between White Guilt (TOWGAS) and racism (RAS; 
Saucier & Miller, 2003). We similarly hypothesized that White Shame would be 
positively correlated with the TOSCA-3’s shame-proneness subscale; we also 
hypothesized that White Shame would negatively correlate with racism as assessed by the 




Miller’s White Guilt scale and the PCRW’s White Guilt subscale, but that Negation 
would positively correlate with racism.  
Table 3 
Correlations Among TOWGAS and TOSCA-3 Subscales, White Guilt (Swim & Miller), 
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TOWGAS 
White Shame 
.548** .      
TOWGAS 
Negation 
-.543** -.330** .     
White Guilt 
(SM) 





.612** .578** -.459** .795** .   
Racism 
(RAS) 








.376** -.020 -.215** .169** .040 -.196** .376** 
** Signifies that the correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
  Our hypotheses were confirmed in each of these statistically significant 
relationships (see Table 3 for Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients). Negation 
was significantly negatively correlated with the two extant White guilt scales (Swim & 
Miller and PCRW) and was positively correlated with racism (RAS). This indicates that 
participants who were prone to negate White Guilt and Shame (on the TOWGAS) were 




Guilt on the TOWGAS subscale was significantly positively correlated with the two 
extant White guilt measures and exhibited a weaker, but significant, correlation with the 
TOSCA-3’s guilt-proneness subscale. This is conceptually meaningful, because 
proneness to feeling guilty and proneness to experiencing White guilt are not 
interchangeable, but should be positively correlated, as we predicted. Our White Guilt 
subscale was also significantly negatively correlated with racism. This means that 
participants who expressed a stronger likelihood to feel White guilt were less likely to 
express racist attitudes. We did not predict a relationship between White Guilt and 
generic shame-proneness on the TOSCA-3, but found a positive significant correlation 
between these constructs. White Shame was significantly positively correlated with its 
TOSCA-3 counterpart, as well as extant White guilt measures, and exhibited a significant 
negative correlation to racism. This means that participants who were prone to White 
shame were also prone to generic shame and expressed feelings of White guilt. These 
same participants were less likely to hold racist attitudes as measured by the RAS. 
Relationship of TOWGAS Scores to CSES and Within-Group Differences 
 Though we did not formally hypothesize significant differences based on gender, 
sexuality or race, we were interested in how scores on the TOWGAS might differ based 
gender and sexual orientation. Furthermore, we wanted to explore these differences not 
only using demographic variables (i.e., man/woman, gay/straight) but through relevant 
scores on the identity subscale of the Collective Self Esteem Scale (CSES), which allows 
participants to express the centrality of their gender, race and sexual orientation to their 
sense of sense. To examine the relationship between TOWGAS factor scores and CSES 




independent variables: (a) CSES-Gender, (b) GSES-Race, (c) CSES-Sexuality, (d) 
religiosity, (e) social class, (f) percentage of friends who are White and (g) political 
affiliation. We used the median scores on the three CSES identity subscales to split the 
sample into high and low subsamples. No participants identified as transgender or 
intersex, so we compared men and women only. Our sample was overwhelming 
heterosexual, so we did not analyze differences between heterosexual or straight-
identified participants and the LGBTQ subsample (n = 11). We did, however, test 
whether differences in CSES-Sexuality of heterosexuals influenced scores on any of the 
three TOWGAS factors. Significant findings are reported below.  
 CSES-Gender. A (2x2) univariate ANOVA with the between subjects factors of 
gender (M/F) and CSES-Gender was performed on the TOWGAS White Guilt scores. 
Though there was no main effect for CSES-Gender, F(1, 244) = 2.21, p > .05, η2 = .01, 
there was a main effect for gender F(1, 244) = 15.73, p < .001, η2 = .06; however, this 
was qualified by a significant two-way interaction F (1, 244) = 7.01, p < .01, η2 = .03. 
This interaction effect suggests that men and women differ in proneness to White guilt 
only when they are highly gender-identified on the CSES identity subscale (see Figure 6). 
Furthermore, post hoc analysis revealed that highly gender-identified men show less 
proneness to White Guilt (M = 2.33) than low gender-identified men (M = 2.77). Another 
(2x2) ANOVA with the between subjects factors of gender (M/F) and CSES-Gender was 
performed on the TOWGAS Negation scores. There was no main effect for CSES-
Gender, F(1, 241) = .97, p > .05, η2 = .004, but we once again found a main effect for 
gender, F(1, 241) = 6.92, p < .01, η2 = . 03. This finding suggests that highly gendered 




lower levels of CSES-Gender (M = 2.77). This pattern was replicated directionally when 
we tested for gender differences in proneness to White Shame, but the results were not 
significant.  
 CSES-Race. One-way ANOVAs indicated that degree of CSES-Race (i.e., White 
racial identity), F(1, 150) = 4.23, p < .05, η2 = .02, was significantly related to White 
Shame, where those with higher levels of CSES in terms of their White racial identity 
expressed less proneness to White Shame (M = 2.67) than those with lower CSES-Race 
(M = 2.89).  
 
Figure 6. Two-Way ANOVA, CSES-Gender Identity and Gender (Dependent 
Variable=White Guilt factor, TOWGAS) 
Political affiliation. We grouped political affiliations as follows: Democrats (n = 
113), Republicans (n = 55) and Independents (including “no affiliation” and “other”) (n = 
83). We then conducted one-way ANOVAs to examine relationships between political 
























political affiliation, F(2, 251) = 5.84, p < .01, η2 = .05. Post hoc comparison revealed that 
Democrats (M = 2.93) were more prone to experience White guilt than Republicans (M = 
2.48; p < .01), who were less likely to experience White guilt than Independents (M = 
2.77; p < .05), as well. No main effect was found between Democrats and Independents 
on White guilt proneness. We also found a strong main effect for political affiliation on 
Negation, F(2, 248) = 9.56, p < .001, η2 = .07. Pos hoc comparisons indicated that 
Republicans respondents expressed higher levels of proneness to Negation (M = 3.02) 
than Democrats (M = 2.54; p < .001) and that both Independents (M = 2.84) and 
Republicans were more prone to experience Negation than Democrats (p < .01). No such 
effect was found for White Shame, F(2, 253) =2.86, p > .05, η2 = .02, though directional 
trends indicated that Republicans were the least prone to White Shame. 
The remaining one-way ANOVAS on White Guilt, White Shame and Negation 
using the factors of CSES-Sexuality, religiousity, social class and percentage of friends 
who are White did not reveal any significant results.  
Discussion 
 This study demonstrates the factor structure of the TOWGAS, which reflects three 
distinct but significantly correlated factors of: White Guilt, White Shame and Negation. 
These conceptually meaningful factors account for 42% percent of the variance. Each of 
the factors demonstrated optimal levels of internal consistency, with coefficient alphas 
ranging between .80 and 86. As we predicted in the design of the instrument, each of the 
TOWGAS subscales assesses distinct, correlated constructs, and the subscales should be 
analyzed and scored separately in future research and applications. We anticipated a four-




“detachment” and “externalization of blame” subscales loaded onto the same factor, 
which we called “Negation.” We presented initial data on the construct validity in the 
form of predicted, significant correlations with measures of convergent validity, 
including White guilt (Swim & Miller, 1999; Spanierman & Heppner, 2004), guilt- and 
shame-proneness (Tangney & Dearing, 2002) and racism (Saucier & Miller, 2003). 
Finally, we explored the relationships between scores on the three factors of TOWGAS 
and demographic characteristics and self-report indexes of social identity (i.e., race, 
gender and sexuality).  
TOWGAS Factor 1: White Guilt 
 The first and strongest factor included 11 items that tapped proneness to White 
Guilt. Respondents generally scored the highest of this factor, and mean scores on this 
factor were above the scale midpoint (2.5), which contrasts with prior findings reported 
by Swim and Miller (1999) and Spanierman and Heppner (2004) and the mean scores of 
these extant measures during the present administration (M = 2.47, SD = 1.01 and M = 
1.99, SD = .75, respectively). Our higher means may be due to the hypothetical nature of 
the scenarios endemic to the TOWGAS’s response format. This factor is most accurately 
described as assessing proneness to White guilt; thus, “hypothetical” White guilt may be 
easier to measure in self-response format than state feelings of White guilt. Future studies 
should explore whether the TOWGAS is actually able to obtain a more reliable reflection 
of respondents’ propensity to feel White guilt than other state measurement instruments 
that force respondents to reflect on their personal feelings of White guilt during the test 
administration itself. This might be determined by observing the statistical relationship 




observed several identity-based variations in scores on this factor, particularly in terms of 
gender and CSES. While men and women scored similarly on White guilt when they 
indicated lower gender-identity centrality, their scores differed significantly as they 
indicated that gender was more important. These scores do not necessarily indicate 
differences in White guilt based in masculinity and femininity, for example, because the 
gender identity subscale of the CSES does not prescribe how gender is central to a 
respondent’s identity – just that gender is or is not important. However, these findings do 
correspond with existing literature on guilt and shame, which suggests that men are less 
likely to admit feeling guilt than women (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Benetti-McQuoid & 
Bursik, 2005). We also found that political affiliation and White Guilt were significantly 
correlated, with Democrats indicating greater proneness to White guilt than Republicans 
or Independents. Overall, proneness to White guilt was associated with lower levels of 
racism and proneness to Negation; similarly, White guilt-proneness was significantly 
correlated with proneness to White shame, as well as proneness to generic forms of guilt 
and shame. This reflects a general sense of ambivalence regarding White guilt, because it 
is associated with both lower levels of racism and a potentiality for maladaptive forms of 
shame.  
TOWGAS Factor 2: White Shame 
 The second factor of the TOWGAS consists of 8 items that assess proneness to 
White shame, i.e., profoundly negative feelings about being White. Two of these items 
are reverse-coded and reflect how unlikely a respondent would be to detach or externalize 
their connection to a race-based situation of inequality. Respondents scored lowest of this 




actually are in the contemporary United States. On the other hand, shame is commonly 
avoided via a variety of cognitive and affective strategies, so scores on this factor should 
not be examined in isolation from scores on either Negation (Factor 3) or White Guilt 
(Factor 1). Furthermore, the significance of this factor’s emergence and distinction in the 
factor structure of the TOWGAS should not be understated. Though our findings are 
preliminary, this factor does suggest the existence of this distinct form of negative racial 
affect that is highly positively correlated with, but is not the same as, White guilt. 
 Notably, we observed a significant relationship between White Shame and CSES-
Race. This means that respondents who indicated higher centrality of their Whiteness to 
their sense of self were less prone to White shame than were respondents for whom their 
Whiteness was less important to their identity. Future studies should investigate what 
these higher levels of White identity centrality actually mean. This could, for example, 
indicate that people who express high CSES-Race are critical and aware of the role their 
Whiteness plays in unequal power relations in the United States, and that these people are 
therefore less likely to respond to racial controversy and conflict in maladaptive and self-
focuses ways. On the other hand, high CSES-Race could indicate feelings of White pride 
or White supremacy, and corresponding low scores on White Shame could be 
reactionary. In other words, these people could be aware of and comfortable with their 
unfair and unearned racial privilege. It is important to note that White Shame was the 
only factor that expressed this relationship with CSES-Race, however, so this finding can 
be not extrapolated to the domains of Negation and White Guilt. Finally, we found that 
White Shame demonstrated a weaker, negative correlation with racism than did White 




less likely to predict antiracist attitudes or endorsement of diversity programs and 
initiatives than White guilt (Iyer et al., 2003; Swim & Miller, 1999).   
TOWGAS Factor 3: Negation 
 The third factor of the TOWGAS is Negation and includes 13 items that reflect 
respondents’ proneness to externalize blame for White privilege or racial conflict and to 
minimize the role of race in their social interactions. Contrary to our expectations, the 
items we developed to correspond with the TOSCA-3’s Externalization and Detachment 
subscales loaded onto the same factor, suggesting that these processes may not be as 
distinct as prior literature proposes (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Stuewig & 
Mashek, 2007), or that there is something unique about our sample that caused this 
effect.15 Though the processes of externalization and detachment from racial conflict and 
anxiety-provoking situations are conceptually distinct on a definitional level, these 
distinctions appear to wash out when respondents were asked to reflect how they actually 
feel. Qualitative research, such as the one presented in Chapter 4, should examine if the 
lived experiences of White people also reflect the inextricability of externalization and 
detachment. Furthermore, an EFA conducted on the TOSCA-3 confirmed that 
detachment and externalization from generic forms of shame and guilt are not distinct 
factors, either. Through analysis of variance in scores on this factor and demographic 
variables, we found a main effect such that Republican-identified respondents were more 
likely to express proneness to Negation than Democrats, who were significantly less 
prone to Negation than Republicans or Independents. 
                                                
15 However, this effect has already been replicated for the TOWGAS and the TOSCA-3 





Our choice to name this factor “Negation” reflects the literature on self-conscious 
emotions and racial attitudes, as well as research outside of psychology that explores 
neoliberal forms of multiculturalism. As explicated in prior chapters, neoliberal social 
policies and practices organize social reality in terms of race, gender, sexuality and other 
dimensions of inequality, but concurrently and contradictorily obscure this reality 
through the rhetoric of multiculturalism and “colorblind” civil society (Duggan, 2003; 
Melamed, 2006; Bonilla-Silva, 2006; Omi & Winant, 1994). Negation literally denotes 
cognitive and affective strategies taken to deny the potential for feeling White guilt, much 
less White shame. Negation is so important as a constellation of attitudes and feelings 
because it illustrates that the primacy given to White guilt in psychological research may 
obfuscate that more salient processes taken up by White racists to avoid feeling any 
responsibility – collective or individual – for racial inequity.  
Intersectionality 
 This research illustrates the emerging paradigm of psychological research and 
praxis called “intersectionality.” The inherent complexity of intersectional research, 
particularly the emphasis on history and multiple, co-constitutive dimensions of social 
identity, has traditionally been viewed as an obstacle for social scientific research, 
especially quantitative inquiry (Cole, 2009; McCall, 2005; Dill, McLaughlin & Nieves, 
2007). Intersectionality pushes psychologists, specifically, and social researchers, 
generally, beyond attempts to better understand difference by simply quantifying 
identity-based differences and assessing difference as an independent variable or 
experimental condition (McCall; Bonilla-Silva & Zuberi, 2008). Intersectional 




compel researchers to situate identity categories within a complex and historical “matrix” 
of unequal power relations (Collins, 2000). 
 In this study, for example, we would not have been able to observe meaningful 
diversity in participants’ experience of White guilt had we not attempted to measure 
gender in a variety of ways. By using a test of identity centrality and salience (CSES) 
alongside traditional demographic variables, we found a significant interaction effect of 
CSES-Gender and gender identity (M/F). Similarly, a significant main effect of CSES-
Race on White Shame would have been missed if we had not conceptualized White racial 
identity as more than just identifying as “White.” In allowing these identity variables to 
be multidimensional and subtle, we uncovered significant findings that would have been 
obfuscated by more traditional approaches to studying gender- and race-based 
differences. McCall calls this multidimensional analytic approach “intracategorical 
complexity”; in this case, we examined how multiple dimensions of difference inform the 
experience of Whiteness, as race remains our primary analytic category. 
Furthermore, the TOWGAS itself was designed as a historically and culturally 
situated psychometric tool. Each scenario in the TOWGAS reflects real and historically 
contingent social interactions, i.e., actual situations encountered by real White people in 
everyday life. By drawing on recent events in U.S. history, including Hurricane Katrina, 
debates over “political correctness” and controversies on actual college campuses, we 
developed items that we hoped would be sufficiently culturally salient to our young adult 
sample. This not only reflects a commitment to culturally grounded psychology, but 
better approximates our working model of White guilt and shame, which posits both as 





 There are several limitations of the present investigation that merit explication. 
First, our sample was limited to White-identified and relatively affluent college students 
in the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States. Accordingly, the external validity of our 
findings is highly limited, and future studies should incorporate more age-, regional- and 
occupation-diverse samples. For example, the findings from our college student sample 
may reflect latent cohort effects that are characteristic of White U.S. college students, 
who have been found to move through developmental trajectories as they develop 
autonomy from their parents and begin, potentially, to form their own attitudes and 
values (Spanierman et al., 2007). Such developmental periods, in terms of the capacity to 
process and understand the complexity of social problems, have been found to have at 
least some bearing on perceptions of race and racism (Spanierman et al.). The next stage 
of this instrument validation project, which has already been completed, involved a 
“snowball” sampling procedure in the general population designed to address this 
particular issue (Grzanka & Fassinger, 2009). Though we were satisfied with the 
diversity of our sample in terms of gender and differential experiences of White raciality, 
we could not examine intersectional differences in sexuality-based experiences because 
of the homogeneity of our sample in terms of sexual orientation. Furthermore, a more 
socioeconomically diverse sample might allow class-based differences in White guilt and 
shame to emerge. 
 A scoring error rooted in a mistake in survey design resulted in an inability to test 
whether participants were responding in socially desirable ways. Though initially we did 




factors, latter analyses illuminated the scoring error and the unsuitability of these data. 
Future studies should utilize the M-C Form C, as well as other measures of multicultural 
social desirability or measures of political correctness, to further determine if social 
factors are impeding authentic responses to the TOWGAS. Moreover, application of the 
TOWGAS in experimental settings might also better minimize various forms of response 
error and bias through experimental manipulation and targeting priming.  
 We intend on continuing to use the TOSCA-3 (Tangney & Dearing, 2002) 
alongside the TOWGAS to compare the Negation subscale with the TOSCA-3’s 
Externalization and Detachment subscales, which were not empirically distinct in this 
study. These analyses may continue to improve claims to the construct validity of the 
TOWGAS, which are limited at this time. Future studies should included additional 
measures to establish discriminant validity, including measures such as the CoBRAS 
(Color-Blindness Racial Attitudes Scale; Neville et al., 2000) and the Modern Racism 
Scale (McConahey, 1986). The present study did not address temporal stability of the 
TOWGAS, and a future study should assess test-rest reliability over at least a two-week 
period.  
 Our study of White guilt is restricted to White people’s feelings about racism 
toward African Americans and Black people exclusively. Further research should expand 
the study of White racial guilt and shame as it manifests in different multicultural 
contexts. For example, do White people experience race-based guilt when confronted 
with inequalities between Whites and Latinos? Do we see a reverse affect – i.e., a 
decrease in White guilt – when dealing with the relative economic affluence of East 




affluent? What about Native Americans? In an increasingly multiracial United States and 
globalized society, such questions will become increasingly important to psychologists 
and cultural researchers. 
Finally, as is part of any instrument development procedure, individual TOWGAS 
items and scenarios should be refined to reflect any undesirable psychometric properties. 
The problematic scenario on “Driving While Black” will be adapted and retested, but 
future studies should also explore whether additional scenarios and items enhance 
reliability estimates and construct validity. One item (“You would think: ‘I would be 
broke if I gave money to every person who asks me for change.’”) cross-loaded onto the 
Negation and Guilt factors equally; the reasons for this double-loading are not 
immediately apparent and should be explored and rectified.  
Implications and Directions for Future Research 
We interpret three primary findings of this initial validation project. First, 
distinguishing between White guilt and White shame on the TOWGAS is the arguably 
the most important finding of this study. A conceptually meaningful group of items 
loaded distinctly onto these first two factors with desirable levels of mutual exclusivity, 
which we assessed via eigenvalues. Based on our knowledge of existing literature, we 
assert that this is the first formal and successful attempt to study White shame in 
quantitative psychological research. We hope that future validation studies of the 
TOWGAS, including experimental research, will illuminate relationships between White 
shame and relevant variables, such as racism. For example, the weak significant negative 
correlation that we observed between White Shame and racism may yield productive 




White shame. Second, the emergence of the Negation factor signals the potential for a 
related research line to look into how Negation influences social and political attitudes, 
identities and behaviors. Finally, the intersectional design of the present study is a direct 
response to Cole (2009) and Dill, McLaughlin and Nieves’s (2007) call for 
methodological innovations in intersectional research that refines and improves extant 
quantitative approaches. We will continue to exercise and expand these methods in future 
validation studies and applications of the TOWGAS. Once the instrument is refined, the 
TOWGAS should be used in future intersectional research projects to explore the 
implications of variations in experiences of White guilt that map onto dimensions of 
difference such as sexuality, gender, class, age, etc. The observed similarities and 
differences we found in the present study are indicative of the intersectional complexity 
of Whiteness, which goes far beyond quantifiable differences in attitudes and emotions. 
Concurrent qualitative studies, such as the one presented in Chapter 4, will help 
illuminate these diverse experiences and complicate quantitative findings that may 
encourage a static or hastily concretized theory of White guilt. 
Overall levels of White Guilt-proneness and related constructs remain low in 
studies such as this one that are conducted in non-experimental settings. We suggest that 
instruments such as the TOWGAS and PCRW are brought into field and laboratory 
contexts. Moving beyond Web- and classroom-based administrations of these instruments 
will create opportunities to tap these constructs in culturally meaningful environments. 
We have begun to establish that White guilt, White shame and negation are distinct, but 
many questions remain. What happens with White guilt in multicultural pedagogy in the 




negation and shame, implicated in moments of highly racialized crises, such as Hurricane 
Katrina, and how do the affective experiences of these situations intersect with White 
guilt to shape political attitudes? During the presidency of Barack Obama, we see 
productive opportunities for real-world testing and application of the TOWGAS of other 
measures related to White racial identity so that we can learn more about how aversive 
and subtle forms of racism manifest in emotion, cognition and attitudes. Such studies 
should not be conducted in disciplinary isolation; political psychologists, sociologists and 
scholars working in a variety of applied social and cultural research should interact to 
produce better knowledge about White guilt and its myriad implications. These 
investigations may ultimately aid in the development of a culturally grounded model that 
accurately reflects the historically and contextually constitutive elements of White 
people’s experiences in the 21st century United States.  
The next two chapters illustrate how such a model should develop as a result of 
interdisciplinary research and praxis. Chapter 4, the final empirical study of this 
dissertation, involves qualitative research with a subsample of our survey respondents 
who participated in in-depth, one-on-one interviews. Finally, Chapter 5 puts the 
qualitative and quantitative data from the prior three chapters in dialectical conversation 






I remember the first time I felt White guilt, too. 
 It was during fall 1995 and I was 11 years old. I was on a community soccer team 
in Aberdeen, Maryland, the middle- and working-class military town in which I grew up. 
Though Aberdeen was racially diverse, largely because of the federal and military 
workforce there, my soccer team was not. Out of the 20 or so boys on the team, only one 
was Black. The rest of us were White. 
 I don’t remember his name anymore, but my best buddy on the team was Black. I 
don’t remember any of my teammates’ names, which says something about how much I 
enjoyed playing soccer. I was sort of a fish out of water on the team. Unlike the other 
boys, I went to Catholic school, not the public middle school at which we practiced. I was 
chubby and not a very good athlete, but my parents made me join the team each year to 
get some exercise and make friends. I always hated soccer in the beginning of the season, 
but had fun in the end. I was so competitive that I would practice really hard and always 
become a starter by the end of the season.  
I got along OK with all of the boys on the team, but this year, this Black kid and I 
became good friends. He was kind of a nerd – like me – and, retrospectively, I realize that 
he wasn’t girl-crazed like the rest of the boys were quickly becoming. I’m sure this drew 
me to him, because there would be less pressure to act like I wasn’t terrified of dating. He 
was also one of the best players on the team, and would help me practice. 
 According to my memory, one day we were all lined up in a long row for some 
sort of kicking drill. My friend was going down the line of White boys asking “Is O.J. 




understood little of what the Simpson murder case was actually about, I remember 
watching it and pretending to get it. I had formed my opinion, too: O.J. was guilty. So, 
when he got to me, at the end of the line, I said so. 
 “Oh, I forgot all White people are racist,” he replied. 
 I am positive I said nothing at the time, but I was furious. As soon as my mom 
picked me up from practice, I told her all about it. Rather than yell at the Black boy, I 
yelled at her. I must have ranted all the way home about how wrong he was, and how 
unfair and ridiculous it was to call me a racist. O.J. was a murderer! That’s it. 
 My mom and I were sitting on the couch in the basement – the same place where I 
had sneaked a peanut butter cup years earlier and experienced my first pangs of guilt – 
and I was still fuming over my friend’s absurd accusation. My mother interrupted me, 
and told me to settle down. I don’t remember her exact words, but the gist was something 
like this: 
 “You see the world from a particular place. You’re White, and we’re White, and 
you don’t know what it’s like to be Black. You don’t know what it’s like to see all these 
White people so sure that a Black man committed this crime. You cannot know what that 
feels like. But you can think about it. And you can consider what it feels like to live in a 
racist world, because you live it, too. You’re just on the other side of it. So don’t be so 
sure of things.” 
 Looking back, it wasn’t only the first time I felt White guilt. It was also the first 
time I had been encouraged to see the world sociologically. There were invisible, 
intangible things that I was implicated in, but that I couldn’t control. It wasn’t fair, and I 




of people who were the beneficiaries and perpetrators of racism. I could have the best of 
intentions, but I would always be White. 
 
 Fast-forward 13 years. I’m 24 and now an adult. I’m getting out of a cab and 
approaching my cousins’ bar in Northeast Washington, D.C. It’s summer, and happy hour 
time, so it’s still light outside. I’m headed toward the bar with my boyfriend, and there 
are a bunch of Vespa scooters parked outside.  
To provide some context, I’ll tell you that my cousins’ bar is in a rough part of 
town that has become a nightlife hotspot in recent years. Not many White people live 
there, but they come to H Street NE to drink at night. Also, the Vespa brand of scooters is 
the favorite mode of transportation for a certain kind of hippie and hipster when the 
distance is too far to travel on a bike. 
 As we approached the bar entrance and prepared to show ID to the bouncer, we 
were interrupted by what appeared to be a drunk, high or otherwise not-sober Black 
woman who was asking people for change to get on the bus. She was approaching us 
from the left, but there was a White woman chaining up her scooter in the Black 
woman’s path. 
 She asked the White woman for change to get on the bus. The White woman did 
not respond or look at her. 
 The Black woman began to yell. Loudly. 
 It would be dishonest to quote her, because I can’t remember the order of what 




 She screamed at the White woman and threw up her hands. She said that her 
grandmother was that woman’s grandmother’s slave. She used the word “foremothers,” 
I’m sure. Not “forefathers.” Foremothers. She kept saying that her foremothers were that 
White bitch’s foremothers’ slaves. She said she was just asking for change to get home 
on a bus. The Black woman was so angry, and she was throwing her arms in the air and 
moving toward the White woman. She looked as if she might hit the White woman, 
though I’m not sure of this. A bystander, a Black man, intervened and pulled the Black 
woman down the street toward the nearby bus stop. She continued to yell and scream as 
the Black man walked her to the bus stop. I remember watching them and not being able 
to tell if they actually knew each other, or if the man was just being kind. 
 I looked at the White woman, who was 10 shades whiter than she had been 
before. She spoke softly to a friend, who had come out from inside the bar. I couldn’t 
hear what she said. We went inside and left them on the street.  
 At first, I judged the White woman. Serves you right, I thought. Stupid White girl 
with your stupid Vespa. Got what you deserved. Do you even know where you are? 
 Once that went away, I heard the Black woman yelling in my head. All I could 
think was: What if I had done the same thing? I probably would have done the same 
thing. I would have tried to ignore her. And then she would have yelled at me about my 
proverbial ancestors and their slaves. Then I would have been that stupid, racist White 
person getting told about himself on the street. It wasn’t me, but it could have been. That 





 I believe in my own antiracism, and I don’t think that White guilt motivates me to 
believe what I believe or do what I do. I can confidently say that I don’t feel White guilt 
all the time. I don’t feel it most of the time. But I feel it some of the time, and I think that 
is OK. In fact, I think it’s important. I don’t want to give it up. I don’t think I should give 








Upsetting Whiteness: Guilt and Shame at the Intersections of Difference 
 
“My response to racism is anger. I have lived with that anger, ignoring it, feeding 
upon it, learning to use it before it laid my visions to waste, for most of my life.” 
-Audre Lorde (1984) in “The Uses of Anger: Women Responding to 
Racism” (p. 124).  
 
“I don't really, personally, I don't think you should ever have a reason to be 
angry; I don't think it's a very constructive emotion. Your anger is the reason – 
you should address that, as opposed to thinking that being angry is really gonna 
do anything for you.” 
 -Steve, a participant. 
 
Introduction 
Chapters 1, 2 and 3 helped to establish what White guilt and White shame 
actually are. Now, I turn our attention to the phenomenological and subjective 
experiences of White racial affect. The present chapter is organized around a fairly 
simple question: how does White guilt happen? In order to build answers to this question 
and the many subsequent questions it evokes, I employ qualitative methods – specifically, 
in-depth interviews and the theory-methods package of grounded theory (GT) (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008) – to construct explanatory narratives of White racial attitudes and 
experience that are based in the lives of a group of young White people. These 10 
interview participants constitute a purposefully recruited group of students from within 
the random sample of 2,200 undergraduates who were contacted to participate in survey 
research in Chapter 3. I met with each of the 10 students twice to discuss their opinions 
and feelings about the three crises analyzed in Chapter 2. In the process of these 




Anderson Cooper and Don Imus, and expressed how their interpretation of those figures’ 
respective controversies is informed by their personal politics, background and identity-
group memberships.  
My participants’ articulations both confirm and challenge the findings presented 
in Chapter 3. Overall, they contribute an additional level of theoretical nuance and depth 
to my investigation, because each of their lives reflect certain aspects of research-based 
thinking about White guilt while refusing to conform to any universal framework of 
White racial affect. In reflecting on and representing White guilt and the dysphoria 
associated with feeling responsible for racism, sexism and heteronormativity, they upset 
any inclination to simplify or reduce White people to a one-dimensional subjectivity. The 
young White adults who participated in this study engaged in affect negation in ways that 
reflect the findings in Chapter 3 and that appear to use some of the same rhetoric 
employed by the journalists in Chapter 2. However, these interviews yielded new 
findings about the dynamic processes involved in deferring, denying and avoiding the 
personal implications of racial conflict, inequities and discrimination. These strategies 
involve but are not limited to: relying on inaccurate history to explain contemporary 
inequalities; the construction of logic that defies reality to accommodate neoliberal 
ideologies; the creation of other guilty and culpable individual and collective subject 
positions; the privileging of other aspects of identity over race; and the absence of 
feeling, which I term “inaffectivity.” 
By asking how White guilt happens, we open the discursive arena up to a variety 
of explanations of how White people come to feel bad about being White in a racially 




which White people feel connected to one another. In other words, when does the group 
entiativity (i.e., group-ness) of Whiteness become strong enough so White people feel 
that the actions of other White people reflect upon them (Bonilla-Silva & Embrick, 
2007)? Under what circumstances do the actions of White individuals come to reflect 
White people generally? What historical and culturally contingent situations motivate 
such collective racial guilt and anxiety (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears & Manstead, 1998)? 
If and when such feelings manifest, what strategies – both attitudinal and affective – are 
used to deal with and manage them? Though I have worked in the prior chapters to better 
specify and explicate what exactly White guilt and shame are as categories of emotion, 
we must concurrently consider that feelings manifest in different ways for different 
people. In terms of racial affect, this means rejecting an explanatory framework such that 
being White alone determines the phenomenology of White guilt and/or shame. 
This chapter presents the affective lives of young White adults as narratives with 
the potential to destabilize uniform or normative accounts of Whiteness. First, I explain 
the methodological orientation of this qualitative project with a focus on how several root 
assumptions distinguish this work from prior chapters in the dissertation. Second, I 
discuss the methods used to gather and analyze data. Next, I present my findings and 
focus on the theoretical insights that emerged from my respondents’ words and their self-
representations. I conclude with thoughts on how these findings might contribute to a 
theory of White racial affect and opportunities for future qualitative inquiries. 
Methodology 
Corbin and Strauss (2008) define methodology as, “a way of thinking about and 




used to gather and analyze data, arise from the methodological position taken by a 
researcher. In Corbin and Strauss’s definition, methodologies are epistemological and 
shape how researchers go about using and constructing “theory,” which is the term used 
to denote accounts and explanations of social phenomena. Though my theoretical 
commitments are present and active throughout the entire dissertation, three primary 
methodological assumptions inform the analytic core of this chapter, which is distinct 
from the discourse analyses of Chapter 2 and the psychometric work of Chapter 3. I 
explicate each of the following assumptions below: 1) individual lives inform collective 
experience, and vice versa; 2) multiple dimensions of identity, including but not limited 
to race, have bearing on the social and political perspectives of White people; and 3) 
White guilt and shame may feel differently for different White people. Each of these 
assumptions is based in extant theory and my findings in the prior two studies. These 
assumptions undergird my construction of this qualitative study and the interpretation of 
the data herein. This methodological exposition is followed by a detailed account of the 
research process itself (i.e., the methods) from research design through data analyses. 
The Significance of the Subjective 
It is conceptually easier to theorize and study how being a part of a group 
influences an individual’s life than it is to comprehend how an individual’s specific life 
experiences might reflect the characteristics of a greater collectivity of people (Côté & 
Levine, 2002). These are the kinds of difficult problems and questions that qualitative 
researchers face when studying a small group of people and theorizing from the position 
of these localized experiences. Reflecting my training in ethnography and the tradition of 




experiences is productive of meaning and serves as the basis for macro-level theory 
building about widespread social phenomena. This means that while the claims that result 
from my analyses of these interview data are restricted to this research situation (i.e., lack 
‘generalizability’), individual subjectivities and life histories are valuable sites of 
meaning-making that inform how we make sense of other, future observations (Clarke, 
2005). Quite literally, the transcripts of these interviews are archives of each respondent’s 
racial epistemology. Taken collectively and in conversation with one another, they offer 
insight into how actual, particular White people experience their race, gender, sexuality, 
nationality and class, and how these dimensions of identity and difference co-constitute 
their perspectives on race, responsibility and affect in the 21st century. As Caughey 
(2006) asserts, critical consideration of even one person’s life story can elucidate cultural 
phenomena just as well as scientifically inflected demographic research or projects that 
attempt to use qualitative methods within a positivist paradigm that privileges the 
experiences of “representative” participants and tends to obscure the tremendous 
variation in any one person’s beliefs and values (p. 8).  
In focusing attention on the unique perspectives of a diverse group of individuals 
who are connected by little beyond geography, nation and race, explanations of social 
problems (e.g., White guilt) may emerge from differences as opposed to sameness. 
Embracing the rich qualitative sociological tradition of symbolic interactionism 
(hereafter, SI) (Mead, 1934; Goffman, 1959; Denzin 1992), this investigation is 
concerned with how my participants make meaning in their own lives and how they come 
to understand their own relationship to social controversies outside of their immediate 




racial conflicts is neither my goal nor positioned as empirically possible. In this sense, my 
concern here is with the cultural and interpersonal dynamics of my participants’ 
psychologies, instead of searching for an intrapsychic and uninhibited sense of self. 
Goffman, for example, disregarded the latter conceptualization of identity as naïve. From 
his position, which is that of a dramaturgical interactionist, all social interactions are 
rooted in performances, which are a kind of citational taking up of typically extant or 
expected social roles (see also Butler, 1993). What matters to the relative success of a 
given interaction, accordingly, is not whether someone is performing truthfully or not, 
but if they are performing convincingly or believably to their audience, which includes 
observers and themselves (Goffman). To Goffman (1959), a performer may be “fully 
taken in by his own act; he can be sincerely convinced that the impression of reality 
which he stages is the real reality” (p. 17). As opposed to these “sincere” performers, 
some performers may not believe their performances at all; he calls these performances 
“cynical” (p. 18). Most performances fall in the space between total sincerity and 
cynicism, because performers constantly practice and make sense of their roles in specific 
social contexts. 
The interviews in this study are framed as performative, highly constructed spaces 
where both my participants and I are assuming social roles and presenting ourselves in 
culturally and situationally specific ways. Goffman’s (1959) division of the “front” 
performance area and the “back” region of preparation for impression management have 
their origins in Mead’s root ‘formula’ of SI: the “I,” the “Me” and the “Generalized 
Other” (Mead, 1934). The “I” is the social actor in (inter)action; for my participants, this 




herself, and the “Generalized Other” is the aggregated audience perspective from which 
the “Me” is viewed. In my interviews, I am likely not the only person whose perspective 
matters to the constitution of their Generalized Others. Indeed, an idealized White person 
or an imagined non-White witness may be part of their metaphorical audience (Goffman). 
Though our interviews are the specific “setting” in which my participants’ performances 
are manifesting, discursive elements and social actors outside of the interviews 
undoubtedly permeate our shared situation (Goffman). I embrace and draw upon the 
discursive strengths of our interview situations, namely the following: my participants’ 
guarantee of anonymity, our shared Whiteness and the privacy of our conversations. The 
goal of interpreting these responses is to examine how these White people’s individual 
experiences might dispute extant theoretical assumptions and, accordingly, enrich my 
emerging explanations of White guilt by developing a theory that is both sufficiently 
explanatory and accommodating of attitudinal and experiential diversity.  
While poststructural accounts of culture beneficially help to reject a 
universalizing subject position (Foucault, 1978), such perspectives may also have the 
effect of reifying a structural rendering of social relationships that denies individual 
subjectivity, agency and resistance (Collins, 1998). Accordingly, a feminist ethnographic 
standpoint rooted in SI draws on the strength of poststructural criticism to trouble the 
subject without displacing it. Adele Clarke (2005) and others (e.g., Mamo, 2007; Joyce, 
2008; Shim, 2005) have done the work of explicating and demonstrating how such a 
position actually manifests in ethnographic research. Clarke’s “situational analysis” 
effectively takes qualitative research, specifically grounded theory (hereafter, GT), 




agency and subjectivity versus objectivity. Indeed, feminist ethnographies and situation 
analyses attempt to implode such reductive and illusory binaries by emphasizing the 
meso-level dynamics of experiences and grounding eventual macro-level theorization in 
micro-level negotiations of power and identity between humans and non-human actors, 
actants and elements. From its origins in the work of Anselm Strauss and the early 
interactionists, GT involves a process of self-reflexively “coding” data for thematic, 
recurrent themes and reducing such codes continually so that a unifying explanation quite 
literally ‘emerges’ from the qualitative data set (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Fassinger, 2005; 
Clarke). Though such a methodology might appear profoundly reflexive and subjective to 
researchers trained in quantitative social science methods, Clarke explains that some 
postmodern, feminist, Marxist and otherwise social justice-committed qualitative 
researchers have critiqued GT as positivist and invested in modernist notions of truth and 
objectivity (Haraway, 1988). By centralizing the always-already postmodern and 
poststructural elements of GT and SI, Clarke proposes new methodological “root 
metaphors” that emphasize a) Foucauldian discourse analysis, b) accommodate the role 
of nonhuman elements and c) promote topographic representations of discourse. 
Consequently, Clarke posits a version of GT primed for use in feminist ethnographic 
projects. Positional maps, such as those used and presented in Chapter 2, appear once 
again in this chapter and are constructed from the articulations and silences of my 
respondents, but once again represent the discursive terrain of inquiry – not specific 
individuals or groups. These maps are the discursive topography of my research and are 
based in my interpretation of my respondents’ self-representations. Through these maps, 




which to build theory that is reflexively co-constituted by the subjectivities of the 
researcher(s) and her participants. Accordingly, situational analysis and a feminist 
reflexive GT draw on the strength and rigor of interactionist methods and poststructural 
and postmodern accounts of identity, difference and culture without falling into 
structure/agency, individual/collective analytic traps.  
Intracategorical Complexity: White People 
  Intersectionality (Collins, 2000; Dill, Weber & Nettles, 2001) mandates a 
recognition of how multiple categories of difference and identity co-constitute human 
experience in history and culture. Cole (2009), Dill, McLaughlin and Nieves (2007) and 
McCall (2005) have all recently wrestled with the complexity of intersectional analyses 
as a methodological paradigm. More specifically, their writing has evidenced how 
intersectionality is best conceptualized as a theory-methods package a la GT, and how 
the project of producing more valid and liberatory knowledge about diverse human 
experiences is bound up in questions of methods and methodology (Clarke, 2005).  
 In mapping the terrain of extant intersectional research, McCall (2005) constitutes 
a continuum of complexity that is anchored by anticategorical and intercategorical 
approaches at opposite poles. Anticategorical analyses tend to be the most hostile toward 
the use of social categories to structure history and experience, reflecting critical 
postmodern and poststructural theories that have troubled modernist and structuralist 
ontologies of the universal, normative subject. Anticategorical complexity compels 
researchers to build qualitative genealogies that describe and explain how specific 
categories such as race and gender came into discourse and have affected material 




complexity may retain a critical stance toward social identity categories, but it deploys 
these categories in research to observe differences and similarities between groups. For 
example, a researcher may want to examine potential variation in frequency and severity 
of depression and anxiety disorders among LGB-identified persons and consider how 
racial identity may be significantly correlated with these psychological issues. Because 
intercategorical complexity actually necessitates the provisional adoption of identity 
categories, these methodological strategies tend to be most commonly used in the social 
sciences and in quantitative approaches that require the constitution of variables. 
Intracategorical approaches fall somewhere in the middle of the continuum of 
complexity, because these strategies are skeptical of social categories but rely on them to 
the extent that social categories tend to provide clues about how inequality has been 
constructed and reproduced over time. With a critical stance toward social categories and 
identity-based group membership, intracategorical approaches “often [focus] on 
particular social groups at neglected points of intersection,” or otherwise 
underrepresented intersections of identity. Accordingly, intracategorical complexity 
recognizes the diversity of experiences within a particular dimension or site of difference, 
such as being a U.S. Latina.  
Black feminists (e.g., Dill, 1978; Collins, 1990/2000, 2005) and scholars building 
the emergent queer of color critique (Muñoz, 1999; Ferguson, 2004) have illustrated the 
tremendous scholarly and academic potential opened up by intracategorical approaches 
directed at neglected areas of inquiry or communities that have been studied using 
oppressive and one-dimensional models of race or class or gender or sexuality (Bonilla-




an over-represented but under-critiqued site of experience: Whiteness. The exigency of 
this intracategorical approach is rooted in the research questions, which aim to probe 
White subjectivity for insight into how affect shapes racial identity and attitudes and to 
examine how these phenomena are differentially constituted and inflected by 
intersections of difference. This intracategorical approach is inherited from Black 
feminist scholarship on the intersections of race, class and gender and queer theories that 
have unsettled the categories of sex, gender and sexuality in their varied deployments 
across history and cultures. The political goals of these projects can be generally 
described as liberatory and emancipatory. In other words, these extant intersectional 
projects were designed to fairly and accurately represent the under- or mis-represented, 
i.e., those groups who have historically and contemporarily been subject(ed) to what 
Haraway (1988) called the “god-trick” or the disciplining, colonizing, masculinst gaze of 
hegemonic knowledge projects (Foucault, 1977). The political objective in the present 
inquiry is not emancipation but destabilization. By using the tools of feminist and 
antiracist social scientific and humanist scholar-activism to denaturalize and mark 
Whiteness – to literally show how these varied but connected racial experiences are 
constituted within the same unequal relations of power that produce and materialize 
White supremacy – the hope is to better account for and critique the practices that 
produce hegemonic Whiteness. 
 In Chapter 3, quantitative methods and analyses were used to demonstrate how 
subjective ideas about gender, not gender identity itself, influence proneness to feeling 
White guilt. This important finding would have been elided had gender not been 




social identity. Sexuality (including heterosexuality) and gender differences (including 
men and masculinity) produce meaningful variations in White people’s lives. 
Frankenberg’s (1993) landmark work took up the task of demonstrating the influence of 
race in White women’s experiences, which included (but were not limited to) sexual and 
intimate relationships, friendships with other women, experiences of space/place, 
understanding of ethnicity and the perception of history. Frankenberg’s intracategorical 
approach employed ethnographic methodology to deconstruct categories of “woman” and 
“White” while exploring their co-constitution and inextricability in White women’s 
subjectivity. Similarly, Pamela Perry (2002) produced an impressive ethnography of 
White teenagers and the intersections of race, class and space in the development of their 
racial identities in high school. Perry interviewed and observed students at two different 
high schools in California – one predominantly White, and another in which White 
students were in the minority – to see how young White people might differentially 
imagine and experience race depending on the context in which they were living and 
learning. She found that: 
White students’ experiences of racial-ethnic difference was complicated by such 
things as the ways gender, class, age-group, and other identities influenced the 
experience of race in a given moment; the degree of diversity whites saw among 
people of color; and the different sentiments and meanings attached to different 
racialized relations, such as white-Asian or white-black relations. (p. 3) 
Reflecting on her role as a participant observer, Perry described how she gathered the 
data to make these claims: “…I attended class with students, hung out with them during 




activities, attended school games, rallies, and other events, and chaperoned the Junior 
Prom and Senior Balls of each school” (p. 211). Through community emersion, in-depth 
interviews and the production of massive qualitative data sets, both Frankenberg and 
Perry illustrate how the dynamic, contradictory and process-based elements of White 
racial identity emerged at the intersections of multiple dimensions of difference, 
especially gender, class and sexuality. 
It is difficult to imagine how this dissertation could have been conducted using 
solely quantitative methods, which necessitate the relative or provisional stability of 
certain categories in order to make observations and claims about statistically significant 
relationships between variables. Qualitative inquiry, on the other hand, generally requires 
much less adherence to the sanctity, parsimony or mutual exclusivity of categories; 
hence, the utility of qualitative methods to the study of intersectionality. According to 
McCall (2005), “Thus new practices of ethnographic representation have been developed 
to allow feminist research to proceed while the authenticity of both the subject and the 
researcher—as if either had a single, transparent voice— is questioned” (pp. 1778-1779). 
The reflexivity and critical stance toward subjectivity, objectivity and the data-gathering 
process so central to ethnography (Caughey, 2006; Clarke, 2005; Hesse-Biber & Piatelli, 
2007) facilitates the transformative and counter-hegemonic epistemology of 
intersectionality. 
In this dissertation, both quantitative and qualitative (i.e., “mixed”) methods are 
used to push intersectional thinking about Whiteness and affect forward. The topic of 




will be discussed in greater length in the final chapter. For now, I turn to another topic 
area that is effectively “opened up” by a qualitative methodology in the present chapter.  
Opening Up Guilt and Shame 
 In much the same way that intracategorical approaches to intersectionality 
motivate the researcher to examine social identity categories at an oblique angle, a 
feminist, interactionist approach to the study of White guilt and shame necessitates a 
conceptually dynamic framework with which to interpret how White people define, 
understand and make sense of their own feelings of racial guilt and shame. The three 
prior chapters have directed analytic and empirical attention toward developing working 
definitions of both of these concepts. Chapter 1 drew upon critique of extant literatures to 
distinguish between guilt and shame and historicize racial affect in 21st century neoliberal 
multiculturalism. Chapter 2 examined how these forms of affect were (not) articulated in 
contemporary popular discourse about race, identity and responsibility. Chapter 3 used a 
new survey instrument to tap my definitions of these constructs and examine their 
relationship to other psychometric scales and variables of interest, such as Collective Self 
Esteem (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) and racism (Saucier & Miller, 2003). What has 
emerged up until this point is a distinction between White guilt and White shame that 
pivots upon emotional direction and intensity, whereby guilt describes negative feelings 
directed at specific behaviors or attitudes of the White racial self or White others, while 
White shame is more painful, self-directed hate about Whiteness. Of distinct theoretical 
import is the associated concept of “negation,” which describes the cognitive-affective 
strategies taken up and performed by White people to defer, deny or displace feelings of 




racial affect insomuch as they adequately and consistently reflect the lived experiences of 
actual White people.  
 Accordingly, the qualitative methodology of the present study holds these 
definitions as tentative conceptual placeholders for a range of affective performances, 
utterances and articulations. A root assumption of this study is that White shame and 
White guilt may not – indeed, may likely not – be felt, performed or understood in the 
same way for all White people in the United States in our current historical moment. 
Recognizing intersectional differences is imperative, because gender, sexuality and class 
may influence the tendency or intensity of one’s White racial guilt or shame. As a 
researcher of emotions, however, it is also essential to allow for the feelings themselves 
to be fundamentally different for different people. Guilt may manifest in radically 
different ways for different White people, and these differences may sometimes be based 
in individual differences not captured by traditional social categories, such as social class, 
age, geography, etc. Before moving into a discussion of my specific research methods, 
two empirical strategies to capture these individual differences merit explication. 
 First, just as the my Test of White Guilt and Shame (TOWGAS) does not use the 
terms “guilt” and “shame,” I avoided using these terms in interviews unless my 
participants brought them up. Instead, I asked questions that described the concepts as I 
understand them, which is similar to the TOWGAS’s response format. The motivation for 
such a rhetorical strategy is that by using descriptive language to talk about these 
feelings, as opposed to psychological jargon that requires the participant and I to share 
understanding of the constructs, I am better equipped to understand what my participants 




opposed to the interview itself, I can then evaluate whether or not we share similar 
understandings of these affective forms. Second, the interviews themselves would be 
organized around similar topics of conflict and controversy as the discourse analysis 
conducted in Chapter 2. By asking for my participants to reflect on their perceptions of 
Cooper’s coverage of Hurricane Katrina and blame assignment after the storm, Imus’s 
firing from CBS Radio, and Washington’s conflict with T. R. Knight and termination 
from Grey’s Anatomy, I could ultimately compare and contrast their responses with those 
of journalists and media figures. More importantly, their words could present direct 
challenges to my emerging framework of White guilt and shame that is considerably 
based on the findings of my discourse analysis of these specific events.  
The goal of this research process is to develop a grounded theory of White guilt 
and shame that possesses satisfactory explanatory power while accommodating ample 
phenomenological diversity. The specific research methods of the project, which I next 
describe, were designed especially with this in mind. 
Methods 
 When completing the informed consent form for the TOWGAS instrument 
development study presented in Chapter 3, participants were asked if they were willing to 
be contacted for a follow-up interview. If they answered “yes,” they were asked to 
provide an email address along with their gender identification and sexual orientation. 
When data collection for that study closed in summer 2008, I began to contact 
participants who indicated they would be willing to speak with me in a follow-up 
interview (see Appendix D for sample interview request email). I contacted participants 




sexuality-diverse group of men and women that included people who identified as 
straight gay, lesbian, bisexual and queer. No participants identified as transgender in the 
original sample; thus, none were included in this subsample. All of the participants were 
U.S. citizens, and all of them grew up in the Mid Atlantic region. I did not contact any 
student participants whom I knew personally or was professionally connected to in any 
apparent way. I ultimately contacted every non-heterosexual student on the list who met 
this criterion (n = 7), and two (one gay man and one bisexual man) were willing and able 
to participate. The remaining participants were straight men and women who composed a 
total participant group of 10 people (see Table 4).  
Table 4 
Participant Demographic Characteristics (n = 10) 
Name Gender Age Sexual 
Orientation 
Religious Affiliation Year in 
School 
Hometown/state 
Jeff M 21 Straight Jewish Senior California, then Columbia, Md.  
Mike M 19 Straight Not religious Junior Columbia, Md. 
Steve M 22 Gay Not religious Senior Vienna, Va. 
Noah M 22 Bisexual Jewish Senior Potomac, Md. 
Tom M 21 Straight Atheist Senior Burtonsville, Md. 
Stephanie F 21 Straight Catholic Senior Conowingo, Md.  
Rachel F 21 Straight Jewish Senior Silver Spring, Md. 
Jamie F 19 Straight Not religious Sophomore Sykesville, Md. 
Amy F 19 Straight Catholic, not religious Freshman North Potomac, Md. 
Claire F 21 Straight Catholic, not religious Senior Frederick, Md.  
 
Interviews were conducted between September 2008 and March 2009. I asked 
each participant to meet with me twice over the period of two weeks. The interviews 
were conducted in my private office in a professional suite on the first floor of a 
residence hall on the university campus. Individual interviews lasted between one half 
hour and one hour and a half. During each interview, I sat in an office chair in front of a 
desk approximately five to eight feet away from the participant, who sat in a lounge chair 




followed a fairly consistent format and was semi-structured by a standard list of questions 
(see Appendix G); however, additional questions were asked and question order shifted 
slightly depending on participant responses. 
 The first interview began with introductory questions about the participant’s 
background and reasons for participating in the research. For example, I asked: where 
they grew up; their age, major and year in school; how they would describe their 
personality; and what are the best ways for a stranger to get to know them. We then 
watched the first clip of Anderson Cooper’s interview with Senator Mary Landrieu and 
proceeded into a discussion of their impressions of the clip and political debates about 
Hurricane Katrina. The interview concluded with the scheduling of the second interview. 
The second interview was held one week after the first to provide the participant with 
time to potentially reflect on our conversation. Our second meeting began with a viewing 
of the MSNBC simulcast of Imus in the Morning from 2007 during which Don Imus 
called the Rutgers University women’s basketball team “nappy-headed hos.” We 
discussed this controversy and the participant’s opinions about whether White people 
might feel some sense of responsibility in moments when figures such as Imus make 
public, racist slurs. We then watched two clips related to Isaiah Washington’s firing from 
Grey’s Anatomy for allegedly calling co-star T. R. Knight a “faggot.” The first clip was 
from backstage at the Golden Globes when Washington told a reporter, while on stage 
with the whole cast who had just won the award for best drama, that he had not called 
Knight a faggot. Then, we watched Knight’s appearance on the Ellen DeGeneres Show 
from later that week in which he discussed the entire controversy and his reactions to it in 




specifically her views on Washington’s firing and the relative force of the word “faggot,” 
the interview concluded with me offering to talk about any of these issues further with 
the participant if she felt that she had more to say at a later time. I offered to send a copy 
of the completed manuscript for feedback and input after the dissertation was completed 
and expressed my appreciation to each participant for volunteering time to my project. 
 After each interview, I wrote notes about my initial impressions of the interview, 
especially my sense of the rapport between the participant and me, as well as any 
interesting comments I wanted to return to in future interviews and data analysis. 
Transcription began immediately using HyperTRANSCRIBE software. Only I had access 
to the digital audio files of the interviews besides me. Open coding began in spring 2009 
and proceeded through the composition of the manuscript. Coding was conducted using 
HyperRESEARCH software. Open coding is the process by which the researcher 
develops loose and flexible descriptors for phenomena in the data that should be 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) and is the first step in 
organizing the qualitative data into meaningful categories. Axial coding followed; this 
process involves refining codes based on the emerging theory, which is articulated 
through extensive memo writing and the gradual incorporation of outside literature and 
existing theoretical perspectives (Fassinger, 2005). HyperRESEARCH enables memos to 
be embedded into the coded interview transcript, so that coding, memoing and even 
additional transcription (for editing) can occur simultaneously. All of the procedures 
followed the general principles of CT research outlined by Corbin and Strauss (2008) and 
Fassinger’s (2005) specification of how to use GT in psychological research. 




principles of situational analysis explicated by Clarke (2005). Positional maps, such as 
the ones that appeared in Chapter 2, represent the variety of positions taken up in the 
discourse and are organized along two axes. Situational maps are theoretically informed 
lists of empirical evidence that help to identify and conceptualize the relevant social 
actors, implied actors, nonhuman actants and macro-level discourses implicated in a 
given research situation.  
Findings: Upsetting Whiteness 
 In the following sections, I explore the concepts that emerged in my participants’ 
responses to the controversies we discussed in both of our interviews and reflect on how 
their individual responses map onto each other’s. There was substantive variability in 
their responses, but rhetorical and ideological trends coalesced around how these people 
think race does and does not matter in certain social settings, and how members of the 
same race, gender and sexuality may differentially feel responsibility for the behaviors of 
other identity group members. Notably, my participants were the most forthcoming and 
explanatory around the ways in which collective responsibility and structural forces do 
not influence individual behaviors, attitudes or feelings. Their responses shift analytic 
attention away from codified emotions of White guilt and White shame and toward the 
various strategies taken to negate these feelings.16  
Histories and the Present 
 Popular rhetoric about young Americans might have us assume that college 
students do not know or think about history often (Loewen, 1995). However, my 
participants invoked history’s influence on the present with remarkable consistency. 
                                                
16 Ellipses appear in direct quotes from participants to reflect pauses and drop-offs in 




History as a concept, more than specific historical events, was constructed as an 
amorphous but powerful factor that exerts a special kind of power on contemporary 
social relationships. 
 Tom, a 21-year-old senior from a Washington, D.C. exurb who had been accepted 
to law school, felt that situations like the Don Imus scandal remind Americans of a 
painful racial past that is best left alone. He explained: 
It just sort of feels frustrating that we can't sort of move past these kinds of things 
and sort of really move forward and make something constructive instead of 
always reverting back to such a bad past. And that sort of...it just keeps bringing 
those sorts of things to light. Not only do those comments just as bad in today's 
society, it sort of brings up the history and then people think about the history of 
race relations when people say things like [Imus did]. 
Jeff, a 21-year-old engineering senior from an affluent, racially diverse suburb between 
Baltimore and Washington, said that history influences the ways in which media 
corporations deal with employees whose behavior incites negative press or a public 
outcry. For Jeff, the American response to 9/11 was not dissimilar to how CBS fired Don 
Imus: 
You know we, especially as Americans, we would prefer action to inaction. 9/11 
is a perfect example. Almost immediately, we bombed out Afghanistan, and then 
we got a lot of backlash for that. And now people are even blaming President 
Bush for, “Oh, look at all the harm you caused in Afghanistan.” But we were the 
ones who demanded that he do this. I mean, if history has shown anything, it's if 
you stand and do nothing, then you're probably going to get overwhelmed and 
taken down by the general public. Especially in big, charged moments like this. 
What can generally be described as U.S. social and cultural history was framed as the 
context in which contemporary social issues are negotiated, and different renderings of 
our collective past helped my participants make sense of Imus’s and Washington’s firing, 
as well as outrage over the devastation left in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. 




explain why these markers of identity remain politically charged, or alternatively, why 
they not longer retain explanatory power.  
Despite the rhetorical significance of history to my participants, history itself was 
a vague and sometimes inaccurate invocation of meta-narratives or anecdotal historical 
episodes. In comparing and contrasting Hurricane Katrina and the gay rights movement 
to past events, participants cited things such as sinking of the Titanic, the Civil War, the 
Holocaust, 9/11 or Hurricane Andrew. The power of history was insisted upon, but what 
history is and how exactly individual people settle upon a collective history and deal with 
history was not explicated. Instead, references to the American past remained mostly 
ephemeral. For example, I asked Rachel, a 21-year-old senior from a suburb close to 
campus, whether she thought racial conflicts or debates over sexuality were more 
important to the American public today or, alternatively, if they were equally important 
and salient political topics. She said: 
I think they're equally important. I think maybe a little more salient is 
homophobia maybe just because it's a newer issue compared to race, which that 
issue has been going on for a long time, since the Civil War and before that. You 
know, they're both still having struggles and challenges, but maybe just a little bit, 
homophobia being more the topic for today. 
Rachel, who is straight, saw race as deeply engrained in American history, whereas 
sexuality is, “because of the newness of the topic,” still congealing into a coherent 
political debate. “Homophobia,” accordingly, may be a slightly more important topic to 
Americans, but this judgment is rooted in Rachel’s perception of an American social 
history in which sexuality just recently came into the public sphere. To my participants, 
the influence of this history stretches beyond political discourse, however, into social 
psychology. Because of sexuality’s relative “newness,” heterosexuals do not feel as much 




people together less, because it only recently became a point of political affinity; race, on 
the other hand, has been historically salient since before the American Civil War. 
Respondents asserted that when social identity and group membership influences the 
interpretation of controversies, Americans use the history of their groups to make 
political judgments. The histories of minority groups – or the histories of majorities in 
terms of minority group subjugation – were the most salient histories.  
 Steve, a 22-year-old gay senior from Northern Virginia, reflected on how history 
shapes collective Black identities in the United States. For him, this story begins with 
slavery: 
So I mean, having absolutely – not even being like a paid individual and 
something like that – and then being thrown into the world economy…and I mean 
like, I would imagine that Black families do not have as much inherited wealth as 
your average American family in the sense that, you know, they have a shorter 
history in that sense. And then like I mean the general attitude that has evolved 
because of that, and the sort of racial tensions that exist, I feel like that helps to 
develop a sort of distinct identity among the African American community that is 
lots of times at odds with the, uh...I guess like the White community. 
For Steve, history is the setting in which political ideas develop for both Whites and 
Blacks. Steve takes up an extremely environmental approach to thinking about how 
people come to have prejudicial attitudes. “I have friends in Michigan and stuff, and in 
Detroit and stuff, and they just genuinely feel like they have more of a conflict with the 
Black community,” he said. He referenced a friend who felt uncomfortable voting for 
Barack Obama, because, “he felt that it would give them a one-up on him type of thing.” 
When I asked Steve if he thought this represented a racist opinion, he said yes but 
qualified his response with: “[My friend] doesn't really think about it as that type of 
thing. It's just that for whatever reason…the way that he group up, then way that he came 




prejudice, individual agency is largely irrelevant; history and context predetermined these 
attitudes. Accordingly, individual people cannot be blamed or held responsible for their 
discriminatory feelings or behaviors if they grow up in a geographic and historical 
context that is perceived as likely to produce such attitudes. Steve perceived his friend’s 
attitudes to be rooted in community conflicts that preceded him. “It's probably just 
representative of underlying tensions that there are between the two communities there. 
Yeah, that's just…he just felt that tension, and he knew what side he was on, obviously,” 
he said.  
 Respondents used the past to contrast or oppose identity categories against one 
another. Stephanie, a 21-year-old engineering senior from a rural county in northeastern 
Maryland, explains why racial inequality remains a more heated political issue in the U.S. 
than gender and sexism: 
And I think that there was a lot of racial issues, in the history of this country, and 
we're just burned by it, and scarred by it. And that's why we're very, you know, 
aware. The gender issue, I think, has been going on, but it wasn't such a stark 
contrast, you know. We didn't go from like slavery to no slavery; it was like...but 
even though, you know, with that, there was progression. But, it's kind of...there 
was no real significant, I think, women's movement. There was a little bit, but it 
wasn't a big thing; it's been a gradual thing that's gone on, and I mean they're still 
kind of doing like "equal pay for equal work" and that kind of thing. But it's been 
so slow. And it's been so progressive, that it's...we're not as scarred by it. And 
society still allows for that kind of situation and women haven't; like, it hasn't 
been like a massive movement for women to seek it to change, where there was a 
massive movement of African Americans to seek equality. There still hasn't been 
that; like, there has been the feminist movement, and there have been a couple 
like significant feminists throughout history, but it wasn't like a big movement, 
and I think that a lot of women right now still will say that they are less than their 
husband or whatever. As long as women aren't pushing for equality, it's not going 
to happen.   
From her perspective of women’s history and the African American Civil Rights 
movement in the United States, women have been complacent in their subordination and 




African Americans, who, according to Stephanie, have consistently demanded and 
achieved equal rights. Equal rights for African Americans is defined as not being 
enslaved by Whites, whereas women’s marginalization is more cultural, pervasive and 
difficult to legislate. Though arguably reductive and eliding of Black women’s 
experiences, Stephanie’s explanation of women’s inequality relative to Blacks’ highlights 
the intersectionality of race and gender in the rendering of history. Quite literally, 
Stephanie’s ideas about gender inequality are shaped by her perceptions of African 
American emancipation for slavery in the U.S. and vice versa.  
Along with a range of rhetorical strategies I observed, the deployment of 
historical factors to account for prejudice prevents nearly all people from being identified 
as racist or prejudiced in the present or recent past. No one can be blamed for racist, 
sexist or homonegative attitudes or behaviors, because a historical context can explain 
how these conflicts came to be. Conversely and contradictorily, historical structures of 
inequality cannot explain how other people contemporarily experience inequality, 
marginalization or discrimination. In other words, history can excuse racist acts but not 
account for why inequality persists “after” racism.  
Whether or not my respondents’ endorse an ‘official,’ consistent or accurate 
version of American history is less important to my interpretation of their responses than 
the regularity with which some version of history was invoked to explain contemporary 
phenomena. Their reliance on a vernacular history is distinct from Steele (1990) or 
Ellison’s (1996) explanations of collective guilt, which move through distinct social 
historical formations – where conceptually discreet historical movements frame White 




subjective reflections presented by Wise (2004) and Berger (1999), whereby political 
attitudes shape the telling of history and vice versa. For Berger, myths of Whiteness are 
created in everyday experiences of racial inequity, and history becomes a way of 
explaining away inconsistencies in ideology and logic. My respondents similarly use 
individualized framings of history to make sense of their perceptions of inequality; 
histories serve as the basis of sociological interpretations of contemporary life.  
Anything But Race 
 Stephanie’s perception of the U.S. women’s rights movement exemplifies an 
important pattern in responses whereby identity categories other than race are used to 
explain (away) highly racialized phenomena, specifically White people’s attitudes, 
feelings and behavior. For my participants, race was the least desirable explanation for 
social problems, and they would typically try to attribute any other cause to systemic 
inequity or an act of discrimination. In the case of the government’s failed response to 
Hurricane Katrina, my participants would acknowledge – sometimes emphatically – how 
horrible the response to the storm was and how the victims in New Orleans and the Gulf 
Coast region should have received more support, protection and aid. Nevertheless, when 
asked to explain the government did not adequately or expeditiously help the storm’s 
victims, respondents would insist that the cause of inaction was either circumstantial, 
accidental, or attributable to other factors that are supposedly divorced from race, such as 
tax systems, social class or government ineptitude. Stephanie explained the failed 
response to Katrina accordingly: “I think that it's, you know, it's bureaucracy and it's 
paperwork and it's stupid little tiny writing that makes things unable to happen.” 




an awesomely powerful storm whose destruction could simply not be avoided. For 
example, Noah, a 22-year-old bisexual man from an upper-middle class family in an 
affluent Washington suburb, said simply, “It's a hurricane. Hurricanes don’t know good 
and bad.” Jeff also expressed concern over what it would mean to connect Katrina to 
race. “I think it's harder for me to accept that view,” said Jeff, whom I asked if Katrina 
was a racialized disaster. He said, “…Partially because that notion reflects on all of the 
United States; it reflects on me, as well. I personally…and see that's the thing – maybe it 
is true?”  
Jeff, like most of my participants, elaborated at length on how “tragic” conditions 
were in New Orleans after the storm, and how the situation could have been remedied by 
a more thorough and efficient governmental response. When I asked him whom he 
thought Anderson Cooper was representing, Jeff said, “[He’s] representing all the 
frustration and anger of the people who live down there, who, you know, they're trying to 
survive and they're not receiving the aid that they feel they should be getting in quantity, 
quality, speed, all of that. So I mean he's representing the people.” But Jeff felt that 
Cooper and others were fixated on assigning blame, which he felt was a fruitless exercise 
during the recovery. To him and other participants, blame is not productive or useful 
whatsoever, especially in situations such as Katrina. Furthermore, when blame is 
associated with race or racism, it becomes a discourse that misplaces and misappropriates 
blame. As Jeff continued to explain, he cannot bring himself to conceptualize Katrina as 
having to do with race: 
You can't label something – especially a society to which you belong...a lot of 
people will easily place a label as long as they're not involved in it. But with 
something like this, I can't – in my own views and my own ideas…and I guess the 




say, "The U.S. doesn't like Black people or doesn't like minorities or doesn't like 
this and don't care what happens to them," because I don't agree with that. And I 
have several friends who I would feel safe to say that they don't agree with it, 
either. Now, there is – you can also discuss what's the demographic of our leaders 
in Congress right now...you know, you're gonna see a lot of John McCains, for 
example. People who are predominantly White, wealthy...so, obviously the 
demographic of our leadership probably doesn't match the demographic of our 
country in terms of like all races and all that. I mean I guess that's probably 
something I haven't considered enough, but I don't think you can put a label on 
something that huge without including yourself in that. By including myself I 
can't agree with it.... 
The only way that Jeff sees race could play a role in government response to Katrina is 
via a manifestation of explicit racism. He does not conceptualize race or racial inequality 
as being constituted as part of systemic or aversive processes. Ultimately, the individual 
choices of victims – i.e., agency – offer more reasonable explanations for the horrors of 
Katrina. From Jeff’s perspective, “When Katrina came in, [the victims] refused to leave. 
Plenty of people said, ‘You've got to evacuate.’ And they were given the choice, 
unfortunately, of staying in their homes. And many of them chose to do that, and many of 
them died, unfortunately.” According to Jeff and other respondents, personal choices to 
stay in New Orleans, combined with the uncontrollable circumstances of meteorology 
and geography, resulted in the devastation of the city and the thousands of lost lives in 
the Gulf Coast.  
The youngest participant, Amy, a 19-year-old freshman from affluent 
Montgomery County, Maryland, was the only person in the study who articulated a 
multidimensional critique that privileged, as opposed to conceded, the role of race in the 
unfolding of Katrina’s aftermath. She said: 
When you think about -- if the Hamptons [laughs] had been hit by a hurricane, I 
think there would have been, you know, faster response. It would have been 
influenced by money and power. But the people of New Orleans and Louisiana 
didn't have that influence. So. I think partly it was due to class and race...why the 




Amy’s responses are also unique because she focuses on wealthy White people’s 
privilege relative to working class African Americans to explain why some people could 
not evacuate the city. For example, she said: 
I think [Hurricane Katrina] definitely opened the door in which people saw that, I 
mean, White people had more means...I mean, I don't know. They just had 
[laughs] better everything. They had more access, options to escape. I don't know. 
In comparison to my other participants, Amy was the only participant to shift rhetorical 
attention away from Black people’s perceived choices to stay in New Orleans and toward 
unequal resources with which to escape New Orleans and the storm’s path.  
From the perspectives of my most of my respondents, gender and class have more 
explanatory power than race in instances when identity matters. Stephanie, for example, 
thought that class and not race was the explanation for failed government response to the 
storm. “I remember people saying that it was racism, but I remember thinking ‘I 
don't...it's not racism, it's people hating poor people’” she said. Stephanie arrived at this 
conclusion from an empathetic response. She felt connected to poor residents of the Gulf 
Coast because she herself feels victimized by an unequal education system that left her 
less prepared to secure scholarships for college than students from wealthier suburbs in 
Maryland. Rachel responded similarly, placing an emphasis on social class: “I don't think 
that racial injustice is, you know, a primary factor [in Katrina]. I mean I think this could 
have happened to any person or group. I think if it was a different socio-economic group, 
a higher group, then that group might have been more able to help themselves, if you 
will.”   
Attributing causation to race was avoided in the Imus and Washington 
controversies, as well. All of my participants felt that the Grey’s Anatomy scandal was 




reaction, it would have placed Washington in a position to avoid being fired. Jamie, a 19-
year-old journalism major from a rural Maryland county west of Baltimore, said, “If he 
had been kept on, then it would have been because he was Black.” Hypothetically, to 
Jamie, if race had been an issue in his firing, “[People] would have said ‘Oh good, they 
fired him even though was Black.’” Steve thought it may have helped the news media tell 
a more salacious story about Washington, but ultimately he agreed with Jamie: “I mean, 
it might have helped the narrative in terms of, you have a bunch of racial tension and the 
sexuality tension going on, so maybe if they were the same race, it wouldn't have been 
quite as, you know, exciting or whatever, but I don't necessarily think that would have 
mattered.” According to my participants’, the public’s reaction to Washington’s behavior 
was not fueled by racism, but Washington’s behavior may have had something to do with 
his Blackness. Reflecting similar patterns of association made by journalists covering 
“Isaiahgate,” some of my participants had previously heard about or observed 
homonegativity in the Black community and thought that this might partially explain why 
Washington called Knight a faggot. None of them, however, thought that race alone 
could explain Washington’s behavior.  
Because Don Imus made an explicitly racist comment when he called the Rutgers 
women’s basketball team “nappy-headed,” dealing with his Whiteness was a more 
delicate process for my participants than denying that race influenced responses to 
Katrina or Washington. Race became a lightening rod in media discourse during the “I-
Mess,” but Tom thought the role of race was overstated. “I don't know,” he said, “I 
thought it was just an off-hand comment. I don't think [Imus] even means to be a terribly 




reprimanded, for sure, but I don't think it was as bad as they put him on to be.” Jamie, 
who admitted to never watching Imus’s show and not really knowing anything about him, 
similarly thought that too much was made of Imus’s comments. “I mean he was just 
doing his normal thing: trying to make a big deal out of nothing. So, I mean, it kind of 
stinks for him, because I don't think he has bad intentions,” she said. Steve echoed these 
comments, arguing that controversies like the “nappy-headed hos” slur can be reduced to, 
“essentially somebody making a politically incorrect slip.” Rachel, on the other hand, 
thought his being an outsider to the team and region was at least as important as his race.  
Explaining racial oppression in terms of things other than race serves to shore up 
the boundaries and logic of neoliberalism on an epistemological level, which I will 
discuss later. But writing race out of these historical controversies also helps to create an 
emotional, cognitive and identity-based distance from situations in which my participants 
might feel implicated on the basis of shared identity characteristics with culprits of 
discrimination or otherwise guilty social actors. Indeed, how “close” one is to a given 
situation seems to play a significant role in whether or not my participants experienced 
affective responses to a situation. Sometimes, this meant not feeling connected to 
Katrina. For example, Mike said of the storm, “I did not watch a lot of news coverage. 
Most of what I heard was word-of-mouth. Every now and then I read about it in an article 
online, but at the time I was kind of busy with a lot of things, schoolwork, etc.” Noah, on 
the other hand, eventually went on an alternative spring break trip to Louisiana to help 
demolish homes irreparably damaged by Katrina. Nevertheless, he could not remember 




feeling culpable, and, in turn, from feeling guilty. Jeff wrestled with these feelings when 
thinking through the Imus scandal: 
Anything that connects you to him, it just makes you more emotionally involved. 
Um, connecting me to him is just the fact that we're White, and that we're males. 
But the fact that he's older separates us; his background separates us. Clearly, his 
views separate the two of us, so do I....? Yes, it's upsetting that yes, I recognize 
that this has a negative connotation on all of White America, certainly just 
because he's White, by association, some of that fallout hits everybody. Because 
there are certainly people who are, for example, not White, or people who are… 
who will take his comments and say, “Yes, this is what's wrong. I can't believe 
White people are like this.” And it's unfortunate that, you know, people who are 
not necessarily as open-minded would make this assumption and not realize, 
“OK, well obviously he's not everybody.” So, I feel some of that, but not all of it. 
I try to focus on the differences when something like that comes up. 
Jeff’s words illustrate a cognitive and affective struggle that many of my participants 
reflected upon as they tried to conceptualize how they are or are not implicated in 
moments of racial tension. Many discussed how focusing on differences besides race 
helped, at least intrapsychically, to make them feel better. Jeff’s comments illustrate, 
though, that such differentiation and detachment may ultimately exacerbate racial 
conflict. “But at the same time,” he said, “it can be a negative, because removing yourself 
from that group, it also means you're removing yourself from potentially any 
responsibility whatsoever toward this kind of thing.” Unless White people are able to 
recognize their roles in certain situations, they will not be able to recognize “progression 
that maybe needs to happen,” he said. 
Anything But Guilty 
 Closely connected to my respondents’ avoidance and denial of race as an 
explanatory or structuring component of these and other controversies was their 
resistance to name social actors as guilty. With consistency, they defended each person or 




controversies we discussed. Washington, Imus and Landrieu, specifically, and the federal 
government, celebrities and public figures, generally, were continually defended, even 
when respondents had previously admitted that they did not feel as if they had sufficient 
knowledge of the issue to make judgments. For example, though some respondents felt 
that Landrieu was disingenuous, Cooper was more frequently framed as inappropriately 
aggressive or as someone misdirecting blame at Landrieu. Mike, for example, said, “I 
think he crossed the line a little bit. [Cooper] was like pointing fingers at her.” According 
to some of my participants, Cooper’s misattribution of responsibility extended beyond 
Landrieu to all government agencies that were responsible for responding to Katrina. For 
example, Steve said, “[Cooper] essentially, the entire time, he's just really looking for 
someone to blame and looking to be angry and was clearly angry about it and really 
wanting to put it on somebody.” Steve continued to explicate his logic, noting that, 
“[Cooper] seemed kind of insulted that she would even dare to make any comments on 
the situation and think about the politics of it….Just because you're pissed off about 
something doesn't mean that somebody is to blame.” 
 Journalists called for Washington and Imus’s firings with such relative 
consistency (see Chapter 2) that, as a researcher, I was surprised at the apparent honesty 
and ease with which my many of participants came to resist assigning blame or endorsing 
punishment for either man. Claire, a 21-year-old senior from Western Maryland, was the 
biggest fan of Grey’s Anatomy and expressed strong sympathy for Knight and offense at 
Washington’s comment. However, even she did not want Washington to be fired. She 
said: 
I am gonna say he deserved to be fired, but I was so mad, because he was such a 




And that's selfish of me, but it would have been better for the show. So, I know a 
lot of my friends were the same. 
Claire and I also discussed situations in which she has personally been called a “faggot.” 
Our conversation went accordingly: 








Patrick: Both. What happened? How did it make you feel when it's been used in 
an aggressive way? 
 
Claire: Well I don't take such extreme offense, because I'm not gay. But it's still 
like – what? Why would you call me that? You know what I mean? Pick a 
different word. Like it makes no sense, it's just like...is that the only word 
you can think of right now? Does it make you feel better by calling me 
that? Like, fine.  
 In a joking way, it's just like, I'm just like, “Ok. Whatever.” I don't know, 
it's not really funny, but you don't mean it in a hurtful way, but...OK. 
 
Patrick: Has it been among your friends or the social circles that you travel in, do 
you think that the word has been divorced from its negative connotation 




Patrick: So people use it not to be hateful... 
 
Claire: To gays. Right.   
Claire went on to say that “faggot” is equally as powerful as the N-word, but indicated 
that straight people may not understand how hurtful “faggot” can be to “gays.” She spoke 
at length about how the 2007 film I Now Pronounce You Chuck & Larry, starring comics 
Adam Sandler and Kevin James as straight men pretending to be a gay for financial 




she explained a scene from the film in which Sandler and James’ characters are riding in 
a cab discussing their “pretend” marriage: 
The cab driver calls them a faggot and they're like “What!?” and they're really 
straight, so they beat him up. So it actually brought up a lot of attention, I think in 
that movie, to how hurtful this word is. I think it, you know, created some 
awareness. 
In her anecdote, straight men’s outrage over being called “faggot” is seen as promoting 
tolerance. The experience of identity-based hate is the way that these fictional straight 
men, according to Claire, come to empathize with gay people.  
Jamie was similarly sympathetic to Knight, but thought that Washington was 
chastised for primarily artificial reasons, such as ABC’s wanting to retain advertising 
revenue and viewers. She said:  
I don't think [Washington] expected him using faggot to be a big deal, otherwise 
he wouldn't have said it. I think that's probably how he feels about it. Sort of 
thinks he didn't want to raise the issue; he didn't want to make that person feel that 
way. He was in the moment; he was mad. If he could go back again, I don't think 
he would have said it. So, but, at the same time – he did say it. And he thought it 
was OK to say it. And I think that's the thing about straight people. Once it kind 
of raises the issue in your head, they wouldn't say it, but in general, I think it's not 
as quite as big a deal as it should be – yet. 
Jamie lodges a fairly sophisticated critique of heternormativity, including the 
qualification that most straight people do not yet think about the consequences of gay 
slurs when they use them, but she ultimately struggles to come to terms with his 
punishment, which she feels is as unfortunate as the offense itself. Her framing of the 
Washington’s behavior is comparable to Steve’s characterization of Imus’s “politically 
incorrect slip.” Tom explained that intention does matter in determining whether one 
should be fired for calling someone a faggot at work: “So obviously it depends if he's 
really meaning it in a terribly malicious way and things like that. I don't know, every 




probably justified. Rachel took a harder stance, arguing that calling someone a faggot at 
work should only result in termination after multiple offenses, and that terminations 
generally should be about performance, not workplace demeanor. To her, the same 
applies to usage of the N-word. According to Steve, the Washington situation merely 
played itself out just by the rules of a pattern of public chastising. “As soon as it got in 
the media's hands, it was, you know, equivalent to the Don Imus thing,” he said. 
“[Washington’s] fate was sealed. He had nobody to come to his defense, and he was in a 
position where the higher powers do not want to be associated with him anymore. It was 
inevitable.” From Steve’s perspective, both Imus and Washington were the victims of a 
public cycle of shame run by the media.  
Jamie did not think that Imus should have been fired, but she ardently attacked his 
use of the term “nappy-headed hos,” outlining how the phrase is humiliating and 
degrading in terms of race, gender and sexuality. Nonetheless, even not knowing 
anything about him, she did not think he should have been fired: she though he just made 
a mistake, but that he did not have bad intentions. Her interpretive strategy appears to be 
to name what is wrong about someone or some group’s actions, but to reject the idea that 
an individual should be blamed, punished, etc. With Katrina, Jamie admitted that the 
situation was about race but not racism, which for her is a term that only applies to 
intentional, malicious acts of discrimination. In her reading of the Imus, intentionality 
was once again invoked and served as the pivot point for her logic of responsibility and 
blame. In the absence of malice (the legal criterion for libel), a social actor cannot be held 
responsible for offensive, hurtful behavior. Indeed, intentionality is a concept used to 




unequivocal, guilty villain. “You know, you can say what you want and I'm not gonna 
think that he's a smart guy because of it, but I'm not gonna say that he's an awful person, 
basically,” said Steve. All participants recognized that “nappy-headed hos” is an insulting 
slur that denotes racism and sexism, but the use of the phrase did not clearly identify 
Imus as a racist or a sexist. Once again, the incident was about dimensions of difference, 
but not oppression, per se.  
Sometimes, participants invoked ideas such as freedom of speech and political 
correctness to defend them, but the displacement of Imus’s and Washington’s guilt was 
more consistently achieved by constructing other implicated social actors on which to 
place (more) responsibility and/or blame. My participants uniformly interpreted 
Washington and Imus’s firing as faceless corporate decisions that do not necessarily 
reflect the moral superiority or authentic antiracist/feminist/pro-gay politics of CBS, 
MSNBC or ABC. Their terminations were interpreted as being about money, not good 
will or harm, which rendered the significance and utility of the firings meaningless. But 
one group was regularly identified as the most culpable of all: “the media.” Universally 
disliked, a disembodied construction of “the media” was discursively constructed as the 
villain in each situation, stirring the proverbial pot out of self-interest and self-
indulgence. “The media” – a singular, race-less entity outside of Cooper – exhibits 
predictable and superficial behavior, always inciting drama and directing public opinion. 
These controversial episodes were perceived as highly orchestrated because “the media” 
is so dependent upon grabbing the attention of uncritical viewers who are mindlessly 
thirsty for stories. None of my participants could relate to people who believe the media 




legitimate news story, was simultaneously framed as sensationalized. Cooper was “doing 
his job” by emoting and empathizing with victims as broadcasters are trained to do. In 
this sense, Cooper was the least offensive, because at least Katrina presented so many 
real, tangible victims. In the case of Imus and Washington, participants viewed both 
stories to be entirely inflated. Only perhaps the Rutgers players and Knight deserved to 
be able to express dissatisfaction with their abuse, but Knight especially should have 
done so privately. “The media” are the constant aggravators, to most of my participants, 
because they make things “racial” when they are otherwise neutral. Mike said: 
To be honest, I wouldn't rely too much on the media. I would go to more -- I 
wouldn't say high-tech, but more professional sources that don’t [sic] really have 
to broadcast to the whole nation like the media does, because you know the media 
always does try to sucker up things to people. Like they won't show really graphic 
things on TV because that could disturb people. Yeah, I'd look for a better source 
than the media, normally. [Emphasis added.] 
Jeff also elaborated on media coverage of Imus: 
Well, I didn't follow all of the outcry too much, but this is kind of like flavor of 
the month kind of thing. There's always something going on. To an extent, it was 
probably just like several other events. In my mind, this is like a general 
observation that I have made, which is that things tend to get blown out of 
proportion. That's because the media is entertaining. So you know if they were 
like “Oh, you know this happened,” then no one is really going to care and no one 
is going to watch it. But if you say “Oh there was a big outcry! Millions offended! 
All these people! Riots!” then people are going to pay attention. 
All of my participants, including one woman who was studying to be a magazine writer, 
expressed some degree of skepticism toward news media and journalists, specifically. In 
some cases, characterizations of “the media” were superficial themselves and lacked any 
specificity. In other cases, these criticisms revealed a sophisticated and internalized 
epistemology of skepticism toward capitalist news organizations that are designed to tell 




systemic oppression, the federal government or the social actors perpetrating 
discriminatory, hurtful or offensive behavior.  
 My participants’ aversion to assigning blame and guilt to others reflects the 
seriousness with which they consider social labels such as “racist.” Indeed, to some, the 
threat of being called “racist” or having one’s behavior attributed to racist attitudes is 
considered a motivating factor for White people’s “good” behavior. For example, Steve 
explained how fans of Imus might have modified their behavior and allegiances during 
the Imus scandal: 
I think that responsibility is a strong word, however, if you're a Don Imus listener 
and all the sudden you hear that, you don't want to be...you know “racist” is a bad 
word, you don't want to be associated with it, so you're much more likely to take a 
step to, you know, call CBS and express your outrage – that type of thing. It's 
really not a good thing to be racist, so you want to make sure that nobody thinks 
that you're racist or anything like that. So in a sense that it might compel you to 
behave differently than another challenge than you're presented with, certainly 
people strive to not be racist is what I would say.  
Anti-racist actions may be elicited through concern over being perceived or labeled a 
racist, according to Steve.  
Other participants confirmed these sentiments with comments, such as “nobody 
wants to be racist,” that reflected a desire not to be labeled a racist – not necessarily to 
challenge racism in one’s self or others, much less society at-large. As Jamie said, “Like 
once [racism is] mentioned once, like it becomes an ordeal, so I guess that just to be 
passive about it would have been to like support it, almost.” In not reacting to him, 
Imus’s listeners and other White people would have been implicated in Imus’s behavior 
and subjected to the label of “racist” had they not reacted negatively. The “genuine” or 
“authentic” interior attitudes of White people were not explicated, but the fear of being 




perceived as racist. When asked to explain what he meant when he said that people want 
to “make sure that nobody thinks that you’re racist,” he said: 
So I mean there are [sic] certain things that you know you shouldn't do or think or 
say because they are racist. But then do you necessarily – in your mind – do you 
really hash it out and really, you know, that's completely different. Most people 
do not want to be racist, however, a lot of them, especially if you don't have a lot 
of exposure to the Black community, if you're in like rural Iowa, you don't want to 
be racist. However, what is being racist, really? Because you've never in contact 
with that thing – you're never really given an opportunity to be racist, in a sense.  
By postulating that racism may not even be ontologically possible in the absence of a 
(racially other) object for hate and discrimination to be directed toward, Steve 
demonstrates how, from his perspective, racism and other forms of discrimination are 
actually rooted in individual subjectivities – not structural process or systems. In this 
sense, I read his and my other participants articulations as confirming and obliging the 
logic of neoliberalism. 
Accommodating Neoliberalism 
 As a hegemonic ideological and historical configuration of power relations, 
neoliberalism has been discussed at some length throughout this dissertation. When I use 
the term, I draw on cultural theorists’ explanation of how, since the 1980s in particular, a 
globalized and globalizing logic of free market enterprise has influenced social 
relationships, domestic policy and power inequalities within the United States, but around 
the world, as well. As Duggan (2003), Melamed (2006) and others (e.g., Pieterse, 2007) 
have argued, neoliberalism embraces difference to the extent that differences can be 
commodified and sold in a marketplace of multiculturalism. In the contemporary 
moment, when difference troubles the status quo, it is marginalized just as it has been 
historically. However, neoliberal social projects make great efforts to appear inclusive 




multiculturalism that Ahmed (2006) calls “nonperformative” antiracism, i.e., antiracism 
minus the actual antiracist act. Neoliberalism structures and organizes experience in 
terms of differentially valued identity categories, especially race, ethnicity, gender, 
sexuality and nationality, but obscures the relationships between these categories and 
their effects on material relations of power (Duggan). Phenomena such as colorblind 
racism (Bonilla-Silva, 2006; Neville, et al., 2000) and “postfeminism” (see Jowett, 2005, 
for an overview) fall under the umbrella of neoliberalism and help shore up the 
ideological pillars of neoliberal hegemony. My participants reflected many aspects of 
neoliberalism in their responses and, similarly to the journalists’ writing about Imus, 
Katrina and Washington, created ways to accommodate these identity-based situations 
into an epistemology that rejects the importance of identity in constituting contemporary 
social relations and structures.  
 Each of the three organizing concepts outlined in the previous three sections are 
strategies taken up by my participants that represent everyday manifestations of 
neoliberalism. By framing these controversies in terms of opaque and nebulous U.S. 
social histories, participants were able to avoid explaining how present-day decisions 
actively promote inequalities. In these cases, history was constructed as the causal 
explanations for current social problems. Furthermore, history could be re-written – for 
example, to eliminate feminism as a major social movement – in order to accommodate 
the persistence of gender discrimination and to blame women for failing to organize a 
meaningful and successful movement for equality. In certain instances, such as Hurricane 
Katrina, past historical contexts in which actual racism did occur were positioned as 




constructed as a historical phenomenon, i.e., something that once happened in the past 
and no longer occurs today. Accordingly, this in-the-past racism could not be invoked to 
question the idea that individuals did not make better choices to avoid being victimized 
by the storm or to interrogate the government’s inability to sufficiently respond to the 
disaster.  
 Intersectional thinking is oppositional to neoliberalism because intersectionality 
insists upon the interconnectedness and salience of identity categories in the shaping of 
social realities and dimensions of oppression (Dill, Nettles & Weber, 2001). Though I 
critically read my participants’ responses as evidence of how multiple dimensions of 
difference influence how people make sense of themselves and others, few of them 
actually acknowledged any connection between social identity categories except in 
‘unusual’ points of overlap. For example, when asked about whether they saw race and 
sexuality as connected social issues, participants commonly responded unequivocally 
“no.” Sometimes, however, intersections were acknowledged. For example, to Jamie, 
race and sexuality intersect as social issues only in the realm of individual subjects who 
occupy two positions of marginal identity. “Um, maybe if you're a gay Black man,” she 
said, “but I don't think they're together as one issue. I think they can be put together just 
as you could with any other social issue, because they all kind of progress, but I don't 
think they're – they're very separate.” Therefore, as systems of inequity, the relationship 
between sexuality and race is rooted in subjects, not structures. Individual people may 
represent the connection between these categories, but they are not otherwise connected 
as systems of oppression outside of multiply marginalized individuals, according to 




one – Noah – explained how being White might influence the way he perceived a clip or 
controversy during the interviews. For Noah, his “White perspective” denoted his 
proximal distance from people of color:  
My White perspective is not having any Black friends growing up. My White 
perspective is not really having any non-Jewish friends growing up. My White 
perspective is living in an upper-middle class home. My White perspective is 
going to a school with like, because it was a private Jewish school, there was like 
one Black kid in my grade. My White perspective is only seeing, let's say – I don't 
know. I mean I don't know how else to say. My White perspective is having no 
communication with this group of people. I mean, part of the reason I chose this 
college was in order to meet people of other religions and ethnicities and things 
like that. My White perspective is just someone who was very out of touch 
because of lack of knowledge. 
Noah’s articulation of Whiteness is unique among my participants, and he generally 
reflected a more self-reflexive view of his own politics and identity. However, Noah’s 
beliefs about race generally fit with my other participants, because race, i.e., Whiteness 
and Blackness, is rooted in subjectivity. Bonilla-Silva and Embrick (2007) call this 
subjectivity a “White habitus,” which designates the social segregation and interpersonal 
distance from non-Whites that produces White social identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). 
Bonilla-Silva and Embrick note that because this social segregation is so taken for 
granted by White people it is atypical for them to be able to express how their isolation 
from Blacks influences their perspective on other White people and racial Others. 
 In creating a metaphorical litmus test for oppressive behavior and specifying the 
essential criterion of racism, sexism and “homophobia” to be intentionality, participants 
engaged in ontological choreography (Thompson, 2005) of racism, sexism and 
“homophobia” to fit within neoliberal discourses of multiculturalism. Participants 
consistently argued that Imus, Washington, Landrieu, President Bush and other 




sexist or homonegative intentions, they could not be labeled as “racist,” “sexist” or 
“homophobic.” The concepts of racism, sexism and homonegativity have been 
reconfigured as agentic phenomena that are straightforwardly impossible to prove 
without evidence suggesting that overtly prejudicial behavior has manifested. Everything 
‘below’ overt hate is explained to be misunderstandings that are based in innocuously 
different cultural backgrounds and rooted in otherwise good intentions. They assumed the 
best of these actors, choosing instead to be hypercritical of “the media.” The media 
disturb the equilibrium of neoliberal hegemony by talking about certain controversies as 
potential manifestations of problematic social relations. Without the media, it is 
implicitly posited that these crises would have passed without incidence. 
Inaffectivity: The Absence of Feeling 
 Participants articulated a variety of opinions about the sociology of race, gender 
and sexuality that helped clarify the conditions under which White people, men, and 
straight people might feel collective guilt or shame when people of the same identity 
group make hateful comments or exemplify socially undesirable characteristics. The 
converse also became apparent; my participants voiced the many conditions under which 
members of dominant identity group categories would not feel guilt or shame. 
Interlocking strategies such as externalization of blame and detachment (Tangney & 
Dearing, 2002) from politically sensitive areas of discourse, which together I call 
“negation,” were invoked to deny collective responsibility and foreclose on the potential 
of White guilt and White shame. Though psychological literature suggests some 
conceptual discrepancy between externalization of blame and detachment, my 




deep interconnectivity between these cognitive-affective strategies. In other words, the 
insistence that a moment was not racialized, sexualized or gendered tended to coincide 
with the assignment of blame upon an outside party. In the process of coding the 
interview data, it become impossible to distinguish between moments of “detachment” 
and “externalizing,” which instead coalesced into one code: “negation.” I used the same 
term from Chapter 4 to inform the naming of this code. 
However, I learned how the lack of emotionality itself also serves to protect the 
self from the painful experiences of guilt and shame, particularly the dysphoria associated 
with recognizing one’s own connection to and implication within systemic social 
problems and unfair privileges. Beyond externalizing blame and detaching, some of my 
participants expressed a total absence of feeling, which I call “inaffectivity.” Inaffectivity 
is a theoretical concept to describe, specifically, a performative void of affect created by 
distancing the subject from sites of relationality and feeling. Whereas detachment implies 
the implication of guilt or shame and is literally motivated by a desire to defer oncoming 
or already-present feelings guilt and shame, inaffective processes are quintessentially 
rooted in neoliberal ideology and are thereby already detached from the identity politics 
of everyday life. Inaffectivity makes negation unnecessary, because the (White) subject is 
removed a priori from the situation or scenario that might otherwise spark identity-based 
guilt and shame. I emphasize to performative qualities of inaffectivity to suggest that 
these expression may be a well-rehearsed social role. As Goffman (1959) found, roles are 
usually taken up now creative; Butler (1993) further characterizes performativity as 
iterative and citational. Inaffectivity, accordingly, may be a learned and ritualized 




described above, but all of my respondents did not equally express inaffectivity. Though 
the concept is rooted in the study of White guilt and White shame, articulations of 
inaffectivity were made about each of the three scenarios and in regard to multiple 
dimensions of identity and difference. Several examples, however, will illustrate the 
meaning and salience of this concept.  
    Steve’s foremost problem with Cooper’s interview with Landrieu and coverage 
of Katrina was his use of emotionally to explain and convey the severity of Katrina and 
the consequences of governmental inaction. As Steve explicated: 
I mean looking for somebody to blame or looking for somebody to be angry about 
isn't necessarily the most constructive thing as opposed to looking for, you 
know...things went wrong, there's no doubt about that. Like, I mean, there's things 
that need to be changed so that that doesn't happen again. But being angry isn't 
going to do anything about it, like...doesn't really, I don't really, personally I don't 
think you should ever have a reason to be angry; I don't think it's a very 
constructive emotion. Your anger is the reason – you should address that, as 
opposed to thinking that being angry is really gonna do anything for you. 
Perhaps the most obvious point that Steve makes above is about race. According to this 
statement, Cooper and the disproportionally Black victims of Katrina should be more 
concerned with their own anger than with the racist structures that predicated such pain, 
suffering and death. “I'm not like trying to surround myself in all this depressing stuff, 
you know what I mean?” said Steve about how little coverage of Katrina he watched. 
“Like that does not interest me at all. I don't want to see those images and stuff. I don't 
really have any sort of...whatever...desire to see that type of thing,” he said. The privilege 
inherent in such a statement is palpable, but the total substance of Steve’s assertion is 
elided if the emotional component is unrecognized. What Steve zeros in on – the point at 
which he targets his critique of Cooper – is the emotionality itself. Anger, as well as the 




are uncontrollable and unpredictable feelings which violate the rationality that serves as a 
guide in these crisis moments. Feelings are the problem, not the culprits of inequality 
(i.e., in this case, the disastrous federal and state response to the storm). 
 When I asked Rachel how the word “faggot” made her feel, she said, “It just kind 
of stirs up inappropriateness. Uncalled for, you know. Unnecessary word that is often 
associated with hate.” As a straight woman, she could not recall ever being called a 
faggot or being the target of the word, so “inappropriate,” which is a word associated 
with etiquette and demeanor, is the descriptor she chose to use when discussing the 
feelings it induces. Similarly, she said that Imus’s “nappy-headed hos” slur might spur a 
brief conversation over the family dinner table, but that it was unlikely to affect White 
people’s behavior or influence decisions they make in everyday life. Once again, the 
privileged distance from racial conflict inoculates the White subject from unpleasant 
feeling. 
For Jeff, news coverage of Katrina was his only connection to the storm, which 
allowed him to watch as an objective observer. As he explained, “I mean I will admit that 
I did not feel as emotional as I'm sure many people who were either were living there or 
had relatives living there or had any kind of connection. I mean there was nothing 
connecting me to the event other than my few friends who went to school down there 
who were fine, and what I saw on television.” Without a personal connection to the Gulf 
Coast region, his general cosmopolitan outlook was all that kept him involved in Katrina 
coverage: 
I would say that I felt the same way about the [2005 Indonesian] tsunami as I did 
about Katrina. Similar things – there was nothing really connecting me to it other 
than it's, you know, bad things happening to other human beings. I generally feel 




that we have a lot of things in common regardless of where we're from or 
anything like that so to that extent I do feel that connection of humanity. But, 
yeah, there was no deep-seeded emotional ties.... 
Even geographic proximity or shared national identity did not bridge the gap between 
Jeff and Katrina victims, and he continued to not-feel his way through the Imus incident: 
“It didn't strike me...I don't want to say that it didn't strike me as racist, because it 
certainly did. It was brazen, but I didn't hit me emotionally, just because I felt like I was 
removed from it.” And finally, in regard to being called a faggot, he said, “So, when 
those words [like faggot] have been said to me, I didn't really think anything of it.”  
Steve, who identifies as gay, also does not feel anything in connection to being 
called a faggot, as long as it is in the context of his friends: 
I have majority straight friends, but yeah, gay friends, too. [Being called a faggot 
is] not something that's really, I mean, I don't know. Part of me being, uh, 
comfortable in social interactions…the way you interact with your friends in 
saying, you know…I certainly cuss a lot more with my friends than I do with, 
when I'm at Burger King or something like that. Like, you know, there's general 
public appropriate language and then there's like friends-appropriate language, 
which is pretty much: anything goes. Like my friends are not gonna get offended 
by what I say and I'm not get offended by what they say, because we both know 
you know that we love each other. So it's not like a big deal. 
Steve’s inaffectivitity prevents him from empathizing with or sympathizing for Knight, 
who was allegedly called a faggot and was outed by Washington’s slur. 
 Stephanie expressed irritation at racial and sexual slurs directed at Black people 
and gay people, but not the kind of outrage she felt about the “ho” component of “nappy-
headed hos” or the class-based inequity she observed in Katrina. She saw herself 
implicated in shared victimhood in latter two offenses, whereas she felt no connection to 
the former two. She explained: 
 I don't think that [“faggot”] inspires any particular strong emotion. Possibly, if I 
were to identify as a homosexual of any type, I maybe would feel different? I'm 




rude word. I don't think the N-word does, and I don't think...just a lot of horribly 
degrading words, I don't think that they invoke some horrible feeling – like that 
the word has any….It's just that when people say rude or, I guess, hateful things, 
that way, the situation invokes kind of just irritance. I'm irritated by the way 
people are and by the way that people have their views and they're so close-
minded and they don't even....I mean [Washington] may not even know anybody 
who identifies that way or to know...I mean obviously he knows T.R....It's 
just...you can't just say things that you know are degrading towards other people. 
It just doesn't make sense. For me, it's irritating, but they also do have a right to 
say it, so I mean I can't tell somebody “No,” like “No you can't say that.” But it's 
irritating when people feel that way.  
This subjective divorce from feelings has epistemological consequences for how my 
participants see their own and others’ social worlds. Stephanie, for example, does not feel 
anything about “faggot,” so perceives the slur as absent from social life: “I've never seen 
any of my gay friends use that word. I have actually not heard that word probably 
since....it's been a long time! [laughs] I think that people are just over the word, and the 
word just sounds so nasty. It just sounds like...I think it's definitely equally as bad [as the 
N-word]...it's not said anymore.” Inaffectivity, therefore, not only characterizes how 
individuals view themselves; to the contrary, inaffectivity frames political perspectives 
on controversies and social realities.  
Whereas ambivalence implies contradictory emotions, inaffectivity’s close 
emotional cousin is apathy. But apathy has a negative connotation and connotes 
emotional lethargy and purposeful indifference; inaffective practices are more accurately 
characterized by a performative absence of feeling rooted in a fundamental cognitive 
distance from the situation of concern. In talking about their lack of feelings, my 
participants did not appear to express ill will toward victims or apathy about hate. 
Nonetheless, when inaffective, they could not conceptualize how certain ‘meaningless’ 
words, distant actions or faraway crises could possibly provoke an emotional response. In 




writing of history. Overall, these articulations pointed to an ability of the subject to 
profoundly distance oneself so as to cognitively remove any potential for connectivity 
and affectivity. In Ahmed’s (2004b) framework, whereby affect refers to the practices of 
identity- and meaning-making, inaffectivity inhibits the production of identification 
between subjects. Inaffectivity is the prototypical neoliberal (un)emotion, because it 
facilitates the sterilization and neutralization of power relations and helps to reestablish 
equilibrium in moments of discursive instability. Though rooted in identity, and the 
ability to dis-identify, inaffectivity serves as the experiential basis for political assertions 
that discursive manifestations of oppression are ultimately merely semiotic and 
meaningless. The presence of such a process has myriad implications for a theory of 
White racial affect, especially the conditions under which White guilt and shame do and 
do not manifest, which I will discuss in greater depth in my conclusion and the final 
chapter.    
Conclusions 
 Though this chapter has outlined the racial epistemologies and conceptualizations 
of identity that emerged from my participants’ responses, the diversity and variability of 
their reflections should not be understated. Though some epitomized what I have called 
“inaffectivity,” some respondents simply did not have much to say about certain crises 
and more about others. Situational analysis (Clarke, 2005) compels the researcher to be 
attuned to sites of discursive silence – the material places and psychic spaces in which 
things are not being said – but GT also conversely forces me not to produce or inflect 
meaning where little or none exists. For example, though Amy identified the effects of 




impacts her on an emotional level. I only theorized from what my participants told me, 
and I tried to break silences when I encountered them during interviews. Negation and 
inaffectivity are the theoretical concepts that emerged from these data and reflect 
discrepancies between highly emotional and unemotional responses to the clips and 
controversies discussed during our interviews. 
It is unfair and inaccurate to label a lack of discursivity as a general lack of 
emotionality. Whether they spoke at great lengths or relatively little, all my participants 
demonstrated a high degree of thoughtfulness. In each interview, they volunteered their 
opinions and feelings to what amounted to a stranger, and several of them spent more 
than two hours total explicating their thoughts on extremely complex and, sometimes, 
disturbing social issues. I perceived honesty in their responses, because much of what 
they said was not the socially desirable or “politically correct” response. I asked them to 
be frank, and they were. Finally, I perceived that my participants exerted intellectual 
energy and effort in our interviews, trying to think critically about their own life 
experiences and their personal theories of race, gender and sexuality. Even if they had 
never done so in such a way before, I saw them pushing toward sociological thinking. In 
the process of getting to know each of them and forming an ethnographic relationship 
with each participant, I came to care about them. They said things that made me sad, 
frustrated and even angry at times, but I ultimately developed strong feelings of 
connectivity to each of them. In the process of trying to embrace what Beverly Skeggs 
(1995) calls a feminist ethnographic standpoint, I had to balance my desire and purpose 




At the greatest points of difference and inconsistencies in the data, my 
participants articulated how their individual life experiences shaped their varied 
perspectives of identity-based oppressions and inequalities. From such a limited sample, 
it would be fruitless to argue that gender- or sexuality-based differences emerged as a 
pattern, but my participants did use gender and sexuality (i.e., their own and others’) to 
make sense of social and political conflict. The intersections of differences in guilt and 
shame to which I refer in this chapter title denote the intersectionality of the three crises 
and the multiple dimensions of identity that shape my participants’ feelings and thoughts 
about collective guilt and shame in these historicized moments and the interview situation 
itself. These differences cannot be reduced to variables of gender and sexual identity. The 
process of coding their interviews illuminated the numerous points of intersection at 
which race, gender, sexuality, geography, religion and age shaped their attitudes, their 
perception of others and the cognitive terrain on which racial guilt and shame are 
materialized – and quickly made to disappear.  
GT analysis did not lead to a bucketing of responses into neatly defined codes that 
corresponded to the factors that emerged from the quantitative data in Chapter 3. To the 
contrary, there was meaningful overlap between certain codes, particularly when it came 
to beliefs about race, gender and sexuality and the emotions associated with these beliefs. 
These points of overlap are described in grounded theory method guides (e.g., Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008) as problematic and undesirable. For the purposes of this research, 
however, the overlapping of codes at dimensions of identity and oppression illustrated the 
most meaningful sites of discourse. These discursive crossroads could not be adequately 




intersections became launching points for theorizing to capture the intracategorical 
complexity (McCall, 2005) of my participants’ experience. This modified grounded 
theory approach, combined with situational analysis, thoroughly upset any universalizing 
or homogenizing perception of Whiteness and White subjectivity. Within the category of 
Whiteness, which does accurately capture their shared racial identity, my participants 
expressed similar and distinct perspectives on racism, sexism, heterosexism and other 
forms of oppression, such as classism and religious intolerance. Whiteness predictably 
inflected the ways in which they left their own racial identity unspoken, but it also 
troubled their perception of sexuality- and gender-based oppression in unexpected ways.  
My participants resisted a simple psychologizing, because their affectivity and 
inaffectivity remains rooted in interactions that they were mostly recalling and 
retrospectively describing during our interviews. Affect is produced in interactivity 
(Ahmed, 2004b), and situations outside these interviews and the controversies we 
discussed undoubtedly shape their perspectives and feelings about identity and 
responsibility. Future research with White participants should include long-term 
interview relationships and participant observation that eventually begins to explicitly 
address the specific concepts of White guilt and shame. Future research might allow the 
researcher to a) observe these actual feelings in action/interaction and b) ask participants 
to recall incidents in which they have felt White guilt and/or shame once they have 
decided on a shared understanding of the concept. An interdisciplinary research team 
model that includes licensed psychologists would aid such projects. Furthermore, future 
studies should continue to employ mixed-methods. In the interest of contrasting these 




phenomenological and epistemological expertise about Whiteness that Black people 
possess, a future should replicate the present investigation with Black participants. 
If I had asked my participants to tell me about their White guilt, I suspect that we 
would have had very short conversations. Like the findings in Chapter 3 suggested, 
individual White people in my studies have not generally been plagued by White guilt or 
White shame. Nonetheless, by asking them to tell me about responsibility, blame and the 
roles of identity in producing the conditions under which people feel collective 
responsibility, my participants articulated important challenges to my own prior findings 
from chapters 2 and 3 and the work of researchers who have previously studied White 
guilt and shame. Most importantly, the concepts of negation and inaffectivity have 
elucidated that by directing primary critical attention at the degree to which White guilt is 
or is not present – does or does not matter – we may miss the centrality of practices to 
avoid, deny and defer and foreclose on White guilt that may be just as consequential as 
White guilt itself. The upsetting feelings that manifest when internalizing critiques of 
Whiteness and privilege are not just about guilt and shame or the lack thereof. Coming to 
affective terms with Whiteness means recognizing that racism does not vanish once 
White guilt has been materialized emotionally in the subject of an imagined White 
collectivity. To the contrary, racisms, which sit in a complex matrix of other identity-
based oppressions (Collins, 2000), reconfigure and reconstitute in these moments. This 
process of emergence is the focus of the final chapter and my conclusion, which puts the 
data from this and the prior two chapters in critical dialectic conversation. In Chapter 5, 
after addressing the methodological and epistemological challenges of the dissertation as 




and disrupt White guilt and White shame. Along with White shame, inaffectivity and 









“Again I wondered why we were caught in this vicious circle, why all the 
attention to ‘guilt’ did not make it go away. Was it fear of action, a secret hope 
that the realities of racism would simply disappear?” 
 -Bernice Fisher (1984), in “Guilt and Shame in the Women’s 
Movement: The Radical Ideal of Action and Its Meaning for Feminist 
Intellectuals” (p. 186). 
 
Introduction 
 The task of developing an empirically grounded, culturally centered and 
historically contingent account of White guilt in the contemporary United States has been 
positioned herein as an interdisciplinary question. Representing the first steps toward 
developing a better sense of what White guilt is, how it functions and what its 
consequences are for social relationships and structures of inequity, this dissertation has 
approached this task from multiple analytic and empirical angles. The methodologies 
embraced and methods employed in this project, however, are neither apolitical nor 
transhistorical. To the contrary, quantitative and qualitative methods have generally been 
constructed through and as oppositional discourses – as if they were antithetical modes of 
knowing and doing. From this perspective, an interdisciplinary question is an 
interdisciplinary problem. This final chapter attempts to dissect and engage with this 
problem. 
 In the concluding pages of this dissertation, I will discuss the epistemological 
complexity and contradictions that materialized throughout this project with a focus on 




any knowledge project, because conclusions cannot be divorced from the methods 
through which they were derived. I introduce the concept of “critical concurrency” to 
describe how these methods from multiple disciplinary origins were enacted 
simultaneously and reflexively. To illustrate the implications of critical concurrency, I 
discuss the specific and consequential ways in which the various studies performed in 
this dissertation co-constituted one another; this includes a topographic visualization of 
my knowledge production process. The next section engages the chapter title, “emergent 
racisms,” and explores the significance of this concept for the study of White guilt. First, 
I explicate the two-fold meanings denoted by the term “emergent,” especially my 
emphasis on non-extant knowledges and emotional processes to describe the lived 
experience of White guilt and shame. Second, I elucidate the implications of ending a 
project about White guilt with a focus on racism. The next section explains the working 
model of White racial affect that has coalesced during this project with specific attention 
paid to the four primary, interactional components of the framework: identity, attitudes, 
situation and affect. Finally, I discuss the major limitations of the project as a whole and 
point to opportunities for pragmatic interventions at the intersection of White guilt and 
various forms of oppression. 
Critical Concurrency: Mixed-Methods and Feminist Reflexivity 
In the Handbook of Feminist Research: Theory and Praxis, Hesse-Biber and 
Piatelli (2007) use their own work, as well as the (mostly ethnographic) projects of other 
feminist researchers, to specify the various concept(s) and methods of “reflexivity.” They 




…A self-critical action whereby the researcher finds that the world is mediated by 
the self – what can be known can only be known through oneself, one’s lived 
experiences, and one’s biography...reflexivity is also a communal process that 
requires attentiveness to how the structural, political, and cultural environments of 
the researcher, the participants, and the nature of the study affect the research 
process and product. (p. 496) 
The authors resist settling a singular theory and praxis of reflectivity, instead troubling 
the concept genealogically and describing many variations on the process as it applies to 
critical, feminist research.17 They do, however, contain their investigation to the 
qualitative realm. Outside of the synthesis of relevant literature, the major contribution of 
their work is their offering of “reflexive sampling” as a method by which feminist 
researchers can hold themselves accountable to their interpretive processes and 
experiences throughout the research process, as opposed to relegating self-reflexive 
analysis to memoing and auditing during the analysis and composition phases of a 
project. 
 While they rhetorically position “reflexive sampling” as unique, I liken it to the 
process of self-reflexive memoing mandated by Clarke (2005) in Situational Analysis, a 
postmodernized version of grounded theory (GT) that emphasizes power, difference, 
multilayered data and cartographic, analytic exercises.18 Clarke views a multifaceted and 
consistent memoing process as central to critical ethnographic work because of the 
                                                
17 Feminists are not the first or only political group/movement to embrace praxis and 
reflexivity in scholarship. Feminist theories and activisms – particularly Black feminisms 
– have most meaningfully shaped my own work. That is why I choose to pick up the 
discourse on reflexivity with this particular perspective.   
18 Clarke has a distilled chapter about situational analysis in the Hesse-Biber (2007) 




possibilities for insight and disruption that reflexivity can provoke in all stages of a 
research project or program. Regardless of whether or not Hesse-Biber and Piatelli’s 
(2007) ideas are “new,” both reflexive sampling and situational analysis encourage the 
actual use of these self-reflexive exercises in continual analysis and composition of the 
research report or manuscript. In both approaches, audio, visual, and otherwise textual 
memos should not be disregarded as only a means to an end (i.e., the manuscript). Self-
reflexive exercises can be meaningful and insightful not only behind the scenes, so to 
speak, but in the presentation of a situation or perspective on a social world. “Experiences 
and practicing reflexivity in the moment…can uncover new angles of vision, reveal 
invisible barriers of power or ethical concerns, and lead to greater understandings, less 
hierarchical relationships, and more authentic research,” they asserted (p. 496). Similarly, 
Clarke posits the methods of situational analysis as strategies by which researchers can 
make visible previously obscured oppressions that are situated in matrices of unequal 
power relations. She wrote that situational analyses “turn up the volume on lesser but still 
present discourses, lesser but still present participants, the quiet, the silent and the 
silenced” (p. 175). Furthermore, Clarke’s reflexivity aims to uncover “sites of silence” in 
data: those glaring absences that have tangible, material and symbolic effects on 
interpretation and representation but might otherwise go unmarked, under-articulated or 
unproblematized. Like a cartographic map of a situation, or a statistical analysis that 
compares multiple forms of data, feminist reflexivity has noteworthy capacity for analytic 
revelations because of the tangible ways in which it helps researchers simultaneously 




epistemologies, ontologies, methodologies and disciplinary investments during all stages 
of research practice; and illuminate obfuscated dimensions and particulars of experience.  
Hesse-Biber and Piatelli (2007) tease at the ways in which reflexivity can be 
diluted into self-indulgent narcissism, such as the reactionary “confessionals” of 
masculinist ethnographers, but they astutely position reflexivity as one of the many kinds 
of feminist methodologies maligned for their seemingly anti-scientific, overly 
constructionist manner of knowing and doing knowledge production. Reflexivity is not 
science, but it can and should be an integral part of scientific knowledge pursuits, namely 
because it helps science be better. For them, “The purpose of research is not to validate a 
Truth, but to enable different forms of knowledge to challenge power. Multiple truths and 
diverse knowledges become the actual product of research when the subjectivity, location 
and humanness of the knower are included” (p. 498). Strong reflexivity is not, however, 
akin to relativism and does not degrade into the kind of nihilistic postmodernism 
critiqued by Haraway (1988) and Collins (1998). Haraway, in particular, points to the 
dangers of relativist thinking, which conditions and disciplines knowledge practice and 
practitioners to abandon the commitment to more accurate, cooperative, democratic 
knowledge by embracing an epistemology that makes all things equal and nothing real. 
Reflexivity does not represent a naïve reaction to totalization, and is instead 
conceptualized as a powerful method for avoiding the “god-trick” of masculinist science, 
during which a knower claims to see (read: gaze) everything from nowhere (Haraway). 19 
The panoptical horizon of the human sciences is reshaped by feminist reflexivities, which 
                                                
19 Not all science is masculinist. Indeed, Haraway and Harding are both concerned with 
the production of more useful and objective forms of science, albeit from slightly 




recognize that while power imbalances between researchers and participants are 
unavoidable, we should all maintain a political and pragmatic investment in doing our 
best to “check” ourselves and our practices. Reflexivity, to Hesse-Biber and Piatelli, is 
synonymous with accountability. Accountability, to Haraway, is synonymous with 
responsibility. 
It is important to note that Hesse-Biber and Piatelli (2007) use the term reflexive 
primarily to signify self-reflexive exercises that help illuminate researchers’ 
positionalities and thereby produce “stronger science” around the individuals, groups and 
situations that constitute the objects of a feminist research project. Building on Hesse-
Biber’s (2007) introduction to the volume that delineates the distinctions of 
epistemology, methods and methodologies, Hesse-Biber and Piatelli explicate the ways in 
which self-reflexivity is an epistemological commitment, a methodological frame and 
practical methods by which feminists can create better, democratic, emancipatory 
knowledge about social worlds. Drawing upon Bourdieu (1992) and Harding’s (see 
Haraway, 1988) theories of knowledge production (i.e., the theory of practice and strong 
objectivity, respectively), Hesse-Biber and Piatelli especially advocate for reflexivities 
that reverse the panoptical, masculinist gaze of human science back upon the researcher 
and the discipline within which a particular researcher is located. Foucault (1970) argued 
that such self-reflexivity is one of the perilous and yet fundamental conditions of the 
human sciences, which is to say that we are always able to conduct sociologies of 
sociology, psychologies of psychology, anthropologies of anthropology, etc. Whereas 
Foucault pointed to this condition as epistemologically dangerous, feminists have 




(and so on) can create social justice via the production of alternative knowledges that 
more accurately represent unequal power relations and the lived experiences of 
marginalized people. Though it may appear somewhat obvious to an experienced feminist 
researcher or someone far outside academic research praxis, the practical implications of 
learning about others by learning about oneself are extraordinary. In this project, my 
self-investigations helped articulate my own feelings about race and my past and present 
relationships with White guilt. By unhinging the disciplinary restraints of traditional 
methodologies that over-invest in lies about objectivity, detachment and researchers’ 
supposed ability to be invisible, feminist self-reflexivities foster necessitate interrogations 
of the self that highlight positionalities and power relations, which signify the always 
already hidden practices of everyday life that maintain multiple, intersecting oppressions. 
Of course, dominant positionalities and hegemonic power relations are essentially 
designed to remain invisible, unarticulated and thereby legitimated (Habermas, 1975), so 
self-reflexivity does the integral work of speaking the unspoken and situating the 
otherwise disembodied. According to Hesse-Biber and Piatelli: 
Feminists argue that researchers can only come to understand themselves as 
subject/object, insider/outsider by reflexively examining the continuously shifting 
nature of one’s role in the field. Power relations occur between the researcher and 
research participants, and exploitative processes bound forth. Hence, not only 
must the reflexive researcher examine his or her own biography, but also the 
unequal power relationship between the knower and the known. (p. 498) 
Therefore, the reflexive action is directed not only at the historical or biographical self, 




reminiscent of the root metaphors of symbolic interactionism (Clarke, 2005), in which 
every communicative act is endowed with the possibility of meaning-making; 
accordingly, all symbolic interactions must be ethnographically attended to in order to 
responsibly and accountably approximate the lived experiences of social realities (not 
reality, singular). Feminist reflexivity resists allowing or promoting the silence of 
researchers who perilously and violently pretend not to (have) matter. Akin to symbolic 
interactionism’s accounts of social worlds, Hesse-Biber and Piatelli’s self-reflexivity 
supports an ethnographic objectivity that is invested in “situated knowledges” (Haraway, 
1988).  
 The trouble with feminist discourse about reflexivity in knowledge production is 
that these practices are typically foregrounded exclusively in the context of qualitative 
methods. There is little guidance for feminist researchers conducting quantitative or 
mixed-methods projects who wish to be reflexive with all data forms. When Stewart and 
Cole (2007) invoke the concept of reflexivity in their discussion of feminist mixed-
methods research, they argue that researchers should be consistently cognizant of how 
different forms of collected/produced data are driving research practices, but they do not 
address reflexivity aimed at the researcher herself. In other words, once quantification 
enters the research terrain, reflexivity becomes about data exclusively and not about the 
researcher and her data. This is highly problematic from the standpoint of a researcher 
who employs both quantitative and qualitative methods and aspires to ethnographic and 
reflexive thinking in all stages of the research process. To only be reflexive about data 
itself precipitates objectification and reifies the subject/object split of masculinist, racist, 




reflexivity to qualitative researchers alone is to abdicate responsibility for social justice to 
the realm of the qualitative.  
 However, the possibilities for social justice in quantitative research are fruitful 
and more readily apparent as cross- and inter-disciplinary models of feminist, anti-racist 
research proliferates. Miner-Rubino, Jayartne and Konik (2007) position quantitative 
survey research as a tool for social change consistent with feminist values that connect 
research with activist praxis. Dill, McLaughlin and Nieves (2007) argued that 
intersectionality, as a broad research program, warrants further innovation in quantitative 
methods. They centralize the relationship between antiracism and feminism that is rooted 
in Black feminist epistemology and advocate methodological innovation as a tool for 
social justice. Cole (2009) also recently argued that psychologists push themselves 
around the intersectional turn by developing a set of reflexive questions that investigators 
should ask as they design scientific research and interpret empirical data that represents 
multiple dimensions of identity and difference. In what has quickly become an 
authoritative text of intersectional research, McCall (2005) used her own largely 
quantitative research in political sociology to demonstrate the methods of intercategorical 
analysis, i.e., intersectional analyses between groups along multiple axes of difference. In 
each of these models, the researcher is compelled to question her and her disciplines’ 
ontological and epistemological assumptions about the constitution of categories. 
Reflexivity is particularly palpable in the research design stage, when variables are being 
specified and measurement instruments are being selected, and in the data analysis stage, 
when latent prejudices can manifest in the interpretation of statistical data. Feminists 




research is possible, so it would seem that integrating quantitative and qualitative 
methods and feminist, reflexive approaches to both would be seamless. 
 To the contrary, major challenges present themselves when attempting to retain a 
multi-faceted feminist reflexivity in the context of mixed methods research that integrates 
quantitative and qualitative methods. First and foremost, the split between quantitative 
and qualitative methods describes academic, disciplinary discourse about esoteric and 
arbitrary means of producing knowledge. “Quant” and “qual” do not, to the contrary, 
accurately describe the complex, mixed and fragmented processes that are actually 
manifest in most research on human beings, much less research in any domain of the 
natural sciences and humanities. Even restricting our conversation to the domains of 
cultural studies, sociology and psychology illustrates that no quantitative process is 
wholly rooted in “numbers,” just as no qualitative method is only reliant upon 
“narrative,” to borrow the labels invoked by Stewart and Cole (2007). On what is perhaps 
the most obvious level, the representation of quantitative and qualitative research in 
written language always involves a mixture of qualitative interpretation and 
representation, as well as relational judgments of size, intensity and quantity that are 
rooted in numerical relationships. For example, in the design and execution of any 
ethnographic project, certain quantitative judgments are always implied. How many 
participants should I recruit? How long should each interview last? How long should I 
immerse myself in this community? How many questions should I ask? How much time 
should lapse between each field excursion? When will I exhaust my data sources? How 




 In quantitative survey research, such as the study executed in chapter 3, 
qualitative considerations are equally as delicate and critical as statistical calculations and 
judgments. The initial design of a survey instrument – including response format, item 
generation, item order and identification of the latent variable under investigation – is a 
qualitative endeavor. Perhaps the most important contribution of the Test of White Guilt 
and Shame (TOWGAS) is the fact that the instrument appears to tap feelings of White 
guilt and shame without using either term linguistically. Constructing the scenarios and 
items that constitute the psychological stimuli of the TOWGAS involved research into 
the historically specific, rhetorical construction of racial conflict and the development of 
written language to evoke these conflicts. When interpreting the results of my exploratory 
factor analysis, the language used in each item signified which findings were 
psychologically meaningful. The language of the TOWGAS is what effectively captures 
proneness to White guilt, shame and negation, not the Likert-based, 5-point scale that 
participants use to indicate their responses. Though this study is referred to as the 
quantitative portion of this dissertation, the actual quantitative analyses involved in 
producing knowledge about White guilt in that chapter constituted a small fraction of the 
overall instrument development process. The months of item construction and design 
were the foundation of the study and made the quantitative data collection and statistical 
analyses possible.  
 When actually investigating the analytic and empirical praxis involved in what we 
call “quantitative” and “qualitative” research, the distance between these domains 
shrinks. The terms themselves are no longer adequate signifiers for what they are 




appears more historical and subjective than immutable and essential. Quant/qual becomes 
as false, reductive and illusory a binary as man/woman, West/East and White/Black. As 
with any binary, it becomes apparent that the differences within a category on one side of 
the binary are greater than the differences between the two sides. We also see that their 
normative relationship is unequal: quantitative research is still the gold standard in the 
production of scientific, objective knowledge and is hegemonically positioned as better 
equipped to produce such knowledge than qualitative methods. Despite being illogical 
and inaccurate, however, the quant/qual binary, like other artificial and harmful dualisms, 
continues to exert influence of relations of power in the production of knowledge 
(Foucault, 1970, 1972).  
 Researchers try to challenge, subvert and implode this binary by conducting 
mixed- or “multiple” methods projects that combine, synthesize or integrate quantitative 
and qualitative methodologies and methods. Stewart and Cole (2007) review extant 
mixed-methods approaches of feminists in the social sciences, primarily, which fall into 
three broad categories: projects that start with quantitative methods and the move to 
qualitative methods (i.e., quantitative then qualitative); projects that begin with 
qualitative research and then move into quantitative research (i.e., qualitative then 
qualitative); or projects that use quantitative and qualitative methods in “parallel” to 
answer different research questions. To illustrate the first approach, we can consider how 
a psychometric instrument development study might begin with a qualitative ethnography 
to explore how people articulate their lived experiences of a latent variable (e.g., White 
guilt). GT analysis might identify, codify or coalesce meanings around one or more 




Then, statistical methods would be used to test the reliability and validity of the new 
instrument in a larger sample. The goal here is to generalize findings that initially 
resulted from a limited, qualitative investigation. Both projects, however, are designed to 
address the same question, problem or issue. In the other direction, which falls under the 
second category of approaches, qualitative research might be used post hoc to complicate 
findings from a quantitative project. One example of this is Spanierman and colleagues’ 
research on the psychosocial consequences of racism to White people, in which the 
development of the PCRW (Psychosocial Costs of Racism to Whites) scale was followed 
by qualitative interviews and analysis using consensual qualitative research (CQR) to 
explore how White college students respond to racism (Spanierman & Heppner, 2004; 
Spanierman et al., 2008). This qualitative study illustrated, informed and enhanced the 
quantitative findings that had previously identified major areas of “costs” of racism to 
White people, such as irrational fear or others and a distorted view of history 
(Spanierman & Heppner).  
The final category of approaches is the “parallel” model, which Stewart and Cole 
(2007) claim is adopted when researchers use quantitative and qualitative approaches to 
address different research questions about the same topic, but “not to explore the same 
ones in different ways” (p. 335). In these approaches, different methods (and 
methodologies) are paired together and used in “parallel” process to answer 
fundamentally different research questions, i.e., questions that the other method/ology 
cannot answer. Though they only cite two examples of this approach, Stewart and Cole 
suggest that this strategy is used in such a way that qualitative methods describe the form 




frequency and variance of the phenomenon. Furthermore, though they call these 
processes “parallel” because at least two methods or methodological approaches are used 
to draw final conclusions, data collection and analyses are still conducted sequentially.20  
 By grouping mixed-methods research that uses both quantitative and qualitative 
elements into these three broad categories, Stewart and Cole (2007) are expressing their 
interpretation of patterns in extant literature. Perhaps more importantly, however, they are 
revealing commonsense or tacit knowledge about research in the humanities and social 
sciences. First, the terms “mixed-methods” and “multiple methods” tend to connote a 
mixture of quantitative and qualitative research practices – not multiple methods from 
within the same domain of the methodological binary. For example, when applied to this 
dissertation, “mixed-methods” first signifies the differences between the methods used in 
Chapter 3 on one hand (i.e., quantitative) and chapters 2 and 4 on the other (i.e., 
qualitative). Despite the differences between data sources, collection and analyses in the 
two qualitative chapters, the greater apparent contrast in method – the difference that 
merits the term “mixed” – is between the quantitative and qualitative methods. Second, 
mixed-methods research of this kind is more common in the social sciences than the 
humanities, because of the perception that the disciplines of the humanities are always 
qualitative, while some domains of the otherwise-quantitative social sciences are rooted 
                                                
20 Stewart and Cole (2007) also mention qualitative projects in the humanities and social 
sciences that “open up” what can be counted as data, and many of these projects represent 
work done at the intersection of social science and humanities disciplines, such as 
psychology and media studies or sociology and literature. These data sources include 
visual discourse and narrative discourse, such as those advocated by Clarke (2005) to be 
used in GT and situational analysis. However, these “multiple methods” projects 
represent multiple kinds of qualitative research (e.g., literary criticism and content 
analysis) being conducted on different data sets, which is standard practice in 





in qualitative research (e.g., symbolic interactionism, cultural anthropology, etc.). 
Implicit in such a stark division between the fields is the assumption that humanists will 
never quantify anything, while some social scientists will hesitantly dabble in the 
quantitative realm.  
 Finally, and most important to the present investigation, is that in grouping 
mixed-methods research into these three categories, Stewart and Cole (2007) are naming 
the most consequential root assumption of mixed-methods research: that no two methods 
can explore the same question at the same time. According to Stewart and Cole, mixed-
methods projects are designed and executed in such a way that a qualitative or 
quantitative project comes first, and the meaning gleaned from this first project informs 
the execution and analysis of the second. In the most reflexive of cases, the knowledge 
produced in the second study is placed in critical conversation with the prior knowledge 
produced in the first study. Regardless of the degree of reflexivity, however, there is at 
least a first and second (and maybe third, fourth and so on). Indeed, in the proposal stage 
of this project, I conceptualized my discourse analysis of journalism sources as first; the 
psychometric work of developing the TOWGAS as second; and the qualitative research 
of my ethnographic interviews as third. In my review of existing relevant literature, I 
found only one study that analyzed survey data and interviews concurrently by cross-
referencing survey responses during GT coding of interview transcripts. This work, by 
Bonilla-Silva and Embrick (2007), developed the concept of “White habitus” by 
examining attitudinal survey data with follow-up qualitative interviews. Bonilla-Silva and 
Embrick describe White habitus as “a racialized uninterrupted socialization process that 




racial matters” (pp. 324-325). Bonilla-Silva and Embrick found that this White habitus 
was the result of social and residential segregation by race that created a normative, 
unspoken connection between Whites. This implicit connectivity and identification with 
other Whites shaped their respondents’ negative perceptions of racial others and positive 
evaluation of other Whites. In their analyses, however, Bonilla-Silva and Embrick do not 
explicitly embrace an intersectional or otherwise feminist methodology or politics; 
furthermore, they pointedly privilege their qualitative interview data over statistical 
survey evidence in drawing their conclusions.  
 There are methodological problems with the formulation of sequential mixed-
methods that the practice of critical concurrency aims to address. By ordering my projects 
sequentially in the proposal stage, I literally centralized the quantitative study, whereby 
all analytic and empirical roads led to and from the instrument development project. The 
qualitative work was imagined in dialectic conversation with the quantitative study, but 
never on its own. The value of the qualitative research was in its ability to improve the 
quantitative research by offering greater levels of depth, specificity and complexity. The 
discourse analysis would culturally ground the items, which would gather the data to 
produce the findings, which would be specified by the interviews. From either 
perspective, one approach (i.e., quantitative or qualitative) is undervalued: either the 
quantitative is misrepresented as fundamentally simplistic, or the qualitative is only 
important in so much as it might subjectively complement the more empirically rich 
quantitative work. Furthermore, such a sequential framework grates against the inductive 
aspirations of GT analysis by structuring multiple research projects as linear and 




explanations will guide interpretation of all qualitative data, and not the other way 
around. After embarking on this dissertation, it quickly became obvious how limiting my 
initial approach was. Furthermore, I realized that such discreteness between studies 
would not only be impossible, but would fail to advance or enhance the goal of producing 
a grounded account of White guilt from a diversity of analytic and empirical angles. So to 
borrow metaphors from two of my most influential foremothers, it was time to stop 
climbing upwards with arms stretched between two poles of quantitative and qualitative 
research. I needed to switch metaphors and build my own feminist architecture.21 
  What emerged from my research praxis – the grounded method, if you will – was 
a tertiary framework of three mutually influential empirical endeavors. A postmodern 
dialectic of triangulated simultaneity more accurately describes what it is that actually 
happened when I began to conduct what we typically call “mixed-methods” research. 
Over the period of two and one half years, three studies were conducted concurrently, not 
sequentially. Figure 7 is a visualization of this process, which I explicate below. In this 
model, the three empirical studies sit at the center. Heavy, double-sided arrows connect 
each of the studies to signify the multidirectional relationship between each study. The 
discourse analysis influenced both the interviews and the instrument development; the 
psychometrics influenced both the discourse analysis and the interviews; and GT analysis 
informed interpretation of qualitative discourse analysis and statistics. Though the studies 
are presented and explained sequentially in this document, the development of each 
                                                
21 This language is borrowed from Haraway (1988), who described the two poles of 
radical constructivism/postmodern accounts of difference and successor science/critical 
feminist empiricism in the science wars, and Anzaldúa (1987), who famously calls for a 





happened simultaneously and was organized around the same research questions. Items 
for the TOWGAS were generated while the literature review was built. The pilot 
quantitative study was run while I gathered news clips for discourse analysis. The second 
quantitative study was run while finalizing the discourse analysis source list and initially 
analyzing the journalism coverage. The first exploratory factor analysis was conducted as 
interviews began to be scheduled. Interviews were conducted alongside discourse 
analysis. Interview transcription and GT coding were completed while I conducted 
statistical analyses to identify significant variation in scores on the TOWGAS and 
demographic variables. The discourse analysis was written up first, followed by the 
quantitative study and the interviews, respectively.  
 
Figure 7. Critical Concurrency 
 A dashed line encompasses the perimeter of the model and signifies the temporal 
elements of the research, including the mutually influential processes of empirical data 
collection and feminist reflexivity. Reflexivity, in this case, describes several specific 
practices. Reflexive sampling (Hesse-Biber & Piatelli, 2007) directed the interpretation 
and interrogation of multiple data sources. The meaningful differences in each of these 















from them; these differences are rooted in disciplinary histories and practices. When 
interrogating data sources, inconsistency was privileged over compatibility. Intriguing or 
surprising findings in one study affected the analyses in another (specific examples will 
be explicated below), and seemingly incompatible data (e.g., item factor loadings and GT 
code lists) were placed alongside each other. Additionally, autoethnographic reflections, 
presented as interludes between each study, took shape throughout the research process 
and reflect the form of the three “factors” that emerged from the instrument development 
study. These self-reflections helped to qualify the arguments forming around each study 
by making explicit my own lived experiences and the assumptions that undergirded my 
analyses. These “factors” reveal my feminist standpoint.  
At the same time, the “empiricism” element on the underside of the model 
denotes the ‘progression’ of the project as further data were collected and analyses were 
performed. Reflexivity and empiricism, therefore, represent complementary directional 
impulses: reflexivity mandates the pauses during which we identify problems, 
coincidences, errors and surprises, while empiricism pushes forward through the process 
of systemically gathering data and producing knowledge.  
 I assert that this process of critical concurrency both addresses flaws in mixed-
methods models organized around the sequential execution of studies and has 
consequences for what kinds of findings can emerge in the research praxis. There are at 
least two major ways in which my findings were transformed by this concurrent model, 
which are discussed below. 




 By conducting discourse analyses on journalistic news coverage of the events 
discussed by my interview participants while I actually coded these interview transcripts, 
I was able to destabilize taken-for-granted assumptions about the influence of the public 
sphere on individuals’ attitudes and the relationship between “the popular” and “everyday 
life.” I assumed that journalistic discourse about radio host Don Imus, actor Isaiah 
Washington and news anchor Anderson Cooper would be reflected in my participants’ 
evaluation of these mass-mediated “crises” (Habermas, 1975). Implicit in this assumption 
is that journalists shape public opinion, especially the attitudes of media-saturated young 
people (Hall, 1997a; Hunt, 2006; Ford, 1997; Gergen, 2000). To the contrary, I found that 
my participants expressed uniform distrust of “mainstream” media and had developed 
fairly sophisticated critiques of the role of capitalism and corporate interests in broadcast 
journalism, especially. Most importantly, feelings of collective responsibility and White 
guilt were often stirred up by media coverage, according to my participants, some of 
whom identified “the media” as problematic, sensationalist and untrustworthy. Cooper 
and the media, to many of my respondents, incorrectly write blame and race into 
everything. This sat in stark contrast to the praise being directed at Cooper and other 
Katrina correspondents by their professional colleagues, the majority of whom celebrated 
Cooper’s “emotional” coverage.  
The differences in these perspectives surfaced while I was conducting my 
interviews, which motivated me to pay special attention to and ask further questions 
about why my participants sometimes felt so negatively about Cooper. This discrepancy 
in evaluations of Cooper might not have been so salient had I not been concurrently 




first or in isolation, I may have missed this variation in evaluation entirely and failed to 
probe for greater explanation from my participants. Ultimately, the consequences for 
uncovering this relationship between media and my participants impacted how I 
interpreted their reflections, journalists’ writing and the operationalization of the 
constructs being codified in the instrument development study. Rather than coexisting 
harmoniously in the discourse of White guilt and shame, individual attitudes and media 
coverage appear to have a more complex relationship akin to Hall’s (1973) formulation 
of active media consumers who oppositionally ‘decode’ mass-mediated rhetoric. For 
some participants, journalists are viewed as the agents of White guilt and shame who 
activate these feelings in their readers and viewers, who consequently distrust the media. 
Detachment/Externalization/Negation 
 Similarly, without both the quantitative and qualitative elements of this project, I 
would not have likely realized the inextricability of “detachment” and “externalization” 
as cognitive-affective strategies to avoid White guilt and shame. The interpretation of 
both statistical evidence, journalistic discourse and participants’ verbal responses to 
questions about how they feel about race and responsibility in the United States together 
helped to illuminate how detachment and externalization are most accurately described as 
intertwined and co-dependent processes, rather than independent and discrete emotional 
responses to guilt and shame. This finding sits in opposition to extant psychological 
research on generic guilt and shame, which distinguishes these strategies empirically and 
theoretically (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  
 As discussed at length in Chapter 3, my exploratory factor analysis (EFA) of both 




Affect-3 (TOSCA-3), showed that items designed to tap detachment and externalization 
collapsed onto the same factor. I hypothesized that my instrument would have a four-
factor structure of White guilt-proneness, White shame-proneness, externalization and 
detachment. This reflected the TOSCA-3 short-form’s four-factor structure of guilt-
proneness, shame-proneness, externalization and detachment (Tangney & Dearing, 
2002). Items for my instrument were developed based on the format and content of items 
in the TOSCA-3, which is an extensively used and validated instrument (Tracey, Robins 
& Tangney, 2007). When my detachment and externalization of White guilt and shame 
items failed to load onto discrete factors despite extensive statistical analyses, I ran an 
EFA on the TOSCA-3 to examine its factor structure during my administration of the 
instrument. To my surprise, the TOSCA-3’s factor structure mimicked the TOWGAS’s 
three-factor structure: guilt, shame and something else. When I examined these items, I 
saw that Tangney and Dearing’s generic externalization and detachment items had loaded 
onto the same factor, just as their analogues had in my proposed instrument. This made 
conceptual sense, but required a theoretical explanation.  
  It made conceptual sense that externalization and detachment items might not be 
as distinct as psychometric methods prefer and which moral emotions literature suggests. 
But the meaning and consequences of this inextricability was more elusive. In returning 
to journalistic discourse about Imus, Cooper and Washington, I saw that my 
interpretations of detachment and externalization at times seemed forced or arbitrary. 
There were occasions when authors seemed to be denying the significance of race or 
identity without naming other guilty parties, but the externalization of blame always 




stated. For example, some commentators blamed the Revs. Al Sharpton and Jesse 
Jackson for provoking public outcry over Don Imus’s “nappy-headed hos” slur. As with 
other examples of externalization, another guilty party was named while denying the 
importance of the issue; in the case of Jackson and Sharpton, they were wrong for 
bringing up race in the context of what was intended to be an innocuous, flippant joke. 
After re-visiting journalistic discourse, it was more obvious why items such as “I can’t be 
held responsible for being born White,” “Race doesn’t matter as much as people say it 
does,” “Those people chose to stay behind,” and “That’s not a race issue. That’s a social 
class issue,” would load onto the same factor. The psychological literature had caused me 
to over-predict the differences between externalization and detachment. Upon further 
investigation of the published psychometric properties of the TOSCA-3, I also found that 
Tangney and Dearing (2002) had not achieved optimal levels of internal consistency for 
the TOSCA-3’s detachment and externalization subscales (Cronbach’s alpha < .70), 
which lent further support to a logical explanation of why these items collapsed onto the 
same factor during my survey administration. Based on qualitative and quantitative 
evidence, I named this factor “Negation,” to describe the related ways in which White 
people sometimes externalize blame and detach from situations of racial conflict. This 
factor and subscale, as I argued in Chapter 3, tapped the ways in which White people 
negate the experience of White guilt and/or shame. 
 These findings undoubtedly shaped my process of open and axial coding during 
the GT analysis conducted to create Chapter 4’s interviews. Grounded theorists, such as 
Corbin and Strauss (2008), have argued since the inception of the method to ‘ignore’ 




Clarke (2005) and Fassinger (2005) also emphasize how grounded theorists should make 
every attempt to divorce their initial coding process and analytic lens from the 
assumptions and prior evidence that shapes extant theory. Fassinger, however, notes that 
this is quite difficult to realistically do, especially in well-researched domains. For better 
or worse, and especially at the beginning of a research project or program, prior empirical 
and theoretical work will inform attempts to design and execute studies that ground 
theory in everyday life and the material-semiotic experiences of research participants 
(Clarke; Haraway, 1997). Moreover, extant literature will become increasingly implicated 
and relied upon as the analyses reaches later stages of interpretation and theory-building. 
The influence of prior literature does not only apply to GT, of course. Psychometric 
instruments, for example, do not develop organically from the minds of survey 
respondents. Strong psychometric tests are based in rigorous empiricism and substantive 
familiarity with the latent variable of concern. In the context of GT (as a methodological 
approach), feminist, interactionist reflexivity can identify when theory and extant 
literature are over-determining the coding process and explanations of phenomena under 
investigation. Through extensive memoing, re-coding data and discussing the coding 
process with experts unconnected with my study, which is a kind of “auditing,” I opened 
up my interpretive process to critique (Fassinger). This kind of reflexivity helps to catch 
those moments when expectations, bias and assumptions are speaking louder than 
participants’ actual words.  
 The factor analysis process had disturbed my assumptions about what 
externalization and detachment would look like in my participants’ lives; these 




Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracey, Robins and Tangney, 2007). The quantitative data 
suggested that I might not be able to observe consistent and meaningful independent 
manifestations of externalization and detachment in my participants’ responses. Indeed, 
the process of coding interview transcripts further confirmed the inextricability of 
detachment and externalization. While we may be able to parse out these constructs on 
rhetorical or conceptual levels, the distinction between the concepts does not appear to be 
reflected in actual emotional processes as accessed by in-person interviews or self-report 
surveys. After self-consciously resisting using the code “negation” in my GT analysis, 
this code eventually emerged once it became clear that practices that psychologists call 
detachment and externalization looked remarkably bound up together in the self-concepts 
and articulations of my interview participants. 
 Negation, however, does not describe a complete, successful or finished process 
of denying White guilt and shame. The qualitative data suggested that participants only 
engaged in these strategies when they felt the specter of White guilt – the potential to feel 
implicated in racism. When my participants negated, they expressed anxiety over racial 
conflict while denying the salience of race and placing blame on others. This concept 
(literally, the code “negation”) could not, however, account for those times when my 
respondents had little or no emotional response to these conflicts or failed to consider 
them meaningful. The specification of negation allowed another concept to emerge that 
better explained the lack of feeling that some participants articulated. Across multiple 
sites of discourse and multiple dimensions of difference, some participants expressed 
minimal or null emotional responses to identity-based conflict. The failure of these 




subjective distance from the experience of identity-based oppression. The privilege of 
dominant-group identity status, as well as subjective and social distance from minoritized 
social groups – especially Black people – inoculated them from the dysphoria of 
collective guilt or shame. This absence of feeling, which I labeled “inaffectivity,” 
complemented the other emerging components of White affect and filled in the 
conceptual space that negation opened. Together, these related concepts – negation and 
inaffectivity – helped to explain a variety of cognitive and affective ways people can 
avoid White guilt and shame. This conceptual framework, as I explain in the next section, 
describes what I refer to as “emergent racisms.” 
White Guilt, Emergent Racisms 
 Since the 1980s especially, scholarship on race and racism has worked to define 
the various elements of racialized, structural inequity that distinguishes racist discursive 
formations in our current historical moment from those dominant forms of explicit racial 
hatred and antagonism that defined racism in the Civil Rights movement and earlier. 
Much of this work has been oriented toward the establishment of certain cultural, 
historical, psychological or social criteria that make today’s racism different from past 
ontological configurations of racism. Distinctions between aversive, overt and “modern” 
racism have helped to describe the how individual social actors perpetuate discrimination 
in socially acceptable ways (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Conahay, 1986). Colorblind 
racism, similarly, describes the sociological processes by which individuals, usually 
White people, assert that race does not matter while organizing their lives around racial 
segregation and adhering to discriminatory patterns of behavior and expression (Bonilla-




racisms within the rise of neoconservative politics and the coalescence of neoliberalism 
as a hegemonic discourse that was consolidated throughout the latter portion of the 20th 
century and early 21st century (Duggan, 2003). Lipsitz (2006) demonstrated the ways in 
which cultural and economic conditions in the post-World War II era resulted in liberal 
social policies being framed as unfairly disadvantaging White people; meanwhile, 
institutional forms of discrimination continued to disproportionately and unfairly invest 
in White people and spaces. Collins (2005) and other Black feminists (Combahee River 
Collective, 1977) promoted a framework of thinking about racism that incorporated the 
ways in which oppressions intersect. Rooted in U.S. Black women’s experiences of 
multiple forms of oppression, Collins argued that a “new racism” structures race relations 
in the U.S. and cannot be understood without consideration of how gender, race and 
sexuality co-constitute in discourses of White supremacy, sexism and heterosexism. 
Meanwhile, Black feminists, queers of color and White allies studied and theorized how 
resistance is possible amid such profound forces of structural inequity (e.g., Collins, 
1990/2000, 1998; Ferguson, 2004; Romney, Tatum & Jones, 1992; Gallagher, 2008; Hill, 
2004; Lipsitz).  
 These academic projects have served to consolidate critical race theories into a 
sophisticated and historically specific discourse about the contemporary conditions of 
racial inequality and intersecting forms of oppression. Each of them has particular 
strengths in explaining how and why racism is sustained so pervasively in the context of 
neoliberal hegemony and its discourse of multiculturalism (Melamed, 2006). But this 
interpretive and analytic strength is not cumulative, because these related concepts cannot 




relationship between these theories of racism is emergent in the philosophical sense of 
the term: the aggregation of the elements of racism cannot explain the whole complexity 
of racism. Rather, the interactions between psychological, sociological, economic, 
historical and cultural forces manifest racism in elusive and contradictory ways. 
Furthermore, the emergent nature of these processes means that racism, as an ontological 
category, is more adequately descriptive of the empirical world (i.e., reality) when 
pluralized. I have liberally drawn upon these theories of racism, because they help us to 
see and critique racisms, in all their complicated and emergent diversity.  
 Racism, like any object of study, is not laid out before us, waiting to be naively 
dissected (Foucault, 1970). In academic inquiry, “racism” is created in co-constitution 
between subject and object, which themselves cannot be separated (Haraway, 1988). In 
this project, racism was made meaningful through an unquantifiable amount of discursive 
interactions between my participants, survey respondents, statistical data, journalists’ 
writing, etc., and me. Though I drew upon a diversity of theories of race and racism to 
conduct these investigations, I rejected many of the dualisms (e.g., past/present, 
agency/structure, individual/group, micro/macro and psyche/society) endemic to these 
perspectives, which reflect a multitude of disciplinary spaces. I drew on their strengths 
and the rigor of their respective disciplinary traditions, but I unsettled these approaches 
and attempted to form interdisciplinarity that moves toward a radical transdisciplinarity 
and away from bricolage that retains an investment in one particular mode of inquiry 
(e.g., Kincheloe, 2001, 2005; Katz, 2001). For example, colorblind racism (Bonilla-Silva, 
2006; Neville et al., 2000) is an important intervention for understanding and interrupting 




rests primarily upon attitudes and White racial identity and does not sufficiently 
accommodate intersections of difference that shape these attitudes. Collins’ (2005) “new 
racism” describes ideology and contemporary discourse, but is not based in empirically 
or systemically analyzed manifestations of racism in everyday life and individual 
psychologies. None of these theories satisfactorily accounts for the emotional experiences 
of the perpetrators of racism – the affective terrain in which racism materializes and 
comes to impact social relations.  
Recognizing the emergent qualities of racism means recognizing the dynamic 
interplay between identities and oppressions that are not only attitudinal/cognitive; 
indeed, racism is also constituted by affect, situations (i.e., everyday life), identifications, 
individual differences and life histories. No disciplinary dichotomy of psyche and 
society, agency and structure or individual and group could possible capture this 
complexity. In this sense, “emergent” means not extant, because existing accounts of 
racism must be uniquely applied in a given research situation to make sense of and to 
critique how racism is determining social phenomena. Emergent racisms emphasizes the 
ontological instability of racism in neoliberalism and helps to challenge assumptions 
about how racism works.  
The concept of emergent racisms also denotes that racism is process, practice and 
performance; racism is not static, finished or isolated. Too often, scholarship on racist 
attitudes would have us prematurely settle upon a conceptualization of racism as a 
measurable attribute that is contained within individual psyches (Conaghy, 1986; Saucier 
& Miller, 2003). Even in qualitative research, racism comes to connote a “thing” or 




imply that certain White people are not racist, as if White privilege is possibly, finally 
able to be disinvested by some and not others. This also frames racism as wholly agentic 
procedures executed by White people upon Black people and non-White Others, as if 
Whiteness and racism were not sustained by historical, structural inequalities and that the 
people who are targets of discrimination and hate are only ever acted upon. This logic 
denies agency to everyone who is not White or able to benefit from racism, which 
reproduces White privilege and further centers the White subject in the discourse on race. 
Though I acknowledge the advantage of being able to distinguish between levels of 
discriminatory attitudes and employed methods to make these distinctions throughout this 
dissertation, I reject an ontology of racism that places it “within” social actors and denies 
the ways in which power-knowledge relations are discursively, socially constructed and 
materialized (Foucault, 1972, 1977, 1978; Butler, 1993).  
Thinking about racisms as emergent compels me to consider how White guilt and 
shame are a) characterized by processes of modification, maintenance and negotiation, 
and b) always about racism. My first point is that racism, in this sense, is often aversive 
or covert, but is also a dynamic and highly sophisticated interplay of identities, affect, 
attitudes and contexts/situations. My research found that White guilt and shame are 
fundamentally connected to attitudinal perceptions of inequity or wrongdoing and that a 
particular injustice was caused by identity. For example, White guilt and shame were 
assigned to Don Imus when he was depicted as sexist and racist, and these attributes 
caused him to say “nappy-headed hos.” My participants felt White guilt when they 
identified with racial injustice and felt implicated in situations when other White people 




hand, White guilt was denied when participants perceived the relationship between race 
and injustice as circumstantial or correlational. Furthermore, race was not the only salient 
dimension of identity in any given conflict. Indeed, the identities of at least four social 
actors were relevant: the participant; the perceived perpetrator(s) (e.g., Imus, FEMA, 
George W. Bush); the victim(s) (e.g., Gulf Coast residents, the Rutgers University 
women’s basketball team); and those present for the participants’ potential experience of 
White guilt. Identification alone was not a determining factor; rather, the perception of 
self and others’ identity was influential. For example, based on survey responses to the 
TOWGAS, higher gender-identified men were less willing to endorse White guilt than 
higher gender-identified women. The relationship between these multiple identity 
categories made the experience of White guilt – including the ways in which it was 
denied – full of interpretation and meaning making. There was no evidence to suggest 
that the feeling of White guilt is permanent, stable or universal. 
In neoliberalism, racism as a label has such a stigmatizing effect that White 
people take action to avoid being perceived as racist; as one of my participants asserted, 
the perception of racism is more important than whether or not one actually possesses 
racist attitudes (Goffman, 1959, 1963). White guilt needs racism to exist, but historical 
racism and past events can provoke negative, self-conscious racial affect in the present. 
Moreover, the individual’s beliefs about race and racism are essential components of 
White guilt. If someone believes that race no longer influences social relationships and 
that his own Whiteness has nothing to do with past inequity, it is difficult to imagine how 
White guilt could happen. But all of my interview participants did think that race and 




beliefs about the salience and import of race and history in their own lives determined 
their relationship to White racial affect. The causes and effects of racism were invoked as 
their justification for the activation or negation of White guilt.  
Emergent racisms and White guilt are not synonymous, but this conceptualization 
of racism as pluralized and emergent is the theoretical lens that has come to frame my 
thinking about White guilt. In arguing for an accounting of racism that addresses the 
institutional and economic practices that created what we have come to call White 
privilege, Lipsitz (2006) argued, “Studies of racial culture too far removed from studies 
of social structures have left us with inadequate explanations for understand and 
combating racism” (p. 2). I concur with his assertion, but also posit: studies of racism too 
far removed from studies of emotion and feeling have left us with inadequate tools with 
which to understand and combat racism. 
This assertion is based in my findings from the three studies, which together 
constitute this dissertation. I discuss these findings, their limitations and the pragmatic 
opportunities they open, below. 
White Racial Affect 
 Formal hypotheses only guided one chapter of the dissertation, Chapter 3, and 
were specifically related to the analysis and interpretation of my quantitative survey data. 
However, many assumptions and ‘predictions’ undergirded the design of the project as a 
whole and the interpretation of data. I have outlined these assumptions throughout, and 
they represent my overarching presupposition that certain key “arenas” of meaning 
making influence the experience of White guilt and shame. These arenas were as follows: 




of difference beyond racial identity or the act of identifying as White; affect, which 
included White guilt, externalization of blame, detachment and the potential emotion of 
White shame; and attitudes, which included political attitudes and the cognitive elements 
of making sense of race and identity-based social relations. These arenas were privileged 
sites of meaning making in the design and execution of my research, which was designed 
to fill in the empirical substance of these arenas and point toward the relationships 
between them.  
 I found that my expectations were verified and challenged by my sites of inquiry 
(i.e., the journalism discourse, survey responses and ethnographic interviews). In trying 
to make sense of all the data collectively, I sketched and “tested” several conceptual 
models to see how well they “fit” my findings and how sufficiently they answered my 
research questions about White guilt. As data become increasingly multisited and 
complex, any model will be increasingly less capable of capturing this complexity. 
Nevertheless, successful findings should have sufficient explanatory power at least to 
promote new questions and guide future research. My findings pointed me toward four 
key concepts that together interacted in the constitution of White guilt and shame: 
identity, attitudes, situation and affect. Culture, meanwhile, grounds the other four within 
a particular social and historical context of shared meanings (Hall, 1997a). Figure 8 





Figure 8. White Racial Affect  
The Framework 
 Culture. I no longer consider culture to be a contributing factor in the experience 
of White guilt and White shame, because its role is actually much more significant than 
that. Culture is literally the discursive terrain that makes the emotional experience of race 
and guilt possible, so cannot adequately be accounted for as a contributing “variable” of 
affective experience. Culture refers to the historical and broad sociopolitical conditions 
under which White guilt happens and is a co-constitutive element of psychology 
(Markus, Kitayama & Heiman, 1996). An explicitly cultural framework helps ground the 
psychology of White guilt in structural elements of experience that cannot be quantified 
or completed captured by qualitative accounts of individual experience. Culture situates 








neoliberalism. As a hegemonic cultural formation, neoliberalism makes talking about the 
causes of racial inequality and consequences of racism difficult even as discourse about 
race and other dimensions of identity proliferates (Duggan, 2003; Melamed, 2006). As 
my participants struggled to articulate how and why identity did (not) matter in conflicts 
that were based on identity, they situated themselves within neoliberalism. Accordingly, 
their psychological experiences must be explicated within a 21st century, U.S. cultural 
context – and knowledge about their experiences should be necessarily limited to this 
cultural context (Gergen, 1973). White racial guilt and shame may indeed happen in 
different cultural contexts and for people who identify with and live in other countries 
with legacies of White supremacy, such as the United Kingdom, South Africa and 
Australia. Indeed, cultural studies of White guilt in these contexts should take sufficient 
care in accounting for the influence of unique cultural factors in these experiences in 
other countries.  
 While I affirm the primacy of culture and the importance of situating 
psychological experiences within specific historical contexts, my findings suggest that 
“history” plays an exceedingly complex role in my participants’ lives. History matters, 
but history is a highly interpretive practice of creating individual and subjective 
constructions of past events and historical narratives. These histories are then used to 
explain current phenomena or make sense of complex sociological relations. Academic 
accounts of U.S. social and political history (e.g., Ellison, 1996) inform the grounding of 
cultural psychology in specific temporal moments, but these renderings of history may 
have very little do with how people experience race and other relations of power and 




considered in conversation and allowed to challenge one another. Social psychology, as 
Gergen (1973) asserted, is a historical practice; such a position necessitates allowing 
multiple histories to influence individual affective experiences.  
Identity. In discourse about race and responsibility, people used multiple 
dimensions of identity to express their self-concepts and their sense of others, as well as 
to understand complex social conflicts. Journalists described how race, sexuality, class, 
nationality and gender shaped public reactions to conflicts and mediated the assignment 
of guilt and expression of shame. Interview participants articulated how multiple 
dimensions of identity influenced their everyday lives and how they viewed the historical 
events we discussed, as well as other comparable events and conflicts they volunteered. 
Whereas religion was not salient in journalists’ coverage of Cooper, Imus and 
Washington, participants sometimes brought religion and religiousity into our 
conversations to elucidate their personal backgrounds. Individual personality differences, 
including perceptions of Imus, Washington, Knight and Cooper, as well as participants’ 
own traits, influenced discourse about White guilt and shame because personality was 
tied to intentionality. Establishing whether harm was intended by actions/behavior was a 
critical test for determining whether or not people could be called racist, sexist or 
“homophobic.” 
Because multiple dimensions of identity overlapped and intersected throughout 
the discourse, it is impossible to reduce discourse about White guilt exclusively to 
discourse about race. Though not always made explicit, gender, class and sexuality 
appear to be the most salient dimensions of identity in this research, though this was not 




explore. Once of the most important findings regarding identity was the influence of 
gender identity salience on proneness to White guilt. An interaction effect between the 
strength of gender identity, as assessed by the Collective Self Esteem identity subscale 
(Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), and White guilt-proneness suggests that men and women 
may be prone to White guilt in different ways. Future studies should target this 
relationship and determine if gender identity may mediate experiences of White guilt. 
Political identification also had effects on proneness to White guilt and negation. 
Republican-identified respondents were least likely to experience White guilt, and 
Democrats were least likely to experience negation behind both Republicans and 
Independents. I did not investigate what political identity means to participants (i.e., 
attitudes, see below), but future studies should probe deeper into the significance of 
political affiliation on White people’s sense of collective guilt and shame. 
The findings confirm the centrality of intersectionality in understanding relations 
of power that are perceived as rooted in any one dimension of experience – in this case, 
race (Collins, 1990/2000; Cole, 2009; Dill, McLaughlin & Nieves, 2007). But the 
intersectional complexity of this discourse should not be understated (McCall, 2005). The 
intersectional identities of at least four social actors or groups mattered in the expression 
of beliefs about identity and the experience of self-conscious racial affect: the subject (the 
person who is (not) feeling White guilt or shame); the perpetrator of the racist act, who 
sometimes is the same as the subject and can also be a group of individuals or an 
institution perceived as White, such as Congress; and the victim or victims, who may 
denied victimhood or the right to claim injustice if negation happens; and witnesses, such 




as judging the subject. From a dramaturgical interactionist perspective (Goffman, 1959), 
White guilt and shame are performances, like all symbolic interaction. Accordingly, this 
fourth category of relevant social actors (i.e., “witnesses” to feeling) likely influences 
experiences of White guilt and shame. Future studies should investigate the determining 
role of witnesses to White guilt; for example, experimental research could test if 
proneness to White guilt and White shame is influenced by the presence or absence of 
racial Others during the test administration of the TOWGAS. 
Attitudes. Cognitive elements cannot be divorced from any model of White guilt 
and shame. Beliefs about race, gender and sexuality were the most common themes 
expressed in my interviews, and may ultimately be the most powerful predictors of 
proneness to White guilt and shame after identifying as White. What people believe about 
race shapes how they make meaning of out interactions with racial Others, as well as 
other White people (Bonilla-Silva & Embrick, 2007). Attitudes are so central to the 
experience of Whiteness that is difficult to distinguish the phenomenology of Whiteness 
from simply what people cognitively perceive about Whiteness and other aspects of 
social identities, such as heterosexuality and masculinity. Racist attitudes, as measured by 
the Racial Argument Scale (Saucier & Miller, 2003), expressed significant correlations 
with each subscale of the TOWGAS, as well as two extant measures of White guilt 
(Swim & Miller, 1999; Spanierman & Heppner, 2004). Future applications of the 
TOWGAS should examine its subscales’ relationships with other racism scales, such as 
colorblind racism (Neville et al., 2000) and modern racism (Conaghy, 1986), as well as 




the social and political domain, but that core beliefs about morals and expectations of 
one’s own behavior especially inform logic about blame and responsibility.  
Situation. In parsing out specific interactions from culture generally, we can 
allow the significance of micro- and meso-level interactions in the constitution of White 
guilt. Complete social isolation from people of color, which contributes to what Bonilla-
Silva and Embrick (2007) call “White habitus,” may help White people to avoid the 
feelings of White guilt and shame. One of my participants suggested that racism could 
not happen in the absence of people of color or a material target for racist attitudes. My 
conversations with interview participants were organized around three primary situations 
that might provoke collective guilt and/or shame, which effectively served as stimuli. The 
TOWGAS itself is dependent upon participants’ willingness to imagine how they would 
react in hypothetical scenarios. Prior literature and my own findings suggest that White 
people do not generally live their lives plagued by a sense of White guilt or shame, but 
that particular interactions can provoke these emotions. Increased interactions with 
people of color may not only provide opportunities for multicultural education and the 
debunking of stereotypes (Stangor & Shaller, 1996; Romney, Tatum & Jones, 1992), but 
may heighten feelings of negative self-conscious racial affect. Certain situations may 
motivate feelings of negation more than White guilt; similarly, certain situations may be 
more provoking of White shame than White guilt. Accordingly, just as situations may 
trigger White guilt, the discursive boundaries of a particular situation restrict what 
knowledge we can extrapolate from individual experiences of White guilt. Understanding 
what kinds of situations activate different forms of White guilt was central to the 




White guilt and related affective experiences. Clarke’s (2005) situational analysis is a 
particularly useful method for conducting such research, as her “situational maps” and 
“social worlds/arenas maps” compel researchers to make explicit the variety of actors, 
nonhuman actants and discursive elements of a given situation and facilitate cross-
situational comparisons.   
Affect. Affect is the conceptual core of my framework and the locus of analytic 
interest. Several findings emerged in this project that influence my understanding of the 
affective contours of White guilt and compel me to think about White guilt as one 
construct amid a range of White racial affective forms. These include: the distinction 
between White guilt and White shame; the substantive coalescence of externalization and 
detachment into negation; and the presence of “inaffectivity” in White people’s lives. In 
the visualization of the model above, White racial affect – including guilt, shame, 
negation and inaffectivity – materializes in the space created by the intersection of 
attitudes, identity and affect in a given situation and located within a cultural context.  
Rhetorics of shame and guilt were articulated in different ways throughout the 
three crises I studied in my discourse analysis. The “I-Mess,” for example, quickly 
shifted from rhetoric of guilt to rhetoric of shame once Imus’s identity became the source 
of the social problem, as opposed to his specific behavior. White shame-proneness clearly 
emerged as a distinct factor in the TOWGAS and described a strong, negative regard for 
the White racial self. Finally, my interview participants used the terms “guilt” and 
“shame” in ways that failed to reflect psychological definitions of the constructs, further 
demonstrating the importance of studying the content of these forms – as opposed to the 




articulate ideas that reflect the differences between forms of negative evaluation of 
Whites’ behaviors (guilt) and White people generally (shame). 
Negation, which represents one of the most important findings in this dissertation, 
illuminates how White people avoid or defer White guilt and White shame. Similarly, 
inaffectivity substantially contributes to this research, because it helps to illuminate the 
meaning in moments that might otherwise appear to be sites of discursive inactivity (as 
opposed to meaningful silence) (Clarke, 2005). Inaffectivity and negation appear to be 
central to the experience or absence of White guilt and shame. Combined with the 
emergence of White shame as a meaningful construct, the collective findings of this 
dissertation provoke a rhetorical and conceptual shift away from a solitary focus on 
White guilt (Swim & Miller, 1999; Iyer, Leach & Crosby, 2003) and toward a 
constellation of White racial affect. Among the forms within this constellation, 
inaffectivity raises especially complicated methodological questions. For example, how 
might inaffectivity be measured quantitatively? After more theoretical and conceptual 
work, future validation studies of the TOWGAS might incorporate potential items to tap 
inaffectivity and develop another subscale. Alternatively, a unique measure may be 
developed to isolate and assess this latent variable.  
In exploring contemporary White guilt from a variety of disciplinary and 
methodological angles, I exposed the multidimensionality of what might colloquially be 
referred to as feeling “White guilt,” and which included actual negative evaluations of 
Whiteness in addition to complex cognitive-affective strategies to deny the salience of 
race in social interactions and the meaningfulness of racial conflict in producing 




which White people use to understand and make sense of racially complicated situations 
that implicate themselves and/or other White people. My findings unsettle arguments by 
those such as Steele (1990, 2006) that White guilt is an inevitable or fundamental 
component of liberal, White racial identity.  
However, my findings do reflect the categorization of White guilt as a potentially 
productive emotion (Swim & Miller, 1999; Iyer, Leach & Crosby, 2003; Spanierman & 
Heppner, 2004). Though it does not necessarily reflect a commitment to antiracism, 
White guilt was correlated with certain desirable antiracist qualities (e.g., lower levels of 
prejudice) and expression of sympathy for victims of racism. My respondents’ 
articulations about White guilt, on the other hand, continue to highlight the self-focused 
properties of White guilt: namely, that the threat of being called racist is a more salient 
and predictable motivator of antiracism than genuine concern about social justice. While 
correlations between White guilt and lower levels of racial prejudice were significant, 
this does not necessarily mean that the experience of White guilt was strong or that 
prejudicial attitudes were actually minimal – only that they were significantly higher or 
lower than other respondents’ scores. 
Limitations & Opportunities 
My developing framework of White racial affect does not yet account for the 
directional or causal relationships between the various components of the model. 
However, the constitution of these four areas of experience, grounded in culture, capture 
the substance of my findings and reflect the most salient aspects of the discourses 
produced and analyzed within my dissertation. They reflect particular limitations of the 




Extant journalistic discourse about White guilt analyzed for this project was 
contained to three historical moments (e.g., Katrina, “I-Mess” and “Isaiahgate”) and print 
media. This decision therefore necessarily limited the amount and diversity of material 
considered. Furthermore, by structuring the ethnographic interviews around these three 
conflicts in popular culture, the format and content of our interviews was meaningfully 
controlled. Though the topic-based connection between the discourse analysis and the 
ethnographic interviews was an analytic strength of the project in terms of mixed-
methods analysis, it also restricted the breadth of journalism materials and ethnographic 
exploration. 
The human participants in my project were limited to undergraduate students at 
the University of Maryland, College Park, and thereby represent only a small slice of 
White people in the United States. My interview participants were all aged 22 or younger 
and were from the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States, attending college outside the 
nation’s Capital; none identified in any way other than middle or upper-middle class. 
Though I aimed to explore how a sexually diverse sample might increase the diversity of 
experiences of White guilt, the relative homogeneity of sexual orientation in my sample 
hindered analysis of sexuality-based differences. The lack of lesbian participants and the 
overall minimal number of otherwise queer-identified participants did not, however, limit 
investigations of how (hetero)sexuality and heteronormativity generally inflected 
expressions of racial affect. Future studies should examine more diverse populations, 
though, to test the generalizability of these findings and to refine explanations of White 
racial affect among White people who differ along primary markers of identity, 




By surveying and interviewing only White people, I relied on the subjective 
experiences of White people to shape my findings. Bonilla-Silva and Embrick (2007), 
however, insist that White people are largely “oblivious” to the ways in which being 
White shapes their lives (p. 325). Though some of my participants were able to reflect in 
depth on their Whiteness, most demonstrated some amount of difficulty in coherently and 
consistently explaining how Whiteness, as well as other dominant identity-group 
memberships, informed their everyday lives (Knowles & Peng, 2005). A future 
comparative study should involve similar interviews with 10 Black college students at the 
same or comparable university. It would be productive to explore the similarities and 
differences in young adult U.S. African Americans’ account of White guilt and the ways 
in which it may or may not affect White peoples’ actions, as well as Black people’s 
experience of racism. 
As I explained in Chapter 1, this research was restricted to White people’s guilt 
and shame over racism toward Black people in the United States. I did not explore how 
other racial minorities and their experiences of inequality may foster guilt and shame 
among White people. Furthermore, I did not distinguish between White people’s attitudes 
and feelings toward African American Black people versus people Black people who are 
immigrants to the United States or who do not identify with African Americans. Future 
research should explore the differences, if any, between how White people respond 
differently to ethnically and nationally diverse Black people. 
My primary research questions targeted the cultural discourse about White guilt, 
the differences between White guilt and shame and the co-constitution of race, gender 




questions, which could not provide causal explanations for the relationship between 
identity, White guilt and racism. However, racism remains the central concern of this 
research. Accordingly, this project opens up future questions that should be explored via 
a variety of empirical and analytic strategies discussed in the conclusions of previous 
chapters. Overall, this line of research should continue to refine the definitions of these 
constructs through empirical investigations. Additional methodologies should be 
incorporated to continue to challenge extant findings, as well as to produce new analytic 
interventions into White guilt and racism. Experimental psychological research and long-
term, in-depth ethnography are two exemplars of methodological opportunities. Both of 
these modes of inquiry are better equipped to ask longitudinal questions about the 
consequences for White guilt on the development of sustainable, antiracist White allies. 
Conclusion 
 The challenge of emergent racisms is to continue to produce more comprehensive 
and useful knowledge about race and racism so that we are better equipped to intervene 
in racism. I was drawn to White guilt as an area of inquiry first because I saw it as an 
impediment to antiracism. From my observations, White guilt seemed to be associated 
with self-focused and counter-productive emotions. I soon realized, however, that I did 
not know what other people meant when they referenced White guilt, much less what I 
thought I was looking at when I saw my own students resist critical pedagogies or 
struggle to articulate how being White made them feel. I was also unsure what role White 
guilt played in my own life. 
By asking what exactly White guilt is, I can say with some certainty that much of 




constructs that denote particular, culturally contingent forms of White racial affect. These 
forms of affect – what I have called White guilt, White shame, negation and inaffectivity 
– are only important to me because they are implicated in racism. The study of White 
racial affect is a careful balancing act of (re)centering the White subject in antiracist 
discourse only to the point at which we can more produce knowledge that more 
effectively displaces Whiteness in contemporary U.S. culture. The point of studying 
Whiteness is to do something about it. 
Seidman (1997) called for a renewed pragmatism in critical social theory at the 
conclusion of his theoretical investigation of how queer theory has transformed 
sociological inquiry and can work with other social movements to fight connected 
systems of oppression and to address the challenges differences pose to the “comfort” of 
modernism. He wrote: 
In a society such as the contemporary U.S., where differences have crystallized 
into sociocultural differences and where convictions of discourse – styles, logics, 
categories, epistemologies – are regularly contested, a pragmatic culture of reason 
that is respectful of difference, comfortable with ambiguity and uncertainty, and 
oriented toward inventiveness and temporary agreements would seem especially 
appropriate, encouraging civil, peaceful, democratic modes of daily managing 
collective life. (p. 264-265) 
I humbly consider my project to be committed to the kind of new pragmatism to which 
Seidman encouraged us, as scholar-activists, to aspire. Neoliberal social policies and 
cultural formations present persistent challenges to a sustainable and powerful movement 




Furthermore, neoconservative and so-called “moderate” political movements that have 
flourished under neoliberalism have effectively obscured the relationships between forms 
of oppression and successfully inflated differences between social-political minority 
groups. Some groups, such as the mainstream gay rights movement, have at times been 
complicit in these efforts (Seidman; Gamson, 1996; Duggan). The politics and 
epistemology of Black feminism, on the other hand, continue to remind us that struggles 
for justice are fought through coalitions, not oppositions (Combahee River Collective, 
1977/2007; Lorde, 1984; Dill, 1979; Collins, 1990/2000). These struggles are political in 
aims and highly emotional in form (Ahmed, 2004b; Fisher, 1984; Lorde). 
This project was executed using a range of typically disparate methodologies – 
particularly in the context of American studies – for a range of politically salient reasons. 
First, diverse methodologies are better equipped to break silences, highlight invisibilities 
and disrupt the (White) noise of hegemonic discourse that averts our eyes from the 
ponderous materiality of oppression (Foucault, 1972). Second, diverse methodologies 
produce diverse, partial knowledges (Haraway, 1988), which are better equipped to form 
these coalitions, to communicate across categories of difference and to implement 
pragmatic moves toward justice. As Katz (2001) argued, to actualize interdisciplinarity, 
“would be to alter the grounds of knowledge and the troubled and troubling structures 
that hold them in place; to make good on the incomplete project of interdisciplinarity by 
using its logics to continue to disrupt the academy as a realm of power and knowledge” 
(p. 525). With further validation, the TOWGAS may prove to be a useful tool for 
pedagogical and psychotherapeutic interventions into racist attitudes. The TOWGAS, and 




Miner-Rubino, Jayaratne and Konik (2007) insist represents the potential for social 
change produced by quantitative survey research. By grounding the development of the 
TOWGAS in qualitatively rich lived experiences, we gain the utility of a social research 
tool without sacrificing the nuance of ethnographic complexity. Future mixed-methods 
studies in controlled environments or field research should continue to employ the 
TOWGAS with qualitative methods to tackle the very real ideological and material 
challenges of contemporary neoliberal racial formation (Omi & Winant, 1994). 
I still wonder what happens after guilt, because I am concerned about the self-
conscious inaction that can manifest in guilt. A quote from Bernice Fisher (1984) opens 
this concluding chapter, because I am struck by how different today’s discourse on 
difference feels from the problems facing the feminist movement of the late 1970s. 
Fisher’s thoughts on the complacency and inaction engendered by White women’s guilt 
and shame reflect psychological concerns about the inability of White guilt to motivate 
substantive social change. And yet there were moments in this project when I felt myself 
longing for White guilt. Today’s multiculturalism seems to have alleviated White guilt 
without alleviating the material effects of racism. Though I will not settle for White guilt 
as the path to deconstructing racism, and I am even more skeptical about the political 
potential of White shame, I am just as concerned about giving up on White guilt 
prematurely, negating its experience or denying the emotionality of race and intersecting 
dimensions of oppression. We should not foreclose on White guilt so long before there’s 








 As the bulk of the research and writing of this manuscript was coming to a close, 
academic discourse on intersectionality was proliferating. Several notable publications 
and major conferences exemplified how scholars in the social sciences, humanities and 
applied domains, such as law and critical legal studies, have been innovating theoretical 
and methodological approaches to the intersections of identity and oppression. Dill and 
Zambrana’s (2009) edited anthology, Emerging Intersections, examined social scientific 
contributions to the study of race, class and gender in theory and policy; this research 
reflects a decade of working papers and ongoing projects at the Consortium on Race, 
Gender and Ethnicity at the University of Maryland, reportedly the world’s first and only 
think-tank dedicated to the promotion of intersectional scholarship. Berger and Guidroz 
(2009) released a multidisciplinary anthology that explored the impact of intersectional 
approaches on the academy as a cultural institution and the disciplinary frameworks that 
constitute its epistemic scaffolding. American Psychologist, the flagship journal of the 
American Psychological Association that is distributed to all APA members, published a 
methods essay by Cole (2009) that posits a three-point framework for how to conduct 
intersectional research in psychology. Finally, UCLA Law’s Critical Race Studies 
program announced a spring 2010 symposium on intersectionality to celebrate over 20 
years of the movement and to consider the past and future directions of intersectional 
research, pedagogy and activism.  
These discourses are linked by more than their focus on intersectional topics and 




as intersecting foundations of lived experience and social structures is their collective 
meta-analytic concern regarding intersectionality as something more than just a 
methodological strategy or theoretical lens. These scholars’ work exhibits relative 
degrees of preoccupation with the past and future of intersectionality the paradigm and 
field, representing research and praxis linked by more than method or discipline. The 
stakes of these diverse conversations about intersectionality have potentially 
transformative consequences.  
The stakes are high for the next proverbial wave of intersectionality, as Zambrana 
and Dill (2009) highlight in their volume. Collins (2009) writes in her foreword to 
Emerging Intersections that, “Unlike the invisibility that plagued the field of 
intersectionality at its inception, it now faces an entirely new challenge of being 
hypervisible within equally novel conditions of global, commodity capitalism” (p. xiii). 
The history of the movement is such that late in the first decade of the 21st century, 
“intersectionality” has political weight in mainstream academic circles and has come to 
signify particular kinds of research practices and theoretical assumptions that may be far 
removed from earlier articulations of Black feminism that sparked the movement and 
articulated the concept of “intersections” (e.g., Crenshaw, 1993; Collins, 1990/2000). 
Those who command influence over what counts as intersectionality (i.e., what 
constitutes intersectional research) will literally chart the future of the field.  
As I completed my dissertation and watched these conversations unfold parallel to 
my own work, the contributions of my project to intersectional research became more 
apparent. The implications of this intersectional examination of White guilt are largely 




divergent from the Black feminist tradition that is the bedrock of the field. First, in 
privileging race, gender and sexuality as the primary axes of identity and oppression 
under investigation, my project engages with sexuality in ways that expand the scope of 
intersectional inquiry to include the consequences of heterosexism and sexual identity on 
the politics of race and racism for all people regardless of racial or sexual identity. 
Certainly, prior literature has dealt with heterosexuality and violence, especially as they 
affect Black women’s lives (e.g., Crenshaw, 1993), while other research has forwarded a 
queer of color critique to highlight the inherent heterosexism of earlier Black feminist 
scholarship (e.g., Ferguson, 2004). Whereas these bodies of scholarship have focused on 
how sexuality functions as a tool of oppression in heterosexual relationships or how 
queer people negotiate the effects of racism and sexism in ways that are unique from their 
heterosexual counterparts, my work attempts to understand how sexuality and gender 
shape racial epistemology. This interpretive move corresponds with Dill, McLaughlin 
and Nieves’ (2007) call for greater attention to those dimensions of oppression that have 
not been at the forefront of intersectional scholarship, such as disability, nationality and 
sexuality. By drawing on the insights of queer theories, which often take up 
heterosexuality as their analytic focus, I have examined how sexual discourses permeate 
all knowledge, logic and talk about race and racism even when sex, gender or sexuality 
are not apparently relevant (Sedgwick, 1990; Stein & Plummer, 1996; Foucault, 1978). 
Sexuality, including sexual identity and sexual politics, is one among many intersecting 
axes of identity and oppression through which White racial feelings are manifested and 
articulated. Whether making sense of Don Imus or determining culpability for Hurricane 




studied herein. These findings are not unique to the extent that these processes were at 
work prior to my studies, but my dissertation has attempted to name and critique these 
processes where other scholarship has failed to do so. We cannot possibly examine every 
intersection of identity, and attempting to capture all identity categories in a single study 
would dilute and particularize findings beyond meaning and comprehension, but paying 
attention to ignored or understudied dimensions of experience facilitates the marking of 
invisible practices and illustrates the limits of extant knowledge (Haraway, 1988; Clarke, 
2005).  
My work is also different from prior research on intersectionality in its 
relationship to disciplines and methods. Extant intersectional approaches have primarily 
relied upon either quantitative or qualitative approaches, just as most social research 
generally takes an either/or approach to the quantitative/qualitative binary. Furthermore, 
qualitative research has been especially dominant in intersectionality a) because of its 
capacity to handle the interpretive nuances of intersectional identities, and b) arguably 
because, historically, qualitative methods have been better positioned in social research to 
treat identity categories as things other than variables, unlike statistical methods. While 
some leaders in intersectionality have signaled that mixed or hybrid methods are broadly 
well suited to intersectional analyses in much the same way that interdisciplinary 
scholarship is consonant with intersectionality (e.g., Stewart & Cole, 2007; Dill, 
McLaughlin & Nieves, 2007), actual mixed-methods scholarship remains rare. For 
example, in the two recent anthologies on intersectionality, only one study employed a 




And while one might expect that interdisciplinary and mixed-methods approaches 
are inevitable in intersectionality’s future, some recent publications have backed away 
from earlier and more radical arguments about the necessity of interdisciplinarity and 
methodological innovation. For example, Cole (2009) is careful to state that psychology 
does not need new methods to become intersectional, and Collins (2009) has asked 
whether or not intersectionality can operate fully and productively within disciplinary 
silos. According to Cole, “To translate the theoretical insights of intersectionality into 
psychological research does not require the adoption of a new set of methods; rather, it 
requires a reconceptualization of the meaning and consequences of social categories” (p. 
176). Though Cole does not argue that psychologists should not develop new methods 
and Collins does not insist that intersectionality should function solely in traditional 
disciplines, entertaining these questions about the place of intersectionality in the 
traditional, epistemic ‘centers’ of academia is a kind of momentum that my project 
resists. This dissertation represents an alternative configuration of intersectional 
methodology that is executable, comprehensible and empirically rigorous. The model of 
critical concurrency piloted here does not require new methods per se, but does insist that 
research questions should drive the selection of methods – and not the other way around. 
Intersectional psychology, for example, should not use quantitative methods because 
psychologists typically use quantitative methods, but because the questions we develop 
may be well suited to a quantitative empirical strategy. Psychologists should not 
foreclose on qualitative methods because they lack the training to execute them, just as 
historians should not avoid quantitative methods because they may be uncomfortable 




oppression (Foucault, 1970; Katz, 2001), and I have argued throughout this dissertation 
that multiple methods and what Clarke (2005) calls “multisite” research are best prepared 
to illuminate intersections that are heretofore unseen or elided by systems of power and 
inequity. To me, mixed methodological approaches – though not always obligatory or 
preferred – are a quintessential form of feminist objectivity because they signify an 
explicit commitment to the partiality and situatedness of all knowledge claims (Haraway, 
1988). Though a methodological revolution may not be necessary to chart the future of 
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Transcript 1: Imus in the Morning, Wednesday, April 4, 2007 (Media Matters, 2007) 
IMUS: So, I watched the basketball game last night between -- a little bit of Rutgers and 
Tennessee, the women's final. 
ROSENBERG: Yeah, Tennessee won last night -- seventh championship for [Tennessee 
coach] Pat Summitt, I-Man. They beat Rutgers by 13 points. 
IMUS: That's some rough girls from Rutgers. Man, they got tattoos and -- 
McGUIRK: Some hard-core hos. 
IMUS: That's some nappy-headed hos there. I'm gonna tell you that now, man, that's 
some -- woo. And the girls from Tennessee, they all look cute, you know, so, like 
-- kinda like -- I don't know. 
McGUIRK: A Spike Lee thing. 
IMUS: Yeah. 
McGUIRK: The Jigaboos vs. the Wannabes -- that movie that he had. 
IMUS: Yeah, it was a tough -- 
McCORD: Do The Right Thing. 
McGUIRK: Yeah, yeah, yeah. 
IMUS: I don't know if I'd have wanted to beat Rutgers or not, but they did, right? 
ROSENBERG: It was a tough watch. The more I look at Rutgers, they look exactly like 
the Toronto Raptors. 
IMUS: Well, I guess, yeah. 




McGUIRK: The [Memphis] Grizzlies would be more appropriate. 
 
Transcript 2: Anderson Cooper interviews Sen. Mary Landrieu (D-La.), September 1, 
2005, CNN. 
COOPER: Does the federal government bear responsibility for what is happening now? 
Should they apologize for what is happening now?  
LANDRIEU: Anderson, there will be plenty of time to discuss all of those issues, about 
why, and how, and what, and if. ... Let me just say a few things. Thank President 
Clinton and former President Bush for their strong statements of support and 
comfort today. ... I want to thank Senator Frist and Senator Reid for their 
extraordinary efforts. Anderson, tonight, I don't know if you've heard -- maybe 
you all have announced it -- but Congress is going to an unprecedented session to 
pass a $10 billion supplemental bill tonight to keep FEMA and the Red Cross up 
and operating.  
COOPER: ... I haven't heard that, because, for the last four days, I've been seeing dead 
bodies in the streets here in Mississippi. And to listen to politicians thanking each 
other and complimenting each other, you know, I got to tell you, there are a lot of 
people here who are very upset, and very angry, and very frustrated.  
And when they hear politicians slap -- you know, thanking one another, it just, 
you know, it kind of cuts them the wrong way right now. Because literally there 
was a body on the streets of this town yesterday being eaten by rats, because this 
woman had been laying in the street for 48 hours. And there's not enough 




LANDRIEU: Anderson, I have the anger inside of me. Most of the homes in my family 
have been destroyed. Our homes have been destroyed. I understand what you're 
saying, and I know all of those details. And the president of the United States 
knows those details.  
COOPER: Well, who are you angry at?  
LANDRIEU: I'm not angry at anyone. I'm just expressing that it is so important for 
everyone in this nation to pull together, for all military assets and all assets to be 
brought to bear in this situation. And I have every confidence that this country is 
as great and as strong as we can be do to that. And that effort is under way.  
COOPER: Well, I mean, there are a lot of people here who are kind of ashamed of what 
is happening in this country right now, what is -- ashamed of what is happening in 
your state, certainly. And that's not to blame the people who are there. It's a 
desperate situation. But I guess, you know, who can -- I mean, no one seems to be 
taking responsibility. I mean, I know you say there's a time and a place for, kind 
of, you know, looking back, but this seems to be the time and the place. I mean, 
there are people who want answers, and there are people who want someone to 
stand up and say, "You know what? We should have done more. Are all the assets 
being brought to bear?"  
LANDRIEU: Anderson, Anderson...  
COOPER: I mean, today, for the first time, I'm seeing National Guard troops in this town.  
LANDRIEU: Anderson, I know. And I know where you are. And I know what you're 
seeing. Believe me, we know it. And we understand, and there will be a time to 




governor knows. The president knows. The military officials know. And they're 
trying to do the very best they can to stabilize the situation. Senator Vitter, our 
congressional delegation, all of us understand what is happening. We are doing 
our very, very best to get the situation under control. But I want to thank the 
president. He will be here tomorrow, we think. And the military is sending assets 
as we speak. So, please, I understand. You might say I'm a politician, but I grew 
up in New Orleans. My father was the mayor of that city. I've represented that city 
my whole life, and it's just not New Orleans. It's St. Bernard, and St. Tammany, 
and Plaquemines Parish that have been completely underwater. Our levee system 
has failed. We need a lot of help. And the Congress has been wonderful to help 
us, and we need more help. Nobody's perfect, Anderson. Everybody has to stand 
up here. And I know you understand. So thank you so much for everything you're 
doing.  
COOPER: Well, I appreciate you joining us on the program tonight. I can only imagine 
how busy you are. Thank you very much, Senator Landrieu.  
LANDRIEU: Thank you, Anderson. Thank you so much. Thank you.  
COOPER: And good luck to you and all the people working to solve this problem. 
Because, at this point, it is very hard to try to figure our how this problem is going 






Measures Used in Online Survey 
Measures are listed here in the order in which they were presented in the survey. 
Reliability data is taken from instrument authors’ publications, unless otherwise noted.   
 




Year in College 
 First Year 
 Third Year 
 Fourth Year 
 Fifth Year + 
 











 White  
 African American/Black 
 Asian American/Asian Pacific Islander/Asian 
 Latina/o or Hispanic 
 Native American 





 Transgender FTM 
 Transgender MTF 












 Other, please specify 
 
Citizenship Status 
 U.S. Citizen 
 Other, please specify 
 




Please assume that the following scale is representative of the full range of social classes 
in the United States. At the far right of the scale are the people with the most money, the 
highest amount of schooling, and the most respected jobs. At the far left of the scale are 
the people with the least amount of money, the lowest levels and quality of schooling, 
and the least respected jobs. Please pick the point on this scale where you think you are. 
 
Lower-class        Upper-class 
(10 dots on the scale to choose from) 
 
Please indicate the percentage of your friends who are White. 
 0-5%, 6-25%, 51-75%, 76-95%, 96-100% 
 
Racial Argument Scale (Saucier & Miller, 2003) 
Reliability: .86 
(1-5 Lickert type scale, 1=not at all, 5=very much) Positive scenarios are reverse-coded. 
 
For the following items, please read each argument and then to rate how well the 
argument supports the conclusion offered on a 5-point scale, 1 being “not at all,” 5 
being “very much.” 
 
Because the world is a diverse place with many different cultures and people, requiring 
college students to take courses such as African American studies is a benefit to them. 
These courses provide students with better understandings of other ethnic groups, 
cultures, and value systems. This educational experience can enrich students ’lives 
through cultural awareness.  
Conclusion: Courses like African American studies should be required in the education of 
all college students. 
 
Articles written about athletes consistently describe White athletes as “intelligent,” “hard-
working,” and “crafty ”and describe African American athletes as “talented,” “flashy,” 




American athletes are not as intelligent as White athletes and fail to credit African 
American athletes for their intelligence, discipline, and work ethics. 
Conclusion: Biased descriptions of athletes should be avoided to stop perpetuating the 
stereotype that African American athletes are less intelligent than White athletes. 
 
The U.S. government is built on a representative democracy that means that politicians 
are elected to represent their constituents in making the country’s decisions. However, the 
political construction of power in the United States does not allow adequate 
representation of African Americans, as shown by the few African American politicians 
who have attained political positions in the highest levels of our government. 
Conclusion: The political parties should allow and support the rise of African American 
politicians within the parties to guarantee fair representation of African Americans in the 
government of this country. 
 
Sickle cell anemia is a disease that is inherited by many African American children. The 
disease is potentially fatal, but research to combat the disease has not been as well-funded 
as research concerning ailments that influence Whites as well. The differences in funding 
are inexcusable, especially since sickle cell anemia is a deadly disease, killing many 
African Americans every year. 
Conclusion: Research to combat sickle cell anemia needs to be as well-funded as research 
for other diseases. 
 
Waiting to Exhale and other major motion pictures starring primarily African American 
casts have been too infrequent in U.S. theaters. Too often, African American actors and 
actresses have been relegated to minor roles in Hollywood productions, or to roles as 
villains, and it is about time that more African Americans like Halle Berry and Denzel 
Washington can achieve starring roles. 
Conclusion: African Americans should be represented in motion pictures in starring roles 
more frequently than they were in the past. 
 
Recent educational studies have shown that African Americans who do poorly in school 
may do so because of language difficulties and cultural differences. It has been argued 
that the use of familiar language and relevant cultural examples in the education of 
African American children can help to improve the performances that African American 
children show in school. 
Conclusion: School systems should incorporate material into their curricula that is 
sensitive to African American culture in order to better educate African Americans. 
 
Experts have argued that SAT scores for African Americans may be lower than for 
Whites due to the poorer opportunities available to African Americans for  education. 
However, the SAT is a valid predictor of college performance and no concessions should 
be made for African Americans. Lower scores mean poorer performance, and a sliding 
scale would only promote future failure for African Americans with low SAT scores 
regardless of why they get low SAT scores. 
Conclusion: African Americans should not be given leniency for low SAT scores in the 





Rodney King was the African American motorist who was beaten by police officers in 
Los Angeles in an incident captured on video. The incident was broadcast as an 
unmotivated racial assault on King by the police, but this may not be entirely accurate. 
King was beaten following a long car chase and resisted arrest upon his capture, and the 
physical response by the police may have been somewhat warranted.  
Conclusion: Rodney King may have at least partially provoked the beating he received 
from the Los Angeles police officers. 
 
It has been argued that welfare programs are too often exploited by African Americans in 
this country. Welfare offices in every state appear packed with African Americans 
applying for and collecting welfare benefits. These high numbers of African American 
welfare recipients are disproportionate for their numbers in the general population and 
other racial groups are suffering because they cannot receive benefits. 
Conclusion: The numbers of African Americans receiving welfare should be limited to 
provide benefits for others.  
 
President Bill Clinton issued an apology to African Americans for the institution of 
slavery that existed in this country more than 130 years ago. Clinton ’s apology was 
inappropriate because he and the present government have no connection with the long-
abolished practice of slavery and the apology may instead incite current tension in race 
relations. 
Conclusion: President Clinton should not have apologized to African Americans for 
slavery. 
 
Christians celebrate Christmas, the Jewish celebrate Chanakah, and some African 
Americans celebrate Kwanzaa, a holiday originating from African culture, during the 
winter “holiday season.” Many people had never heard about Kwanzaa until recently and 
suggest that since it appears to be a “new ”holiday, it must be a second-tier holiday 
seeking to emulate Christmas without much inherent significance. 
Conclusion: Kwanzaa is not a holiday on the same level of importance as Christmas. 
 
It has been shown that White Americans score 15 points higher on IQ tests than African 
Americans. This difference in IQ scores has even been shown when other variables such 
as education levels and socioeconomic status are taken into account. 
Conclusion: Whites are more intelligent than African Americans. 
 
The United Negro College Fund helps to pay the tuition and expenses that allow African 
Americans to go to college. While no doubt benefiting African American students, this 
organization is unconstitutionally biased in that it does not offer financial assistance to 
White students as well. Meanwhile, thousands of White students continue to miss out on 
furthering their education due to financial limitations. 
Conclusion: The United Negro College Fund should be forced, by law, to provide 





Collective Self-Esteem Scale, Identity Subscale, Race (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) 
(1-5 Lickert type scale, 1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree) 
 
Overall my race has very little to do with how I feel. (R) 
My race is an important reflection of who I am. 
My race is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am. (R) 
In general, my race is an important part of my self-image. 
I sometimes worry that my performance in work or school may reflect badly on my racial 
group. 
 
Collective Self-Esteem Scale, Identity Subscale, Gender (Luhtanen & Crocker, 
1992) (1-5 Lickert type scale, 1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree) 
 
Overall my gender has very little to do with how I feel. (R)  
My gender is an important reflection of who I am.  
My gender is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am. (R) 
In general, my gender is an important part of my self-image.  
I sometimes worry that my performance in work or school may reflect badly on people of 
the same gender as me. 
 
Collective Self-Esteem Scale, Identity Subscale, Sexual Orientation/Identity 
(Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) (1-5 Lickert type scale, 1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly 
agree) 
  
Overall my sexual orientation has very little to do with how I feel. (R) 
My sexual orientation is an important reflection of who I am. 
My sexual orientation is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am. (R) 
In general, my sexual orientation is an important part of my self-image. 
I sometimes worry that my performance in work or school may reflect badly on people of 
the same sexual orientation as me. 
 
White Guilt (Swim & Miller, 1999) 
Reliability: Cronbach’s alpha=.90 
(1-5 Lickert type scale, 1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree) 
 
Although I feel my behavior is typically nondiscriminatory toward Blacks, I still feel 
guilt due to my association with the White race. 
I feel guilty about the past and present social inequality of Black Americans (i.e., slavery, 
poverty). 
I do not feel guilty about social inequality between White and Black Americans. (R) 
When I learn about racism, I feel guilt due to my association with the White race. 
I feel guilty about the benefits and privileges that I receive as a White American. 
 
Psychosocial Costs of Racism to Whites Scale (by subscales/factors) (Spanierman & 
Hepperman, 2004) 





White Empathic Reactions Toward Racism (Reliability: Cronbach’s alpha=.78) 
I am angry that racism exists. 
I become sad when I think about racial injustice. 
It disturbs me when people express racist views. 
When I hear about acts of racial violence, I become angry or depressed. 
Racism is dehumanizing to people of all races, including Whites. 
I feel helpless about not being able to eliminate racism. 
 
White Guilt (Reliability: Cronbach’s alpha=.87) 
Being White makes me feel personally responsible for racism. 
I never feel ashamed about being White. (R) 
Sometimes I feel guilty about being White. 
I am afraid that I abuse my power and privilege as a White person. 
I feel good about being White. (R) 
 
White Fear of Others (Reliability: Cronbach’s alpha=.88) 
I often find myself fearful of people of other races. 
I am distrustful of people of other races. 
I have very few friends of other races. 
I feel safe in most neighborhoods, regardless of the racial composition. (R) 
I am fearful that racial minority populations are rapidly increasing in the U.S., and my 
group will no longer be the numerical majority. 
 
White Shame - Anger/Externalization (Grzanka, pretested 2006) 
Reliability: Cronbach’s alpha=.83 (1-5 Lickert type scale, 1=strongly disagree, 
5=strongly agree) 
 
I feel my behavior is typically nondiscriminatory toward Blacks, and I feel no guilt due to 
my association with the White race. 
I do not feel guilty about the past and present social inequality of Black Americans (i.e., 
slavery, poverty). 
I feel angry toward people who say that race is still an important issue in the United 
States. 
Often I feel frustrated that racial minorities insist that they have fewer opportunities than 
White people. 
I feel that racism is no longer a major problem in the United States. 
When I learn about racism, it makes me happy to know that I am becoming a more 
socially conscious person. (R) 
As a White person, I do not accept any responsibility for the problems facing racial 
minorities in the United States. 
When other people talk about racism, I often feel people are “reading into things.” 
 I do not personally discriminate against Black people, but I am tired of hearing about 
their oppression. 
 




Note: new version, no reliability data 
(1-5 Lickert type scale, 1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree) 
The following items are related to contemporary American popular television, both news 
and entertainment. For these items, please read each statement and indicate how much 
you agree or disagree with each statement by circling your answer on the 5-point scale. If 
you have no opinion, please circle 0 for No Opinion (N/O). These questions refer to your 
overall perception of American television, not specific television shows. Please answer 




•  “People of color” refers to all non-White people, such as Black, Latina/o, 
Asian, multiracial people, etc. regardless of nationality.  
 
Local and national television news programs fairly and accurately depict all races and 
ethnicities. (R) 
There are more White people than people of color on television. 
I don’t think about race or ethnicity when I watch television. 
I generally prefer to watch television shows that depict characters that I can relate to in 
terms of race and ethnicity. (R) 
Black people are most likely to be seen in sports, crime reports and sitcoms on television. 
It does not matter to me if a television show is racially and/or ethnically diverse. (R) 
White people typically occupy positions of power in television. 
The television shows that I watch usually have racially and ethnically diverse casts. 
Both news and entertainment television programs regularly feature stereotypical 
representations of ethnic and racial minorities. 
Television series generally have racially and ethnically diverse casts. (R) 
It is important for television series to have racially and ethnically diverse casts. 
Television news is colorblind and racially unbiased. (R) 
 
Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3 (TOSCA-3) (Tangney & Dearing, 2002) 
Reliability: Cronbach’s alpha - Shame=.88; Guilt=.83; Externalization=.80; 
Detachment=.77 
 
Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life, followed by 
several common reactions to those situations. 
 As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate 
how likely you would be to react in each of the ways described. We ask you to rate all 
responses because people may feel or react more than one way to the same situation, or 
they may react different ways at different times. 
 For example: 
 
You wake up early one Saturday morning. It is cold and rainy outside. 
 
a) You would telephone a friend to catch up on news.  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
               not likely            very likely 




b) You would take the extra time to read the paper.   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
               not likely            very likely  
 
c) You would feel disappointed that it’s raining.   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
               not likely            very likely  
 
d) You would wonder why you woke up so early.   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
               not likely            very likely  
 
 
 In the above example, I’ve rated all of the answers by circling a number. I circled a 
“1” for answer (a) because I wouldn’t want to wake up a friend very early on a Saturday 
morning – so it’s not at all likely that I would do that. I circled a “5” for answer (b) because I 
almost always read the paper if I have time in the morning (very likely). I circled a “3” for 
answer (c) because for me it’s about half and half. Sometimes I would be disappointed about 
the rain and sometimes I wouldn’t – it would depend on what I had planned. And I circled a 
“4” for answer (d) because I would probably wonder why I had awakened so early. 
 Please do not skip any items – rate all responses. 
 
1. You make plans to meet a friend for lunch. At 5 o’clock, you realize you stood your friend 
up. 
 
a) You would think: “I’m inconsiderate.”    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
               not likely            very likely  
    
b) You would think: “Well, my friend will understand.”  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
               not likely            very likely  
 
c) You’d think you should make it up to your   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
friend as soon as possible.           not likely            very likely  
 
d) You would think: “My boss distracted me   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
just before lunch.”            not likely            very likely 
   
 
2. You break something at work and then hide it. 
 
a) You would think: “I’m is making me     1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
anxious. I need to either fix it or get          not likely            very likely             
someone else to.”    
    
b) You would think about quitting.    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
               not likely            very likely  
 
c) You’d think you should make it up to your   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
friend as soon as possible.           not likely            very likely  
 




           not likely            very likely 
 
3. At work, you wait until the last minute to plan a project, and it turns out badly.  
 
a) You would feel incompetent.            1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                not likely            very likely  
    
b) You would think: “There are never    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     enough hours in the day.”           not likely            very likely  
 
c) You would feel: “I deserve to be reprimanded   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
for mismanaged the project.”            not likely            very likely  
 
d) You would think: “What’s done is done.”    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
           not likely            very likely 
 
 
4. You make at mistake at work and find out a coworker is blamed for the error. 
 
a) You think the company did not like the coworker.    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                not likely            very likely  
    
b) You would think: “Life is not fair.”    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
           not likely            very likely  
 
c) You would keep quiet and avoid the coworker.  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
           not likely            very likely  
 
d) You would feel unhappy and eager to     1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     correct the situation.            not likely            very likely 
 
 
5. While playing around, you throw a ball and it hits your friend in the face. 
 
a) You would feel inadequate that you      1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
can’t even throw a ball.            not likely            very likely  
    
b) You would think maybe your friend needs   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5           
some more practice at catching.          not likely            very likely  
 
c) You would think: “It was just an accident.”    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
           not likely            very likely  
 
d) You would apologize and make sure your    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     friend feels better.            not likely            very likely 
 
 





a) You would think the animal shouldn’t have      1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
been on the road.            not likely            very likely  
    
b) You would think: “I’m terrible.”    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
           not likely            very likely  
 
c) You would feel: “Well, it was an accident.”   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
           not likely            very likely  
 
d) You would feel bad you hadn’t been more alert  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     driving down the road.            not likely            very likely 
 
 
7. You walk out of an exam thinking you did extremely well. Then you find out you did 
poorly.  
 
a) You would think: “Well, it’s just a test.”     1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                not likely            very likely  
    
b) You would think: “The instructor doesn’t like me.”  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
           not likely            very likely  
 
c) You would think: “I should have studied harder.”  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
           not likely            very likely  
 
d) You would feel stupid.        1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
            not likely            very likely 
 
8. While out with a group of friends, you make fun of a friend who’s not there. 
 
a) You would think: “It was all in fun; it’s harmless.”    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                not likely            very likely  
    
b) You would feel small…like a rat.    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
           not likely            very likely  
 
c) You would think that perhaps that friend should  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     have been there to defend him/herself.          not likely            very likely  
 
d) You would feel unhappy and eager to     1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     correct the situation.            not likely            very likely 
 
 
9. You make a big mistake on an important project at work. People were depending on you, 
and your boss criticizes. 
 




about what was expected of you.          not likely            very likely  
    
b) You would feel like you wanted to hide.   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
           not likely            very likely  
 
c) You would think: “I should have recognized the   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
    problem and done a better job.”           not likely            very likely  
 
d) You would think: “Well, nobody’s perfect.”   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                    not likely            very likely 
 
10. You are taking care of your friend’s dog while your friend is on vacation, and the dog 
runs away.  
 
a) You would think, “I am irresponsible and incompetent.” 1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                not likely            very likely  
    
b) You would think you friend must not take very  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     good care of the dog or it wouldn’t have run away.        not likely            very likely  
 
c) You would vow to be more careful next time.   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
           not likely            very likely  
 
d) You would think your friend could just     1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     get a new dog.             not likely            very likely 
 
 
11. You attend your coworker’s housewarming party and you spill red wine on a new cream-
colored carpet, but you think no one notices.  
 
a) You think your coworker should have expected some   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
accidents at such a big party.           not likely            very likely  
    
b) You would stay late to help clean up the stain   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     after the party.             not likely            very likely  
 
c) You would wish you were anywhere but at   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     the party.             not likely            very likely  
 
d) You would wonder why your coworker chose   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 








Sample Recruitment Emails 
Contemporary Racial Issues (Part 2, Main Survey) 
 
Subject Line: Take a brief survey and Win $50 Target Gift Card 
 
Dear University of Maryland Student, 
  
I am writing to request that you participate in my dissertation research by taking a brief 
online survey. My project is an investigation of contemporary racial attitudes, and this 
brief online survey is designed to give people like you the opportunity to voice their 
opinions about race and racism in the United States. This online survey can be taken from 
any computer and requires a maximum of 25 minutes of your time. Follow this link to 
access the survey: Contemporary Racial Attitudes. Actual URL: (link here) 
 
As a token of my appreciation for your participation, I am offering $50 gift cards to 
Target that will be randomly awarded to five people who take the survey. A selected 
group of undergraduate students are being invited to take the survey and far fewer will 
actually participate, so your chances of winning $50 are fairly high. And who doesn’t 
love free cash?! 
  
As a fellow student, I understand how valuable your time is and how busy things can be -
- especially during the middle of the semester. I ask, though, that you take just a few 
moments to assist me in my work. I believe this research is important, and your 
participation will help me develop better ways to learn and talk about contemporary 
racial attitudes and the psychology of race in the U.S. Of course, your responses will be 
completely confidential. 
  
Thank you so much in advance for your time. I *really* appreciate your help. Please let 
me know if you have any questions and feel free to contact me at pgrzanka@umd.edu 
  




Patrick R. Grzanka 
Assistant Director, Honors Humanities 
Ph.D. Candidate, Department of American Studies 
University of Maryland 
1103 Wicomico Hall 








Note: Your email address was released to the University of Maryland's Department of 
American Studies for department-sponsored research. Your email address will not be 
used again nor for any other purposes. 
 
Contemporary Racial Attitudes, Part 3 (Interviews) 
 
Dear [Student’s First Name], 
 
I hope this message finds you well. I am writing because you indicated willingness to be 
contacted for an interview when you completed the Contemporary Racial Attitudes 
Survey earlier this summer. You have been selected as a potential participant for a 
follow-up study involving two one-on-one interviews with me, the co-principal 
investigator on this project. 
 
If you choose to participate in this research, I will ask you to take part in two, one-on-one 
interviews with me. These interviews will last no longer than one hour, and will be 
conducted in my office in Wicomico Hall at the University of Maryland. Each interview 
will be digitally recorded, but your responses during the interview will remain completely 
confidential. In other words, though I may use the information you provide in 
publications and professional conference presentations, your name and identity will not 
be revealed at any point. During the interviews themselves, we will discuss your 
attitudes and opinions about some contemporary social issues, such as the controversy 
surrounding the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. You will watch some video clips of news 
coverage and I will ask for your opinions and reactions. There will be no surveys or tests; 
these interviews will be conversations between you and me. 
 
I would greatly appreciate your consideration of my request. Unfortunately, I cannot offer 
you any compensation for participating in this research. If you are willing to participate, 
please contact me via email by replying to this message. In your reply, please tell me the 
best way to contact you in the future (email, cell phone, room/home phone) so that we 
may set up your first interview. 
 
Thanks in advance for your continued participation in this dissertation research and for 




Patrick R. Grzanka 








Informed Consent Forms 
Contemporary Racial Attitudes (Part 2 – Main Online Survey) 
 
Welcome & Introduction to Contemporary Racial Attitudes Survey 
 
Why is this research being done? 
This is a research project being conducted by Dr. Sheri Parks and Patrick Grzanka at the 
University of Maryland, College Park. We are inviting you to participate in this research 
project because you are a White student at the University of Maryland. The purpose of 
this research project is to gather information on contemporary racial attitudes of people 
like yourself so that we can improve existing tools of assessing racial attitudes. Part of 
this research involves examining the relationships between racial attitudes and gender 
and sexuality. 
 
What will I be asked to do? 
The procedures involve taking this online survey, which should take approximately 20-25 
minutes to complete. The questions in this survey involve a brief demographic 
questionnaire and several different kinds of items that ask for your opinions about race 
and race relations in the United States. Some items will ask you to indicate how you 
might feel when dealing with racial issues and racial inequalities in the United States. If 
at any time you indicate that you do not identify as a White person, you will be directed 
to exit the survey, as many of these questions are specific to White people's experiences. 
 
By participating in this survey and offering your email address below, you will be 
automatically entered in a random giveaway with a chance of winning one of five $50 
Target gift certificates. You do not have to give your email address to participate in the 
survey, but you do need to submit your email address in the optional field below in order 
to be entered in the giveaway. Your email address will not be made public, will not be 
connected to your survey responses and will only be used to contact you in the event that 
you are selected as a winner of one of the five $50 gift certificates. 
 
We are also asking you to indicate at the bottom of the this page if you are willing to be 
contacted regarding a follow-up interview after completing this survey. Indicating that 
you are willing to be contacted regarding participation in a follow-up interview does not 
necessarily mean that you will be contacted nor that you will be required to participate 
any further in this or any other studies. 
 
What about confidentiality? 
We will do our best to keep your personal information confidential. To help protect your 
confidentiality, your name and email address will be stored separately from your 
responses to the survey items and will not be released at any time nor connected to your 




participated in this survey, and your responses will not be connected to your name by the 
investigators. If you are selected as the winner of one of the gift certificates offered for 
participation in this research or if you choose to indicate your willingness to be contacted 
regarding a follow-up interview, you will be contacted via email by the investigators, 
who will have no knowledge of your particular responses (only that you participated in 
the research). If we write a report or article about this research project, your identity will 
be protected to the maximum extent possible. Your information may be shared with 
representatives of the University of Maryland, College Park or governmental authorities 
if you or someone else is in danger or if we are required to do so by law. 
 
What are the risks of this research? 
There may be some risks from participating in this research study, including emotional 
discomfort and/or anxiety resulting from the subject matter of the items. 
 
What are the benefits of this research? 
This research is not designed to help you personally, but the results may help the 
investigators learn more about feeling and attitudes about race in the United States. 
Furthermore, your information may assist the investigators in their efforts to develop 
improved methods of assessing racial attitudes. We hope that, in the future, other people 
might benefit from this study through improved understanding of the psychology of race 
and race relations in the United States. 
 
Do I have to be in this research? May I stop participating at any time? 
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You may choose not to take 
part at all. If you decide to participate in this research, you may stop participating at any 
time. If you decide not to participate in this study or if you stop participating at any time, 
you will not be penalized or lose any benefits to which you otherwise qualify. 
 
What if I have questions? 
This research is being conducted by Dr. Sheri Parks in the Department of American 
Studies at the University of Maryland, College Park. If you have any questions about the 
research study itself, please contact Dr. Parks at: 1102 Holzapfel Hall, College Park, MD 
20742; (email) slp@umd.edu; (telephone) 301.405.6255. If you have questions about 
your rights as a research subject or wish to report a research-related injury, please 
contact: Institutional Review Board Office, University of Maryland, College Park, 
Maryland, 20742; (e-mail) irb@deans.umd.edu; (telephone) 301-405-0678. 
This research has been reviewed according to the University of Maryland, College Park 
IRB procedures for research involving human subjects. 
 
Statement of Age of Subject and Consent: 
Your electronic signature indicates that: you are at least 18 years of age; the research has 
been explained to you; your questions have been fully answered; and you freely and 
voluntarily choose to participate in this research project. 
 
*Signature and Date 





I am willing to be contacted regarding participation in follow-up interview to this 
survey. (If you are willing to be contacted, please select "yes" below.) By indicating 
"yes," I understand that I may not necessarily be contacted and I am not obligated to 
participate in any further research studies. 
Yes No 
 
OPTIONAL: Email address (for giveaway) 
 
 
If the participant was not willing to be interviewed, they were forwarded to this page: 
 
Proceed to Survey 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research. Please follow the link below to 
proceed to the survey. Remember that all of your responses are confidential. Please 
answer all items in the survey as it is very important that we have a complete set of 
responses from each participant. However, remember that you may stop at any time, 
without penalty, by closing your browser. 
 
Click "PROCEED TO SURVEY" to begin answering questions. Please do not click 
"DONE" below, as this will quit the survey. 
 
**Please don't forget to close your internet browser window after completing the entire 
survey.** 
 
PROCEED TO SURVEY 
 
 
If the participant was willing to be interview, they were forwarded to this page before 
they received the link to the survey: 
 
Follow-Up Interview Information 
Thank you for being willing to be contacted regarding a follow-up interview. You should 
provide your email address if you are willing to participate in a follow-up interview, 
though providing your address does not necessarily mean that you will be contacted nor 
that you will be required to participate any further in this or any other studies. Though it 
is not required, we ask that you please provide the following information regarding your 
gender and sexual orientation, which will help us select participants for follow-up 
interviews. The optional information below will not be connected to your responses on 
the actual survey. Once you are finished, click "next" to proceed to the actual survey. 
 
Email address (so that we can contact you) 
Please indicate your gender. 
Man  Woman  Transgender  Other (please specify) 





Contemporary Racial Attitudes (Part 2 – Interviews; Chapter 4) 
 
CONSENT FORM  
 
Project Title Contemporary Racial Issues, Part 3 
Why is this research 
being done? 
This is a research project being conducted by Dr. Sheri Parks and 
Patrick Grzanka at the University of Maryland, College Park.  We are 
inviting you to participate in this research project because you 
participated in our prior study, Contemporary Racial Issues, Part 2.  
The purpose of this research project is to learn more about White 
people’s attitudes about contemporary racial issues and to explore how 
gender and sexuality inform these attitudes.  





The procedures involve __. [Describe the procedure(s) chronologically 
using lay language and short sentences.  State the location where the 
study will be conducted.  Explain medical and other technical 
terminology using simple language.  State the overall duration for the 
subject’s participation and, if appropriate, how long each procedure 
will take.  If the research involves surveys or interviews, include a 
detailed description of the questions. Identify experimental 
procedures.  Describe alternative procedures or courses of treatment, 






We will do our best to keep your personal information confidential.  To 
help protect your confidentiality, ____________ [Include a description 
of the procedures to maintain the confidentiality of the data, e.g. 
having locked filing cabinets and storage areas, using identification 
codes only on data forms, and using password-protected computer 
files.  For anonymous surveys, state that “the surveys are anonymous 
and will not contain information that may personally identify you”.  
For coded identifiable information, state the following, if applicable 
(1) your name will not be included on the surveys and other collected 
data; (2) a code will be placed on the survey and other collected data; 
(3) through the use of an identification key, the researcher will be 
able to link your survey to your identity; and (4) only the researcher 
will have access to the identification key.]   If we write a report or 
article about this research project, your identity will be protected to the 
maximum extent possible.  Your information may be shared with 
representatives of the University of Maryland, College Park or 
governmental authorities if you or someone else is in danger or if we 
are required to do so by law. 
 
 [If there is a possibility that you will collect information on child 
abuse or neglect, abuse or neglect of the developmentally disabled or 
other vulnerable adults, danger to the subject or others, or similar 
types of information that may need to be disclosed to comply with 




disclosure must be included in the consent form.  See the following 
example, and modify it to include all applicable types of information.  
If there is a possibility that you will collect such information, but you 
do not intend to disclose it, you must provide an explanation and any 
justification for non-disclosure in your IRB Application. If you have a 
Certificate of Confidentiality, refer to the Appendix.]  In accordance 
with legal requirements and/or professional standards, we will disclose 
to the appropriate individuals and/or authorities information that 
comes to our attention concerning child abuse or neglect or potential 
harm to you or others.    
What are the risks 
of this research? 
 
There may be some risks from participating in this research study 
[Describe any known risks including physical, psychological, social, 
emotional, legal and financial risks that may result from participating 
in the research.  Some studies include risks that may be better 
described as things that could make the subject feel uncomfortable 
such as fear, embarrassment or fatigue. These are also examples of 
risks that should be included.  Do not describe risks as minimal and 
do not state that there are no risks beyond everyday life.  If applicable 
include a statement that the research (or a particular procedure) may 
involve risks to the subject (or to the embryo or fetus if the subject is 
or may become pregnant) that are currently unforseeable. OR if 
applicable, state the following: There are no known risks associated 
with participating in this research project.   
 
Project Title [This title should be the same as the project title used in the IRB 
application.] 
What are the 
benefits of this 
research?  
The benefits to you include [only list the direct and reasonably 
expected benefits to the subject.  Monetary compensation and extra 
credit for courses are not benefits and should be described in the 
procedures section] ____________________ or This research is not 
designed to help you personally, but the results may help the 
investigator learn more about ______________________________. 
We hope that, in the future, other people might benefit from this study 
through improved understanding of ___. Describe the anticipated 
benefits to science or society expected from the research, if any. 
 
Do I have to be in 
this research? 
May I stop 
participating at any 
time?   
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary.  You may 
choose not to take part at all.  If you decide to participate in this 
research, you may stop participating at any time.  If you decide not to 
participate in this study or if you stop participating at any time, you will 
not be penalized or lose any benefits to which you otherwise qualify. [If 
applicable, include an explanation of any circumstances under which 
a subject’s participation may be terminated by the investigator without 
regard to the subject’s consent.  If applicable, include an explanation 
of the consequences of a subject’s decision to withdraw from the 
research and any procedures for orderly termination of a subject’s 
participation.] 





if I am injured? 
 
risk  If included, please do not modify the wording displayed at 
right unless different for a particular study.] 
The University of Maryland does not provide any medical, 
hospitalization or other insurance for participants in this research 
study, nor will the University of Maryland provide any medical 
treatment or compensation for any injury sustained as a result of 
participation in this research study, except as required by law. 





This research is being conducted by [principal investigator’s name and 
department] at the University of Maryland, College Park.  If you have 
any questions about the research study itself, please contact 
___________ [principal investigator’s name] at: _____ ____________ 
[Address, telephone number, and (if appropriate) e-mail address of 
principal investigator.] 
If you have questions about your rights as a research subject or wish to 
report a research-related injury, please contact: Institutional Review 
Board Office, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 
20742;             
(e-mail) irb@deans.umd.edu;  (telephone) 301-405-0678  
This research has been reviewed according to the University of 
Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research involving human 
subjects. 
 
Project Title [This title should be the same as the project title used in the IRB 
application.] 
Statement of Age 
of Subject and 
Consent 





Your signature indicates that: 
   you are at least 18 years of age;,  
   the research has been explained to you; 
   your questions have been fully answered; and  
  you freely and voluntarily choose to participate in this research 
project. 
NAME OF SUBJECT 
 
 
SIGNATURE OF SUBJECT  
Signature and Date 
[Please add name, 
signature, and date 
lines to the final 
page  
of your consent 
form] 
DATE  
****Please note: When the consent form requires more than one page, please include a space 
for the subject to initial and date at the top right-hand corner of each page.  The corner should 
appear as: Initials_____ Date_____     
Also, each page must display a page range such as:  Page 1 of 2, then Page 2 of 2.  This 
additional information would confirm that the subject agreed to the entire contents of the 






Test of White Guilt and Shame (TOWGAS) 
 
Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life, 
followed by several common reactions to those situations. 
 As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate 
how likely you would be to react in each of the ways described. We ask you to rate all 
responses because people may feel or react more than one way to the same situation, or 
they may react different ways at different times. 
 For example: 
 
You wake up early one Saturday morning. It is cold and rainy outside. 
 
a) You would telephone a friend to catch up on news.  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
               not likely            very likely 
   
b) You would take the extra time to read the paper.   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
               not likely            very likely  
 
c) You would feel disappointed that it’s raining.   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
               not likely            very likely  
 
d) You would wonder why you woke up so early.   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
               not likely            very likely  
 
 
 In the above example, I’ve rated all of the answers by circling a number. I circled a 
“1” for answer (a) because I wouldn’t want to wake up a friend very early on a Saturday 
morning – so it’s not at all likely that I would do that. I circled a “5” for answer (b) because I 
almost always read the paper if I have time in the morning (very likely). I circled a “3” for 
answer (c) because for me it’s about half and half. Sometimes I would be disappointed about 
the rain and sometimes I wouldn’t – it would depend on what I had planned. And I circled a 
“4” for answer (d) because I would probably wonder why I had awakened so early. 




1. In a class, you are corrected for your usage of the term, “Blacks.” 
 
a) You would think: “I’m ignorant.”       1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                not likely            very likely  
    
b) You would think: “Labels don’t really matter.”  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 





c) You would apologize and ask your instructor    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     for the correct/appropriate usage of the term.         not likely            very likely  
 
d) You would think: “It’s not my fault – I can’t    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     keep up with all this political correctness.”         not likely            very likely 
 
 
2. You read a news story about White students at large private university dressing in 
“Blackface” for a theme party. 
 
a) You would think: “That’s so awful. I hope they have   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
to face consequences for their behavior.”          not likely            very likely  
    
b) You would wish you weren’t White.    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
           not likely            very likely  
 
c) You would think: “People make way too big   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     big a deal over stuff like this.”           not likely            very likely  
 
d) You would think: “I’m sure the students didn’t   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     mean any harm.”             not likely            very likely 
 
 
3. In a diversity workshop at school/work you have a conversation with a Black 
peer/colleague about White privilege. 
a) You would feel miserable because of all your    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
privileges.             not likely            very likely  
    
b) You would think: “I can’t be held responsible for   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5     
being born White.”            not likely            very likely  
 
c) You would wish there was a way to make up for   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     all your unfair advantages.           not likely            very likely  
 
d) You would think: “Race doesn’t matter as much as  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     people say it does.”            not likely            very likely 
 
 
4. One of your White friends uses the N-word in a joke and you laugh. 
 
a) You would think: “It was all in fun; it’s harmless.”    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                not likely            very likely  
    
b) You would feel small and think about it for days.  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
           not likely            very likely  
 




    N-word, why can’t White people?”          not likely            very likely  
 
d) You would stop laughing and tell the friend that   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     you don’t think racist language is OK, even         not likely            very likely 
     when joking. 
 
 
5. You read a news article about a hurricane in recent history in which wealthy White people 
were able to evacuate and the poorer Black majority was left behind; many people died.  
 
a) You would think: “That’s not a race issue. That’s    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
a social class issue.”            not likely            very likely  
    
b) You would think: “Those people chose to    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     stay behind.”             not likely            very likely  
 
c) You would feel sad and send whatever money   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     you could to the relief effort.           not likely            very likely  
 
d) You would hate yourself for being White.    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
            not likely            very likely 
 
 
6. You realize that all characters on your favorite television show are White. 
 
a) You would feel bad for not noticing earlier but     1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
probably be more critical of the show.           not likely            very likely  
    
b) You would feel bad for not noticing sooner and never  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     watch the show again.            not likely            very likely  
 
c) You would think: “It wouldn’t be realistic if there   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     were lots of minorities on the show.”          not likely            very likely  
 
d) You would think: “I don’t care what the characters  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     look like as long as the show is entertaining.”         not likely            very likely 
 
 
7. A Black person on the street asks you for money and you ignore him or her. 
 
a) You would think: I would be broke if I gave       1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
money to every person who asks me for change.        not likely            very likely  
    
b) You would feel horrible for ignoring the person   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     and think about it all day.           not likely            very likely  
 




     likely give some change to the next person who asks.        not likely            very likely  
 
d) You would go about your day as usual.    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
        not likely            very likely 
 
8. You read a Civil War novel about American slavery that describes violent abuse of Black 
slaves by White slave-owners. 
 
a) You would feel depressed and sad about the history    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
of racism in the United States.           not likely            very likely  
    
b) You would think: “I wish there was something I could 1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     do to make up for all the harm slavery caused         not likely            very likely  
      Black people.” 
 
c) You would think: “Slavery was awful, but people   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
     need to get over it and move on.”          not likely            very likely  
 
d) You would wonder why slavery is still discussed  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 




Mean scores for each subscale should be calculated independently using the item-scoring 
guide below. Note: (R) indicates that item must be reverse-coded. 
 
White Guilt (11 items) 
8a, 8b, 2a, 3c, 1c, 2c (R), 4d, 4b, 6a, 1a, 5c 
  
White Shame (8 items) 
5d, 6b, 2b, 3a, 7b, 7d (R), 6d, 7c 
 
Negation (13 items) 







Question List for Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
Interview #1 - Introductory Questions 
 
Why did you agree to participate in this research? 
-Do you have any personal interest in race and race relations in the United States? 
-Was your decision to participate more a matter of curiosity? 
 
What are some of the qualities that best describe your personality?  
 
What are the best ways for a stranger or new person in your life to get to know you? 
 
Is there anything you hope to learn or achieve during this process? 
 
Do you have any questions for me before you watch the first clip? 
 
Clip #1 - Hurricane Katrina (Anderson Cooper & Senator Landrieu) 
 
Had you ever seen this interview before or heard about it? 
 
How would you describe the interview? What is your initial reaction? 
 
Who do you think Senator Landrieu was representing? Who do you think Anderson 
Cooper was representing? 
 
Remember back to the Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath…can you describe how you 
felt during and after the storm? 
 
Anderson Cooper asks Senator Landrieu who she’s angry at…he seems to believe that 
there is blame in the situation…do you agree or disagree with him? 
-Was someone or some group of people responsible for the aftermath of the 
storm, and if so, who? 
-Why do you think that Cooper, among others, felt that blame was due?  
 
Do you think Anderson Cooper was out of line or broke journalistic ethics by chastising 
Senator Landrieu? Why or why not? 
-What do you imagine was his motivation for expressing such anger on camera 
during an interview? 
-Does this interview damage his credibility as a journalist in your eyes? 
 
Many people argued that Hurricane Katrina was a natural disaster that revealed the 




-Do you think that the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina is indicative or reflective of 
racial inequality and race relations in the U.S.? 
-Would you classify this event as a racial issue? Why or why not? 
-Is there any other event in American history, past or present, that you think 





Clip #2 - Don Imus 
 
Do you remember hearing about this scandal last year? 
 -If so, what were your initial reactions to it? 
 
What in your mind was wrong or not wrong about what Don Imus said? 
 
How do you feel about the public and media’s reaction to the event? Did he deserve to be 
fired? 
 -Was it “important” for the public and CBS to react to his comments?  
-Do you think the public, the media and CBS were sending a message in 
condemning Imus? If so, what is the message? 
-He was recently given a radio show again…is this OK? 
 
Do you think that Don Imus represents an extreme position? Do you think that other 
Americans would make similar comments about women basketball players? Black 
women basketball players, in particular? 
 
What do you think was more important to the public about Don Imus’s comments: that 
the players were women or that they were Black? Or was it some combination of the 
two? 
-Do you think that either part of his comment carried more negative weight, i.e. 
“nappy-headed” or “hos”? 
 
Recently, Mel Gibson was chastised for his anti-Semitic comments during a drunken rant 
to a police officer and Michael Richards was similarly condemned for his racist 
statements during a stand-up comedy routine. 
-Would you group the Don Imus incident with these other two? Why or why not? 
-What, if anything, distinguishes Imus from Gibson or Richards? 
-Would you compare the Imus incident to another incident I haven’t mentioned? 
 
Do you think that Imus’s identity as a White person influenced people’s reaction to his 
comments? What about his identity as a man? Might people’s reaction been different if 
he was a woman or a person of color? Does identity matter in a situation like this? 
 
Do you think that Imus’s comments reflect anything about White Americans generally? 





Do you think that some White people feel any responsibility when other White people do 
or say things like Don Imus did? Are these feelings warranted? Why or why not? 
 
Clip #3 - Isaiah Washington and the “Faggot” Scandal 
 
Do you remember hearing about this scandal last year? 
 -If so, what were your initial reactions to it? 
 -If not, do you have any questions for me? 
 
What in your mind was wrong or not wrong about what Washington said or did? 
 
How does the word “faggot” make you feel? 
 
Do you think that faggot is as powerful or negative a word as the N-word? Why or why 
not? 
 
Would the reaction have been the same if Washington had allegedly said “fairy” or even 
“pussy”? Was the use of the particular word “faggot” significant in your perspective? 
 
How do you feel about the public and media’s reaction to the scandal? Did Washington 
deserve to be fired? 
 -Was it “important” for the public and ABC to react to his comments?  
-Do you think the public, the media and ABC were sending a message in 
condemning Washington? If so, what is the message? 
-After the scandal broke and he denied calling TR Knight a “faggot” (twice), do 
you think that there is anything Washington could have done to avoid being fired? 
 
Do you think that media and ABC’s treatment of Washington was fair? Why or why not? 
Is calling someone a “faggot” an offense worth being fired for? 
 
There is a growing perception in the American public that African Americans are 
generally more homophobic and discriminatory toward gay and lesbian people than the 
rest of the population (i.e., White people). Do you believe this to be true? Do you think 
incidents such as this one contribute to that idea?  
-Accordingly, was Washington’s punishment and the reaction related to his 
identity as a Black man?  
-Do you think that Knight’s identity as a White man had any effect on the 
situation? 
 
Incidents such as this one tend to bring us conversations that pit race and sexuality 
against one another -- e.g. race v. sexuality, which is a bigger issue? What do you think is 
more relevant in the U.S. today -- debates around racial equality and racism or sexuality 






Do you think that Washington’s comments reflect anything about Black people or 
straight people generally? Do straight people generally have any responsibility for gay 
slurs such as Washington’s?  
 
Do you think that some straight people feel responsible or accountable when other 
straight people do or say things like Washington did? Are these feelings warranted? Why 
or why not? What about Black people? Can you imagine Black Americans feeling some 
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